CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A001200150001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 28, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
28 August 1952
OCI No, 8863
Copy No. 23 5
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION _`~
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS9 TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
1. Pravda says Mao has greatly enriched Marxist theory, The
Chinese ommunis arty under Mao has adapted Marxism-Leninism
to China "not dogmatically, but creatively... thus greatly en-
riching the Marxist theory," according to a Pravda review of the
publication of the first volume of Mao's "SeTeeci Works" in the
USSR. Pravda stated that the "Soviet people will study Mao Tse-
tung's works, which embody the 'firm friend9&&26 the two great
peoples, with intense interest." (R FBIS Aug 52) 25X1A
Comment: As far as is known, this is the first time that
Soviet sources have originated comment, rather than quoting Chinese
Communist statements, regarding Mao's "creative" contribution to
Marxist theory.
2. Ambassador Kennan analyzes changes in party structure, Am-
bass, or Kennan points out that a av a r 2c e 2 AAugust
confirms that the establishment of asidium merely formalizes
an already existing situation. The article suggests that since
the war, control over the party apparatus has rested with the
Secretariat.
The Ambassador comments that under the arrangement now to
be formalized, lesser members of the Politburo, and even Molotov
himself, have apparently been excluded from control over per-
sonnel, which would also mean control over the delicate question
of future succession. This latter function has apparently been
delegated to Malenkov and a few people under him, working within
the framework of the Secretariat and receiving general guidance
from Stalin.
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3. Chou En-lai mission to Moscow overshadowed by Soviet atten-
tion to Party Congress: The arrival o ou En-lai in Moscow and
his meetings with Vyshinsky and Stalin have been reported with
little emphasis by the Soviet press. The press coverage of the
Chinese mission is similar in volume and content to the coverage
of Mao's visit to Moscow in December 1949.
The Party Congress, which was announced two days after the
arrival of the Chinese delegation, has completely overshadowed
the Sino-Soviet talks. Chou's interview with Stalin on 20 August,
which coincided with the announcement of the Congress and the Plan,
was reported in one short news item, in contrast to the saturation
broadcasting on the Party Congress and the Five-Year Plan.
The Satellites have apparently been given no directives as to
the correct line to take in regard to the Sino-Soviet talks. The
Satellite press reported the Chou mission factually, with no com-
ment or speculation; in contrast, there was a ready propaganda re-
sponse from all the Satellites in regard to the Party Congress and-
the Five-Year Plan. (Factual data from: R FBIS 18, 19, 20, 21
Aug 52; R Vienna 523, 22 Aug; Bucharest 58, 22 Aug; Praha 118,
22 Aug; Warsaw 93, 22 Aug; Budapest 164, 22 Aug; Warsaw 95, 24 Aug
52)
4. Italian sources circulate rumor that Albanian premier is in
disfavor: Strong rumors persist in Rome that AlEanian Premier
Hoxha is in "gross disfavor" with the Kremlin. A Rome broadcast
on 19 August alleged that Radio Moscow had announced Hoxha's re-
signation. (S Rome MAR 2480, 26 Aug 52; R FBIS 19 Aug 52) 25X1A
Comment: On 20 August Hoxha addressed the Third Congress of
the A anian Trade Unions. While there is evidence that conditions
in Albania are unstable, there is no confirmation of reports that
Hoxha is on the way out.
5. Economic difficulties may be reflected in Bulgarian propagan-
on
da: According to an editorial published in a otnic esco De lo
T-August, Bulgaria's most important economic and political goal
during 1952 must be to surpass the production level scheduled for
1953, thereby fulfilling the Five-Year Plan in four years. The
article stated that this would demand intense effort, and that
constant expansion and intensification of socialistic competition
in every branch of the economy were required if the goal was to
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,be reached. (U Summary of World Broadcasts #337, 11 Aug 52)
Comment: On 28 May, Premier Vulko Chervenkov stated: "Judging
by the level of industrial production, the Five--Year Plan was ful-
filled at the beginning of 1952." The Premier added that it was
"obvious" that the plan would be fulfilled a year ahead of sched-
ule.
Although the goal of fulfilling the Five-Year Plan in four
years continues to be a primary theme in Bulgarian propaganda,
the optimism manifested earlier this year has recently been tempered
by considerable restraint. It is possible that this modification
of the propaganda line has been occasioned by difficulties or
failures in Bulgarian economic planning.
6. Hungary failing to meet coal production target for 1952:
The US Lega ion at Budapest calculates on t He basis of pub fished
Hungarian data that Hungary is producing only 15 million tons of
coal annually, although the Five-Year Plan target is 18.5 million
tons for 1952. The Legation also estimates that the output per
man shift is probably lower than before the war.
