CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A001200210001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 8, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
8 September 1952
OCI No., 8869
Copy No. 23 5
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
GENERAL
14 Canada offers proposals for settlement of Korean prisoner-
of-war question: The Canadian Government considers the time
opportune o a tempt to break the stalemate over prisoner-of-
war exchange in the Korean peace negotiations, and thus fore-
stall any Soviet intent to introduce the issue at the
forthcoming UN General Assembly. The Ambassador to the United
States may be instructed to urge that specific proposals for
an armistice be made involving the immediate exchange of
prisoners willing to be repatriated and leaving the question
of those unwilling for future settlement.
The Canadian Government does not consider that any useful
purpose would be served by the introduction of the Korean
question in the General Assembly, (S Ottawa 66, 4 Sept 52)
Comment: A number of other countries contributing to
the U operations in Korea have advanced similar proposals in
recent weeks.
2. Czech pension system to be reorganized along Soviet
lines: Czech me Minister Antonin apo oc y complained re-
cen y that nine percent of the national income was being
devoted to pensions and relief payments to the detriment of
increased productivity. Warning that the state could not af-
ford to pay pensions equal to wages, he indicated that the
pension system would soon be "improved" by reorganization along
Soviet lines. (S Prague Weeka 34, 22 Aug 52)
Comment: Zapotocky has spearheaded the Czech Govern-
ment s aback on the extensiveness of the pension system.
Last November he warned that social benefits must be adjusted
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in accordance with the rise in labor productivity; In May
he condemned widespread pension and relief abuses and urged
the voluntary relinquishment of social benefits. .
The government now appears to be planning a sharp re-
duction in the number of people receiving benefits, as was
done in Hungary last March.
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3, North Korean Government concerned over civilian morale:
Accor n to information
25X1C the concentrated UN air attacks on North Korea
brought a North Korean request for a greater air defense
commitment from the Chinese, in order to prevent a complete
collapse of civilian morale. The Chinese refused, arguing
that the UN's real target was Manchuria. They agreed, how-
ever, to a joint approach to the USSR for additional aircraft.
Comment: This is the first report on the
effect o he intensified bombing on c v an morale. Enemy
propaganda, by its vilification of the gttacks, had previously
indicated some degree of effectiveness.
40 Effects of intensified bombing weighed by FECOM: The
UN's program of intensified bombing of ort Korea, -beginning
with the raids against power plants in late June, has had a
"substantial effect on the enemy," the Far East Command
believes.
Reports from North Korea indicate that the loss of elec-
tric power caused considerable disruption of both military
and civilian activities through early August.
Civilian morale, already lowered by the long and costly
war, has been subjected to additional strains by the mass
bombing. Rigid Communist control techniques, however, have
counterbalanced them.
The military has not suffered any material lowering of
morale. The enemy is still able to keep his front line units
supplied despite destruction of some arms plants and supply
areas. (S CINCFE Telecon 6121, 6 Sept 52)
25X1 C
e Chinese at the
Moscow conference will request extensive military and econo-
mic aid, including a long-term loan, and additional shipping.
Some military items wanted by Peiping are equipment for more
armored and airborne divisions, 500 jet planes, and 60 sub-
marines.
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25X1A
25X1 C
25X1 C
Peiping will request restitution of the Port Arthur-
Dairen area, but will be satisfied with nominal control.
It desires return of the Changchun railroad, but will agree
to joint Sino-Soviet operation for a stated number of years.
The Chinese hope to obtain Moscow's agreement to a truce
in Korea, to the timing of an invasion of Formosa, and to the
loan of 50,000 tons of shipping as well as Soviet naval and
air assistance for the invasion.
comments cover the entire spectrum of Sino-
Sovie re a ions except policy toward Southeast Asia,
The composition of the Chinese delegation to Moscow
indicates that the talks will be concerned primarily with
economic matters,
6. Peiping allegedly seeks Soviet commitment to air defense:
25X10 asserts that, as of August, e p ng
r ce v no reply to its request for a statement of Soviet
polic in the event of UN bombing of Manchuria.
25X1A
Comment: It is improbable that a policy has not yet been
formulated.
The Soviet Ambassador and the Soviet Counsellor in Pei-
ping, on separate occasions in late 1950, told
i
25X1C that the Soviet Air Force would "take ac on
aircra t bombed Manchuria. No Soviet official has been
known to make such an assertion since that time, and no
reliable information as to Soviet policy in this matter has
come to hand from any other source.
