CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T01146A001000030001-8
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RIPPUB
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S
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 8, 2001
Sequence Number: 
1
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Publication Date: 
May 15, 1952
Content Type: 
REPORT
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Approved F Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO144SA001000030001-8 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION US OFFICIALS ONLY 15 May 1952 OCINo.5181 Copy No. 267 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re- ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146AO01000030001-8 Approved For Lase 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146AD01000030001-8 SECRET THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. 1. Embassy comments on Soviet religious conference: In his first comment from Moscow, Ambassador Kennan points out that Soviet religious leaders, under the threat of renewed police persecution and of the curtailment of their recent relative freedom, are being driven steadily deeper into becoming spokesmen for the regime. Kennan describes the conference of all Soviet churches at Zagorsk, which ended on 12 May, as "peculiarly cynical and sadistic" in its driving together of religious denominations which are not naturally compatible and which probably distrust one another because of police pene- tration and provocation. (C Moscow 1814, 13 May 52) 2. US Legation in Budapest reports on Sulzberger article in Times: The Legation in Budapest confirmed the presence othe defects in Hungary's economy allegedly described in a report referred to by Sulzberger in the New York Times of 5 May. The Embassy was unable, however, to verify the ex- istence of the report. A series of moves since March to overcome the defects, following the return of planning chief Zoltan Vas from Moscow, emanate from Soviet pressure. (C Budapest 846, 13 May 52) Comment: The Sulzberger article reported that the Hungarian government was in trouble with the Soviet-run Council for Mutual Economic Assistance for inadequate pro- duction and falsification of statistics. A Soviet investigat- ing committee reportedly spent several weeks in Hungary. A copy of a special report made by the committee was alleged to have slipped out. Sulzberger attributed recent measures tightening the Hungarian system to Soviet pressure following the report. 1 15 May 52 Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146AO01000030001-8 Approved For Fhase 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A 1000030001-8 3. Polish Government's resettling plan meeting with limited success- The Embassy in Warsaw reports that there Is no great--"land rush" as yet by the Polish population to move to the former German territories now under Polish administration despite the attractive financial inducements offered by the government to encourage settlement there. Uncertainty surrounding the government's future agri- cultural policies insofar as they affect the individual farmer, poor homes to move into, the unsatisfactory physical layout of the farms available, and ineffective enforcement of law and order in the area have tended to offset the value of the government's inducements. (C Warsaw Desp 434, 15 Apr 52) Comment: Press reports concerning the progress of the resettlement have notably declined from their first full flush of enthusiasm following announcement in March of the resettlement program. These press stories, while picturing the program's progress as various groups of farmers arrived, suggested by implication that the number of resettlers represented by such groups was insignificant compared to the government's desires. 2 15 May 52 Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 000030001-8 Approved For I(ease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146AAd 1000030001-8 SECRET 4. Japan rejects Soviet barter trade offer: The Japanese Foreign Office has rejected a trade deal un er which Japan would repair six Soviet vessels in exchange for about 120,000 tons of Russian coal. The agreement was negotiated between the Soviet Mission and the Naigai Trading Company, and would ha been valued at 600 million yen ($1,666,666). (R FBIS JIJI, 13 May 52) Comment: The price, equivalent to almost 14 dollars per ton, is considerably higher than previous alleged Soviet offers. at ten dollars. The fact that there are no international or domestic legal barriers to this deal and its rejection by the Foreign Office, however, suggest that it was banned on politi- cal rather than economic grounds. 5. Japanese fishing boats reportedly seized by Russians: Two Japanese s ing boats were seized on 10 May By Soviet patrol boats seven miles off Rausu, on the eastern coast of Hokkaido, according to the Japanese press. This makes five boats confiscated in this area by the Russians since 7 May. (R FBIS, _ 13 May 52) Comment: If the seizures actually occurred at the point indicated tie boats would have been in the Japanese side of the channel, but within ten miles of the Kuriles. Thus it is not clear whether the seizures occurred because of violation. of Soviet-claimed territorial waters, or violation of the MacArthur line, defunct since the peace treaty's effectivation, which lies three miles off the Hokkaido coast. North Korean Ministry of State Inspection reorganized: The Nor Korean Uo-vernment announced on May the formation of the "People's Inspection Committee" which will supersede the Ministry of State Inspection. The new bureau was organi- zed, according to Pyongyang, "for the purpose of consolidating the inspection of the implementation of government decisions and directives as well as auditing of State property." Yi Sungyop, secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party, will become chairman of the new inspection committee. (R FBIS, 12 May 52) Comment: The Ministry of State Inspection had jurisdic- tion on y over government agencies whereas a Central Inspection SECRET 3 15 May 52 Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79TO1 146AO01 000030001-8 Approved For Rase 