CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A001000080001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 22, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
22 May 1952
OCI No. 5186
Copy No.267
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
DIA, DOS, OSD Declassification/Release Instructions on File
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
DIA, DOS, OSD AND USAF REVIEW COMPLETED
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
1. USSR informally suggests Finland join the Nordic
25X1 C Council: 1 1, Soviet
m assador Rodionov in Stockholm in late April expressed the
view to the Finnish Minister there that Finland should join
the Nordic Council. The Soviet Ambassador also made a simi-
lar statement to Swedish Prime Minister Erlander prior to
the latter's recent trip to the United States.
25X1C Finnish Premier
Kekkonen will attempt to keep Finlan out of the Council for
the present. 25X1A
Comment,. If the report of Rodionov statement is cor-
rect, would appear to be another Russian effort to
weaken Scandinavian support of NATO.
Several months ago Denmark proposed the formation of a
Nordic Council, to be composed of representatives from
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland. The Council would
serve as an advisory committee dealing with problems common
to its members and recommend legislation to each of the
Parliaments. Denmark and Sweden are willing to participate
and it appears that 'Iceland and Norway will join, despite
some domestic opposition.
2. Czech jets make identification passes at Belgian air-
liner- On 19 May ree MIG-15's made identification passes
within about 700 feet of a Belgian airliner flying in-
side its corridor over Czechoslovakia. No attempt was
made to interfere with the plane's line of flight., The
United States Embassy in Prague warns that a corridor or
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border violation may result in more drastic action by Czech
jet interceptors. (S Prague Unnumbered, 20 May 52)
Comment: This incident could be a Czech warning of
potent-al unpleasantness if Belgium and the Netherlands fail
to grant a Czech request for reciprocal flight rights.
Czechoslovakia has been pressing both the Netherlands and
Belgium for several months to grant it landing rights in
order to re-establish its air routes to Western Europe which
were cut off on 10 September.
3. _ iCzechoslovakia pushes export measures to offset American
earn o Tars by exports and thus overcome American economic
sanctions,r 1.
It has undertaken an "export offensive" to all countries
which can pay in dollars, especially in Latin America, and
it is probing for means to re-export Czech goods to the
United States through third countries in Western Europe and
25X1 C
Latin America, as of March, no re- 25X1C
25X1A export deals had been put through from Mexico, 25X1A
Comment: There have been a few indications that the
Czechs are rying to re-enter the United States market
through Mexico and by direct shipments of goods valued at
less than one hundred dollars, for which consular invoices
are not necessary.
Large quantities of Czech ethyl alcohol and Czech and
Polish naphthalene are reportedly being offered for sale to
the Unitea States from West Germany. The sale of the ethyl
alcohol alone reportedly would realize some three million
dollars.
4. Hungary seeks North African trade: Hungarian partici-
pation in e Algiers fair is interpreted by the American
Legation in Budapest as part of a drive to expand trade with
underdeveloped areas. Hungary exhibited heavy machinery,
electrical equipment, textiles and leather goods. (R USARMA
Budapest L-2888, 16 May 52; R FBIS Budapest, 15 May 52)
Comment: Budapest's interest in developing trade with
the Levant and North Africa has been pointed up by Hungarian
participation in local trade fairs in the area. "Hectic"
preparations for the Beirut spring exhibit were reported
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recently by a Budapest trade journal. Among the Hungarian
industrial products to be shown at Beirut were machine tools,
electrical machines and appliances, radios, railway, trains
and equipment, river and sea-going vessels, X-ray s~ppliances,
drugs and chemicals. Hungary's trade with Algeria has ap-
parently been negligible in the past.
Yugoslav estimate of Satellite strength: The Yugoslav
intelligence chief recently informed a Army Attache
in Belgrade that his government does not visualize any out-
break of hostilities with the neighboring Satellites in the
predictable future. The general staff estimates that Rumania
and Albania remain negligible in combat potential, whereas
the Hungarian armed forces are continuing to expand, and
now possess qualities which must be reckoned with.