7. Sino-Soviet talks allegedly precede "general offensive":
I alleges that t e current Sino-
Soviet a s in Moscow were undertaken two months ahead of
schedule and that the Chinese Communists are "planning a
general offensive shortly after" the talks are concluded.
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25X1 C 8.
The offensive will "probably" take place in Korea and Southeast
Asia and "may possibly" extend to "other areas." 25X1A
Comment: Speculation of this type apparently derives from
a presume connection between the Sino-Soviet talks of early
1950 and the Korean Communist invasion of South Korea in June
1950.
Just as the 1950 Sino-Soviet talks culminated in the con-
clusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and
Mutual Aid, so the current talks are expected to result, inter
alia, in increased Soviet aid to China for long-range military
and economic programs.
The Chinese Communists have long been capable of mounting
a new offensive in Korea and of invading any or all contiguous
areas of Southeast Asia. Although Chinese capabilities will
presumably be enhanced by the current Moscow talks, there is
no reliable evidence of a Communist intention to break off
the Korean talks or to invade Southeast Asia in the near
future.
Chinese workers subjected to forced resettlement: A
told the
to leave Shanghai to work in the coal mines of North China.
He also knew of persons being forced to move from Shanghai
to the outlying province of Sinkiang and of workers on water
conservation projects who reported that they were working
under virtually forced labor conditions.
merican Consul General that he knew o workers being forced
In this connection, the Consul General has recalled
Communist references to expanding acreage in northern Manchuria
cultivated by persons from southern Manchuria and China proper.
Peiping authorities, furthermore, have provided for the re-
settlement of unemployed persons in a recent directive. The
Consul General believes that many Chinese are scheduled for
forced resettlement. (C Hong Kong 537, Joint Weeka 35, 29
Aug 52)
Comment: Peiping has stated that its measures to reduce
unemployment will "fit into the pattern of the forthcoming
large-scale national construction program." This program
emphasizes the economic development of outlying areas, where
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there are now relatively few people. Unemployed persons in
the cities are being given the alternatives of accepting
"government-sponsored work" or of returning to their native
villages. '
9, Unexpected drop in Chinese orders for Ceylon rubber
reported: Two Polish vessels, the Mickiewicz an the linski,
are due to load at Colombo in September a total of only 2,900
tons of rubber for China. The American Embassy in Colombo
reports that a lack of other Chinese orders for rubber has
forced down the local market price and left several dealers
with an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 tons of unsold rubber. The
Embassy believes that the Chinese may have suspended purchases
until after discussions with the Ceylon rice-purchasing mis-
sion, now due to leave for Peiping on 11 September. (C
Colombo 98, 5 Sept 52)
Comment: The Chinese, who have been paying premium
prices for eylon rubber, have probably stopped buying in
view of the early prospect that they will be able to barter
rubber for rice rather than pay cash. These two shipments
in September will raise to 17,700 tons the quantity of rubber
shipped from Ceylon to China in 1952.
100 Peiping reaffirms confidence in Viet Minh victory: Radio
Peiping, commenting on t e seven ann1versary of tie proclama-
tion of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, quotes the Viet
Minh Ambassador to Peiping as declaring that the Communist
movement in Indochina will "have to go through arduous times"
but, backed by the Soviet bloc, "will undoubtedly win final
victory."
Liu Shao-chi, vice chairman of both the Peiping regime and
the Chinese Communist Party, is quoted as hailing the "friendly
cooperation" of Communist China and the Viet Minh, and as ex-
pressing confidence a Viet Minh struggle will "end in
victory. (R FBIS AW 2 Sept 52)
Comment: Peiping's comment provides no clue as to whether
the C ntil?ese Communists envisage a prolonged stalemate in Indo-
china, plan to increase their aid to Ho Chi Minh, or anticipate
a negotiated settlement of the Indochina conflict.
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Current Communist propaganda, in connection with the
forthcoming Pacific "peace" conference, calls for peaceful
settlement of existing conflicts in Korea, Indochina and
Malaya. There is as yet no convincing evidence that the
Communists in Indochina or Malaya will follow the lead of the
Korean Communists in seeking truce talks,
11, Chinese Nationalists apprehend 6,000 persons in August
police ra s: T fie 26 and August police raids on Formosa
Have ne to about 6,000 persons who are accused of vagrancy,
desertion, or not possessing proper documentation. The
purpose of the raids was to arrest vagrants and criminals who
could be impressed into military service, to eliminate For-
mosan dissidents, and to apprehend Communists.
