CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000900140001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 18, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
18 April 1952
OCI No. 5162
Copy No.
266
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
DOS and DIA Declassification/Release
Instructions on File
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
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SECRET
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UST:-.UTHORIZPD PERSY N 13 PROHIBITED BY LAW.
25X6
2. Soviet violation of Iranian border reported: In the
course of asovie patrol violation of the Ir an border in
the Azerbaijan area, one Russian soldier was killed and one
arrested. At the request of the USSR, a meeting with the
Iranian frontier offices was held, at which time a Soviet
ambush recaptured thee soldier. Later, the body of the other
was recaptured and the Iranian Commissar was kidnapped. He
has not yet returned.
Comment: Reports of increased Soviet security measures
along ttontier, , and preparations for regular spring
maneuvers have been received in the past few weeks by the
American Embassy in Tehran.
Similar border measures and stepped-up patrol activities
were also report=ed during April 1951. Iranian Military In-
telligence has reported to the US Military Attache that the
US R has generally avoided incidents for the past two years.
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EASTERN EUROPE
3. Josef Tesla reported as a Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee o the Czechoslovak ommunis Party: The American
-massy in Prague quotes a zec press report that Josef
Tesla was present as "a Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Czechoslovak Communist Party" at the demonstration mark-
ing the twentieth anniversary of the miners' strike at Most
on 13 April. This contradicts a United Press report from
Vienna in March that Tesla was purged. (C Prague 741,
6 Apr 52 )
Comment: As part of the Czech Communist Party reorgani-
zation of 6 September, six Secretaries of the Central Com-
mittee replaced the Deputy Secretaries General. There have
been unconfirmed reports that at least two of the original
six were purged, and in March Frantisek Pexa and Jindrich
Uher were reported as new Secretaries of the Central Com-
mittee.
This is the first indication that Josef Tesla may be a
Secretary of the Central Committee. He is Secretary of the
Communist Party Regional Committee in Usti nad Labem,under
whose jurisdiction Most lies. It is believed, therefore,
that he may have been mistakenly reported on the Central
Committee and may in fact still hold the position of Secretary
of the Regional Committee.
4. Hungarian Cabinet decrees economy drive: The Hungarian
Cabinet on 11 April adopted a resolu ion calling for the
elimination of "superfluous" investments, fuller use of
present equipment, and concentration of investments on high
priority projects such as the Stalin Iron Works. Specific
recommendations called for reduction in the cost of building
operations by three percent below estimates, and ordered
raw material savings of two percent in rolled steel and lower
coal consumption in manufacturing, power stations, and rail-
ways. Last year's economy committee was abolished, along
with the special committees in factories, and responsibility
for the economy campaign was transferred to the People's
Economic Council, the National Planning Office and the ap-
propriate ministries.
Another cabinet resolution on 16 April imposed pay
sanctions for unwarranted absenteeism and reduced wages for
the worker's lunch period. The wording of the Szabad Nep
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article publishing the cabinet decision is believed to
foreshadow wage economies and to imply higher work norms.
(R Budapest 790, 16 Apra R Weeka 15 Budapest, 11 Apr 52)
Comment: Basic deficiencies of manpower and raw
mater als :setting Hungarian industry have led government
and party to an ever-intensifying campaign against waste,
high costs, low labor productivity, poor discipline, and
inefficient management in general. Decrees in March re-
duced wages for vacation time and imposed paid interneships
on graduates of universities and technical schools.
Almost simultaneously a decree, ostensibly regulating
the extension of credit, tightened bank control over
financial operations, evidently as a means of increasing
financial responsibility on:the part of managers of State
enterprises and cooperatives.
The newest measures may be connected with the return
of Zoltan Vas, head of the National Planning Office, from
Moscow. When he reached Budapest he took up the problems
of work discipline and manpower migration with the Hungarian
Workers' Party Central Committee,
5. Yugoslav Foreign Minister receives Iranian and Argentine
Minis ers: A lgr ed r im broa east -states haf Acting
o h inister Leo Mates received the Iranian and Argentine
Ministers on 12 April. No statement regarding the subject
of these separate conversations was made. (R FBIS Belgrade,
14 Apr 52)
Comment: Consultations with the Iranian and Argentine
representatives at this time may be related to Yugoslav
apprehension over, the prospect of a "big power deal" on
Trieste. Yugoslavia may hope to gain some insight into the
problems of other minor powers who contend that they have
been victims of United States=-United Kingdom ",imperialism."
