CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A001000100001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 26, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Copy No.
26 May 1952
OCI No. 5188
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
267
DIA, DOS, OSD, ARMY Declassification/Release Instructions on File
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
1, HICOG Berlin analyzes possible reaction to signing of
Western agreements: The Soviet-East German reaction to t e
signing of l He contractual agreement and the EDC treaty is
not apt to be accompanied by moves likely to provoke war,
according to evidence available to US officials in Berlin.
It is expected that the German Democratic Republic will be
given more ostensible sovereignty and expanded authority over
transportation and communications. The US officials envisage
further isolation of the East zone p pulation from Western
Germany, along with tighter Communist Party control in the
Soviet zone.
With regard to Berlin, the USSR is expected to in-
tensify its harassment short of bringing about a full block-
ade and to concentrate on moves designed to affect morale
and economic stability. (S Berlin 1390, 23 May 52)
Comment: A further reaction is likely to be the ex-
pansionhe East.German alert police beyond its present
strength of 52,000..
20 Communist trade union organizer for Caribbean detained:
The American Consul in Jamaica repor ed tat er nan
Smith, Secretary for American, Canadian and Caribbean Affairs
in the World Federation of Trade Unions Vienna headquarters
and head of the newly created WFTU Department of Colonial and
Dependent Countries Affairs, would arrive in New York by air
on 21 May on his way back to Europe. The_Consul recommended
surveillance of Smith's airport contacts and asked in case
of any detention that Smith not be returned to Jamaica.
The Daily Worker of 23 May stated that Smith was ar-
rested at I d Airport and is being"held incommuni-
cado in the Ellis Island concentration camp." (C Kingston 68,
20 May 52; U Daily Worker, 23 May 52)
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Comment. Smith arrived in Jamaica on 24 April but was
refusecT entrance to Trinidad. Correspondence since January
between him and the London WFTU Publications Office has con-
cerned the advisability of sending a WFTU representative to
the Caribbean area.
Smith, who lived in the United States for 30 years but
was never granted citizenship, left the country to escape
deportation about 3 years ago. He is a Jamaican negro with
wide experience in leftist trade union, racial and other US
organizations and is well qualified to contact labor leaders
in an attempt to win affiliations, to counter efforts of the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to organize
the area, and to stir up the Communist campaign against
"Anglo-American oppressors." It was reported that his trip
would also provide material for a special series of WFTU
articles on the Caribbean area.
3. Progress made on 1952 Sino-East German trade
Chinese an t e East ermans agree in Marc on t ,act` The
general
provisi
ons of the ro
25X1C ade pact for 1952,
The pact will re
million dollars, This amount will includerWesterntorigin50
merchandise bought by the East Germans for China.
In payment for this merchandise, Chinese goods will be
delivered to various European ports and sold by the East
Germans. The funds thus received, minus a commission for the
East German agents, will be set off against the value of n?r-
chases on hAhn 7 f -P ri..4
Comment: The 1951 Sino-East German trade pact was an-
nouncea_ in October 19500 Communist failure thus far to an.
pounce the 1952 agreement indicates that substantial differ-
ences still exist between the negotiating parties. The USSR
is said to be bringing pressure for the conclusion of the
agreement despite East German dissatisfaction over Chinese
performance under the 1951 pact,
4. Indonesians report USSR disinterested in low grade rubber:
Two Indonesian de ,gates to t e Moscow Economic on erence
reported upon their return to Djakarta that the Soviet Union
was interested in purchasing Indonesian rubber, but "hedged'
when asked if it would accept low grade rubber. The delegates
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said that the USSR could furnish ships to transport Indo-
nesian products if Indonesia would supply bunker oil for the
return trip. (C Djakarta Joint Weeka 73, 23 May 52)
Comment: Indonesian Government circles and rubber pro-
ducers lave claimed that the cessation of American purchases
of low grade rubber has seriously decreased prices and has
created a backlog of unsold low grade rubber in Indonesia,
One Indonesian delegate to the Moscow conference asserted
that the Soviet Union was interested in Indonesia's low
grade rubber.
Sudjatmoko, also a member of the Indonesian delegation,
emphatically denied that the Soviet wanted low grade rubber.
He said that the USSR only desired higher grades.
