CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A001300050001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 29, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
29 September 1952
OCI No. 9388
Copy No. 297
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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1. Syro-Lebanese Communists to attend 19th Party Congress
in Mo owe
bias reported that Khalid Bakdash, secretary general
of the amalgamated Syro-Lebanese Communist Party, and five
other members of the party will attend the 19th Party Congress
in Moscow on 5 October.
After completion of the congress, it is alleged, Middle
East Communists, including Kurds, will convene in Bucharest
for detailed discussions of Middle East problems.
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Comment: In addition to the previously announced
atten ance of the Indian and Israeli Communist Party secretaries
at the congress in Moscow, reports have been received which
indicate that the Trieste, Chilean, and Uruguayan Communist
Parties will also be represented.
2.
Arab
delegations expect new
emphasis in UN General
Assembly:
spokesmein
view that
In
for
the
conversations with
Egypt, Lebanon and
United Nations is
the American a egation,
Syria have expressed their
entering a. period of crisis
in which General Assembly deliberations will place emphasis
on problems of individual nations, particularly Near Eastern
ones, rather than on the East-West conflict.
On Near Eastern questions, they added, an increasing
number of countries will vote with the Soviet bloc. (S New
York 267, 25 Sept 52)
EASTERN EUROPE'
3. Necessity of cooperation between party and private
farmers s resse in Bulgaria: According to an a i.toria].
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published in Rabotnichesko Delo on 25 September, regional
and district party comma ees must stop underrating the im-
portance of individual and private farmers, and conduct
party work among "tomorrow's cooperative farm members" in
a slow, patient, and attentive, rather than impetuous manner.
"By listening to the voice of the nonpolitical peasants,
strong relations between the peasant masses and the party can
be created" which will lead to greater peasant support of our
ruralpa:rty organizations. (R FBIS Sofia, 25 Sept 52)
Comment: During the past year increasing attention has
been Iven to the problem of improving party-peasant relations
in
Bulgaria. Special attention was given to the problem
at
the
May meeting of the Third Congress of the Fatherland
Front,
and
during the plenary session of the Central Committee
of
the
Communist Party in June. The same emphasis was noted in
the
reports of several provincial party conferences during
the
past summer.
Since the spring of 1951 Bulgaria has concentrated, with
little success, upon the consolidation and strengthening of
existing cooperatives, rather than upon the creation of new
ones. The current campaign to improve party-peasant rela-
tions suggests that, until the present consolidation campaign
achieves some degree of success, the regime will postpone
further efforts to form cooperatives and seek to pacify and
win the cooperation of private farmers who have previously
been subjected to strong government pressure and discrimination.
4. Hungarian newspaper attacks Calvinist pastor for aiding
deportees: The irs vehement public attack on relief wor
or deported persons in Hungary criticizes a Calvinist pastor
for sending food parcels and money to deportees. The news-
paper article asserted that the deportees had left Budapest
"laden with plenty" and charged that the real aim of such
relief activity was a "demonstration against the People's
Democracy." (R Budapest 287, 25 Sept 52)
Comment: The condemnation of relief as sabotage ought
to halt ai -to the deportees effectively.
The choice of a Calvinist pastor as a target indicates
that the anti-religious campaign may now turn against the
Reformed Church. This summer Catholic priests have been the
common object of attack and they have usually been linked
with kulaks.
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5. Rumanians adopt constitution: The Rumanian Grand
Nation.- ssem y has unanimously approved the draft consti-
tution and proclaimed 24 September as "Constitution Day.''
During the discussion, Premier Gheorghiu-Dej read a long
report which hailed the country's progress toward socialism,
attacked alleged American imperialism and war aims and Western
criticism of the Rumanian draft, and compared Rumania's
progress with "deplorable conditions" in the West. He claimed
that 18,836'proposals and amendments had been suggested during
nearly two months of "public debate" and recommended acceptance'
of a change in wording to emphasize the "unitarian, independent,
and sovereign" character of the Rumanian state. (R Bucharest
99, 24 Sept; R FBIS Bucharest, 25 Sept 52)
Comment: The six months required for writing and final
.adoptTonfthe new Rumanian constitution is a record for the
Orbit, probably because most of the provisions are nearly
identical to those in the Soviet constitution.