6. Yugoslavia permits the entry of foreign technicians in
industry: 'ieta ee ~i easy oc~als in Be gra e e ieve
that announced decree permitting the employment of
foreign technicians and the expenditure of foreign exchange
for their compensation may indicate a partial victory for
Svetozar Vukmanovic, President of the Council for Industry
and Buildings, who is believed to favor such steps in an ef-
fort to complete the key industrial investment program.
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Despite the acceptance of foreign technicians under
the various technical assistance programs, Embassy observers
state that the Yugoslavs still regard the presence of US-
sponsored technicians as a necessary evil. They are less
reluctant, however, to accept private or United Nations-
sponsored groups. There is also evidence that certain
technicians of unspecified nationality will be employed by
"mili.tq.rv enterprises and institutions." (C Belgrade
Desp #832, 4 Mar 52)
. Comment: In view of the ambitious nature of Yugoslav
d/velopm a -plans, the shortage of capital and technicians
is an ever present problem. The Vukmanovic school of
thought is believed to be.sharply opposed by that led by
Boris Kidric which, on ideological grounds., opposes the
admittance of Western capital and technicians.
7. Ambiguity plagues Yugoslav agrarian policy: The United
States assy in Belgrade reports a some o ficial im-
patience has been expressed regarding the apparent reluctance
of local authorities to reorganize uneconomic collectives
and emphasize the role of the general type cooperative in
which the individual peasant owns and works his own land.
Although the general type has received much lip service,
conflicting concepts of the precise role to be played by
these units have created a vast amount of confusion. One
group regards the general cooperative as a means of in-
creasing the production of private peasants; the other be-
lieves that it is an alternative mechanism to collectivize
those peasants who have thus far resisted frontal attack.
According to Embassy observers, the latter view appears for
the present to be dominant. (C Belgrade Desp #653, 11 Mar 52)
Comment: In keeping with the effort to increase
agricTtura production, the regime last fall initiated a
new tactic in the form of a "more rational" agrarian policy.
In the collectivized sector, workers were to be paid in
cash for norms met, not in kind for hours of labor. In
addition, uneconomic units were to be returned to the
general collectives or to the completely private sector. The
principal short-term objective of the regime during the past
year has been to hold the line in the face of strong peasant
pressures to withdraw from existing collectives.
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SFrRFT
Rhee's opposition in National Assembly exhibits strength:
Rumors that Rhee's recent campaign of threats and blandishments
have sapped the strength of his opposition in the Assembly ap-
pear to pave doubtful validity. The strength of Assembly
opposition to the concentration of power in Rhee's hands is
demonstrated by the collection of 123 signatures, out of 183
Assembly members, to a petition calling for a constitutional
amendment to institute a system of cabinet responsibility to
the Assembly.
A further indication of opposition to Rhee was exhibited
by an Assembly Committee which introduced a constitutional
amendment restricting the arrest of "those engaged in a po-
litical movement."
Rhee's campaign against Assembly opposition during the
past week took the form of politically motivated action,
consisting of a court indictment and a recall petition,
against two key leaders in Assembly resistance. (C Joint
Weeka 16, 16 Apr 52)
Con}nient: A similar "cabinet responsibility" amendment
submitte may the National Assembly was previously vetoed by
Rhee. A reliable South Korean political observer predicted
this action and noted that Rhee might take precipitate steps,
including dissolution of the Assembly, if the amendment was
re-submitted.
9. Peiping negotiating delivery of radio factories from
East Germany: The Chinese trade e ega ion visiting East
Germany reportedly is urging the East Germans for delivery
of 25 radio factories capable of producing small radio sets,
designed to receive Radio Moscow and Radio Peiping. The
factories are valued at about.25 million rubles (over 6 mil-
lion dollars at the official rate of exchange).
Although conclusion of an agreement covering 1952 trade
was expected soon, the Chinese have reportedly been informed
that they would receive no further deliveries for the time
being, .s their payments to East Germany were 50 million
rubles in arrears.
Comment: The last trade treaty between Communist China
and Eats rmany, negotiated in October 1950, covered 1951
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commerce between the two countries. Failure thus far to an-
nounce an agreement for 1952 trade may reflect substantial
differences.between the two parties. In addition to irrita-
tion at the unpaid balance due from China, the East Germans
are said to have complained about the quality of Chinese de-
liveries.
