CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T01146A000900180001-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 22, 2004
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 24, 1952
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T01146A000900180001-4.pdf595.65 KB
Body: 
Approved F Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01 A000900180001-4 SECRET 25X1 24 April 1952 25X1 OCI No. 5166 Copy No. 266 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIA and DOS review(s) completed. This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re- ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. 25X1 RETURN TO ARCHIVES & RECORDS CENTER IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE JOB nc Tl l~#-1b Box A roved For Release - T01146A00090~1$QQq ? Approved f Release 2005/01/26: CIA-RDP79T0W6A000900180001-4 SECRET 25X1 S ATESINFORMATION THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS WITHIPTATHECMEANINGEOFATHE AL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED SECS. 793 AND 794, THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ET WHICH ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS GENERAL 2e Orbit trade reprisals against Italy feared: American Embassy o T s n ome a lave e r w initiate serious retaliatory measures if two pending trade deals be- tween Italy and the Soviet Orbit are cancelled because of the s Battle Acta One mill the worth of rolling Parts to dollars worth of coal; the second provides for shipment to Czechc.slovakia of 194409000 dollars worth of "catagorv B" ball bearings, a non-strategic size. SECRET l 24 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900180001-4 Approved Release 2005/01/26: CIA-RDP79T01A000900180001-4 SECRET Italy, which badly needs coal, fears that cancellation ld bring Polish retaliation mill shipment wou of the rolling lls for US coal. d o nd he nce force it to expend t a -mess to dispose of its e g Comment: Poland's apparen coal surplus, even at some disadvantage, was shown in recent transactions with Scandinavia. Thus it would appear unlikely paetaretaliation if Italy that Poland would undertakenserious failed to provide the 25X1 SOVIET UNION fifty-nine Little change in Moscow~s May Day slogans- ee of The ftheiftySoviet May Day s ngans issue y distributed by TASSe Communist Part have been widely Comment: As was the case last year, the first twelve slogans ea with foreign affairs. They follow the same order SECRET 2 24 Apr 52 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900180001-4 Approved FRelease 2005/01/26: CIA-RDP79T01WA000900180001-4 as last year's with the notable exception that last year's slogan greeting the "liberation movements" in colonial areas was dropped in favor of a greeting to the Japanese people. The phraseology was sterotyped for the most part. To the slogans greeting "all peoples," the Germans, the Japanese, and the Yugoslavs, fighting "for peace, independence, and democracy" a phrase which emphasized the idea that they are "fighting against aggressors" was added. Only the aggressors in Yugo- slavia were identified -- the "fascist regime of the Tito- Rankovic clique." The German slogan which last year ended with the words "for Germany" now closes with the phrase "for a German state." Since the Kremlin's May Day slogans are usually a reca- pitulation of current propaganda themes, it is noteworthy that references to biological warfare and the colonial liberation movement were omitted. Other communist parties have included these issues in their May Day slogans. The call for increased military preparedness, while new to the May Day slogans, was the point of emphasis on the occa- sion of Red Army Day, 23 February 1952. The remaining slogans, dealing with Soviet internal af- fairs and the state economy,reveal no notable changes. EASTERN EUROPE 5, Build-up of antiaircraft defenses of Prague: The US Military Attache in ague reports o servation of work on four additional antiaircraft positions on the perimeter of the city. This. brings the total of such positions under con- struction to ten with an average of three 88mm guns per posi- tion. Comment: Development of the antiaircraft defenses of Prague w? as Indicated by the accumulation of a pool of anti- aircraft guns and equipment in the suburb of Bohnice. A total of 103 88mm guns were counted at this air defense depot and training center early last November. In late January, only 40 pieces remained and it is believed that some of the guns were shipped away from Prague. SECRET 3 24 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2005/01/26: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000900180001-4 Approved F Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01NiGA000900180001-4 SECRET The activity around Prague follows the pattern observed around Warsaw where a ring of 20 positions was established last summer. Increased air defense activities elsewhere in the Satellites have featured improved protection of the national capitals and key rail and communications centers. 6. Hungary rejects Yugoslav proposals for a Mura Island Settlement: In a note on 19 April Hungary rejected Yugoslavia's proposals-for the establishment of a mixed commission to settle the long standing Mura Island dispute. Hungary demanded ces- sation of border violations, and satisfaction for provocative attacks. The note was interpreted by the American Legation in Budapest settle- ment. 25X1 Comment: Hungarian-Yugoslav relations were strained severely last December when a Hungarian armed force took poss- ession of the island. The dispute has been used by both sides chiefly for propaganda purposes. There is no apparent indi- cation that Yugoslavia is prepared to implement its claims to the island. 