CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A001300280001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 30, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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V4W 1w
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
30 October 1952
OCI No. 0089
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
*Army, DIA and State Dept
reviews completed*
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18., USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
1. Brazil to exchange cotton for 70 British jet fighters: The
Brazilian Government signed an agreement with the British on 28
October providing for an exchange of Brazilian cotton for 70 jet
fighter aircraft, according to a newspaper subsidized by the Bra-
zilian Government. The American Embassy comments that it does not
yet have official confirmation of this report, but that it has
learned informally that the planes are Gloucester Meteors Marks
7 and 8. (R Rio de Janeiro 596, 28 Oct 52)
Comment: The Bank of Brazil purchased cotton from local pro-
ducers at prices above the world market and has been unable to
dispose of it at a satisfactory price.
The Brazilian air force has not previously acquired any jet
aircraft. Its current purchase coincides with a British tour of
Latin America displaying the Canberra twin-jet bomber. Meteors
have been decisively defeated in Korean battles with Soviet MIG-
15's, and the Royal Air Force is now concentrating on later-model
jet fighters.
2. USSR states position regarding Caspian fisheries agreement:
The Soviet Charge has informed the Iranian Government that the
Soviet-Iranian Caspian fisheries agreement will expire on 31 Jan-
uary 1953. In September, the Iranian Government had requested
Moscow's views as to when the agreement should expire. (U Tehran
1738, 28 Oct 52)
Comment: Although the Soviet-Iranian agreement of 1927 pro-
videsTar joint operation of the Caspian fisheries, this concession
has been under the complete domination of the Soviet Union. Moscow
has monopolized the post of managing director, has delayed in re-
placing Soviet specialists with Iranian nationals as it had agreed,
and has used the concession for clandestine activities in support
of the Tudeh.
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Tehran press reports recently have suggested that the Iranian
Government might not extend the agreement. An Iranian move to
nationalize the fisheries would place the USSR in an embarrassing
position in view of its open support of Iran's oil nationalization
policy. However, should the USSR decide to retaliate, many avenues
of political and economic pressure will be open for bringing about
negotiations on a new accord.
3. French insist NATO Standing Group should establish liaison be-
tweenMEanNA The French Government has informed the-Ameri-
can Embassy in arcs that it still considers the NATO Standing Group
"particularly qualified" to establish close liaison between NATO
and the proposed Middle East Defense Organization and to give en-
lightened opinions on the work of MEDO. Such would not be the case
with a new organization whose creation, according to the French,
would involve useless complications.
The French consider that it would not be necessary, in the early
stages at least, to place MEDO under the authority of the Standing
Group. Instead they propose that the SG attach a liaison mission
to MEDO. (S Paris 2611, 28 Oct 52)
Comment: The French Government has delayed comment on a Brit-
ish memorandum proposing the establishment of a planning group in
which the seven countries participating in MEDO would have equal
representation. It would like to strengthen French prestige in
the Middle East by establishing a close relationship between MEDO
and NATO.
EASTERN EUROPE
4. Presence of Bulgarian medical brigade in Korea announced:
Bulgaria has just announced that a medical riga a formed y the
Bulgarian Red Cross and composed of highly qualified volunteer
doctors and nurses arrived in Korea on 23 March and is installed
in a hospital at Pyongyang. (R FBIS Sofia, 28 Oct; FBIS Ticker
London, 27 Oct 52)
Comment: Although much attention has been given to Korean
aid dr vi es Tn Bulgaria, no mention of this unit has previously
been made in the Bulgarian press.
25X1
two field hospital units
were sent to Korea from Rumania in the summer of 1951. Another
unit was sent later in the year, probably as a replacement. A
Hungarian hospital unit is also known to be in the Korean theater.