100 Chinese-.trained Tibetans to be used in remodeled Tibetan
Army: The en stmen o Tibetan natives-of i ang Pro-
vince to serve with the Chinese Communist armed forces was
attributed to propaganda work by Chinese Communist units cros-
sing Sikang into Tibet. After basic training in Sikang, the
volunteers are to be sent to Tibet proper to become the
nucleus of the garrison forces.formed from the army of the
old Tibetan regime, r
that Li Mi was not an immediate threat to Yunnan and that the
Chinese would not enter Burma "in order to avoid provoking the
US and UK," The Burmese Communists, however, were to cgntinue
their pressure upon the government with a view to developing
25X1C Comment:
25X10 the Chinese
ommunsts had disbanded the old Tibetan Army. In its place
the Communists have raised a small force of newly-trained
Tibetans, mostly from Chinese-influenced Sikang.
lninese policy in Tibet is to deprive the Dalai Lama's
following of any power of resistance to the Communists while
using the Halal Lama as a figurehead.
11, Chinese Communist plans for Burma reported: Representa-
tives o the urma Communist arty an a nese Communist
Embassy met with Soviet advisers in Kunmin Yunnan, on l March,
25X10 It was decided
25X1A
a situation similar to Indochina. C
Comment: This report cannot be confirmed by information
from .ter sources,
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
12, Iranian delegate to Moscow Economic Conference reportedly
discusses Armenian immigration to i e Soviet Union,: n Irani-an
25X1A
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delegate to the Moscow Economic Conference, Roman Isayev,
is reportedly discussing with?tTSSR officials a plan to per-
mit the immigration of one hundred Armenian families from
Iran to the Soviet Union. The Iranian Ambassador in Moscow
has asked the Iranian Foreign Office if Isayev had authority
to conduct such talks. The Foreign Office had not replied
25X1A up to 15 April.
25X1A
Comment: Isayev is a prosperous Armenian merchant with
close dvie and Tudeh connections, and was involved in the
.-3946 Soviet plan for "repatriating" Armenians to the USSR.
It is doubtful that the Iranian Government would support
any plan suggested by Isayev or agree to any such immigra-
tion.
a
under two members of the Chenik cabinet,
and Mohamed Badra. Instructions from Cairo to Tunisia are
Libyans want US to play larger part in Libya: Libyan
Prime Minister untasser as n orme a mer can Minister
in Tripoli that an increasing number of Libyans believe the
United States, rather than Britain and France, "should as-
sume primary responsibility for the Libyan nation." Some
Libyans fear that a few years of strong British interest ined
Libya may result in something comparable to what has happ
in Egypt.
Muntasser stated that Libya "has little confidence in
France" and that, while relations with the Italians were
satisfactory, negotiations toward a property settlement were
slow and filled with obstacles. (S Tripoli 560, 15 Apr 52)
Tunisian nationalists reportedly hope to form government-
in-ex e n a roe Minor Neo-estour ea ers stjll a large
are reportedly eeing to Cairo to form a government-in-exile
1ah ben-Xoussef
S
relayed by a Tripolitanian official.
25X1A
Comment Of more significance than the organization of
any government-in-exile is the reported use of Libyan govern-
mental employees to communicate with Tunisia. Undoubtedly a
number of'young Tunisians have fled to Libya and a few may
have reached Egypt. France, with the aid of the British, now-
ever, can exert sufficient pressure upon the Libyan Government
to dissipate a concentration of nationalist strength in Tripoli-
tania.
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15. Changes in Tangier adidinisrration r considered
ur7i
a
The Amer can egat on a ang rep
1923 Statute, as amended in 1928, which the Spanish Government
demands, is not now desirable. Ce tainichangesainithet1945
agreement could be made, however, to t
hindering satisfactory administration and to increase Spanish
participation.
The Legation suggests that the Committee of Control could
make the Administrator responsiblfor the the maintenance of pub-
lic order and grant him control over adding a Spanish
Spanish participation could be increased byss that the nosh e Deputy Commandant of Police. It also Welfare could be
of Assistant Administrator for Hygiene
re-created and' given to the Spanish. These steps as well as
others, such as increasing Italian representation in the,leg-
islalaturP, could be taken within
international conferences neces-
agreement and wo339ma15nApr an 52)
sary. (S Tangier underli Comment: The 30 March disorder Tingthe TangiernCom-
the nee recognized by a participants
mittee of Control for an effective allocation of responsibility
for public order. the 1945
Although Spain accepted considered situation be in ac-
coremen, it has not cordd with its rights and interests. bedreFrance solvedalso
feel that the questions raised by Pain which they fray would
. without an international conference,
prompt the USSR to exercise its prerogatives of membership
in the Committee o-f Control.
