TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T01146A001200060002-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 26, 2001
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 15, 1952
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79T01146A001200060002-2.pdf | 232.25 KB |
Body:
Approved For Relbe0e 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00W00060002-2
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
15 August 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
TOP. SECRET SUPPLEMENT
CIA No, 49771
Copy No. 38
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO01200060002-2
Approved For Rel re 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146AO04 00060002-2
TOP SECRET
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE,
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW,
25X1X
1. Albanian Communists reportedly dissatisfied with Hoxha
25X1X
ninety percent of the
population, including a majority of the Communists, will
support any serious attempt to overthrow the present govern-
ment.
The Communists have developed this attitude because of
their disappointment with the Hoxha regime and their belief
that the USSR would not risk a general war to save Albania
after a political coup. Probably no more than. one quarter of
25X1A the police units are loyal to the government, 25X1A
5 Aug 52. FOR CRITICAL SECURITY REASONS this report
is not to be further transmitted within the United States, or
beyond the. borders of the United States, without the express
permission of the releasing office.)
Comment: Reports over the past six months reveal that
increased corruption and disaffection in the Albanian state
apparatus have resulted in the arrest of many secondary Commu-
nist officials, that the army is unreliable, and that resis-
tance bands from Yugoslavia have stepped.up subversive activity.
2. Tripartite notes to Italy and Yugoslavia on Trieste
completed: The US, British an. French Governments have agreed
on tripartite representations to Premier de Gasperi and Mar-
shal Tito urging settlement of the Trieste issue on the basis
of a continuous ethnic line. The note to De Gasperi suggests
that the Italian Government not attempt to demand guarantees
from Tito concerning Yugoslav actions in Zone B of the Free
Territory. The communication to Tito details the apparent
TOP SECRET
1 15 Aug 52
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TOP SECRET
inconsistencies of Yugoslav statements on a solution of the
Trieste problem.
The three governments are prepared, if necessary, to
assure both sides that they will publicly guarantee not to
support any additional., territorial claims following a satis-
factory settlement, (TS S/S London 820, 13 Aug 52)
25X1X
3. 25X1X Spain steps up program for lower living costs:
the Spans textile y
will be permitted to import raw cotton with dollars made avail-
able by the government at the Tangier market rate. Spanish
authorities reportedly hope by this means to break the control
exercised by Tangier over the peseta and gradually lower the
exchange rate to where they believe it belongs, namely,. at 40
25X1A to 45 pesetas to the dollars 13 Aug
52, FOR CRITICAL SECURITY REASONS this report is not to be
further transmitted within the United States, or beyond the
borders of the United States, without the express permission
of the releasing office)
Comment: A more realistic and uniform exchange rate
would undoubtedly contribute toward the expanded production
of textiles at lower prices which the Spanish. Government an-
nounced earlier this year as the next objective in its cam-
paign to reduce living costs. It would also enhance Spain's
position in current negotiations for an equitable exchange
rate for US counterpart funds.
4. Chilean President alarmed at possible Communist and
Argen lne intervention in elections: President onza ez
c a has informed Ambassador Bowers that the democratic
parties of Chile are "deeply alarmed" over the prospects
of former dictator-president Ibanez in the 4 September pre-
sidential elections. He attributed much of Ibanez' strength
to Argentine financial support, and believes that the
13
August strikes in the copper, coal, and nitrate mines
were
manifestations of Communist alignment with Ibanez.
The President mentioned his hope that the
United
States
Government will "permit" American companies in
Chile
to give
financial help to the rightist or center-left
forces,
(S
S/S Santiago 51, 13 Aug 52)
2 15 Aug 52
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TOP SECRET
Comment: Although Ibanez does not have the support of
large, organized parties, he does have wide popular appeal
and might well command not only the Communist vote but also
considerable support from parties. now aligned behind other
candidates.
It is likely that Ibanez has been receiving support
from Argentina, but there has been little definite information
to indicate its nature and extent.
3 15 Aug 52
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001200060002-2
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Approved For Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T01146AQQ1200060002-2
TOP SECRET
FORM 26 UEE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. TOP SECRET l40l
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