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5. New Czech auxiliary internal security force established: The
American Embassy in Prague reports that new security officers list-
ed by the press as the "Interior Guard" have been appointed in Olo-
mouc and Prague and that members of the Guard appeared recently in
Prague in new uniforms. (S Prague Weeka 42, 17 Oct 52)
Comment: On 8 August Czech Minister of National Security Karel
BacileVrevealed that the national security forces were being streng-
thened by the formation of auxiliary units drawn from employees of
state farms, agricultural cooperatives and machine-tractor stations
and under the direction of appointed district commissioners. These
units would aid the National Security Corps in controlling the pop-
ulation and searching for dissident elements.
6. Defenses along Czech-Austrian border strengthened: The Amer-
ican Army Attache in Prague reports that defenses a ong the Czech-
Austrian border have been strengthened by the installation of elec-
trified barbed wire fence, trenches and camouflaged pill boxes.
He notes that defenses south of Znojmo on the Austrian frontier
appear to be as strong as those along the border with the US Zone
of Germany but that fewer border guards are in evidence in the
Znojmo area. (S Prague 852, 28 Oct 52)
Comment: The steady strengthening of Czech border defenses
along ie Austrian frontier has been noted since last fall. The
depopulation of the frontier zone, the severance of roads across
the border, the establishment of stringent controls on the movement
of peoples and the erection of defense installations follow the
pattern used along the Czech-Bavarian frontier.
The Hungarian Government has also established strong border
guards and defense installations along the Austrian border. The
zone of Austria which borders on both Czechoslovakia and Hungary
is Soviet-occupied.
7. Hungarian youth organization campaigns against "class enemies"
in in us ry and agriculture: The organ of the Hungarian Union o
or ing Youth, DISZ, denounced the "complacency" of a mining ma-
chinery factory's youth organization which had failed to purge
its secretary, allegedly a former Social Democratic Youth leader.
The youth organ pointed approvingly to an agricultural cooperative
which had expelled a kulak for attempting to sabotage planting
operations, assertedly at the instigation of a Catholic priest.
(R FBIS Budapest, 28 Oct 52)
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Comment: The bitter tone of these articles reflects the
recenf emand of DISZ's Central Committee for sharpened class strug-
gle against "the remnants of the-bourgeoisie" and "clerical reaction."
Last week the secretary of the organization's forthcoming national
congress reproved local youth leaders for lukewarm execution of the
Committee's directives and for poor organization in general. A
serious shakeup of the organization appears to be in prospect at
the congress.
8. Hungarian Cabinet decrees higher wages for industrial workers
and premium paymen s for managers: A Hungarian Cabinet decree rais-
ing the Basic wage in certain branches of industry and providing
premium payments for factory managers who overfulfill their norms
will take effect on 1 November. Wage increases assertedly are
proportionate to the importance of the industry to the economic
life of the country. Foundry workers are promised 12 to 14 percent
increases of their basic wage and other industrial workers smaller
increases. Technical and administrative managers of heavy and light
industry will receive large premiums for fulfilling their plans and
overfulf:illment will be rewarded by premiums proportionate to the
amount of overfulfillment.
Professors and high school teachers are also promised salary
increases in the neighborhood of 10 percent. (R FBIS Ticker Buda-
pest, 29 Oct 52)
Comment:? Increased wages for workers and incentive rewards
for managers appear to be the regime's answer to the poor showing
made in the third quarter of the Five Year Plan for 1952, in spite
of the increase in work norms last June, as well as a means of
coping with increased prices. This is also the Soviet technique
for getting and keeping workers in key industries.
9. Polish Government announces overwhelming participation in elec-
tions: According to the official communique, 95.03 percent 0_7'e
qua ifiedl electorate participated in the Polish elections on 26
October. All National Front candidates and deputy candidates were
elected to the Sejm, and National Front lists are reported to have
received 99.8 percent of the valid votes cast. American Embassy
officials were informed that Polish voters carefully avoided the
use of curtained booths in which changes on the ballot could be made.