EASTERN EUROPE
5. Tito regime self-consciously attacks "reactionary"
influences: The ugos av mmun t Government is reacting
against "unfriendly" influences which are adversely affecting
its religious and agricultural policies and, indirectly, its
control of the country.
In April, the regime's attitude toward the United States
information program in Yugoslavia stiffened, indicating that
Yugoslav'Communist leaders were becoming apprehensive of the
effect of the program.
Also in April, the official Communist Party organ Borba
referred to "unfriendly elements" who were emphasizing tie
importance of general agricultural cooperatives to the detri-
ment of the peasant working cooperatives. The latter is the
Communist-approved collective farming enterprise, and the
effect of the Borba article is to reaffirm the regime's past
policy of applying varying degrees of pressure to force inde-
pendent farmers into collectives.
On 20 May, a Borba editorial by the Vice Premier of the
Slovene Republic attacked the Catholic Bishop of Ljubljana
for writing a circular letter which the editorial claimed
was a "public attack on our state policy and ... our edu-
cational policy." The Bishop was characterized as an
"incorrigible political enemy who is particularly dangerous
because he hides under the cloak of protector of religion."
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The strong language used caused.United States observers to
speculate that the editorial might be the prelude to an
intensification of the goyernment's drive'on organized re-
ligion, (C Belgrade Desp '992, 22 Apr 52; R Belgrade Desp
993, 22 Apr 52; C Belgrade";1467, 21 May 52)
Comment: These actions further reflect the regime's
apprehension concerning its hold over Communist supporters
who have been uneasy because of Tito's general rapprochement
with the capitalist West.
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Japan plans gradual pressure to oust Soviet mission:
The Japanese Government plans to force the departure of the
remaining members of the Soviet mission by gradual pressure and
attrition without taking any "spectacular" action, according to
Ambassador Murphy. Although nothing has been done to restrict
the movements of the Soviet personnel, the government is keeping
them under close surveillance and granting them no facilities.
The Japanese Foreign Office has received no request from the .
Soviet representative to give him a formal status. (C Tokyo 242,
23 May 52)
Comment: The Japanese Government is seeking to transmit
a note to the USSR through a third party stating that the
Soviet mission, formerly attached to the defunct Allied Council
for Japan, no longer has legal status. Japan's recent firm
attitude toward the USSR suggests that it is determined not to
accept a subordinate status in its dealings with the Soviet
Union.
Japanese plan to relax export controls: The American Em-
bassy in Tokyo has been formally approached by the Japanese
Government for the American reaction to a relaxation of export
controls on shipments to Communist China. Japan proposes to
ship galvanized sheets, dyestuffs, wool yarn, knit goods, and
textile machinery in return for iron ore, coke, soybeans and
other products.
The approach was based on the expectation of increasing
Diet demands that Japanese restrictions not exceed those of
Western Europe. Ambassador Murphy recommends that the United
States offer no objection. (C Tokyo 240, 23 May 52)
Comment: For some time Yoshida's government has been
under in-' creasing pressure from political and trade groups to
reduce controls to the level exercised by Japan's western
European competitors. .
A relaxation of Japan's controls may encourage similar
action elsewhere in the Far East. Galvanized sheets, for ex-
ample, which the Japanese propose to export to the Chinese
Communists, cannot legally be shipped from Hong Kong to China.
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8. Japanese correspondent in Moscow without government per.-
mission: yo o correspon ent Jiro a a a proceeded to Moscow
n earn May without the Japanese Government's permission,
25X1C His mission is to try to seek'
information concerning the 300,000 missing Japanese POW's.
Upon the invitation of the Soviets, Sakata left Moscow around
16 May for Peiping where he may trv to interview high Commu-
nist officials. 25X1A
Comment: Soviet authorities approved Kyodo's application
to senrrespondent to Moscow last February, but the
Japanese Foreign Office's attitude ward his passport request
previously has been unclear. Sakata was a Moscow correspondent
before and during World War II.
9. May Day riot may have been unauthorized by JCP: The Tokyo
May Day riot may ave een nst gate y ca Communist leaders
without the approval of party headquarters, according to Japan-
ese press reports. The chief of the party's military affairs
committee has allegedly submitted a report to the "politburo"
condemning the riot as an "unskillful performance staged by
a few biased elements.,. without party sanction." The Japanese
police suspect that the JCP may be attempting to camouflage its
responsibility for the riot. (R CINCFE INTSUM, 10 May 52)
Comment: The localized nature of the riot and its unpro-
pitiousBing from the Communist standpoint, lend credence
to the possibility that it was staged by local elements acting
on their own initiative. The disorders have caused the govern-
ment to take stronger anti-subversive measures, weakened the
JCP's popular front campaign, and alienated labor.