An interesting aspect of the Assembly meeting was the
presence, according to the American Legation in Bucharest, of
Ana Pauker, Teohari Georgescu, and "possibly" Vasile Luca
among the deputies.
6. Significance of Yugoslav Communist Party Congress post-
?ponemen : Ambassador Allen believe s ghat postponement of the
ugos av Communist Party Congress from 19 October to L Novem-
ber is principally related to unresolved party questions.
His over-all impression is that the party is not well prepared
and is on the defensive. It has failed to build up enthusiasm
among party members, and the timing of the Soviet party
congress for 5 October left it insufficient time to organize
a counterattack to expected Soviet charges.
Ambassador Allen views the official Yugoslav reason for
postponement, i.e., the pressure of work produced by the
drought, Trieste problem, Eden's visit, relations with Greece
and Turkey, economic decentralization, etc., as a secondary
factor. (S Belgrade 411, 24 Sept 52)
Comment.- The Tito regime's current policy of ostensibly
decentra izi.ng economic, government and Communist Party
administration has resulted in considerable confusion and
some opposition among party officials, particularly on the
local level. However, the party congress is intended to put
the rubber stamp of approval on Tito's new policies, and if
there was significant opposition the postponement would have
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been for more than two weeks.
It seems most likely that Tito and his lieutenants,.,
the same,men most affected by the press of government
business, desired the extra time to prepare counter-criticism
to the Soviet proceedings, which may also be used to obscure
the current confusion in the Yugoslav Communist program.
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7. Ambassador Murphy notes Yoshida concern over 1 October
election: Ambassador Murphy Believes that recent s a ernes
by Premier Yoshida's private secretary indicate the Prime
Minister's anxiety about the coming election. The secretary
said that, while no firm trends were yet evident, Yoshida was
"encouraged" by the prospect that in his home district the vote
was expected to be "only" 30,000 less than his 1948 total and
he anticipated both an absolute and intraparty majority. He
noted that Liberal Party polls, which indicated a steadily
favorable trend prior to the 1948 election, now displayed
wide weekly fluctuations. (C Tokyo 1009, 25 Sept 52)
Comment: It is believed by most political observers
that Me=erals will lose some seats and perhaps their
present Diet majority owing to the growing Yoshida-Hatoyama
schism, the party's close association with the occupation,
Yoshida's declining prestige since the peace treaty, his
dictatorial methods, and finally his alleged "surrenders" of
Japanese interests in dealing with foreign governments.
8. Japan objects to postponement of GATT membership: The
Japanese Foreign Office advised Ambassador Murphy on 19
September that the postponement of Japan's application to GATT
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) beyond the seventh
session is acceptable only if the alternative is outright
rejection. Ambassador Murphy is disturbed by the negative
British attitude toward Japan's application and feels that
the United States should not ignore the Japanese Government's
sincere desire to participate, which is strongly supported by
the people as well as business circles in Japan. (C Tokyo
1037, 26 Sept 52)
Comment: Japan has become increasingly concerned
over Tie -Nmposition of discriminatory tariffs against Japanese
goods and hopes that by its entry into GATT this trend will be
retarded. The British Government wishes to avoid a political
affront to Japan and has requested US support for a resolution
which will postpone Japanese entry into GATT until sometime
next year.
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10,
Communist China makes large shipment of gold and dollars
to USSR: About $30,000,000 in gold and American currenc were
flown from Peiping to Moscow in August 25X10
This was reportedly more than half the gold
and foreign currency which the Chinese people were forced to
surrender during the campaign against private capitalists
earlier this year.