British and American Embassy personnel were under especially
close police surveillance on election day. Efforts to jam VOA
broadcasts in Polish were especially severe during the week before
the election, in an obvious attempt to reduce the influence of
these broadcasts. (R FBIS Warsaw, 28 Oct, C Warsaw 228, 27 Oct 52)
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Comment: Article 55 of the Polish electoral law provides that
the voters to mark his ballot behind a screen, where he has the
right to strike off individual candidates or deputy candidate from
the list of his choice. However, the Poles were apparently afraid
to make use of these screens, if they existed at all, lest they be
considered enemies of the regime. In addition, the Polish Government
provided itself beforehand with a legal basis for its announced elec-
tion results, since under Article 61 of the electoral law, unmarked
ballots were automatically to be counted as votes for the National
Front lists.
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law %no,
SECRET
25X6
110 French Consul in Tientsin reportedly held for ransom:
The Pe pang regime`=s sai a e -. c`Teman n-g-paymen# o-f-"
?$250,000 before permitting the French Consul in Tientsin to
leave China. The French are reportedly willin to meet this
demand.
25X1A
Comment: The Chinese Communists have invariably refused
to al'oes` o"reign diplomats to leave China until extortionate
claims against their offices have been met. Moreover, a
French official reported in July that the French Consul in
Tientsin was being detained on currency speculation charges,
There is no confirmation of the figure of $250,000 or of
French willingness to comply.
12. Highway repairs lagging in Fukien Province opposite
Formosa.- Radio ei-p- ng a oai=-' cto er `a " ,TI8`kilo-
me ersrs?'of highways were open to traffic in Fukien Province,
(R FBIS Peiping, 25 Oct 52)
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Comment: In November 1950, according to a Shanghai news
broadcas , ,300 kilometers of highways in Fukien were, in
full operation and 900 more kilometers were to be built in
1951. Peiping's recent broadcast indicates that only some
400 kilometers of Fukien highways were restored in the past
two years. Since the Nationalist Ministry of Communications
reported.in February 1946 that there were 4,416 kilometers
of highways in Fukien, apparently many have not yet been
restored.
Road from Lhasa toward Nepal border reportedly under
construction: 25X1
Itne uninese were 25X1
planning to build a road toward "Tingri, Kuti, Kerong and
Dyonggly" (apparently points 300 to 400 miles west of Lhasa
near the Nepal border). also 25X1
stated that his former report a planned road toward Sikkim
was found to be incorrect. (S New Delhi Desp 817, 23 Sept 52)
Comment,. The route through Sikkim is the principal trade
routeTrom ';hasa to the outside world. There is no reliable
evidence that the Chinese are building any highways west of
Lhasa. If they are, however, improvement of the Sikkim road
probably would have first priority,
SOUTHEAST ASIA
14, French expect lull in Indochinese fighting,. French
forces in e o LLa secfor sou 'E o - e B ac River expect
no Viet Minh assault against their defenses for at least 15
days because of the enemy's extended lines of communication
and lack of transport, the US Army Attache reports. General
de Linares, commanding in Tonkin, is confident of maintaining
the present defensive line and of keeping the delta secure
from :infiltration, (S Hanoi 239, 28 Oct 52)
Viet Minh keeps supplies tnovin
t e Viet Minh, despite the bad state of roads in its
area, emptied the supply depot at Cao Bang on 13 October.
Some 4,000 mortar shells and 50,000 cartridges for Thompson
and 7m9mm machine guns and Sten guns were shipped south,
presumably to depots in the Tonkinese interior. On 14
25X6
25X1
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October additional materiel, including 40,000 12.7mm cartridges
25X1A and 900 120mm shells arrived in Cao Bang from Communist China.
Comment: Intensive French bombing of Viet Minh supply
routes isii'ought to have hampered the flow of supplies in
Tonkin, but there is as yet no firm indication that the Viet
Minh's combat capability has thus been significantly reduced.
The French currently estimate that 500 tons of materiel a
month are being delivered by China, in contrast to the high
of 1,300 tons monthly during late 1951.
