DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000800190001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 12, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
OCI No. 3891
Copy No. 256
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared pr in;arily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
State Dept., ONI, JCS reviews completed
Approog(llor Release 2
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12 March 1952
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ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETURN TO
0 C~IIVES,
II46AAG0 g80ENCY 90.1-4
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING TH NATIONAL
D,SFENS : OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHO,IZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
German peace treaty: In a
1. USSR. Soviet Union proposes
n to to the three estern powers t e Soviet Union has pro-
posed a four-power discussion of anGallaGermanegovex?nment.
with the direct participa
As a basis for discussion the Soviet Union submitted
a draft treaty which
of .trooper, a guarantee
any military llterritrial
to the Potsdam decisions,
of German trade or econom and permission for Germany to
have its own army.
Comment: The Soviet proposal climaxes Soviet and East
German propaganda that a peace treaty would mean German is
sovereignty, withdrawal of troops and German unity, a
the strongest maneuver to date to prevent West German inte-
gration into the European community.
The USSR, however, has not given any indication that
ofelections
all-German
it would allow supervised
Germanhgovern-
mebent x}e in cessary treaty for the talks, participation and by including this condition the
USSR has presented attractive offers without fear of having
to fulfill them.
The Soviet offers will appeal to a large element of
the German population, and the opposition Social Democrats
will probably have an intra-party-struggle over the pro-
posal which could end by their approving the first steps
in the Soviet program -- an immediate Big Four conference to
consider a peace treaty. However, the Bonn Government and
the Bundestag will regard the proposal skeptically.
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2. BULGARIA. Premier Chervenkov appears in Sofia:' According
To a Bulgarian radio report, Premier ul a ervenkov was
among those who attended ceremonies marking the 25th anni-
versary of the newspaper Rabotnichesko Delo in Sofia on
5 March.
Comment; Yugopress, a semi-official Yugoslavian news
agency, reported on 8 March that Chervenkov had not been
seen since he left for Moscow on 20 February to discuss
"forthcoming Bulgarian monetary reforms" with Soviet finan-
cial experts. This report has been widely echoed in the
American press. Although there is no evidence to indicate
that Chervenkov actually left Bulgaria during February, it
is perhaps noteworthy that the Bulgarian Premier did not
appear at festivities held in Sofia on 22 February in
celebration of'the 34th anniversary of the Soviet Army.
3. Two notes of protest directed to United Nations:
The Bulgarian Ministry o oreign airs as protested o
the United Nations against a 12 January resolution providing
for further study of UN anti-aggression machinery.
Bulgarian note charges that the resolution, which is "aimed
at weakening the principal organ of the United Nations,
the Security Council," constitutes "an outright attack
against the principle of unanimity in the Security Council
and endangers the very existence of the United Nations."
A second note protests the dissolution of the special
UN Commission for the Balkans, and its replacement by a
Balkan sub-group of the Peace Observation Commission.
Since this new commission will allegedly cause still greater
tension in relations among the Balkan countries, the Bul-
garian Government "will neither recognize it nor afford it
any assistance."
Comment: Western-sponsored measures for strengthening
the capabilities of the United Nations as an organ of
collective security have already received sharp attacks from
the USSR and the Satellite members of the United Nations.
these Satellite states might
Similar protests from
be expected to follow 4. HUNGARY. Stalin fails to congratulate Rakosi: The most
in .restin eve opment o Matyas Ra osi s recent birthday
celebration was the absence of a congratulatory telegram
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y according to the US Legation in Budapest.
a of the Hungarian Workers'
from Stalin, General s from the Central
Rakosi, who is Secretary- greetings
Communist), did receive g of the Soviet Union the
y
ist Part
th Korea,
t
par
Nor
mmun
y the Co
Committee of Auste German Democratic
well as the Communistllediaers of rchina, ia th
ean sates
in
G
.