10. Forming of South Korean political assassination groups
repor 621 : Wit presi en as a ec ions approxIma Ie i__mo__n_fh
away, oth administration forces and opposition leaders in
South Korea are formin assassination gangs,
25X1C Followers o' res en
Rhee have organized secret police units to murder ranking oppo-
sition leaders. Meanwhile, the opposition has recruited a
"team of trained gunmen" whose targets are members of Rhee's
Comment: Rhee's overwhelming victory in recent local elec-
tions,, coed with his systematic intimidation of opposition
legislators, has steadily strengthened his position vis-a-vis
the legislature and increased his chances of being re-elected
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by the National Assembly. This report may be a deliberate
leak designed to bring additional pressure on the opposition
in the Assembly.
11. Rhee reputedly supporting Sin Hungu's presidential
candidacy: n ungu, r, ugh ynn, who recently announced
~a~s candidacy for the presidency, was encouraged to do s
President Rhee
Otixir
Hung Sa Dan between Sin and ex-prime Minister Chang Mvon.
support of the opposition Democratic Nationalist Party and the
Comment: Sin is at the moment the only avowed candidate.
It is conceivable that Rhee urged him to run in order to
weaken Chang as well as to confuse the opposition in the
National Assembly. The Hung Sa Dan is a secret political
brotherhood with representatives in several conservative South
Korean groups.
25X1 C
25X1A
25X1A
12. Mobilization plan to increase powers of Chiang Kai-shek:
The Chinese ationa, ss a ne on prl a opts a mo i -
zation program designed to increase Chiang Kai-shek's emergency,
powers and thus free him from legislative restraint. A mobi-
lization committee is being established which will receive
orders directly from the President and will administer the
pro ram throw h the a ro riate government channels. 25X1A
25X1A
Comment: Although the emergency powers granted to the
President n 1948 by the National Assembly are broad, they are
subject to modification or abrogation by the Legislative Yuan.
During the past year the Legislative Yuan has shown an
unprecedented degree of independent action which has reportedly
displeased Chiang.
13.
25X1 C
Chinese incursion
three -Chinese battalions have entered Indo-
china and are aiding the Viet Minh 148th Regiment in a clean-
up operation against French-supported tribal ast
of Lao Kay. 25X1A
Comment: A Chinese incursion of this area against non-
Frenc roops is not improbable; however, in view of inadequate.
intelligence on this area, the reported strength of such a
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force must be treated with reserve. Since the French evacuation
of this border area in late 1950, the anti-Viet Minh effort
there has been largely in the hands of French-supported tribal
guerrillas-. This report indicates_ 3,ts effectiveness .
14. French general views situation in Tonkin: During a recent
interview, enera Linares, cowman er.a French ground forces
in Tonkin,. seemed well satisfied with recent operations against
the Viet Minh and said he currently had "no major troubles."
He told the American Consul in Hanoi that Viet Minh forces have
been ordered to remain quiet for the time being and to engage
only in small operations, but that French forces were prepared
to effect an encirclement of any units which might attempt a
major move.
Linares. also stated that, on the assumption that the Viet
Minh during the current harvest period will stockpile rice with-
in the delta and attempt to move it out gradually, the French
problem will be one of blocking the removal of rice rather than
preventing Viet Minh entry into the harvest area. (S Hanoi
767, 20 May 52)
Comment: The French recognize the possibility that the.
Viet Min may launch an attack on the defense perimeter to
divert attention from Viet Minh rice-collecting efforts in
the delta. Linares' appraisal of the problem within the
delta emphasizes the seriousness of Viet Minh infiltration and
is a tacit admission that French defenses along the perimeter
are inadequate to prevent the smuggling out of rice, a view
recently expressed by a French civil official.
15. Indochina situation aggravated by deteriorating conditions,
25X1C The political situation in Cambodia is con-
t nuing to disintegrate. Many government members tacitly support
former Premier Thanh, who has gone underground against the
French. There is no proof, however, that Thanh has as yet
agreed to cooperate with Viet Minh elements in Cambodia, although
the latter are attempting to reach an agreement with him.