16. Allison reports on United States-Philippines defense
talksT? n the (-fo- 'er 5 f erase a s in Manila, Am-e-FTE-an
o `3cials were impressed by the desire of the Filipinos to
take an active role against Communism, including the willing-
ness to furnish troops in event of further Communist aggres-
sion in the Pacific. The Americans agreed to recommend a joint
group to study the possibility of furnishing equipment for the
training of additional Philippine reserves. Assistant Secre-
tary of State Allison reports that the conference was of value
in "assuaging Philippine sensibilities," although emphasis on
the need for Philippine internal reforms was met with "notice-
able coolness." (S Manila Circular 38, 29 Oct 52)
17, Burmese Government"s assumption of Shan chieftains
powers o e s ow:e mer can mhassy n angoon reports
e recen renunciation of administrative powers by the
Shan sawbwas represents a victory for the Burmese Government.
No immediate change is anticipated, however, as the actual
transfer of power must await the recommendations of a com-
mission which will be appointed to study the m tte.r. Even
after the change, the sawbwas will retain effective control
of the Shan :,tat(-, since they will continue to dominate the
Shan State Council. (C Rangoon E97, 28 Oct 52)
Comment: While the Shan people have not expressed
serious- 'satisfaction with the sawbwa system, there is no
evidence to indicate that the contemplated changes will cause
trouble unless the Burmese Government attempts to implement
a program of rapid "Burmanization."
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18. Prime Minister Nehru on tour of troubled areas of India:
5- c o er, r me inf er Ne ir'u-returnd' ? ew De i rom
On 2
a month-long tour of Hyderabad, Madras, Mysore, Assam, and
Manipur States in southern and eastern India< On 2 November
he is scheduled to arrive in Srinagar, Kashmir. During the
course of his trip Nehru has spoken frequently on the subjects
of Indian. unity and the need for developing a national, rather
than a provincial, outlook. (S New Delhi 1727, Joint Weeka
40, 25 Oct; U New Delhi 1736, 27 Oct; 1761, 28 Oct 52)
Comment: Nehru's tour, immediately prior to the scheduled
openiixg o parliament in early November, is presumably designed
to collect information on the major issues which the Congress
Party government is likely to face during the parliamentary
session.
Communism is rife in all of these areas, while states
rights movements and food shortages, which have been exploited
by Communists, are common to a number of theme It may be,
therefore, that Nehru expects these problems to be the major
ones with which his government will shortly have to deal.
Nehru may also hope by his personal appearance to forestall
the raising of certain embarrassing questions.
19. Armed Chinese infiltrate Kashmiri province of Ladakh:
In August or September ei3 Ind an overninent was preparing
a note for despatch to Communist China, protesting the part
played by the Chinese army in smuggling arms from Tibet into
the Kashmiri province of Ladakh and demanding the immediate
withdrawal of armed Tibetans who had infiltrated that pro-
vince. According to the source of this information, who
apparently has good contacts in the Indian Ministry of
External. Affairs, the note also indicated that some 300
armed Tibetans had already been apprehended in Ladakh.
(C New Delhi Desp 681, 9 Sept 52)
Comment: Since the Chinese occupation of Sinkiang and
Tibet, Naas been standard practice for Chinese troops,
especially in northern Kashmir, to extend their activities
in border areas to the point where they meet open resistance.
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The Ladakhis are ethnically and religiously akin to the
Tibetans. Their leaders have complained in the Kashmir Con-
stituent Assembly about the poor treatment accorded their
province, and the Head Lama of Ladakh reportedly has pro-
Tibetan leanings.
20, Tudeh shows greater boldness in anti-Shah rioting: The
demonstration on the a s rt ay, w c took p ace in the
face of the Shah's strong police escort, indicates increasing
boldness on the part of the Tudeh, according to the American
Embassy. The Embassy states that 270 agitators were arrested
and one or possibly two killed,
Mossadeq reportedly has ordered the Tehran military
governor to try immediately all those arrested under the
terms of the new public security law and to exile the guilty
to the Persian Gulf islands. (C Tehran 1745, 28 Oct 52)
Comment: Tudeh agitation has been concentrated against
the SEia`"h__a.ncd the United States in recent weeks and this inci-
dent may mark a more militant anti-Shah policy. The Tudeh
possibly hopes to force the abdication or the removal of the
Shah as a price for refraining from violence which contributes
to Iran's instability.