In an earlier conversation with Ambassador Allen., Marshal
Tito stated that Bulgaria was Yugoslavia's most dangerous
Satellite neighbor. (S USARMA Belgrade 370, 20 May 52)
Comment: In the pasty Yugoslav estimates have indi-
cated considerable scorn for the military capabilities of
the neighboring Satellites, except Bulgaria.
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6, Japan seeking United States assistance in demarche to
the U : T Fie, Jaii-a-nese Government as made Informal nqu ries
concerning the willingness of the United States to act as
intermediary in delivering a note to the Soviet Government.
The note would notify the USSR that Japan considers the Soviet
Mission in Japan "null and void." (C Tokyo 190, 22 May 52)
Comment: The Swedish Foreign Office refused a similar
request from the Japanese Government to act as intermediary.
7. Smuggling of critical materials from Japan indicated:
The American massy in To yo as rece ve reports that
Japanese smuggling activities, formerly limited primarily to
consumer goods, are now being expanded to include goods on
the export control lists. The shipments presumably are made
in collusion with customs officials, and it is reported
that fairly large manufacturers and exporters are becoming
increasingly interested in the illegal profits derived from.
these activities. (C Tokyo Desp 1453, 24 Apr 52)
Comment: According to CINCFE, smuggling of strategic
goods, such as machinery, optical instruments and medical
equipment, from Japan to China has now become "big business."
There are indications that large foreign freighters are
playing an increasing role in the smuggling trade.
Extremist elements becoming ac
Japan: Japanese
political alignments during the first weeks of sovereignty
reflect a strong swing both to the left and right from center,
according to Ambassador Murphy. He reports that strong
appeals to Japanese patriotism are being made by both ex-
tremes in an effort to capture national sentiment at its
peak of reaction to the occupation, with the Communists
attempting to seize the advantage by regaining labor leader-
ship and fostering neutralist and anti-rearmament sentiment.
On the extreme right, the return of the wartime leaders to
public life is providing a rallying point for many who.had
silently resisted democratization.
Murphy believes that this development is a reflection of
confused thinking and general restlessness resulting from a
misconception of the US-Japan Security Treaty, as well as
from di,3illusionment and isolation from realities which were
caused by the war and occupation. (S Tokyo 187, 20 May 52)
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9o No indication Chinese Communists intend to expand air
opera ons In Korea: The Par East Air Force_(FEAF)_r__ep_o__r_fs
on 20 May that t ere are no indications that the enemy in-
tends to expand air operations over Korea beyond the present
defense of the Northwest. Only 189 aircraft were sighted in
the past week, but the pilots are becoming more aggressive.
The Communists, FEAF conjectures, may have decided the cost
of extensive combat training was too high, and moved the
majority of jet training back to Manchuria. (S FEAF AX
5193, 20 May 52)
Comment: With at least 350 MIG-15's based on the
Korean or er, the Communists are capable of flying many
more combat sorties than are now observed. Communist air
strength in Manchuria has steadily increased in 1952, and is
estimated at 1,100 planes, including 600 jet fighters.
100 Chinese Communists reportedly want to sell iron ore
Japan: E. Otf an Company n orme the American Consul--Ge-neral
inThong Kong on 16 May that Chinese Communist authorities on
Hainan Island requested the company to arrange the export of
Hainan iron ore to Japan. The form of payment was not
revealed. (C Hong Kong 3074, 16 May 52)
Comment: The Chinese Communists have exported iron ore
only to the Soviet bloc, and they regard it as a strategic
export in the same category as tin, antimony and tungsten.
In 1950 they were negotiating to sell Hainan iron to Japan,
but no shipments were made.
11, French bomb bridge near China border: A bridge at the
Tonkinese town o ong Bang, several miles es from the China
border, was bombed by the French during the past week.