According to the American Consul General in Hong Kong,
these gold and dollar shipments probably represent partial
payment for war materiel and other goods received from the
Soviet Union. (S Hong Kong 817, Joint Weeka 39, 26 Sept 52)
Comment: This strengthens other reports that the exor-
bitant lev ei on private businessmen in the first half of
1952 yielded substantial revenues to the Peiping regime.
These levies enabled the Communist regime to finance military
expenditures without resort to large paper money issues.
Rapid growth of cooperatives in China reported: A total
of 10,,.f00, Chinese were members of cooperatives in June
1952, according to a 13 September news broadcast from Peiping.
In 1951 cooperatives handled 10 percent of all retail sales
in China and 60 to 70 percent of government purchases of farm
products. (R FBIS Peiping, 17 Sept 52)
Comment: Membership in cooperatives in Communist China
was only 24000,000 in March 1950 but "over 50,000,000" in
September 1951. Most of these cooperatives were formed by
the government to market surplus farm products. Their rapid
growth has increased the state's ability to utilize agricul-
tural surpluses.
Communists urge more Sino-Japanese trade: The Chinese
Communists are apparently annoyed at Japanese failure to send
delegates to China to conclude specific trade deals. In one
broadcast from China, the chairman of the Chinese Committee
for Promoting International Trade reminded the Japanese of
his previous cables on the subject and added: "I therefore
once again ask you to send a delegation to Peiping as soon as
possible to discuss and sign concrete proposals.,, (C FBIS
Far East Survey, 25 Sept 52)
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Comment: The Chinese Communist effort to negotiate
specific trade deals with the Japanese is part of a wider
drive to create dissatisfaction with East-West trade controls
in non-Communist countries generally. In a broadcast from
Canton on 23 September, the head of a visiting British party
declared, "we were assured that China genuinely desires to
resume and extend normal trade with the whole world." In
another broadcast on 20 September, a Chinese economist
asked Americans, "why a blockade when the prospect of trade
with us is brighter than ever before?"
12. Communists kidnap alleged Nationalist agent from British
ship: The American Consul General at Hong Kong reports ha
'the-British are '"mystified" and "concerned" about the 25
September incident in which a Chinese Communist gunboat
intercepted a British-registered vessel en route from Hong
Kong to Macao and a Chinese passenger was kidnapped.
The mystery is why the Communists kidnapped an individual
in this manner and the concern arises over the future of the
ships on the Hong Kong - Macao run,which had not been disturbed
for the last two years. (C Hong Kong 808, 25 Sept 52)
Comment: Chinese Nationalist sources in Hong Kong are
said t-Tiave identified the kidnapped passenger as the top
Nationalist agent in Macao. If so, he may have been too well
protected by the Portuguese for the Communists to abduct him
there.
There has been no further Communist interference with
ships on this run in the past four days.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
13. Recent session of Thai Assembly demonstrates ruling
clique's comp e e control: The NalioRal Assembly's unanimous
passage of a supplementary budget bill before adjournment
demonstrates its "rubber stamp" nature, in the opinion of the
American Embassy in Bangkok. Frustrated opposition members'
inability even to delay government legislative steamrollers
has evidently discouraged even nominal opposition to the
military clique's legislative proposals. (C Bangkok 536,
25 Sept 52)
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Comment: The creation of a more pliable legislature was
one oX`"he chief motives behind the November 1951 coup d'etat.
14. Government to investigate depression in Thai provinces:
Thai officials have been instructed to investigate reported
economic hardship in northeastern and southern Thailand. In
addition;, a special fund has reportedly been set aside to aid
the poverty-stricken people in these two important sections.