The disposition of these prisoners has not been deter-
mined. The commander on Chinmen has already registered an
official objection to having any assigned to his command,
fearing that they would create a disciplinary problem.
Comment: Another report stated that the Nationalists
execu a over 200 Communist agents in early August. These
are the first such raids conducted on Formosa this year, and
they may have been occasioned by the reported arrest on 15
August of a lieutenant general and his brother for espionage.
12. Chinese Nationalist Overseas delegates may remain for
meeting of National Assembly: The Chinese Nat ona fists hope
tHat many o e ove s-ea s delegates to the Seventh National
Congress of the Kuomintang scheduled for 10 October and the
conference of Overseas Chinese immediately following will
remain for the National Assembly meeting in January. The
lack of a quorum has previously deterred the Nationalists
from convoking a National Assembly meeting and no official
announcement has been made; Chiang Kai-shek, however, does
not appear to be concerned with this problem at this time.
states
that uniang n n to use a National Assembly to consolidate
his control over the government prior to the outbreak of World
War III, which he expects in 1953?
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Comment: The Seventh National Congress of the Kuomintang
is expected-
xpec a to call for a meeting of the National Assembly,
which would have power to institute impeachment proceedings
against Vice President Li Tsung-jen.
13. Macao obtains strategic goods from Portugal: The Hong
Kong government has given te American onsu eneral a copy
of the manifest of the Portuguese vessel India, which arrived
in Macao from Lisbon on 24 August..
As in past instances, the. cargo included several strate-
gic items. Quantities of ball bearings, chemical products,
auto parts, analine dyes, and steel wire in most cases ob-
viously exceeded Macao's own requirements. (C Hong Kong
537, Joint Weeka 35, 29 Aug 52)
Comment: The authorities, in Lisbon insist that the
prosperity and security of Macao require the continuation
of strategic shipments to China. The recent border incidents
have stiffened the Portuguese in this attitude, since they
fear that stopping the strategic trade might provoke further
clashes with the Chinese Communists,
14. British may refuse Hong Kong visas to "peace" delegates:
A Brit fs official n oyo has "indicated" tFiat Britain has
decided not to grant transit visas through Hong Kong to per-
sons desiring to attend the Pacific "peace" conference in
Peiping this month. (C Tokyo 812, 4 Sept 52)
Comment: About 500 persons from more than 30 countries
have been invited to attend the "peace" conference. British
refusal to permit transit through Hong Kong would discourage
many of the delegates from attending, particularly those of
Southeast Asian countries,
Reports of Viet Minh hardships increase: The American
Embassy in Saigon reports that recent accounts of conditions
in the Viet Minh zone dwell increasingly on the deterioration
of the enemy economy, the shortage of food, and the dissatis-
faction of the people with the onerous taxation and police
measures. The Embassy also notes lowered morale among
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military units, but warns against drawing too optimistic
conclusions from these reports. (C Saigon 523, 5 Sept 52)
Comment: The bulk of evidence suggests that civilian
morale in tie Viet Minh zone is poor, but that this factor
has been largely neutralized by the impossibility of organ-
ized opposition and by the widespread conviction among
Vietnamese that in relation to the Bao Dai regime the Viet
Minh. is the lesser evil.
The morale of Viet Minh troops in general is fair and in
some cases, notably those divisions which have been resting
and regrouping since February, it is probably good to
excellent.
16. British suspect French proposal for tripartite statement
on Sou east As la: T He American Consul enera in ngapore
reports a Brit ish officials there suspect that the French
are preparing to propose an Anglo-American-French declaration
of aims regarding Southeast Asia which will primarily disregard
British problems, The Consul General believes the British
would resent American approval of the French statement as an
indication that the United States is also unconcerned with
British problems, (C Singapore 266, 4 Sept 52)
Comment: The French reportedly favor a tripartite
pledgee io elp Southeast Asian nations "realize, maintain and
defend their independence." They probably believe that it
would be popular in Indochina. Such a statement would be
embarrassing to British officials in Malaya as it would draw
attention to the fact that Malaya is the only Southeast Asian
country not nominally independent.