(S Saigon Weeka 20, 18 May 52)
Comment: The proximity of Dong Dang to the China border
lends -s gi nificance to this raid. During Marshal de Lattre's
command the French scrupulously avoided acts which could
provoke China. The bombing of Dong Dang, which probably was
part of the effort to interdict Viet Minh supply lines, may
indicate a revision of this policy; the French may believe
that there is now less danger of an incident with the
Peiping government,
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25X1
Karens and Burmese Communists nearing an alliance: In
early 71pr1l staff-level representatives of t e areas and the
Burmese Communists reached an agreement on joint operations
and the administration of captured areas, 25X1C
1 1. No agreement was reached re-
garding the boundaries of a future Karen state.
While feeling that a complete alliance with the Commu-
nists is inevitable, the top Karen leadership is reportedly
stalling for time in the hope of receiving military assis-
tance from other sources. 25X1A
25X1A1
Comment: This is the latest in a series of reports
indicating progress toward an alliance between the two major
insurgent forces in Burma.
13. Burmese hope to send delegation to Peiping peace confer-
ence: The pro-Communist Burma Trade non Congress is 25X1X
reported to have chosen a four-man delegation to atten e
forthcoming "peace" conference in Peiping. Although the
delegates have already obtained their passports from the
government there ar ies to overcome"
before they leave. the'delay is 25X1X
caused by the hesitancy of the Chinese Communist Embassy to
finance the entire tripe (C Rangoon 1115, 20 May 52)
Comment: This report illustrates the contradictory
Burmese policies regarding Communist activities,
The Chinese Communist Embassy has been reported by other
sources to be financing the activities of various pro-Commu-
nist groups in Burma,
14, University exchange established between Indonesia, USSR,
and China: semi-official n onesian news agency reported
from Amsterdam that members of Indonesia's delegation to the
Moscow Economic Conference succeeded in establishing exchange
arrangements between the Gadjah Mada and Islam Universities
in DjokjakArta and universities in Moscow and Peiping. For
the present the exchange will be limited to scientific mater-
ial, although the Moscow University is willing to accept
Indonesian students. (R FBIS Djakarta, 20 May 52)
Comment: As far as is known, no student exchange program
has ex s"-steed heretofore between universities in Indonesia and
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Communist-controlled countries. However, small groups of
Chinese students leave Indonesia monthly to pursue higher
education in Communist China, and Indonesians are known to
be studying in the eastern European Satellite countries.
In June 1951, a Chinese-language daily in Djakarta took
special note of the "first" Indonesian going to Communist
China to study. There has been no previous report of
Indonesian students going to Moscow to study.
15. The forthcoming parliamentary elections in Ceylon:
Indications are that t He pro-Western United National arty
(UNP) coalition government led by Prime Minister Dudley
Senanayake will win a narrow victory in parliamentary elec-
tions to be held between 24 and 30 May.
The government's recent disenfranchisement of most
Indians living in Ceylon will not be a decisive issue in the
elections.
The UNP apparently has lost little strength and popular
support since the previous Prime Minister's death in March.
A reported coalition of the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaj Party
and the independent Sri Lanka Freedom Party, which might
threaten the position of the UNP, has showed few signs of
power.