The American Embassy in Bangkok believes that provincial
needs will continue to be subordinated in the current struggle
for power between military leaders. (C Bangkok 536, 25 Sept 52)
Comment: The drought-ridden northeast has long been
negleccedby Thai politicians, who have preferred to concen-
trate governmental largess on the inhabitants of Bangkok and
its environs, an area where its political effects are more
pronounced. However, reports of discontent in northeastern
and southern Thailand have been exploited by the Communists
and have brought the issue before the Thai public. 25X1C
15. Indonesian Moslems plan attack-in- West Java:
25X1C a regimental command
Darul Islam, the ana is o em group, has ordered a "deter-
mined attack" on all army and mobile brigade units in the
Bogor regency of West Java on 29 September.
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Comment: Bogor is less than 40 miles south of Djakarta.
Nearly all oof West Java, which is the least secure area in
Indonesia, is subject to raids by dissident groups.
The government claims to have thwarted Darul Islam
plans for a revolt on 17 August and is presumed to be on
the alert for other possible attacks. A large-scale
campaign against the group is planned in December, and
additional troops have been brought into West Java in
preparation for the operation.
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16. =acommanaer auerrilla a der denies connection with Darul
Islamleb s
guerrKAMP MUZUKELaIr 011 .6v tLpA-.L- nied that he
had been appointed leader of Darul Islam forces in the Celebes.
Signing himself as Field Commander of "The People's Freedom
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Army," Muzakkar stated, "false accusations that the Real
Freedom Struggle in the Celebes is a part of the Darul Islam...
Comment: The Indonesian Government announced on 28 April
that it iaT-conclusive evidence of a connection' between the
Darul Islam in West Java and the Muzakkar rebels in the South
Celebes. A press report of the same date stated that Muzakkar
had been appointed commander-in-chief of DI forces in the
Celebes.
The terminology used by Muzakkar throughout his statement
suggests Communist influence. Although there is no reliable
evidence of Communist infiltration among the Muzakkar guer-
rillas, both Indonesian and Chinese Communists have been
active in the Celebes since the spring of 1951.
17. Indonesian Parliament severely criticizes Defense Minister:
At open par amen sessions on 23 aand 24 ep ember, leftist,
nationalist, conservative Moslem and independent speakers
criticized the Defense Ministry for its cliques, domination
by the Socialist Party, incompetence and corruption, undue
retention of the services of the Netherlands Military Mission,
and the generally lowered morale in the army. A motion of
nonconfidence in the Defense Minister has been tabled pending
his reply to the parliamentary accusations.
The American Ambassador comments that regardless of the
vote on the nonconfidence motion, these discussions have pub-
licized the existence of dissension within the army and bitter-
ness within the coalition cabinet. He feels that the results
can only be damaging to the prestige and future prospects of
the government. (C Djakarta 577, 24 Sept 52)
Comment: The American Military Attache believes that in
addition To-persistent nationalist and left-wing parliamentary
criticism obviously aimed at the Defense Minister's removal,
President Sukarno and Prime Minister Wilopo are maneuvering
toward the same end.
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18, British sound out Indian attitude on Gurkha issue: The
British Foreign Office states-that the-Indian High Commissioner
in London responded "sympathetically" to its informal suggestion
that British Gurkha recruiting activities might be moved into
Nepal if the Indian Government were to support a British ap-
proach to Nepal on the subject. The British pointed out that
this would take the "political heat" off the Nehru Government,
which under pressure of Communist-led agitation last month
requested that Britain stop Gurkha recruit processing in
Indian territory.
The Foreign Office sees "no indication whatever" that New
Delhi will repudiate Great Britain's right under the 1947
agreement to move troops and supplies across India. (S
London 1744, 25 Sept 52)
Comment: The British previously indicated their belief
that moov ng the recruiting stations into Nepal would be the
least unsatisfactory of the possible solutions.
There are indications that the Indian Communists intend
to press for abolition of Britain's transit rights under the
tripartite treaty with Nepal.