The Deputy Chief of the Hungarian Mine Research Institute
recently called upon miners to use machinery available in mines
in order to raise the coal output per shift and meet the Five-Year
Plan target. (R Budapest 181, 26 Aug 52)
Comment: The campaign to increase coal production recently
has risen to a crescendo, with major stress on use of machinery.
The official party organ on 23 August declared that only 6 of
41 combines in 17 mines were in operation. The newspaper termed
non-use of machinery "sabotage."
Much of Hungary's mine machinery comes.fromthe Soviet Union
and not only is unfamiliar to local workers but is unsuited to
the damp conditions in Hungarian mines.
7. Polish Government centralizes control over rural supply and
purchase cooperatives: In a speech to the first congress o rural
supply and purchase cooperatives on 25 August, Deputy Prime Min-
ister Gede recommended that the Supreme Cooperative Council should
be integrated in the national plan drawn up by the Ministry of In-
ternal Trade. Gede added that the Council should be considered a
powerful organization controlling almost all exchange between the
towns and the countryside. The rural supply and purchase cooper-
atives, he said, should face the task of taking over non-quota
sur lus goods by contract and non-contract purchases. (R FBIS
26 Aug 52) SECRET
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Comment: In May the Polish Government transferred control
over al agricultural machines to state machinery centers. The
centralization of rural supply and purchase activities'constitutes
a further step towards government control of agriculture, and
should strengthen the government's position with regard to future
attempts at collectivization.
Since Gede also occupies the position of Minister of Foreign
Trade, the move possibly may be connected with inter-Orbit economic
cooperation.
8. Rumanian Liberation Day celebrated: The eighth anniversary
of Rumania's alleged "liberation by the Soviet Army" was celebrated
on 23 August. The usual military parade and fly-past were accom-
panied by the usual civilian trudge-past and speeches by Minister
of the Armed Forces Emil Bodnaras, Vice Premier and Party Secretary
Gheorghe Apostol, and Soviet trade union chief V. V. Kuznetsov.
Kuznetsov conveyed greetings from the USSR, congratulated the Ru-
manians on their progress, and stressed the need for increased vig-
ilance both at home and abroad as the advance toward socialism
makes the class struggle more bitter. Vituperative references to
Tito were limited and there was no mention of overthrow of the Tito
regime, in contrast to last year's speeches by Voroshilov.
The American Legation in Bucharest noted that the Soviet dele-
gation under Kuznetsov seemed rather low level compared with that
headed by Voroshilov last year. but that this may be explained by
the Chinese talks in Moscow. reported
that military participation appeared about the same as last year 25X1A
except for the display of some new armored cars, tractor-drawn
medium artillery and heavy self-propelled guns recently received
from the USSR. In addition, 27 YAK-23 jet fighter planes, which
are apparently based at Ianca airfield in eastern Rumania flew
past. No Soviet heavy tanks appeared. (R FBIS 25 25X1A
and 26 Aug; C Bucharest 59, 22 Aug; 25X1A
9. Yugoslavs comment on Soviet Party Congress: The Yugoslav
press on 23 ugus interpreted the timing of the forthcoming
Soviet Party Congress as intended to provide an opportunity for
the USSR to slander and harass Yugoslavia, and to eclipse the
Yugoslav Party Congress, scheduled to convene on 19 October.
It is considered that the Congress in Moscow will not produce
a new "program of Communism," as predicted by Zhdanov and Malenkov
in 1947, but will be merely a monotonous reiteration of old phrases.
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The role of Malenkov as principal speaker at the Congress is an
indication of his increasing strength. Stalin's silence, on the
other hand, is viewed not as a sign that he is fading away, but
as a wise decision not to mouth theories that are unheeded in
practice. In general, the Congress will concentrate on increasing
the existing autocracy, while the possibility of changes in per-
sonnel and foreign policy are deemed unimportant. (U Belgrade 230,
23 Aug 52)
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SECRET
FAR EAST
10a25X1X North Korean labor mobilization office reportedi
a "North Korean Central
Urban Trust" was established last April. This organization,
subordinate to a military committee of the Ministry of Indus-
try, was mobilizing laborers and technicians to construct
public works and defense installations.
The trust's branch offices throughout North Korea were
recruiting, sometimes forcibly, men and women between the
ages of 17 and 50 for the rehabilitation program. These
recruits included many South Koreans who had retreated with
the Communists in September 1950. The wage paid common
laborers was scarcely enough to buy a day's ration of rice,
and all employees found it difficult to leave their jobs.
Comment: Sharply declining morale among North Korean
civil antes has reduced both the industrial and agricultural
output in North Korea and has probably forced the Communist
regime to institute harsher controls on the labor force.
This is the first report of such a trust, however, and its
existence is unconfirmed.