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146AQPI000030001-8 SECRET Committee controlled and inspected industrial production. The apparent consolidation of these two functions, plus the appoint- ment of a high Labor Party official with cabinet experience indicates a tightening up of the regime's instruments of control. It is probable, moreover, that the new organ will have authority over agricultural production where some loss of control at local levels has been reported, 7. French official warns Cambodians against sympathy for rebels: Letourneau, Minister-Resident in Indochina, toTT-TSe Cam o ian King and his Prime Minister that France's contract to defend the country would be "reconsidered" if the active support which certain Cambodian officials have accorded Nation- alist rebel elements were not discontinued. Letourneau later told the American Minister that the present Cambodian consti- tution enabling the Democratic Party to dominate the King is "not applicable to the state of political development of Cambodia," As a remedial measure, he said that the King might dissolve the National Assembly and draft a new constitution "more in accordance with political realities." (C Saigon 2241, 13 May 52) Comment: The collaboration between Cambodian officials and armedre el elements, to which Letourneau referred, is largely attributable to the Cambodians' dissatisfaction with their present degree of control over their own affairs. Letourneau appears to be advocating even less popular control. A French threat to reconsider its commitment to Cambodia could not be dismissed lightly by the Cambodian King. 8. 25X1 C Burmese Communist leader believed ordered to work for 25X1C Than Tun, chief of the Burma Communist Party, had been ordered by the Chinese Communists to 25X1A "work for peace." Comment: The Burmese Communists and their sympathizers have recently extended a number of peace feelers to the Bur- mese Government. While it is not yet clear whether these Communist proposals are an indication of weakness or merely a tactical maneuver, the government thus far has not been receptive. 9, Indonesian UN delegate hopes US will not surrender on POW issue: Palar, the Chief Indonesian Representative at e UNoTd-an American official that he hoped the United States SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A001000030001 8 May 52 Approved For Rase 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146AQW1000030001-8 does not surrender on the demand for forced repatriation of prisoners of war because "if you give in, it would be a great blow to the prestige of the UN and the United States through- out the Far East. Palar said he believed "most" of his colleagues would agree with him, (C New York 809, 13 May 52) Comment: Palar's comment must be considered primarily a personal opinion. The Korean deadlock has attracted little attention in Indonesia. The American Ambassador commented recently that the Indonesian Government has no policy on Korea and it is not faced with pressure to form one. 10, Prime Minister Nehru announces the new Indian cabinet: Prime Minister Nehru announced a number of cabinet changes on 13 May. There are six new members in the cabinet while several of the older ones have shifted positions. (R FBIS, 13 May; New York Times, 14 May 52) Comment: These cabinet changes suggest that somewhat abler ex~ceutlves have been placed in certain key posts, but the changes apparently do not foreshadow major revisions of Indian domestic or foreign policies. All but two of the min- isters appear to be completely loyal to Nehru. Home Minister Katju is a respected, long-standing Congress Party member, friendly to the United States. Defense Minister 25X6 25X6 Ayyangar He may be expected to reflect the Prime Minister's views on defense. Kidwai probably brings greater administrative ability to his post as Food Minister than his predecessor, but there is little reason to believe that he will be more successful. Krishnamachari, the new Commerce Minister, has a realis- tic view of India's need for economic development and has stressed the fact that India should help itself. As Labor Minister, V. V. Giri, former High Commissioner for India in Ceylon and a man with first-hand experience in the labor field, should materially improve the government's relations with Indian labor. 5 15 May 52 Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146AO01000030001-8 Approved For Rase 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146AQ 1000030001-8 11, Ankara complains of anti-Turkish propaganda in Arab states: The Turkish ore gn Minister on 9 May told m assador McGhee emphatically that anti-Turkish propaganda in certain Arab states was being inspired by "friends," presumably British in the case of Iraq. He added that such action was against the commoninterest, but that Turkey did not intend to lodge a protest or to make it a public issue. (S Ankara 1239, 13 May 52) Comment: Turkish Foreign Office officials have pre- viously expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of cooperation on Middle East defense planning from the British and particu- larly from the French in Damascus. British and French offi- cials in Syria have not favored a Turkish plan to train Syrian officers in Turkey. 13. French Residency considers haphazard violence in Tunisia "planned": a Security Officer in the French IFesidency General elieves that there is a definite plan behind the new outbreaks of violence in Tunisia. The French have not, how- ever, been able to link the recent bomb explosions with the Communists, Neo-Destours, Old Destours, or any particular group. The apparently haphazard way bombs have been planted makes motivation obscure. (C Tunis 5945, 13 May 52) Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIAU-RDP79TO1146A001000030001 B5 May 52 Approved For ease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146W1000030001-8 Comment: The resurgence of violence on-12 May after two weeks of relative calm again emphasizes the unpopularity of the pro-French cabinet and the Tunisians' dissatisfaction with the proposed administrative changes. The reported house arrest of the Bey, when he objected to the imposition of French secu- rity controls over his palace, makes more sporadic outbreaks of violence probable. 