19. Indian leftists threaten "direct action" in Travancore-
Cochin Stae: On or about September, parliamentarian P.
r iantan lfair stated in Ernakulam, Travancore-Cochin State,
that the leftist United Front Party would launch "direct
action" to force the government to adopt measures which
would solve the unemployment problem in that part of India.
(U New Delhi 1308, 25 Sept 52)
Comment: The unemployment problem in Travancore-Cochin
is crit a Tand could easily be exploited by the Communists,
many of whom were elected to the state government under the
aegis of the United Front because of a ban then existing on
the Communist Party. Since "direct action" in Indian Com-
munist parlance usually implies violence, this is another
indication that the Communists are prepared to use it where
they feel strong enough to do so successfully.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
20. Kashanireportedly plans to overthrow Mossadeq:
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Mullah Kashani has plans to overthrow Prime
Minister Mossadeq in the near future. Kashani is said to have
25X10
lined up both National Front and conservative support in the
Majlis. He also has support in the army and police and among
the clergy.
Plans call for the ousting of Mossadeq by the Majlis and
the installation as Prime Minister of retired General Zahedi
as a front for Kashani. If Mossadeq is not ousted by parlia-
mentary means, a military coup will be attempted.
Kashani has reportedly indicated that he will not adopt
a hostile attitude toward the Shah, and has left the impres-
sion with opposition leaders that he will be easier to deal
with than Mossadeq. A key figure involved in the plot has
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allegedly stated that the British approve of Kashani's plan.
Comment: Previous reports have stated that the conserva-
tives,uding two of the Shah's brothers and certain high
army officers, were considering enlisting the cooperation of
Kashani in a plot to oust Mossadeq. Kashani has become in-
creasingly critical of the Prime Minister and he is reported
to have warned Mossadeq that he would take matters in his own
hands if "conditions" did not improve.
Kashani's growing power in the Majlis, his control of the
extremist elements in the National Front, and his willingness
to accept Tudeh support might make such an attempt by him
successful. There is no evidence, however, that Mossadeq
has yet lost his majority in the Majlis. How the army would
react to a Kashani-inspired coup is not known. Recent army
changes made by Mossadeq as a result of his suspicion of a
plot appear to lessen the chances of a successful military
coup.
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21. Greek Prime Minister favors postponing elections: Prime
Minister Plastiras t5ld Ambassador Peurifoy on 25 September
that he is opposed to new elections this year. He maintained
that an election campaign might produce anti-American slogans.
A well-placed source has also recently reported that
Plastiras' coalition government is determined to avoid elec
.tions "at all costs." (C Athens 1057; 25 Sept 52) 25X1A
Comment: Apparently Plastiras, who has insisted that he
would win---In any immediate elections, now fears that he cannot
do so. His implied threat of anti-American propaganda appears
to be an attempt to persuade the United States, which has
urged early elections, to support his efforts to postpone them.
23.
Defense Minister in Greece recommends reinstating leftist
generals: The Greek Government as presented to the Palace
a bill-recommending the recall to active duty of several left-
ist generals, including Serafis and Othonaios, according to
George Vendiris, the King's political adviser. Defense
Minister Mavros signed the bill but insists that he was
unaware of its implications. (S Athens 1038, 24 Sept 52)
Comment: Serafis and Othonaios, leading Communist
generals wring the Greek civil war in 1944 and 1945, were
only recently released from prison.
The King would probably not sign a bill recalling
notorious pro-Communists to active duty. Nevertheless, the
government has sponsored an increasing number of measures
favoring the Communists in its desire to attract leftist
support. As pressure for new elections continues, there
will probably be more such measures.
Libya may delay action on treaty with France: Libyan
Tripoli that there is little hope of early action on the
treaty of alliance between Libya and France. The Premier
added bluntly that his country dislikes French policy in
North Africa and expects to consider the American and
British treaties first.