17. Philippines may soon ratify Japanese peace treaty: A
high official o t e apanese Foreign ice has confiden-
tially informed the American Embassy in Tokyo that his
government has tentative assurance that the Philippine
Nacionalista Party will soon support ratification of the
Japanese peace treaty. The official indicated that Japan
would be willing to discuss reparations only within the terms
of the treaty. (C Tokyo 779, 2 Sept 52)
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Comment: The opposition Nacionalista Party, which
controoTs die Philippine Senate, has blocked ratification
since President Quirino submitted the treaty in March. By
insisting on larger reparations and expressing fear of a
resurgent Japan, the Nacionalistas have hoped to gain popular
support for the 1953 elections,
18. Mullah Kashani reportedly ready to act against Mossadeq:
Mulla Kashani notified Prime b n-i er Mossadeq a ore his
departure for Mecca that he will take matters into his own
hands if the government does not take measures "to remedy th
resent situation."
Kashani expects Majlis support and
will probably also have Tudeh cooperation. The timing of
the plan is not known but it is believed to call for action
shortly after Kashani's return.
Kashani wishes to become the next prime minister. His
ultimate aim is to oust the Shah and become president of an
Iranian republic.
Comment: An anti-Mossadeq group in the Majlis, composed
of conservatives and followers of Kashani, sought American
support in August. Kashani also apparently has the support
of several street organizations which, combined with the Tudeh,
could have a powerful effect. Kashani's acceptance of Tudeh
cooperation is probable, since he has always maintained that
he could easily control the Tudeh once he has used it.
25X1X 19? Iranian Cabinet reportedly imcompetent and anti-American:
Lola that most of
the -American. He added that they
probably would change their attitudes if United States policy
were more favorable to Iran.
Only the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Health
are reported as friendly to the United States. The rest of
the cabinet is characterized as opportunistic
Aug 52)
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e ng a . e tist .
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Comment: Mossadeq's cabinet was hand picked and has
been characterized as a "rubber stamp" with incompetent
members. When Foreign Minister
Hague, he was described by
intelligent-, and
a man who "if he had deep thoughts, certainly keeps them
hidden."
20. Britain to permit jet aircraft exports to Middle East
states: The British ore gn Office has decided to no i y the
governments of Iraq, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon tnat they can
each purchase a maximum of 12 combat and 2 training jet air-
craft. Deliveries will be phased over a period of several
years, The French and Turkish Governments are being informed
of this decision, which stems from increased efforts to expand
the arms export program to help Britain's economic situation.
In view of the concern expressed by the American Embassy
in London over the suddenness of this decision, the Foreign
Office agreed to try to delay the instructions to its missions
until the State Department could offer its views. (S London
1264, 4 Sept 52)
Comment: This decision relaxes the British position taken
.in Se pte im er 1950 to halt all high-priority arms exports except
to NATO and Commonwealth countries. The Middle East states
are very eager to obtain jet equipment, and this policy change
comes at a time when Britain is seeking a friendly Arab atti-
tude toward its proposal for a Middle East Defense Organization.
21. General Nagib may visit Sudan: The British Foreign Office
reports that General ag an Prime Minister Ali Maher
intend to visit the Sudan within the next month or two. The
Foreign Office feels that in some ways such a visit would be
advantageous but that the question of timing should receive
careful consideration. (S London 1305, 5 Sept 52)
Comment: Maher's forced resignation will obviously
change ese plans, but there is no reason to believe that
Nagib, despite his new duties as Prime Minister, will abandon
them or lose interest in the Sudan. Nagib's few cautious
statements on this issue do not clearly indicate what his
position will be.
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The new constitution, bringing almost complete self-
government to the Sudan, will go into effect in November
unless the two condominium powers agree on changes. Past
British efforts to secure Egyptian cooperation on the Sudan
have been rebuffed.
22. French alarmed over implied American support of Tunisian
nationalists:-. The Acting French Resident General in Tunis
has expressed grave concern over an alleged statement by UN
delegate Gross that the United States hopes the "consultations
between France and the true representatives of the Tunisian
people will result in an agreement prior to the UN General
Assembly."
The Resident General stated that the Neo-Destour Party
will interpret the word "true" as full American backing for
their thesis that Baccouche is not a Tunisian representative.
(C Tunis 076, 4 Sept 52)
Comment: France may now request clarification of the
alleged statement in the hope that an American reply might
indicate more positive support for the French position.
In a UN information program on 1 September Ambassador
Gross stated that the United States hoped Tunisian diffi-
culties might be solved by "fair and friendly consultations
between the French and the Tunisians -- by that I mean
representative Tunisians."