It is therefore unlikely that the opposition, including
the Communist front, will display sufficient'strength to
overthrow the present government. (Factual data from C
Colombo Desp 863, 2 May; R Colombo Desp 840, 29 Apr; R
Colombo Desp 828, 17 Apr 52)
16. Indian Government revokes sale of 70 war surplus aircraft:
The sale in December 1951 of surplus Curtis C-46 aircraft
to Banwari Lal & Company, Bombay, has been revoked by the
Indian Government for non-payment of purchase price. Banwari
Lal is reported to be legally contesting the revocation of
sale. (S New Delhi 4266, 17 May 52)
Comment: These United States' surplus aircraft are in
the han s o the Indian Government. If they were sold to a
private Indian firm, they might eventually reach the Communist
Orbit. Revocation of the above sale eliminates this possibi-
lity for the time being.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Iranian oil official says Italian tanker expected: A
Nations Iranian i Company spokesman-has con irme informa-
tion received by the American Embassy that a tanker is due
momentarily at Abadan to load one thousand tons of crude oil
for Italy. The spokesman described the shipment as an
experiment which, if successful, would result in further
shipments. (C Tehran 4494, 21 May 52)
Comment: This is the first confirmed report since the
British w hdrawal from Abadan that a tanker is actually
prepared to load there. An. Italian oil company representative
in Iran on 20 May informed an American Embassy official that
an Italian ship was due in Abadan on 21 or 22 May. The
British Admiralty reports that the vessel is the Italian-
owned tanker Rosemary, under charter to a Swiss company.
The shipment is apparently the first to be made under a
two million ton per year contract reportedly concluded between
Iran and a small Italian petroleum company in February. The
Italian Government has made definite assurances that no
Iranian oil will be given import licenses. These assurances
will not necessarily prevent shipment of the oil to another
country.
Changes in top-level command in Spanish Morocco likely:
The High Commissioner o panes orocco, t. Gen. arcia
Valino, will probably be replaced by a civilian, possibly
Spanish Foreign Minister Martin Artajo, according to a
Spanish official high in the Moroccan administration. This
official also expects that Moslem General Mizzian will be
given command of the armed forces in Morocco.
The Spanish officialtold the American Legation in Tangier
that these changes would serve as further indications of the
liberalization of Spain?s Moroccan policy and are expected to
be favorably received in Morocco atu the Arab world. (C
Tangier 383, 19 May 52)
Comment: It has been rumored for some weeks that Garcia
Valino, regarded as a most able military officer, would be
replaced. The appointment of a civilian as his successor
would mark a new departure in Spanish policy. Martin Artajo's
removal from his present post has been reported as imminent
ever since the cabinet changes of last July. He recently
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completed a goodwill tour of the Arab states.
The appointment of Mizzian, a Moroccan, to command the
army of Morocco would be enthusiastically received by
Moroccans; however, recent events suggest that if he were
given.the command it would be nominal only.
French UN representative is discouraged over North
African situation: Throughout a conversation on the North
African s ua on with the American delegation to the United
Nations on 19 May, the chief of the French delegation appeared
to be generally discouraged. Regarding Tunisia, he said
that there were two conflicting extreme views in France: (1)
that France should release the imprisoned nationalists so they
could enter into negotiations -- but this would be "yielding
to blackmail" -- and (2) that France should continue its
policy of firmness. He blamed the United States for the
current difficulties, saying that if the United States had
taken a firm stand in the beginning, the nationalists would
not have been encouraged in their intransigent position. He
also implied that the French Government would have to make
concessions to the Tunisians.
With regard to Morocco, however, he stated the Foreign
Office was preparing to make "substantial concessions" to
the Sultan. This, he felt, might "do the trick." (S New York
835, 20 May 52)
Comment: French diplomatic officials are more and more
frequency blaming the United States for their difficulties
in Tunisia and Morocco. No solution of the Tunisian impasse
is yet in sight, and the 17 March demands of the Sultan of
Morocco remain unanswered.
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WESTERN EUROPE
20. Soviet tough line in Germany seen meeting early test:
The next ew wee s may e t e test, according to American
officials in Bonn, of the actual effect in West Germany of
the Kremlin's new tough line. The High Commissioner's office
points out that the "crust of West German courage is under-
standably thin" under the present circumstances, but that
it. may be hardened if the Allies are able to show a deter-
mination to counter Soviet moves.
HICOG believes that the Soviet Union will not impose
a full-scale blockade of West Berlin, but is more likely
to apply a "creeping blockade" of selective harassing, pos-
sibly restricted to outward movements from Berlin, combined
with an'Eastern offer to absorb West Berlin's production.