Mossadeq's reported order to prosecute those arrested
is probably based not so much on their Tudeh affiliation as
on their instigation of public disorder.
Mossadeq reported to be playing "cat and mouse" with
Tudeh? 25X1C
Prime Minister
Mossadeq, through his control of the police, is "permitting"
periodic Tudeh demonstrations for the purpose of keeping the
Shah "frightened" 'nto submission. According to 25X1
the Prime Minister has the Tudeh Party
"in the palm o his hand" and releases or restrains it at
will,
25X1A
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Comment: There is no other evidence to confirm this
repor,a Mossadeq regards the Tudeh as primarily an indig-
enous movement enhanced by poverty and want within the
country, and he appears willing to permit it to operate
as long as it remains within legal limits.
Kashani, the second strongest leader in the National
Front, has previously said that he could control and use the
Tudeh as he wished, although in a recent public statement
he denied that the Iranian people would support a Tudeh
government.
22. Shishakli publicly confirms Syrian-UN agreement on Arab
refugees Syr an ictator C sine1-its a i was recently
over1e7a-rd publicly confirming Syria's agreement with the UN
to improve the living conditions of the Arab refugees.
The American Ambassador also reports that earlier press
leaks regarding the agreement, whereby Syria agreed to re-
settle 80,000 refugees now within its borders, had so far
produced no adverse repercussions either officially or in
the local press. (S Damascus 317, 29 Oct 52)
Comment: Since the Syrian-UN plan is an integral part
of the a est UN efforts to improve the conditions of the
850,000 Arab refugees, popular acceptance of, or even in-
difference to, the agreement might assist the UN in inducing
other Arab countries to follow Syria's lead.
Shishakli has been cautious in the past about releasing
news of the agreement for fear that it would be misinter-
preted as a repudiation of the refugees' demands for re-
patriation and compensation and thus encourage popular
outbreaks against his government.
23, Jordanian Prime Minister may resign in November: Jor-
danian Prime Minis e r Abi7u77 Hu-Jaina ~?esign a ter the parlia-
mentary speech from the throne on 1 November, 25X1X
25X1X
25X1X Abul Huda, before submitting his resignation,
will authorize the formation of political parties, lift press
censorship, and cancel certain defense regulations.
25X1A 25X1A
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Comment: This information may be a plant designed to
obtain r ish support for the Prime Minister, against whom
opposition is increasing, particularly among the Palestinian
Arabs now included in the Kingdom. Abul Huda's departure
would remove a dominant figure who effectively maintained
control at the time of Talal's abdication last August and
who withstood Iraqi ambitions to annex the country at that
time.
25X6
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26. Austrian coal import plans seen involving increased re-
li ante on
25X6
Committee reportd on 15 October that his government desires to
reduce its imports of coal briquets from West Germany. and import
more from the Orbit. He said that the more favorable terms
offered by the Satellites and Austria?s large trade deficit
with the West make this shift necessary. Although aware that
implementation of this policy might involve increased ship-
ments of strategic items to the Orbit, permanent reduction
Of West German sources of supply, increased Austrian reliance
on imports from the Satellites, and diminution in Austrian
coal stockpiles, he asserted that his government is unable
to cope with the problem. (S Paris REPTO A-521, 22 Oct 52)
Comment; The release of counterpart funds and the re-
laxation o internal. credit restrictions to stimulate coal
imports have both been considered in Vienna as means of
utilizing Austria's favorable credit position with Poland and
maintaining Austria's coal stockpiles. So long as the
Austrians have difficulties in exporting to the West, the
favorable trade terms quoted by the Orbit will appear es-
pecially attractive.