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WESTERN EUROPE 25X1C
'23, Russians reportedly see little hope of blocking EDC:
25X1C Ea-sT German Pr Mme
Minister Grotewotil n rs in mid-August that
the then forthcoming Soviet note on Germany assumed that little
chance remained of preventing a European Defense Community. He
allegedly stated that the Soviet note would serve primarily as
proof of Russian desires for German unity, and that the Kremlin
did not expect a four-power talk to result.
In East Germany, the Soviet Union would respond to the
American system of Western European alliances with a "completely
new policy" featuring accelerated socialization and a closer
control over East German parties and other organizations here-
ted because of their West German connections.
25X1A
Comment: Grotewohl's remarks, if accurately reported, may
well have been designed to reassure his subordinates that their
positions would be secure despite Soviet proposals for all-German
elections. This suggests that the East German parliament's
recent nomination of delegates to an all-German electoral commis-
sion is primarily intended to further the Soviet propaganda line
rather than to lead to serious negotiations.
24, West German Socialist forecasts ratification of treaties:
Carlo Schmid, a leader of the opposition Soc a Democratic Party
and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee now considering
the Bonn and Paris treaties, believes that final Bundestag action
cannot be completed before early November, but that ratification
is certain. Since he did not mention his party's case against
the constitutionality of the treaties during his talk with
American officials, he apparently assumes that Chancellor
Adenauer will win on this issue as well.
Neither the Bonn coalition parties nor the cabinet have yet
seriously discussed the timetable for ratification. Adenauer
and his party continue to favor speedy action, but the minor
coalition parties, dissatisfied over the war criminal and Saar
issues, are showing less eagerness. (C Bonn 974,. 4 Sept 52)
.25. France considering new plan for Saar voting: The French
Foreign. 'Min stry is working out a plan for o ng a referendum in the
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Saar as soon as a French-German agreement on the broad lines of
a settlement has been reached and other interested countries
have been consulted. If the Saarlanders approve the proposed
settlement, details will be worked out with the Saar Government.
No final decision on this plan will be made, however,
before the 8 September meeting between Chancellor Adenauer and
Foreign Minister Schuman. (S Paris 1397, 4 Sept 52)
Comment: Saar government leaders agreed on 3 September that
elections must be held, under the Saar constitution, not later
than December. They recommended that a prior referendum be held
on the question of Europeanization.
Chancellor Adenauer is strongly opposed to a referendum
before a French-German agreement has been reached. He hopes to
get French agreement to a postponement, failing which he plans
to raise the "human rights" issue in the forthcoming Council of
Europe Assembly.
26. Soviet blast against Austrian Government believed tied to
treaty negotiations American Embassy officials in Vienna
report ...a available evidence indicates that the recent Soviet
blast against the Austrian Government for alleged failure to
carry out Allied democratization directives was concocted for use
in future Austrian treaty negotiations. A high Soviet repre-?
sentative is reported to have informed an Austrian official that
the Soviet statement was prepared some time ago and that no
"positive results" were anticipated in the Allied Council. (C
Vienna 656, 4 Sept 52)
Comment: The Soviet Union appears to have been more
distur e1e -than heretofore believed by the introduction last
March of the short treaty draft and subsequent Austrian moves
to appeal to the United Nations. Charges aimed at the demo-
cratic character of the Austrian Government may lead to Soviet
demands for prior Austrian guarantees not to enter "aggressive
Western alliances."
27. NAC considers political implications of military exercises:
Referring to forthcoming NATO exercises in Germany, N C ecre-
tary General Ismay recently suggested advance discussion of
future large-scale maneuvers which might be accompanied by
political repercussions. The British, French, Norwegian and
Danish representatives expressed full agreement, the latter two
citing recent experiences in connection with this month's NATO
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naval exercise. The Standing Group is aware of the need for
working out a procedure for the future, according to its liaison
officer. (S Paris POLTO 259, 4 Sept 52)
28. France seeks three-power MEDO Standing Group: France wants
a Middle ast Defense Organization Standing Group composed of
the United States, Britain, and France, as in NATO, according
to preliminary Foreign Ministry views. The French hold that their,
agreement last year to support Turkey's NATO membership and to
join in the first approach to Egypt on the so-called Middle East
Command was based on a definite three-power understanding of this
Standing Group concept.
The French oppose any approach to the Arab states until the
establishment of.MEDO is announced. The Foreign Ministry still
desires an early tripartite meeting in London on MEDO. (S Paris
1394, 4 Sept 52)
Comment: The preliminary British MEDO draft makes no pro-
vision for a Standing Group at this stage. The French, who have
no forces to contribute at present, see the Standing Group concept
as their only means of retaining any top-level control.