As West German integration becomes a fact, the Kremlin may
also insist more and more that the Western powers deal with
the East.German Government, acting as a front for the USSR.
(.S Bonn 2803, 13 May 52)
21. Britain blocking agreement on German defense contri-
bution: erman Finance-Minister chae er is ev ent y
prepared to accept the American proposal that Germany's
defense contribution be divided between the Allies and
Germany on the basis of increasing the German share after
a period of continuing high payments to the Allies for
support of their forces in Germany.
British representatives, however, have been instructed
to insist upon a flat monthly rate for.support costs on
the grounds that scaling down German payments to the Allies
this year would prejudice the British bargaining position
for the period after 30 June 1953. (S Bonn 2951, 20 May
52)
Comment: Although Schaeffer's conciliatory attitude
presen s some hope of reaching an agreement in principle
on the defense contribution, the inability of the British
negotiators to modify their position may make it necessary
to leave the entire question for the Foreign Ministers to
settle.
22. Adenauer may regain control of the West German Senate:
Free mocratic Party ea ers now predict that the West
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German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg will have a pro-Adenauer
government within eight weeks, and have directed the Free
Democrat deputies to withdraw their support. from the present
state government. They have taken this action because the
Federal Senators from that state will not support the federal
coalition's program. If a special state convention on 7 June
does not concur in this directive, a national party conven-
tion on 5 July may expel some of the objecting members.
American officials in Bonn comment that the party's
national leaders will probably be successful in securing a
new state government favorable to Adenauer. (S Frankfurt
Sitrep 18, 20 May 52; C Bonn 2950, 20 May 52)
Comment: Certain financial provisions of the contrac-
tual agreement and its implementing legislation may not be
ratified unless there is a pro-Adenauer government in Baden-
Wuerttemberg, giving the Bonn government a majority in the
Federal Senate.
23. French police reportedly sanction strong-arm group's
anti-Communist demonstration: a American massy in
Paris has een " re a y n ormed" that the group of RPI'
militants and various veteran elements which broke up a.
Communist-sponsored anti-American play on 17 May had the
"tacit approval" of the police, who had been given advance
notice of the demonstration. This same group intends to
take similar action against any "particularly insulting"
Communist demonstrations., (S Paris 7157, 19 May 52)
Comment: Heretofore, Communist and Gaullist strong-
arm groups Have been treated impartially by the police
The reported tacit agreement reflects the growing boldness
of the government in its repression of Communist activity.
Threatened resignation of Austrian Trade Minister
reflects ore gn -trade ispute: The request of n ster
o Trade oec m re ssau that a be relieved of his cabinet
post has been turned down by the Executive Committee of
the Austrian People's Party. The Minister's announcement
of his intention to resign in opposition to a further ex-
tension of the foreign trade law is considered by US of-
ficials in Vienna to have been a "tactical move" in the
protracted coalition dispute over economic policies. (R
Vienna TOMUS 381, 16 May 52; R FBIS, Vienna, 21 May 52)
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Comment: Under the present law, extensive authority
over foreign trade is vested in a commission where, because
of the necessity for unanimous decisions, "veto" power is
exercised by the participating representatives of labor, in-
dustry, and government. The commission is clearly cumber-
some, restricts the authority of the Minister of Trade, and
has long been held an obstacle to an export program which
would reduce Austrian dependence on foreign aid.
Since tentative agreement to extend the trade law may
be linked with mutual concessions by the coalition parties
on various economic issues, the Minister's "resignation"
suggests a "face-saving" gesture as well as a tactical move.
Italian Government faces danger in 25 May elections:
The United States Embassy In Rome Believes that the exten-
sive gains which the extremist parties are "certain" to
make in the 25 May South Italian elections will "jolt" Pre-
mier de Gasperi's government and result in insistence by
the left, and probably also by the right, on immediate
national elections.