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27. Prospects for early European assembly election diminish:
Leaders o the coal-Steel Community Assembly have rejected
the new French proposal for a popularly elected European
political assembly in the near future. Belgium's Paul Henri
Spaak, president of the CSC Assembly, states that the ad hoc
assembly has gone too far in preparing a draft treaty for a
political community to be delayed by discussions of the French
proposal, and West Germany's Heinrich von Brentano, chairman
of the Constitutional Committee, agrees. American observers
in Paris believe that the proposal will not receive further
consideration. (S Paris 2582, 27 Oct 52)
Comment: Adoption of the French proposal would have re-
sulted in-protracted delay in the writing of a European federal
constitution since the scheme also called for transferring
responsibility for the constitution's drafting to the projected
popularly elected assembly. Previously, there had been indi-
cations that the majority of the French and German delegates
to the ad hoc assembly would support the French proposal.
28. French may seek separate agreements before ratifying
EDC treaty: Nerve p an , French Deputy to the Nor
,an is Coouncil, recommended to Premier Pinay and Defense
Minister Pleven last week that the government conclude
certain agreements with its defense partners before calling
for National Assembly debate on the EDC treaty.
The proposed accords would provide for additional
American aid for Indochina, enabling France's defense con-
tribution in Europe to balance Germany's; for permanent
French membership on the NATO Standing Group; for estab-
lishment of the principles of a European political community;
and for a two-year transition period during which the French
forces in Germany would change from occupation to EDC status.
The American Embassy observes that the government seems
to be already pushing these points whenever possible, (S
Paris 2616, 28 Oct 52)
Comment: Pinay had previously invited the National
Assembly to recommend "additions" to the EDC treaty. It is
not yet clear whether he will seek a formal reopening of EDC
treaty negotiations or merely an exchange of letters to make
the treaty conform with any new agreements reached.
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29, December NATO meeting seen falling far short of its aims:
In view of ri ain s failure to make a complete submission -
to the NATO annual review on time, the MSA Mission in London
believes that the December ministerial meetings will be able
to agree on firm NATO force goals for 1953 only. A later
meeting would then be required to decide provisional 1954
targets, and there is not likely to be enough information
even then to discuss planning for 1955. (S London 2488,
28 Oct 52)
Comment; The annual review has been intended as a con-
tinuing examination of national political and economic capa-
bilities in the face of NATO military requirements over a
three-year period. The determination of 1953 military force
goals alone would leave the European NATO countries uncommitted
to any definite programs for future defense spending and pro-
duction to support the continued build-up and maintenance of
NATO forces, 25X1
25X1
31, Argentine General Confederation of Labor elects all
new officers; a Cent ra ommi ee o e Argentine General
con a era ion of Labor has elected an entirely new Executive
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Secretariat headed by Eduardo Vuletich, director of the small
Pharmaceutical Workers Union. New arbitration and auditing
committees were also elected. The American Embassy comments
that at first glance the new officers seem to be experienced
union men rather than political stooges. (R Buenos Aires
333, 29 Oct 52)
Comment: The election of relatively unknown Vuletich
shoulc allow Peron more latitude in determining his labor
policies. Among the former members of the Executive Secre-
tariat who were not re-elected is leftist Isaias Santin who,
without Senora de Peron's intervention, would have defeated
ex-Secretary General Espejo in the last elections.
25X1
The political orientation of the new Secretariat is
not known, but it replaces one of confirmed leftist orientation.
25X1
32. Possibility of arm coup seen increasing in Venezuela:
ears a government mis-
s ua ion prior to the 30 November
Constituent Assembly elections may lead to an army coup in
the near future. The recent police killing of Democratic
Action underground leader Ruiz Pineda, he believes, may
incite assassination attempts against the three-man governing
junta, 25X1
I only intervention by the Papal
Nunc.Lv can ua a junta strong-man Perez Jimenez to adopt
a more moderate course and thus prevent a new and even more
dictatorial army regime. (S Caracas 190, 28 Oct 52)
Comment: The junta, aware of increasing army and public
discon, ent,, has been making wholesale arrests in an effort to
uncover activities against the regime. There have been no
reports, however, that influential officers are contemplating
a coup at this time or that they have sought or found a leader
to oppose Perez Jimenez.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
30 October 1952
CIA No. 49874
Copy No.