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WESTERN EUROPE
ia. Stikker predicts serious economic trouble tatesro eicialsch
Durvy-
Fore ig nister btlKlce ~~v????`, -
cted "real economic trouble in
in Washington that he?expe
within the next month so.
He doubted whether the OpaaiUnionrcouldpbenkeptngoing
Cooperation and the European Payments
in the future, particularly in view of the United States refusal
ffand difficulties. that members
to make a direct contribution
solve their own financial
Stikker believes that a termination of theEUniUnion
n,wouldmiean
the end of the trade liberalization p gr and
Community and the
prevent implementation of the3Eu1opean 52)
Schuman Plan. (S to Paris 683, 5 Comment: The continuation of the Payments Union, which is
schedule to end 30 June, is still under discussion. Although
Stikker is at times unduly pessimistic on world developments, necessary for the the Dutch Government has coQ~iientra-Europeannmultilateral trade.
preservation and expansion
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18. German unity issue might lead France to reject the European
Defense ommun ty. The mer can Embassy in Paris warns teat i
to Trench pu gains the impression from Western publicity
on the Soviet note that the strength of the West is being
harnessed in the cause of German unity, the French Government
will be faced with additional difficulties in seeking National
Assembly ratification of the EDC.
There is widespread fear in France that efforts to unify
Germany could precipitate a new world war, and one of the most
telling arguments against the EDC when the Assembly first debated
the question was the claim that a European Army might be used in
the service of German unification. (S Paris 6334, 16 Apr 52)
Comment. The French Government was unprepared for the
violence or the Assembly reaction to the pre-Lisbon Defense Com-
munity plan, and despite the steps to meet the Assembly's
conditions, the renewed discussion of the possibility of German
unity will encourage parliamentary opposition to the European
Defense Community.
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200 Soviet enterprises exploit Austrian workers for production
gains, The Quiet Military Ban In enna reportedly ntroducjd
oneJanuary a new accounting procedure designed to stimulate
production in Soviet-controlled firms in Austria through a system
of wage penalties. Under this scheme, plants failing to reach
production targets one month will suffer proportionate reductions
in allocations for wages the following month. One-third of the
firms affected reportedly delayed filing production returns in
January while the remainder reported fulfillment of production
25X1A goals-
Comment- The Military Bank?s assumption of closer control
over soviet Enterprises in Austria and the initiation of a
production drive have been suggested by other evidence. Never-
theless, the initiation of a system of wage penalties must be
accepted with caution. Despite Communist infiltration, labor
in the USIA-complex retains comparative freedom of action and
has frequently expressed dissatisfaction. So obvious an attempt
to exploit the workers could be expected to provoke a violent
reaction.
21. Ammunition for Italian Army sabotaged in process of pro-
25X1A
duction- Defective casings which split during icing tests have
caused military officials to reject 4009000 rounds of rifle and
machine-gun ammunition manufactured for the Italian Army by the
Bombrini?Parodi?Delfino munitions factory. Factory officials,
who were unable to determine the cause by instituting strict
controls in the production process, suspended work for three
days in the section making the cartridges. .When the machinery
was checked an almost invisible piece of sheeting was found
which had cut the casings during the stamping operation. 0 25X1A
Comment- This act of sabotage, undoubtedly part of the
Commun sit campaign to hamstring defense production in Italy,
is the first instance in which specific details have been
received on sabotage techniques and results. It illustrates
the techniques which the Communists can easily apply in plants
where they control a large part of the labor force,
massy that the Danish Government would undoubtedly reject any
loan provision in connection with the United States financing
the importation of American coal as a substitute for Polish
coal. (S Copenhagen 710, 15 Apr 52)
Danish Government dislikes loan aspect of US-financed coal
imports- a an s ore gn ce has Informed t e American
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Comment: With some difficulty the Danes had been dissuaded
from agreeing to export a tanker to Poland in return for vitally
needed coal on the assurance that the US would finance the net
dollar cost occasioned by the shift from Polish to US coal.