Prime Minister Muntasser as o d the French Charge in
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The French Charge believes that Libya hopes to gain
maximum benefits in its foreign agreements by delaying action
and by playing the Western powers against each other. (S
Tripoli 190, 24 Sept 52)
Comment: Libya has repeatedly stalled in negotiating
treaties granting special privileges to the United States,
Great Britain and France. Muntasser recently suggested that
the United States should double its previously agreed compen-
sation payment to assure early ratification of the treaty by
Libya. Great Britain is currently encountering difficulty
on the question of the duration of its treaty.
24. Moroccan Sultan states that French Government opposes
publication ocorrespondence: The Sultan of Morocco a egedly
told his representative on-75 September that the French oppose
the publication of correspondence between the Sultan and the
President of the French Republic on increased self-government
for Morocco and revision of the 1912 treaty which established
the French protectorate over Morocco. The Sultan has not yet
decided on his next move because a reply needs further study.
(C Rabat 29, 25 Sept 52)
Comment: Inasmuch as the Moroccans as well as the French
are looTing toward the next UN General Assembly, the Sultan
may time his counterproposals to gain the maximum benefit
from UN consideration as to whether the Moroccan issue should
be placed on the General Assembly agenda.
On 17 March the Sultan requested a revision of the Treaty
of Fez, which established the French protectorate over Morocco
in 1912, as well as more self-government for the Moroccans.
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WESTERN EUROPE
25. East Germans continue propaganda on Volkskammer delegation
to Bonn: ve opments since the departure of the o sammer
~Ie e~ga.ion from Bonn point to the probability of redoubled ef-
forts by the East Germans to exploit the initial advantage
_gained there, with the strong possibility of some new overture
from the Soviet Union.
Since the East Germans have advanced considerably if
cautiously beyond the. proposals contained in the latest Soviet
note on Germany, the present propaganda tempo can scarcely be
maintained in East Germany without some new Soviet gesture. This
may well include an early reply to the latest Western note and
an attempt to undermine Western objections to the Soviet agenda
by proposing simultaneous discussion of agenda items.
In the meantime, individual members of the Bonn mission
have asserted that they expect not only a reply from the
Bundestag to their proposals, but also the appointment of a
delegation to join the East Germans in. talks on all-German
elections. This optimistic appraisal of their efforts and the
encouragement. it provides for still further efforts may stem in
part from continued signs of confusion in West German circles and
the open criticism in the West German press of the Allied reply
to the Soviet note. (Factual data from: R FBIS, East Germany,
2226 Sept 52;_C London 1765, 26 Sept 52)
26. West German press criticizes West?s reply to Soviet note:
Commenting on West German press reaction to the Western reply'
ep y to
the Soviet note on German unity, American officials in Bonn fear
that implicit reservations and open criticism of the three-power
note may portend future difficulties for the West. Although the
pro-coalition press approves of the importance' placed on all-
German elections, many papers seem to consider the exchange of
notes fruitless, and some openly charge that insistence on
"principles" is preventing four-power talks and the unification
of Germany. (C Bonn 1367, 25 Sept 52)
27, French Socialist leader warns against rejection of Eden
roposals: French oc a- s leader Guy Mollet has warned t at
Germany and Italy continue their hostility in the Coal-Steel
Community Assembly to the British proposals for establishing
ties between the Council of Europe and the emerging Community of
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Six, the French Socialists will vote against EDC ratification.
He told the American observer at the Council of Europe that any
majority for the EDC that Pinay might "scrape together" without
the Socialists could not be considered a stable basis of foreign.
policy. ((S Strasbourg 108, 26. Sept 52)
Comment: Since the dissident Gaullists have resolved to
follow Cene?al de Gaulle on foreign policy, the Socialists could
block French ratification_of the EDC treaty. This threat, however,
may well be merely an effort to obtain strong American support for
Eden's proposals. Last spring, when hope of close British as-
sociation with the Continent was fading, Mollet appeared willing
to accept the EDC without British association.