29, Schuman Plan members oppose outside control: According to
the American Embassy in Paris, the German vice-president of the.
coal-steel'pool's High Authority believes that the governments
and parliamentarians already favoring an independent Schuman Plan
Assembly are more determined than ever to keep the Assembly free
of outside control. Their determination has been stimulated by
the administrative difficulties between Jean Monnet, president
of the High Authority, and the secretary general of the Council
of Europe. (C Paris POLTO 252, 3 Sept 52)
Comment: Monnet has taken vigorous action to ensure the
independence of the Schuman Plan Assembly. His bickering with
the secretary general of the Council of Europe over procedural
matters, however, has aroused criticism which may be voiced at
the forthcoming meeting of the coal-steel pool Assembly.
,300 Belgian Cabinet weakens: The resignation of Belgian
Minister of Justice o en over the government's "leniency"
toward two wartime collaborators has not mollified public opinion.
The government has failed to explain that its policy remains un-
changed, and the Socialist opposition has reaped an electioneering
advantage by exploiting the question. (C Brussels 245, 4 Sept 52)
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Comment: The present Social Christian cabinet commands only
a slim parliamentary majority. Any cabinet overturn would result
more from domestic than from foreign policy issues, and the suc-
cessor cabinet would probably also be dominated by the Social
Christians.
31, Principal anti-Franco organization disintegrating: During
its congress at Toulouse last month, the panic Socialist Party
voted to end the 1948 pact with the pro-Don Juan monarchists.
The resolution, which reportedly resulted from objections by
party members in Spain. to agreements that "compromise" their
actions, places future cooperation with anti-Franco groups on a
project-by-project basis.
According to the American Embassy in Madrid, this move may
lead to a radical reorientation if not the complete dissolution
of the clandestine monarchist-led Coordination Committee of the
Interior (CIC). (S Madrid Joint Weeka 35, 29 Aug 52)
Comment: The CIC, which is based on the 1948 pact, has
been Spain's most important non-Communist anti-Franco organi-
zation.
Monarchists were recently ordered by the Conde de los Andes,
Don Juan's personal representative in Spain, to cease all clan-
destine activity. The Socialist resolution appears as a reaction
to this decision, and conforms to a similar step taken last year
by Spanish Socialist exiles in Mexico.
32.
Chilean Congress will probably name Ibanez president next
month: nce no candidate has obtained the necessary majority
in the Chilean election, the naming of a president rests with
Congress, which must choose between the top two candidates,
Ibanez and Matte. Although the Ibanez forces have little
strength in Congress, as against Matte's-approximate 40 percent
control, there are indications that Congress will respect
Ibanez' 47 percent plurality and select him.
The very recent "go easy on Ibanez" attitude on the part
of. the administration, in strong contrast with its previous
desire to smear him as linked with Peron, lends credibility to
a reported deal between Ibanez and the administration forces,
.which also control 40 percent of Congress.
SECRET
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SECRET
The Congress probably will not act until 24 October. Should
it not proclaim Ibanez president, a revolt can be expected.
(Factual data from: C Santiago 77, 5 Sept 52; La Prensa (NY),
5-7 Sept 52)
Opposition to Batista regime in Cuba reported growing: A
s increased to where an armed revolutionary attempt
t h
a
governmen
may be made in the near future. He states that ever since the
10 March coup, rapidly increasing numbers of small groups have
been organizing and preparing for revolt, and that efforts to
unite them under the major opposition groups are well under way.
It is believed that aggressive action will be taken when the op-
position is properly organized.
Reportedly the leading forces in the movement are the
Authentic Party group under Antonio Varona, the Orthodox Party
group led by Emilio Ochoa, the pro-Prio (deposed president) group
_~_e:____ a....~.s .,e.i ^+ +hnir
f
as mIa - - --r- - 25X1A
now in exile, and a gi-uu o
positions by the coup.
Comment: Reports concerning impending revolutionary at-
tempts gainst the Batista regime have been received periodically.
-
One attempt is reportedly scheduled for 10 October. Batista is
said to know of all such plans and has instructed the military
to take extraordinary precautionary measures.
A counterrevolutionary effort, probably involving the as-
sistance of Cuban exiles and other Caribbean revolutionary
elements, is considered a definite possibility, particularly
between now and the promised November 1953 presidential elections.
SECRET
17 8 Sept 52
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