Meanwhile, the presence of Viet Minh units in Laos is a
security problem to the French. If these forces were reinforced,
they would constitute a serious threat to the Laotian Government.
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Comment: Cambodian restiveness under French controls is
becomig aa major problem in Indochina. Thanh?s popnlar.ity in
the government, in Parliament and among the people is very
great and could stimulate a general rebellion similar to that
in Vietnam. French handling of the situation has been inept,
according to the American Legation in Saigon.
Burmese estimate insurgent strength: The American Army
Attache in 'Rangoon reports a t e Bu se War Office estimates
that organized insurgent strength is now 15,000 troops. This
figure is 5,000 less than the December estimate and does not
include groups of 100 or less. bandits or Chinese Nationalists.
The Attache comments that he expects the present attri
tion fate of 200 insurgents per month to decline during
the monsoons which have just commenced. (C USARMA 60, Rangoon,
21 May 52)
Comment: It is doubtful that the Burmese army accounted
for 5,Rnsurgents since December.
Since large numbers of insurgent groups operate with
less than 100 persons and the number of bandits is unknown,
it is obvious that government forces are far from restoring
complete internal security.
17. Airdrops to Karen insurgents reported: 25X1C
25X1C , a 1111gfit un en i ied aircraft" on about
1 May dropped 100,000 rounds of small arms ammunition to the
Karen insurgents in eastern Burma. 25X1C
this was the fifth such dropping in the past two years. A
surrendered Karen officer is alleged to have informed the
Burmese Premier of this activity. 25X1A
Comment: There have been other low-level reports of
outsi a ass stance tothe Karens in eastern Burma. The relia-
bility of this. report is questionable, however, since it is
doubtful that-anything smaller than a C-47 could handle a load
of 100,000 rounds of small arms ammunition.
The Burmese. Government has thus far given no indication
that it has received reports of aid to the Karens.
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18. Afghanistan negotiating with USSR for installation of oil
storage tanks near a u o German employee of the Afghan
U5vernmEnt petrol monopoly states that the Afghan Government
is now negotiating with the USSR for the installation of oil
storage tanks of 300,000 gallons capacity on the outskirts of
Kabul.
The American Embassy in Kabul comments that this would be
the first development project undertaken by the Soviet Union?
south of the Hindu Kush Mountains. (C Weeka 20, Kabul 484,
22 May 52)
Comment: Earlier reports have stated that Soviet interest
in sou i~Te`rn Afghanistan is increasing.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
19. Ambitious Cyrenaican threatens position of Libyan Prime
Minister: Acting r me n s er a e ia, an opportunistic
yrena can, has become a.serious challenger for the position
of Prime Minister Muntasser,who is now vacationing in Europe.
American Minister Villard in Tripoli points out that Kekhia has
increasingly strengthened his own position with the King at the
expense of Muntasser.
Villard warns that the formation of a Libyan Government
under the ambitious Kekhia would be a further step in the
trend toward the expansion of Cyrenaican influence over that
of the more important, populous province of Tripolitania.
(C Tripoli 694, 23 May 52)
Comment: The replacement of Muntasser in the. premiership
would resu in the loss of a responsible Tripolitanian leader.
He has consistently supported Western objectives in Libya and
has played an important part in the formation of united inde-
pendent Libya.
20. Egyptian Minister of Interior again advocates reform
program: Minister of-the Interior Maraghi a a ec are he
is working on a reform program which he hopes to submit to
King Farouk within the next six weeks,
25X1C Maraghi Pasha believes that Egypt has no time
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to lose and does not think it can expect American assistance
unless the government is determined to effect extensive
reforms.
The Minister thinks that any reform program,.wouldhave,
to be imposed by forte, which he would not hesitate to use
with Farouk's backing. If the King is udwilling to support
the reform, Maraghi stated that he would be faced with the
dilemma of doing nothing or leading a revolution,which. he
does not wish to do.
Comment: There is no indication that Maraghi Pasha, who
has been mentioned as a possible successor to Prime Minister
Hilali Pasha, would be able on his own to obtain sufficient
support for drastic social and economic reforms.