28. Dutch still fear neglect by NATO defense planners: The
American massy In T___ Hague reports tfia-t the c are.still
seriously disturbed over NATO defense planning and have strong
reservations about Marshal Juin's impartiality as an international
commander. They fear that in a military crisis Juin would not
hesitate to alter SHAPE plans to the benefit of France. (S' The
Hague 417, 25 Sept 52)
Comment: Both the Netherlands and West Germany have been
greatly concerned over Allied strategy in the event of a Russian
attack, particularly since General Juin, during the Allied military
maneuvers in Germany early in September, appeared to base the
Allies' defense on the Rhine, thus risking abandonment of most of
northern Holland to the invader. Subsequent American assurances
have apparently failed to convince either the Dutch or the Germans
that their territory will be defended.
29. Belgians insist on retaining real voice in EDC Commissariat:
A Belgian delegate to tFie'R directing committee in Paris has
informed an American official that, for political reasons, his
country will insist on a Benelux proposal that the EDC Commis-
sariat's executive powers'be exercised through committees rather
than individuals.
The Benelux proposal was attacked by the French, German and
Italian delegates as deviating from the treaty provision regarding
delegated authority for individual members of the Commissariat and
as reducing organizational efficiency. (S Paris 1870, 25 Sept 52)
Comment: The Belgians want the Commissariat to direct
operations on a collective basis in order to retain a check on
the French, German, and Italian members.
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30, outcome of Italian elections:
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the Italian Premier expressed
pessimism regarding his party's chances in the 1953 elections.
He pointed out that Italy's social problems were far from solved,
and "greater difficulties may yet arise," (S Bonn 1368, 25 Sept
52)
Comment: This is the first time that De Gasperi has been
known-To -express outright pessimism concerning next spring's,
elections.
LATIN AMERICA
32. Latin American delegates to WPC reportedly met with "Latin
American sect on of international Communist organization": ego
Montana Cuellar, upon his return in ml mJuly rom the World Peace
Council meetings in Berlin, reportedly told the Colombian Com-
munist Party that one of the secret WPC meetings was attended by
representatives of the "Latin American section of the inter-
national Communist organization, with headquarters at Prague."
These representatives told the Latin American delegates that every
effort would be made to find practical solutions for the needs
and financial difficulties of the Communist parties in Latin
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Americ_a.,and.for.the problems:relnting to their positions with
respect to the regimes in power. The representatives asked that
the Latin American section in Prague be supplied detailed demo-
graphic,, economic and political studies on each country. (C
I I
Comment: This report merely adds to the list of uncon-
firmed rumors concerning." the existence in Prague of a central co-
ordinating and directing.committee for Latin American Communist
activities. i
33a Bolivian Socialist Falange reportedl plans revolt: Un-
identi a members of the Bolivian Socialist Falange have 25X1C
detailed plans to overthrow the Paz Estenssoro government and to
"eliminate" Minister of Mines and Petroleum Juan Lechin and
Minister of Labor German Butron,
25X1C The date of the revolt was not specified. 25X1A
Comment: The Falange, now the principal opposition group,
has been seeking support from army officers dissatisfied with
their position under the new government. In late August a number
of Falangists were arrested for alleged plotting.
The plan to "eliminate" Lechin and Butron, both important"
labor leaders, presumably stems from a desire to reduce the ef-
fectiveness of labor's power.
340 Costa icon President relinquishes power pending congres-
sional; nvestigation of police. President tilio U ate announced
on 26 September that he would temporarily leave office while a
congressional committee investigates. charges that certain high
officers of the civil guard have engaged in bullying tactics. He
named First Vice President Alberto Oreamuno to take his place.