11. Nine high-ranking Nationalist officers reportedly executed
for corrup on: ne high-ranking a ona ist officers report-
Ty were executed in August by order of Chiang Kai-shek. They
were accused of selling US-made uniform material intended for
Nationalist troops and substituting a cheaper Communist-made
material. Only three of the nine men were sentenced to death
by the military court, but Chiang was so irritated by this
obvious case of corruption that he ordered all nine executed.
25X1X
is con-
vin a exchange or materials was engineered by
Chiang Ching-kuo's Political Department to obtain additional
funds for operations.
Comment: The source's explanation does not appear true.
Chiangng-kuo exercises sufficient influence with his
father to have saved these men, if he so desired.
Numerous reports have credited Chiang Kai-shek with
sincerely attempting to decrease corruption among Nationalist
officials.
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12, Additional details of Chinese rice sale to India
repore : The Chinese ommunists reportedly s gne a secret
agreement with India last May whereby the Chinese would be
permitted to ship unlimited amounts of rice through India to
Yatung in Tibet, and India would purchase 100,000 metric
tons of rice at Shanghai or Canton for 581 rupees per ton.
Comment: The general outlines of the above agreement
were announced in May, although it was not known that they
were part of the same agreement. The amount of rice which
can be shipped to Tibet is limited by the difficult mule
trail from Gangtok through Sikkim. The Chinese reportedly
plan to ship ten tons of rice a day over this route, using
about 2,000 mules, and reportedly have armed guards on the
part of the route which is inside Tibet.
The reported price of 581 rupees per ton, equivalent
to $122, is about 20 percent less than the export price of
Thai and Burmese rice in May. If this price is correctly
reported, it is evident that India was given highly favor-
able terms, probably for political reasons.
25X1X
13o Police chief's intimidation may force Thai Premier
resign:
25X1X Premier Phibun may be forced to resign because of
a ion by powerful Police Director General Phao,
If Phao succeeds Phibun as premier, the source believes
that his position will be constantly threatened by Army 25X1A
General Sarit and his Bangkok troops,
Comment: Numerous reports indicate that Phibun's
ability to maintain his position by playing his adversaries
off against each other has diminished and that he may
actually be forced to resign. Most observers doubt, however,
that Phao will become premier without first eliminating Sarito
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Preparation intensified for All-India Peace Congress:
The A ,In a Peace Congress wi o its third session
from 12 to 14 September in Jullundur, Punjab, according to
.a Peiping radio report. Leaders of the peace movement are
taking extensive tours to publicize the meetings. The
report names the prominent leaders of the group and the
areas where they will concentrate their efforts. (R FBIS
25 Aug 52)
Comment: The directors of this group are secondary
leaders. the Indian Communist Party or its more prominent
fellow-travellers, some of whom have recently returned from
extended visits in the USSR and China. Both the location of
this session and the areas which these leaders will visit
have recently been the scene of allegedly Communist-inspired
disturbances, Moreover, these areas are either anti-Congress
or Communist strongholds where the Communists are increasing
their activities against the Congress government.
15. Bey continues
to delay reply on French reform
proposals:
According to a French Residency official, the Bey told Ke-
Tunisian Prime Minister that a reply regarding the proposed
French reforms might not be ready for a "week, two weeks, a
month: why do you bother me?"
Residency officials also stated that one of the reasons
the Bey cannot reply now is because a disagreement has arisen
within the four-member drafting committee. In addition, the
Jewish member has left for France, leaving behind him an
agitated Jewish community which feels that the Jews are
becoming too deeply involved in local politics. (C Tunis
60, 63, 25 Aug 52)
Comment: Since other members of the Bey's advisory
counc gave made trips to Paris to consult government of-
ficials, the departure of the Jewish member does not neces-
sarily bear out the French interpretation that a rupture
has occurred, The Residency has previously exaggerated
racial animosities between the Jewish and native communities.
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Tunisian nationalist suggests modifications of French
program: The .eo es.tour represen a ive In Paris has sug
geto the American Embassy that French-Tunisian under-
standing might bereached-if a "homogeneous" government
were established within afixed period. Under such an
arrangement, the French could continue to handle foreign
affairs and external security; a bilateral agreement could
govern the economic relationship. The Tunisians would ac-
cept in principle an elective all-Tunisian assembly, with
procedures to be determined later, but they stipulated that
Tunisian citizenship would be a prerequisite for any indivi-
dual of French origin who participated in deliberative bodies.
Finally, all repressive measures should be removed and
political detainees released, including Bourghiba who might
be allowed to reside in France. (C Paris 1219, 26 Aug 52)
Comment: These proposals parallel the French program
now under - s udy by the Bey's advisory group, at the same
time closely adhering to the October 1951 demands of the
Chenik cabinet. They may indicate the tenor of the Bey's
eventual reply to Prance.