37
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
. 25X1 C
1. Divided loyalty of army toward president heightens ten-
sion in Indonesia.:
25X10 "real trouble" may be expected in Indonesia
due to the developing conflict between President Sukarno and
the army clique which was responsible for the 17 October
demonstrations. Certain army officers in East Java are in
what amounts to "outright revolt" against their division
commander, declaring their loyalty to President Sukarno. 25X1A
The American Embassy reports persistent rumors of a' 25X1A
split throughout the army. (S Djakarta 808, 28 Oct;
Comment: The Minister of Defense is reported to have
accepted Sukarno's decision that parliament should be
indefinitely recessed but not dissolved and that the cabinet
should remain in office. High army officers, however, are
reportedly angry that Sukarno refused them a mandate which
would, in effect, have authorized a military dictatorship.
Prime Minister Wilopo and other civil leaders are
reportedly working strenuously to avert a clash between the
opposing factions within the army and hope that they will
neutralize each other,
2. East Germans appoint Chief of Staff and organize new
army groups: e S Army in Heidelberg reports that two
military ieadquarters in East Germany have been established
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as Army Group Central and Army Group South. Meanwhile,
American. officials in Frankfurt report that Vincenz Mueller,
Deputy Minister of Interior, now has the title of Chief of
Staff as well. (S CINCUSAREUR Heidelberg SX 4689, 27 Oct 52;
S/sensitive Frankfurt Sitrep 41, 29 Oct 52)
Comment: The headquarters of Army Group North, which
reportedly controls 50,000 men, has previously been identified
at Pasewalk, north of Berlin. No details of the organization
of the two new army groups have been reported.
Mueller, an acting army commander in World War II,
surrendered to the Russians and became a Communist. As a top
leader of the East German National Democratic Party, he has
campaigned energetically to convert former Nazis to the
Communist cause. Recently he was listed as a major general.
3. East Germans reported initiating search for technically-
o
trained wor ersa Apparently as a part of a general effort-
o tain necessary data for the planned utilization of manpower,
the secretariat of the East Berlin Socialist Unity Party (SED)
has reportedly directed a general census of East Berlin resi-
dents over 14 years old. Questionnaires asking for training
and experience data are to be distributed in connection with
the issuance of ration cards.
American officials in Frankfurt comment that the search
for trained workers may be connected with East German military
production and note that there are numerous reports of. factory
surveys for workers skilled in aircraft, tank, and munitions
production. (S/sensitive Frankfurt Sitrep 41, B-3, 29 Oct 52)
Comment: Graduated wage decrees issued last summer were
intended not only to encourage the acquisition of technical
skills, but also to attract trained workers to high-priority
industries. A general survey of available skills, such as
here indicated, would suggest that monetary incentives have
been insufficient to mobilize the required skills where needed.
4. East Germans tighten surveillance over Liberal Democratic
Party: American o is als in ran urt elieve that recent
controls imposed on the East German Liberal Democratic Party
are indicative both of the existence of anti-regime sentiment
within the party and of the suspicion with which it is re-
garded by the East German Government. At the party's con-
ference last month, a resolution. was adopted, presumably under
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SED pressure, setting up an "investigation commission to
guarantee the security of the party organization," and the
secretary general is now required to submit monthly per-
sonnel evaluation reports to the East German Communists and
to the Soviet Control Commission. American observers believe
that many LDP leaders would probably prefer to dissolve the
party rather than continue under these restrictions. (S/sen-
sitive Frankfurt Sitrep 41, B-2, 29 Oct 52)
Comment: The LDP, which has continued to suffer heavy
membersh losses, has seemed to bear the brunt of the govern-
ment's disfavor for some time. Unlike the East Zone Christian
Democratic Union and National Democratic Party, whose impor-
tance in church affairs and in mobilizing ex-Nazi support for
the regime continues, the LDP appears from the Communist view-
point to be losing rapidly its raison d'etre,
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