The intention of the US to offer a loan instead of a grant for
part of the net dollar costs greatly disturbs the Danes, who
ndnfeel that their
consider such a proposal inconsistent and
chronic dollar shortage p
LATIN AMERICA
23. Colombian Cabinet resigns: On 16 April all members of the
Colomb an a inet present. a joint letter of resignation to
president-designate Urdanetaa The object of this move, which
followed mounting rumors of governmental instability, was ap-
parently to give the president a free hand during the present
political crisis. Newspapers report that some of the resignations
will probably be accepted.
According to an unconfirpngovernorshipsitary
men in all cabinet posts and all departmental
(S Bogota 661, 16 Apr 52)
Comment: Urdaneta?s apparent desire to place military
leaders in important political positions is not illogical in
view of the government?s embarrassing inability to end the
guerrilla.warfarem He may also consider this an effective way
to head off a threatened military coup.
244 Ecuador fears extension of Argentine influence in Latin
America: Ecuadoran oreign inister Ponce as to d a U m assy
o TM al that he is worried about the possible extension of
Argentine influence in Bolivia and other Latin American countries.
Ponce said that Ecuador may be among the last to recognize the
new Bolivian regime, partly because he intends to investigate
rumors that it came to power with Argentine assistance.
According to the Embassy official, Ponce probably had
Ecuador and its forthcoming elections in mind when discussing
the possible expansion of Argentine influence. (C Quito 311,
15 Apr 52)
Comment: Ecuadoran presidential candidate Velasco Ibarra,
like to new Bolivian chief of state, has spent the last several
years in Argentina and is rumored to have the support of Peron.
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Ecuadoran officials may fear that widespread and prompt
recognition of the Bolivian Government might spark a revolution
in Ecuador.
25.
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TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
18 April 1952
CIA No. 49615
Copy No, 46
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
(including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
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 Approved f,pr Release 2002/05/20: CIA-RDP79T014MA000900140001-8
TOP SECRET
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
SOVIET UNION
1. Substance of Stalin-Radhakrishnan talk confirmed by
Indian urge: `either Stalin nor is ins y made specs is
proposals during their talks with Indian Ambassador Rad-
hakrishnan, according to Gundevia, the Indian Charge in
Moscow, who was present. He confirmed the fact that only
Indian international relations and internal affairs were
discussed. It was due to pressure from newspaper corres-
pondents that the Ambassador made a statement of his per-
sonal views, which were only in a negative sense based on
the Stalin talk. (S S/S Moscow 1689, 17 Apr 52)
Comment: Indian officials in New Delhi have likewise
confirmedthat the talks consisted merely of polite con-
versation with no tangible offers made. According to the
US Embassy in Moscow, United Press man Shapiro felt the
Ambassador made his press statement on settling world pro-
blems partly out of wishful thinking, but mainly as a
statement of his own views on leaving Moscow,which he
hoped would be enhanced if placed in the framework of his
talk with Stalin.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2. Establishment of interim government in Greece now
appears unlikely: Opposition leader Papagos has prevented
formation of the proposed interim government by his refusal
to participate in a vote of confidence. The King's po-
litical adviser, Vendiris, had insisted that without the
support of all the parties an interim government could not
carry out economic and other reforms. (S S/S Athens 4513,
15 Apr 52)
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Comment: Papagos fears that a vote of confidence in an
interim g -government would enable it to remain in power inde-
finitely. Consequently he has refused to take part in such
a vote.
Indications are that the present government will con-
tinue to function for the time being with decreasing effec-
tiveness in the face of a deteriorating economic situation
and increasingly bitter opposition from Papagos' Greek. Rally
Party,
30
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TOP SECRET
4. East Germany orders decentralization of municipal
governments: The East German Government as orderec"7 ef-
e~ive-=ay, the decentralization of the administrations
of the ten largest East German cities, excluding Berlin.
American observers in Germany consider this order as
further evidence of the Socialist Unity Party's determination
to strengthen its control by associating the population more
closely with the regime and by enlarging its opportunities
for influencing the people. (S Frankfurt Sitreps 12 and 13,
8 and 15 Apr 52)
Comment: This action may be part of the current
"democratization" in the Soviet Zone. Reports of penal
reforms, an order for increased attention to individual
rights, and a recent directive for favorable consideration
of "bourgeois" personnel in government positions are indi-
cations of the new."democratic" policy which was started
in January.
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transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official
duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form
and indicate period of custody in the left .hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and
SIGNATURE OFFICE/DIV. DATE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below
and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
Ap ved For
FORM 26 UAE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
07i
o c
OFFICE DATE
lease 2002/05/20 Cl -RDP79TO11
TOP SECRET
OFFICE
6A000900140001