14. Malan stirs up issue of British protectorates in South Africa: A presently rreconc lable i erence between t e pion eUouth Africa and the United Kingdom has been aggravated by Prime Minister Malan's assertion that a campaign issue of the 1953 South African general election will be a formal petition to London to secure control of the native protectorates of Bechuanaland, Swaziland, and Basutoland. The ruling white South Africans of all parties cite historical arguments in support of the transfer, but even the Nationalist government until now had deferred taking any step toward making a formal request. Important unofficial National- ist circles have suggested applying economic pressure on the protectorates if Britain fails to agree, The British Government, however, is bound by its pledge, supported by all parties, not to turn the territories over to South Africa without consulting the inhabitants, and in the Sudan it is currently demonstrating its request for such a pledge to native peoples. All. informed native opinion in the protectorates, according to the latest information, is extremely hostile to incorporation into the tightly segregated Union of South Africa. (Factual data from': U New York Times, 14 May 52; R Pretoria Desp 261, 25 Oct 51) 7 15 May 52 Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A001000030001-8 Approved For ease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146h01000030001-8 WESTERN EUROPE Europeans fear that United States may provoke new war: 15 . The general uropea.n ear t at the United States might provoke nd West F d i rance a n a global war is especially pronounce 25X1C Germany, '25X6 Comment: Many Europeans expect war to come when the Unites 'States, after its military strength is built up, will be tempted to take more positive action in the face of Soviet provocation. Considerable anti-American feeling is develop- ing among such Europeans who think themselves at the mercy of forces over which they have no control. Communists sponsor international conference against German agreements: Communist-sponsored international con- erence "for the peaceful solution of the German problem" is scheduled to meet in Paris from 13 to 15 June. Representa- tives from all Western European countries, including German Pastor Niemoeller, and delegates from Poland and Czechoslovakia are allegedly planning to attend. The American Embassy in Paris believes that the pre- ponderance of professors and theologians among the foreign representatives suggests that many are not aware of the actual nature of the conference. (C Paris 7017, 13 May 52) Comment: This conference, which is being widely publi- cized by t e French Communist press, undoubtedly will challenge the legality of the contractual agreements scheduled to be signed late this month between the Western powers and Germany. 25X1 C 8 15 May 52 Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146AO01000030001-8 Approved For lase 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T011461000030001-8 Austrians allegedly informed of future Polish trade retaliation-7 An official of the trade policy section of the Austrian ?reign Office has allegedly been warned by Polish representatives in Vienna that Polish coal deliveries will be cut next fall unless aluminum bars and semi-finished pro- ducts are supplied by Austria. The Foreign Office reportedly hopes that some compromise can be worked out between Polish Comment: This report must be accepted with caution. The Poles have recently appeared anxious to fulfil their coal obligations and previous Austrian fears of Polish retaliation have not been borne out. The Austrians, who are somewhat restive under American restrictions in trade matters, may not be averse to circulating rumors of impending Polish counter- measureso On the other hand, the Poles may possibly anticipate that Austria's currently favorable bargaining position arising from US-coal shipments and Soviet-produced fuel oil supplies will be changed by fa.llo and American demands. 9 15 May 52 Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A001000030001-8 Approved For Fase 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A NOV 000030001-8 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION US OFFICIALS ONLY TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT 15 May 1952 CIA No. 49649 Copy No. 4 TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (including S/S Cables) Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE. Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146AO01000030001-8 Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146AQ01000030001-8 TOP SECRET THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONA DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE L ESPIONAGE LAWSy TITLE 18 USC SECS OR REVELATIONOFpWHICH?IN9ANY AND X94' THE UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. ANNER TO AN GENERAL 1. 1 Italian role in Greek e -Turkish? rumore e er can assa Yugoslav defens Plannin or ~ g e French believe that the n oj'med in Athens e recent G i . r nv Turkjs eek h tai saged including Italy in th talks on e _ Turkish Foreign He reports, however that the T an g Minister has never , th mentioned including the any of his discussions with Embassy officials on Greek... Turkish rapprochement with Yugoslavia and he believes i likely that the Turks would have such an association in (TS Rome 4884, 9 Ma 52 it un- cif. mind. Y ; TS Ankara 1231. 12 Ma y Since the ,-; .-.,-. ----~ between Italy and Yugoslavia;i~ that the French version is correct? ltis doubtful In view of the Turkish desire for firm defense arrangements in the area, however, the matter may have been proposed as a Possibility for future, the 25X1 C TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A0010d00YM1 , UN LASSIFlED whenA ~r V~ F hYEI @ a 'I f64T,R A9Rt '11~6tAl~I?~1Q3~?(>~04?1a~d or declassi- fied when filled in for is etac a from control ocument. CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REGISTRY SOURCE C CIA CONTROL NO. c DOC N . O. DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED DOC. DATE C D _ COPY NO. 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