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21. Italy again seeks American-British pressure on Yugoslavia
about r este t Under ear etary o ore gn Affair s has
expressed to General Winterton, British commander of Zone A of
Trieste, his government?s view that no progress can be made
toward a final solution of the Trieste problem until the United
States and Britain put pressure on Yugoslavia to cooperate;
Belgrade, he said, would also have to install a United Nations
type administration in Zone B.
Although he assured Wianterton that Italy will carry out
loyally the decisions made recently in London on increased
Italian participation In the administration of Zone A, the
Italian spokesman insisted that direct negotiations between Italy
and Yugoslavia cannot continue unless the above steps are taken.
(C Trieste 1138, 23 May 52)
Comment: The Yugoslav reactions to increased Italian
partT-aonn in the administration of Zone A of Trieste and
the use of this issue in the recent electoral campaign have
made Italian spokesmen more intransigent on this question.
There have been no indications that the Italian Government is
planning to make any concessions.
22, Standing Group approves EDC treaty draft as fulfilling NATO
requirements- The taan ang roup an t e Military Repre-
sentatives-committee have informed the North Atlantic Council
that, from the point of view of military effectiveness, the
EDC treaty and its annexed protocols would fulfill the require-
ments set forth in the Brussels and Lisbon decisions for
obtaining German participation in Western defenses (S NATO
SG 333 to Paris, 20 May 52)
Comment: Approval by the North Atlantic Council will
represent
he final step by NATO in the complicated negotiations
over its relationship with the European Defense Community. The
complexity of these negotiations stems-from the necessity of
integrating the European Defense Force, including West German
troops, into the NATO defensive system without extending NATO
membership to the German Federal Republic.
23. European countries
NATO maintenance costs as further
threa to t e r ece~agom es : p~c i a 1eg~resenta t eve n urope
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Draper reports that the European NATO countries are already
concerned about the burden which the maintenance costs of their
NATO forces will impose upon their economies. He expects them
to ask, in connection with the NATO annual review, whether the
United States plans to continue to underwrite most of the dollar
maintenance costs of NATO forces after their build-up is
completed.
Unless the United States assumes for an indefinite time
most of this dollar burden, which Draper estimates as one billion
dollars annually, the Europeans may insist that they cannot
maintain present force goals, thus endangering even the pro-
posed 1953 build-up, (S Paris POLTO 1286, 22 May 52)
Comment.- This problem has major political significance
for m??opean countries which have obtained public ac-
ceptance of economic measures necessary to achieve their NATO
force goals by promising a subsequent lowering of military
budgets. Continuous maintenance costs, which include spare
parts and replacement of equipment largely American-made, are
likely not only to prevent appreciable reduction in defense
expenditures, but also to continue the dollar drain which
plagues European economies.
24, West German Government will attempt early ratification of
contractual agreement. era Repu c cos tiona ea ers Will
press ar amens or ratification of the Allied-German contractual
agreement before it adjourns on 20 July. They believe that
prompt American ratification of the treaty would greatly improve
chances of early acceptance of the treaty by German legislators.
High Commissioner McCloy comments that West German ratifi-
cation will surely be delayed if the United States Senate fails
to approve the document during its present session, or if Allied-
Russian talks are held on German unification in the near future.
(S Bonn 2977, 21 May 52)
Communist youth schedule large rallies in rural Austria-
The Commune st Free Austrian Youth a is arranging two
national youth meetings for 30 May in the British and American
Zone cities of Bruck an der Mur and Linz Approximately 25,000
delegates, including representatives from East and West Germany,
France, Italy, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, are expected to
attend.
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26.
Although headquarters for the Linz meeting will be in the
Soviet-occupied suburb of Urfahr, main events are expected to
take place in Linz'. Propaganda at both meetings will allegedly
stress the peace theme. 25X1A
Comment: Such a. large attendance would undoubtedly be far
more mi pressive in provincial Austria than in Vienna. The
Austrian Communist theoretic monthly, which has been highly
critical of the youth organization, has billed the Whitsuntide
rallies as a preparation for intensified youth activity.
conversation as to the sincerity of Austrian Socialist leaders.