The statement with regard to Bourghiba is another
indication that rival nationalist leaders are ascendant
and would prefer his permanent absence from Tunisia.
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17. Reorganization of Soviet Control Commission in East Germany
reports imminent: American officials in Germany consider it
qui a possible" that "complete reorganization" of the Soviet
Control Commission (SCC) in East Germany may be imminent. Un-
confirmed reports state that leading personalities of the SCC
are to be replaced by new arrivals from the Soviet Union and that
"field administration" is to be adjusted to conform with the new
district administration of the East German Government.
Reports that important functions of the SCC will be trans-
ferred to the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party and
that the SCC will in the future supervise without "direct inter-
ference" may, in the opinion of American officials in Germany,
presage some kind of Soviet-East German "peace treaty," (S
CINCUSAREUR Heidelberg Weeka 34, F-6, 25 Aug 52)
Comment: Although it is likely that some Soviet adjustments
to the reorganization of the East German Government will ulti-
mately be made, these reports of imminent overhauling of the SCC
appear somewhat premature and contradictory within themselves.
The reportedly planned retention, for example, of local resident
officers subordinate to the SCC and to local army commanders ap-
pears to run counter to the current centralization of authority
within the East German Government under top-level supervision of
the SCC.
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19. France may seek American concessions for ratification of
EDC treaty: France may still attempt to use ratification of
treaty as-a lever to force additional American support
for French policy. This was suggested by a Foreign Ministry
.spokesman's explanation of a reference to "related problems" in
Schuman's message to Secretary Acheson on the US Senate's ap-
proval of the contractual agreement.
Schuman's statement that French ratification of the Bonn and
Paris treaties would involve more difficulties was interpreted by
the spokesman as referring to stronger American support in Indo
china and North Africa'and to additional assurance against German
secession from the EDC. Such assurances would involve replace-
ment by American or British troops of any divisions withdrawn
by the Germans. (C Paris 1196 and 1216, 25 and 26 Aug 52)
Morale of Austrian
Party reported low: Austrian
government officials who follow Communist affairs closely believe
that Austrian Communist Party (KPOe) optimism that economic
deterioration would provide opportunities for Communist exploi-
tation has given way to great pessimism throughout the party
hierarchy. They attribute this development to the party's serious
financial difficulties, public apathy toward Communist propa-
ganda efforts, and lack of Soviet support for the party's
activities.
These Austrian officials state that the Austrian Communists
were particularly dismayed by the absence of a clear-cut Soviet
reaction to the initialing of the West German contractual agree-
ment and by the failure of West German Communists to organize
"strong resistance," Plans of the Austrian Communists to support
the "fierce and decisive struggle" were completely cold-shouldered
by the Administration of Soviet Enterprises (USIA), which continued
to emphasize the necessity for expanded commercial contacts between
it and the West. (S Vienna Desp 152, 21 July 52)
Comment: The Soviet occupation, after apparently considering
increased support for the KPOe, is again contemptuous of the
Austrian Communists as instruments of Soviet policy. Soviet
economic interests may account in considerable degree for present
Soviet satisfaction with the status quo in Austria.
21a Swiss resist new discussions with US on East-West trade
controls: High Swiss officials oppose the sending of a special
met rican mission to discuss additional Swiss controls on East-
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West trade, according to the American Minister in Bern. He states
that the pressure such a mission would have to exercise on the
Swiss during its short visit would be disproportionate to.
probable gains, and recommends that the Legation itself undertake
such negotiations over a period of time. (S Bern 225,. 26 Aug 52)
Comment.: The Swiss have efficiently enforced the East-West
trade controls which they agreed upon in June 1951. Early in
1952, Swiss officials in Washington indicated there would be
little difficulty in arranging discussions regarding the extension
of controls to include items added to the COCOM lists since June
1951. Although the Swiss may be merely trying to drive the best
possible bargain, their present attitude may indicate that they
wish to relate further controls to other problems between them
and the United States.
LATIN AMERICA
25X1X
22, Former Soviet Legation funds reportedly being donated t
Cuban Communist Party.'
(PSP) stated in June that the party would receive 5, a month
from the USSR beginning in July. This amount was formerly al-
located to the Soviet Legation in Havana for expenses, but because
of the "break" in diplomatic relations between Cuba and the USSR,
will now go directly to the PSPO The Soviet Embassy in Mexico
City will give the money to a third party, who will deliver it
to assigned Cuban Communist leaders for monthly transfers to
Cuba.
25X1A
Comment: The Cuban Communist. Party has reportedly been in
financial straits because of a reduction in party membership and
the withdrawal of advertisements from Communist publications by
large-Cuban firms. This addition to the party?s income should
enable it better to carry out its varied activities.
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