52 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900180 01-4 Approved F orelease 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01,WA000900180001-4 SECRET FAR EAST 7, Indonesian Socialist reported in Moscow: Friends of Sudja mo o; ormer ounse or o Indonesian Embassy in Washington and prominent disciple of socialist Party chair- man Sjahrir, report him in Moscow,but insist that he went there not to participate in the Moscow Economic Conference, but as a private correspondent of the Socialist daily, Pedoman0 His associates admit his hope to visit various areas In Russia and to proceed to Peiping. American Ambassador Cochran notes the visits of prominent Socialists to Iron Curtain countries and comments upon the "newly invigorated anti-Westism and anti-Americanism" of Pedoman. Comment: The Socialist Party, under the direction of former premier Sutan Sjahrir, strongly advocates the "third force" principle and is believed to have been highly influen? tial in Indonesia's adoption of and continued adherence to a foreign policy based on this concept. The visits of Socialists and Socialist-influenced Indonesians" to Iron Curtain countries appear to be partially a political gesture designed to augment the party's following, and partially a sincere effort to study conditions in eeis little indication of a Socialist communist countries. There orientation towad the SECRET 5 24 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900180001-4 Approved Fo?lease 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146M00900180001-4 SECRET WESTERN EUROPE German Bishop believes Communists would accept a neutral Germany, American o is a s in Berlin-believe that the recent proposal of Evangelical Bishop Dibelius for all-German elections to be supervised by the Evangelical and Catholic Churches is primarily a maneuver to generate pressure for German unification and for a four-power conference. Dibelius, who is the head of the a.11-German Evangelical Church, is alarmed at the thought of a permanent split of Germany, which would mean the division of German Protestantism. He tends to believe that the Communists would agree to a unified, neu- tralized Germany. He also, reportedly feels that the West, the United States in particular,!is not sincerely interested in Germany's unification. Catholic circles give the impression that their Church considers the proposal naive. nd will have nothing to do with 25X1 it. Comment. Most West Germans believe that unification with East ermany will be almost impossible to achieve under present conditions. They resent, however, any Western action which would preclude unity, and are concerned over the increasing Allied 25X1 insistence on integration. Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0009001810E0 Approved F%Release 2005/01/26: CIA-RDP79T011 000900180001-4 SECRET 10. Economic dispute may be endangering Austrian internal stabs ty a ustrian overnment s a lure to resolve a four- mont controversy over economic policies is threatening serious economic and political consequences. Mutual Security Agency officials in Vienna believe that the prospects for agreement on a broad economic program are now less, even though Chancellor Figl claims near-agreement on measures to reduce the Austrian deficit. They say that the continued withholding of counterpart releases by the US in an effort to force agreement on an economic program is aggravating an unfavorable employment situation, and fear that further pressure may force the Austrian Government to seek alternative financing. The American mission believes that leverage over Austrian policy deriving from control of counter- part funds has now substantially diminished. Implementation of the economic program desired by MSA would require major concessions from both coalition parties. Despite claims of American support from both sides, the Socialists have apparently suspected that the Vienna mission has undue sympathy for the conservative position because of its initial emphasis on a shift from long- to short=term investments and its failure to achieve conservative support for across-the-board reforms at the same time that major concessions have been demanded from the Socialists. A principal organ of the People?s Party recently denounced American criticism of restrictive business practices in Austria as "interference in Austrian internal affairs," 25X1 The consequences of a further exacerbation of conservative- Socialist relations could be serious. Economic reforms achieved at the expense of isolation of Austrian Socialism could jeopardize future internal political stability in Austria. Netherlands Government disturbed by US action against Dutch bank. The et er an s as profest&-ff mer can i-etion iig insets of the Slavenburg Bank for allegedly financing shipments of strategic materials to Communist China- The Dutch claim that it was up to them, as signers of the UN resolution on trade with China, to investigate the charges and to determine the action to be taken, 25X1 Furthermore, a Dutch official stated that the bank was following accepted international practices and added that US 25X1 foreign trade statistics show that American importers are su plying large net dollar balances-to the Soviet bloc. SECRET 7 24 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900180001-4 25X1 25X1 Approved F,Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T011MWA000900180001-4 SECRET 120 Swedish press sees Prime Minister furthering American under- -- newspaper asserts that r me Minister Erlander's recent visi to the United States has increased America's understanding of Sweden's alliance-free foreign policy. The non-Communist press generally ridicules Moscow's charge that his visit marked a reorientation of the country's foreign policy. 