The center's continuing ability to hold a national
working majority against both the Communists and the ex-
treme right will meet its test in Rome, where the Christian
Democrats are linked in an electoral bloc with other moderate
parties only. The Embassy believes the center alliance will
pull through in Rome, but with a plurality of only 50,000
or fewer votes as compared with 320,000 in the 1948 national
elections.
Should De Gasperi lose the city, "even the staunchest
supporter of the center would have to admit doubt of its
continuing viability." The ensuing crisis could bring
about national elections this fall, or a radical reorgani-
zation of the government, possibly with the resignation of
De Gasperi, or an admission of government weakness by post-
ponement of national elections from 1953 to 1954. (S Rome
5067, 20 May 52)
26. Detained Spanish opposition leaders freed: The majori-
ty of the Socialist leaders arrests in a nat on-wide police
drive during March are now at liberty The arrests were in
part a precautionary measure against a possible recurrence of
the strikes of last spring. inc government presumably de-
cided that the activities of these opposition members were
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not a serious security threat and therefore did not warrant
risking the unfavorable foreign reaction which prosecutions
would produce.
The round-up of leaders of the clandestine Socialist
organization was apparently made possible by the theft last
fall by a Spanish police agent of files from the Socialist
Party headquarters in Toulouse, France. (Factual informa-
tion from: S Madrid Desp 997 and 1059 27 Mar and 17 Apr 52;
25X1A
27. Latin American labor committee calls for recognition
of Bolivia: The Committee for Latin American yn ca nity
requested the presidents of all American nations to
recognize the new Bolivian Government, according to a tele-
gram sent to the Bolivian labor federation by Jose Espejo,
president of the committee and top Argentine labor leader.
The committee has also directed its regional subcommittees
to call for a plebiscite i ' n the respective countries in
favor of recognition. (R Buenos Aires 791, 20 May 52)
Comment: This action is indicative of the committee's
primary interest in political rather than labor matters.
The committee, which was formed at an Argentine-subsidized
conference in Asuncion last February, has subcommittees in
Costa Rica, Haiti, Chile, and Uruguay, and national com-
mittees in a few other countries.
Bolivia has been recognized by only four countries
Guatemala, Spain, Argentina, and Paraguay.
28. Argentina will not renew contract for United States
Army Mission: e c e of the Army Mission n Argentina
was informally notified on 19 May that Argentina. will not
request extension of the mission's contract. No explana-
tion was given, but the decision was made on a level higher
than the Ministry of the Army.. (C USARMA Buenos Aires 24,
19 May 52)
Comment: The decision is in line with Peron's late
1951 order that Argentine Army officers would avoid un-
necessary contracts with US Army personnel in Argentina.
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29.
300
Peron's advisers have tried to convince him that the. United
States is directing a plot against him, and the army is in
the strongest position to attempt such a plot.
Peron's apprehension of a possible army revolt has been
indicated by continuing arrests of army officers, his placing
the army on a 24-hour alert, and his asking congress to ex-
tend through 1952 the law authorizing him to "readjust" the
armed forces register.
Last October the Argentine Air Force decided not to
renew its contract with the US Air Force Mission.
Brazilian Foreign Office apparently changes position
on Bo van recogn on ues on: delay o even several
months-In recogn z ng t o new o ivian Government would
have no important long-range effects on Brazil's oil opera-
tions in Bolivia, and Brazil is content to observe the
situation for the time being, according to a statement made
to the US Ambassador on 20 May by the head of the Brazilian
Foreign Office's political division. (S Rio de Janeiro
1440, 20 May 52)
Comment. The Brazilian Foreign Minister informed the
US Am assn or on 14 May that early recognition of the new
regime in Bolivia would be in the best interests of Brazil
and that he had stated this view to President' Vargas, He
added that preservation of continental tranquility could
be more easily assured with a recognized regime than with
one "kept dangling."