Ulate said that he had already started his own investigation
and therefore considered the congressional action a personal
insult. A newspaper article identifies the accusers as members
of the'Civic Revolutionary Action, a small irresponsible veterans'
group. (C San Jose 58 and 60, 26 Sept 52; C San Jose 61, 27 Sept
52; U La Prensa (NY) 27 Sept 52)
Comment: Acting President Oreamuno, a physician, is pro-
Ulateand ro?United States. In May 1951 he quoted Ulate as
saying that he was thinking of resigning provided Oreamuno would
take over. According to Oreamuno, Ulate felt that he had dis-
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charged his duty to the country and would like to return to his
neglected newspaper business.
So far, there is nothing to indicate whether Ulate's "tempo-
rary resignation" is actually a matter of honor arising out of
the police.case or whether he is merely using the charges as an
excuse to leave politics. Ulate had been reorganizing the police
in preparation for next summer's potentially explosive elections.
35. Cuban opposition plots to overthrow Batista: An attempt to
overthrow President Batista of Cuba will reportedly be made
within the next few days. Leaders of the plot are said to be
supporters of ex-President Prio, members of the large opposition
Orthodox Party, and elements of the armed forces.
In view of this and other reports, the US Embassy in Havana
considers an armed uprisin in the near future possible. (S
Havana 178, 25 Sept 52; 25X1A
Comment: Opposition to Batista has been increasing during
the past few months. Batista is probably aware of the current
plot, however, and able to thwart it.
36. El Salvador acts against alleged Communist plot: The
Salvadoran government on 26 September suspended constitutional
guarantees for 30 days and announ6ed that the country is in im-
minent danger of Communist-inspired disorders. The Communists,
it said, are taking advantage of "the constant plots of the
extreme right," and are preparing to instigate riots and ter-
rorism in El Salvador. About 15 Communists have been arrested.
The United States Embassy states that, although the Com-
munists are a potential threat, such drastic action is not war-
ranted by the present situation and may have been taken "for
other purposes." (R San Salvador 51, 26 Sept 52)
Comment: There is no evidence that the Communists pose an
immediate threat in El Salvador, though they have been active in
some labor unions and student groups.
Rightists have repeatedly been reported engaged in plots,
and earlier this month the government declared that an al-
leged plot had been foiled and prominent conservatives arrested.
The present action may be simply a prelude to the exiling, as
in March 1951, of leftist,and rightist opponents of the regime.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
29 September 1952
CIA No. 49821
Copy No.
38
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
SOUTH ASIA
Sheikh Abdullah makes new proposals for settling the
Kashmir spate: Dar ng a conversation with Am asses or
owes on eptember, Sheikh Abdullah, the Indian-spun
sored Premier of Kashmir, suggested that his state should
be made semi-autonomous for a ten-year period under a
United Nations guarantee, with "free access" to both Paki-
stan and India. He added that he would welcome direct dis-
cussions between his government and that of Azad Kashmir,
which is Pakistani-controlled, in the hope of developing
some formula which could be advanced to India and Pakistan.
Abdullah protested his complete loyalty to India,
but stated that he felt the time had come to consider every
reasonable suggestion for solving the Kashmir issue. (S
S/S New Delhi 1291, 24 Sept 52)
Comment. Abdullah has never before made such specific
reommencataons for settling the Kashmir dispute, though he
has previously raised the subject of autononV and has made
overtures to the Azad Kashmirisa His remarks suggest
that he is planning some new move which might seriously em-
barrass the Indian Government.
In their present mood of frustration, both the Pakis-
tani Government and the Azad Kashmiris-might consider some
such proposal.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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Moroccan nationalists
promise to give American officials
has o an erican o ica -in Tangier that American au-
thorities there or in Rabat would be given advance notice of
any nationalist uprisings in Morocco, (TS US AIRA Algiers
Unnumbered, 23 Sept 52)
Comment: Although Moroccan nationalists have frequently
discussed heir problems with American Legation personnel
and occasionally have petitioned for US support, it is un-
likely that they would jeopardize any plans for disorders by
revealing them even to an American official,
TOP SECRET
2 29 Sept 52
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