25X1 25X1 Comment: While the press comment is designed in part to enhance the prestige of Erlander for the September parliamentary elections, it also reflects the Swedes' constant search for evidence that their foreign policy course has not hurt their reputation in the Western world. It thus suggests a degree of uncertainty in their own thinking. .SECRET 8 24 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2005/01/26: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000900180001-4 25X1 25X1 Approved Foi`$elease 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T0114W00900180001-4 TOP SECRET 24 April 1952 CIA No. 49624 Copy No. 46 TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST 25X1 Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE. Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1 This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For RblPasP 9nnsinl/9R ? (1A-RnP7gTO1146A000900180001-4 Approved For Release 2005/01/26: CIA-RDP79T011000900180001-4 TOP SECRET THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATIONNAFI ECTINGIN EONATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHI SECSe 793 AND 7g4v THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICBYH ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORISED PERSON IS PROHIBITED FAR EAST f diplomatic relations o Japan proposing establishment otenese t o hig -rank~.ng o icy a o with slap nations. A Japan s and otes with officials ~Philippines that -reign ice as informed nAme has proposed an exchange o treaty. A Indonesia which would establish dip omapea sheen pending relations their ratification Of the similar offer will be Government. resentatives The official also neic attached to the Allied e eaceftreatyabecomesbeffectiveoat ordinar aliens after the veral diplomatic missions position of se Comments The pgovernments will not have now accred to SCAP, whbseApril, has previously been ratified the peace treaty by 28 in doubt. In view of Japan?s reluctance etoederfine eatyCtalks, sovereignty in the current japan-China acal has not been it may be significant that a similar prop made to the Chinese Nationalists- is in accord with the This report indicates that Japan for the occum chinery the contr United States viewthaACJ and theoFarl Commission, comes into force- potion, including the automatically terminates when the treaty There has been some speculation that the USSR might dispute enciestvon the grounds that the the termination of th~setTil].egalo San Francisco treaty disturbed over government?s lack of progress-. 2. Bao Dai zcan Minister Heat , Bao In an interview wit mer 3 to form a more pointed out the uselessness of attempting representative government until the actions of the local p lie French regime make Vietnainsvicnt~~pe~o~ernrnenteaffairs and deplored French meddling TOP SECRET 24 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900180001-4 Approved Fo,elease 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T011*A000900180001-4 TOP SECRET described as "intolerable" disregard of Vietnamese laws, notably tax legislation, by French citizens. Heath comments that Bao Dai is partially to blame for the weak Vietnamese Government in that he has not rovided energetic leaderships Comment: The Vietnam Government is still unable to attract tie popular support necessary to counter the Viet Minh's appeal, The French have deplored to American officials Bao Dai's inertia, but there is evidence that they have not assiduously tried to arouse him to action. The new French diplomatic counsellor in Saigon states that Resident Minister Letourneau intends to replace "old colonialist" officials with men not previously associated with Indochina, The French have been committed since early 1947 to the formation of a genuinely Vietnamese Government, but the proposed replacement of the "old colonials" in Indo- china has not materialized. TOP SECRET 2 24 Apr 52 Approved For Release 2005/01/26: CIA-RDP79TO1146A000900180001-4 25X1 TOO SECRET UNCLASSIFIED when blA0pA ftaEF8fTR1El1@&9@4b6t M1j46 - p - of B~YJ~~ ~~8~~ld4or declassi- fied when filled in form is detached from controlled document. CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION SOURCE D iZ_ D OC.N0 . DOC. DATE COPY NO. NUMBER OF PAGE NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS c t?? REGISTRY% CIA CONTROL NO. DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED LOGGED BY ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns. REFERRED TO RECEIVED RELEASED SEEN BY OFFICE SIGNATURE DATE TIME DATE TIME SIGNATURE OFFICE/DIV. DATE NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed In the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record. DOWNGRADED DESTROYED DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO BY (Signature) TO BY (Signature) WITNESSED BY (Signature) BY (Signature) OFFICE A DATE proved For FFICE eease 2005/01/26 : CI DATE -RDP79T011 OFFICE DATE 46A000900180001-4 FORM 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 8-73 TOP SECRET