The US State Department informed Peru on 20 May that
the United States "together with Brazil" had reached the
conclusion that continued non-recognition is equivalent to
withholding help from moderate elements and that it had
asked President Truman for authorization to recognize the
Bolivian Government sometime next week.
Constitutional guarantees reported re-established in
Cuba. Interior minister amore erm a as announce at
t-econstitutional guarantees which were suspended after
the 10 March coup in Cuba have been automatically re-
established, since the Council of Ministers has not ex-
tended the original suspension order which expired on 20
May.
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14 22 May 52
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 Approved Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T06A001000080001-3
SECRET
This brings to an end the initial period of national
emergency and attests to the fact that the current political
situation is such as to warrant the beginning of a return
to "constitutional normalcy" within the terms of the newly
promulgated Constitutional Statutes supplanting the 1940
constitution. The announcement will probably further lessen
popular resistance to the Batista regime. (Factual data
from: U La Prensa (NY), 21 May 52; R FBIS Havana, 20 May 52)
SECRET
15 22 May 52
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001000080001-3
 Approved FWRelease 2002/05/20 : lWdA001
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
22 May 1952
CIA No. 49654
Copy No. 46
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO01000080001-3
 Approved AN"'Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01 A001000080001-3
TOP SECRET
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
FAR EAST
Indonesia expects to open Consulate General inQJapan:
The Indonesian press announc e
e on ay (R govapern ne
intends to open a Consulate General in Tokyo.
1689, 20 May 52)
Comment: Prior to 28 April, when the Japanese Peace
Treaty-56-came effective, Japan proposed to Indonesia and the
Philippines the establishment of diplomatic relations pending
theEmbassy
their ratification
itsTstatusIndonesian
tofSCthe AP,treaty.
treatyin Tokyo,
became effective.
Although the former Indonesian government signed the
Japanese treaty, Parliament has indicated reluctance to
ratify it and the new Prime Minister has implied that the
treaty will be re-examined.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2, Iran offers to include oil in exports to USSR: Iran
has now agree to inc u e of on its st of exports offered
to the USSR under the pending trade agreement. The Iranians,
however, have made the offer conditional on the payment of
world market prices, on limitations on quantity, and. on the
Russians' taking delivery at Abadan. They also insist on
Soviet deliveries of sugar and machinery in exchange. The
Russians reportedly are displeased with these conditions.
The US Embassy in Tehran comments that the USSR could
be expected to make every effort to move the petroleum if
it thought this would result in discontinuance of American
aid to Iran. (S S/S Tehran 4468, 19 May 52)
TOP SECRET
1 22 May 52
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 Approved Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T016A001000080001-3
TOP SECRET
3. Greek official denies army retirements are due to
political pressure: Gree Under Secretary o De ense Mavros
as assure the American Ambassador that he will do all he
can to prevent a further political purge of the armed forces.
The Ambassador had been informed that the High Military Council
had ordered the retirement of all officers connected with the
clandestine army organization IDEA. When he questioned Mavros
about the matter, the latter insisted that the Council intended
to retire only the five officers involved in the abortive
coup which followed Field Marshal Papagos? resignation in May
1951. (S S/S Athens 4937, 17 Mar .52)
Comment: The five officers appear to be those sentenced
in Fe ruary for their part in the coup. Their sentences had
been delayed pending review by a board of inquiry. The army
command in the past has attempted to disguise its purge of
pro-Papagos officers by claiming that it was merely trying to
reduce the influence of IDEA.
Although Mavros may be successful, government fear of
Papagos' influence is still strong, and further efforts to
continue the purge may be expected.
TOP SECRET
2 22 May 52
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001000080001-3
 UNCLASSIFIED when bla f~ (R~r ~~,#@C ~ O (~eC~~~~{~ y I p~~ ~ 8p~j"6"r( " 3 decla],s,
fled when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
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