According to him, the Socialists are not interested in economic
stabilization measures, but are using threats of withdrawal from
the coalition to gain American support for Socialist objectives.
leader questions anti-Communist record
of Austrian Socialists o e iple ? s Pa ?ty Chairman Ju Rha
reports y expresse considerable doubt in a recent private
In considering measures to counteract Socialist influence
in America, Raab allegedly asserted that this would be difficult
because of the Socialists' better public relations and their
good anti-Communist record. This record, Raab believes, holds
good only in the short run, for the Socialists would ultimately
weaken Austria's Western connections, both ideologically and
economically, 25X1A
Comment: Raab's views, if accurately reported, are
demonse of the political tensions aroused by current
coalition disputes. American-supported economic reforms have
met opposition from both sides, and both parties have probably
used American fear of a break in the coalition to achieve their
own ends.
There is no evidence that the Socialists are insincere in
their vigorous anti-Communist stand. Raab's questioning of their
sincerity, however, probably portends exploitation of the "Marxist
origins" of the Socialists in future election campaigns.
27. Plans for British youth "peace" festival meet with little
success: Prepara ons or the Communist-supported youth peace"
esval to be held at Sheffield from 30 May to 2 June are not
meeting with much success, according to the British Foreign Office.
Only 1,800 of the hoped-for 5,000 participants have enrolled so
.far. Due to the efforts of the Labor Party, the Trades' Union
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Congress, and responsible youth organizations, the Communist
character of the Congress has been widely publicized.
There will be no change in the recent government policy of
prohibiting foreigners from entering Britain for the specific
purpose of participating in Communist activities. Festival
organizers are believed to be trying to arrange for large numbers
of foreign delegates from countries which do not require visas
to arrive together at one point of entry to attract attention.
(C London 5340, 23 May 52)
Comment.- The 5,000 participants were expected to include
4,000 was, 500 university students, and 500 colonials resident
in Britain. The festival is expected to promote the usual Com-
munist themes: the call for sabotage of rearmament efforts, and
the need for improved social and economic conditions.
Plot against Argentine Government reported: The followers
of Co one uarez are repot y aga n p ott ng a revolution
against the Argentine Government. Peron is said to be aware of
the plot and planning to call before 4 June a mass labor
demonstration placing the blame on the United States. (S Buenos
Aires 806, 23 May 52)
Comment: Retired Colonel Jose F. Suarez was arrested in
June 1 and again in early 1952 for plotting against Peron.
There is no indication of the strength of his backing, but the
government's knowledge of the plot should enable it to take
sufficient precautionary measures.
There have been many reports of a new revolutionary attempt
before Peron's inauguration on 4 June, but there has been no
indication of how such an attempt could successfully evade
Peron's rigorous security controls. Peron might, however,
exploit any real or imaginary revolutionary planning to strengthen
his attacks against the United States.
29. Cabinet changes reported possible in Bolivia: The Bolivian.
Government suspects that German Bu ron, Minis tar of Labor, may
be acting as an informant for the military Junta which was ousted
in the April coup, no im-
mediate action will be taken against Butron because the government
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SECRET
fears that measures against him might provoke anti-government
reaction by labor.
25X1A the government may use
this situation to develop a pretext for "house cleaning" all
its leftist members, including Juan Lechin, Minister of Mines.
Comment: Any effort in the foreseeable future to oust Juan
Lechihis government post would almost certainly start a
serious and bloody revolt because of his popularity with the
important organized mine labor. The government's fears of taking
any immediate action against Butron also seem well founded.
30. General Estillac Leal defeated in Brazilian Military Club
election: m e election o Brazilian ary Club officers
for the 1952?1954 term, General Alcides Etchegoyen won with
8,288 votes. General Estillac Leal received only 4,489 votes.
25X1A (R FBIS 22 May 52)
Comment: The Military Club, which all active and reserve
off icers o the armed forces are eligible to join, is extremely
powerful as a lobbying organization. The recent election was an
important test of extremist strength, with ultranationalists and
Communists supporting General Estillac Leal. Estillac's campaign
pronouncements had stressed the dangers of foreign investment,
particularly in petroleum, and had accused the opposition of.
grossly overstating the menace of Communism in Brazil.
31, Remon retains heavy lead in Panama's presidential elections:
Preliminary a e_ on returns In Panama g ve pregiNntial can
date Jose Remon a commanding 2-to-1 lead over Roberto Chiari.
Remon considers himself the president-elect.
Chiari has privately admitted defeat, but charges Remon
supporters with fraud and intimidation and says he intends to
contest the election results "by all legal means." Chiari
supporters have filed a petition with the National Electoral
Jury demanding the annulment of the election results on the
grounds of fraud. Norberto Navarro, candidate for first vice
president on the Chiari ticket, warns that if the electoral jury
approves the election "farce," he will be "ready, firm and
determined" to lead the fight against dictatorship. (U Panama
City 974, 22 May 52; C Panama City 970, 21 May 52)
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Comment: The National Electoral Jury contains a majority
of Remon supporters and is not expected to question the election
results. As the former Commandant of Police, Remon has the
support of the Panama. National Police which, barring unforeseen
events, is capable of assuring his inauguration on 1 October.
The Communists played a completely insignificant role in
the presidential election.
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 z2 /
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TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
26 May 1952
CIA No. 4 9673
Copy No. 46
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
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 Approved For R%Wase 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP79T01146 '1000100001-0
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
1. Formosa allegedly to be invaded "soon". A onetime Finnish
offic a , now a prominent a ow- rave er, claims to have been
told by a "Chinese general" that Formosa is "soon" to be in-
vaded. (TS USARMA Helsinki 522, 21 May 52)
Comment-, A Chinese Communist military attache may have
made is assertion. Peiping's leaders frequently state,
publicly and privately, their intention of acquiring control
of Formosa, but do not commit the regime to any deadline for
the operation.
The spring is a favorable season for an attempted in-
vasion of Formosa. There are no indications, however, of
Communist preparations for an attempt in the near future.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2. Soviet Union protests against American military aid to
Iran-, The note delivered to Iran on May is the first
official Soviet reaction to Mossadeq's agreement on 24 April
to the renewal of American military aid. Earlier, the Soviet
Ambassador in Iran was said to be "furious"-over its resump-
tion, and his absence from the opening session of the Majlis
on 27 April was interpreted as an unofficial expression of
Soviet displeasure.
While the note, the first sent to Iran since 1950, would
appear routine Soviet policy, the Russian trade delegation in
Iran has now reversed its position and insisted that oil be
included in the list of exports under the pending Iranian-
Soviet trade agreement. The protests, therefore, would appear
timed to force Iran to agree to the Soviet terms, as well as
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to reconsider renewal of American ''military aid.
Should Iran consent, the USSR might attempt to import
at least a token oil shipment in order to force the United
States tm.suspend assistance. (Factual data from?U-FBIS
Ticker, 23 May; C Tehran 4233, 2 May; S S/S Tehran 4443, 17
May 52)
4. King Talal may not be allowed to return to Jordan: The
Council of Ministers, which rules Jordan in the absence of
King Talal, has taken steps to authorize French officials to
make the King take the medical treatment deemed necessary for
his recovery.
The British Minister in Amman believes that the Council
of Ministers does not intend to allow the King to return to
the country unless the medical authorities approve. He states
that if Talal should return without approval, he would have
the status of a private person and the Council would continue
to rule. (S S/S Amman 368, 21 May 52)
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Comment: The King's deteriorating health has been so
marke abnormal conduct recently that the Prime Minister
and the Council of Ministers have questioned his capacity to
rule. They hope that proper medical treatment will enable
him to continue in power at least until May 1953, when he
could abdicate in favor of his son who will then be of age.
5. Revolutionary elements reportedly ready to
renew Carib-
bean ac v es: The Panamanian Consul General in Costa ca
has informed s government that preparations are being made
to run substantial amounts of arms, including over 5,00 machine
guns, from that country to Panama. The Panamanian Minister
of Government says that the shipments are destined for Vene-
zuela.
Meanwhile, Ambassador Wiley reports that US Army intelli-
gence in Panama has information that the Caribbean Legion is
moving arms to the west coast of Costa Rica. (S S/S Panama
City 971, 22 Mar 52)
Comment: The arms may be coming from the plantation of
Jose ggueres, ex-President of Costa Rica whose name has long
been linked with activities of the Caribbean Legion, a hetero-
geneous group of political exiles whose aim is the overthrow
of dictatorships.
The weapons could be destined for any number of trouble
spots in the area: Panama, where anti-Remon forces threaten
to challenge by force the results of the 11 May election;
Colombia and Venezuela, where arms reportedly have been
smuggled to opposition groups recently: or Ecuador, where
political conditions are highly unstable with the approach
of the 1 June presidential elections.
TOP SECRET
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