Europ
reat Brita
Republic and Prime Minister Dobi
s to
? avagant eulogies by tie ed
Extr
Comment. emphasized RakRakosi attribut
and M n er of State Ienr his own speech, t
Stali o adapt the
n and theunist- successes to the ability
Hungarian Comm to Hungarian conditions*
d Stalin
doctrines of Lenin an hiu-DeJj
that Gheorghe Ghearg also
it should be noted
of the Rumanian Communist the occasion
Secretsry_General reeting from Stalin on
failed receive glast November.
of his 50th birthday ties
ia's strong
lav
Tito refers to Yugospror1 e
a co n erence w l - ugos av
5. YUGOSLAVIAeSRYESDuring monthTito reportedly stated that
wl a that his army
ea ers ~n rioni last month,
allied armies.
dship with the West of estrong
frien
Yugoslav considered as one
could almost be ast Yugoslav errors on the
increased assistance from
In response to criticism of p
and requests for st mistakes would be
art to the
Trieste question Tito promised that Pa
stance
d that he wood lend his moral support
assissistance
the Trieste groues
d financial
irease
n
fornc a corrected croup's request
ieste g
en
T r from the Slovene Governm
the closeness of
Tito's remarks concerning designed to re-
Comment. may have been
his re a ions with sthe upporters West ters that their cause would not
assure his Trieste be compromised. pro-Yugoslav party in Zone A
st year the During the pa its activities becausortedly
has been forced to curtail
for p
support from Yugoslav re olitical
sufficient slarger exp
doubt the effectiveness of activity in zone A.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
eriar pcoiograpas malenaon Port or on
1. CHINA. Photographs show no
sands near n aocnii, .
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(a) at Peihai, a mainland port ear tneelbutethere
border, the airfield appeared was no indication of activity;
(b) on Weichou Island, near Indochina, the airfield
was definitely unserviceable;
abandoned airfields,
(c) Hainan sland, the
were Folo and
while overgrown.
while se
The Peili airfield was definitely'unserviceable.
In the harbors of Paso and Yulin no military
activity or installations were observed.
Comment: During the past two years, numerous reports have
descr etc lie reconstruction of airfields and other military
activities at these places.
3. THAILAND. Premier admits intention to resign: Prremmierrep bus
con rmed to the American m assa or in ang
that he wished to reflg5 barchecwhenome are
mentioned the date o
expected to end.
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wantss American military installations in
c ear
Libyan King 1 Ya as ma e i unmis aka y
L
ng r 0
7. LIBYA. welcome the establishmo ntyrenaicalnan mil arn
yrenaicaa The Governor
a e would province C
royal, citing
installations. in even r oken in his app resting
renaica-was evemore outsp from the P
of Cy
as reasons the economic benefits resulting
of US troops. between
points out that rivalry bVetw etw of
The American Minister and prosperous p airbase, pjheelf
of Cyrenaican authorities.
Tripp icalita and th whi mchehaspthe important US
never-
Field strongly a -colors the vltwportant CYrenathicea es is tabli shment
He observes that strategically imPencouraging ue tali be
forendliness othe Middle East.
litthis friendliness
of theless American almost bases unique and tiniat this
ne lected in over-all m I
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
to GENERAL, Major European Maritime powers reluctant to end
chartering o s cps o r r. In rep y o American inquiries
in COCOM as to vy a er the other governments intended to stop
the long-term chartering of List I vessels, particularly tankers,
to the Orbit, Britain, Denmark, and Norway have taken the position
that the US inquiry was improper since previous discussions had
been held on the subject and they had nothing further to says
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and France indicated they
had no List I vessels under 'charter and would not permit the
chartering of such vessels to the Soviet bloc. The Italian
delegate said his government had cancelled two tanker charters
and was negotiating with Italian ship owners to limit ship
charters to the USSR. The Canadian delegate stated that his
country had no vessels under charter tc the Soviet bloc.
The Dutch delegate countered the American inquiry by asking
for information on any lend-lease tankers still held by the
Soviet Union and on any American oil company tankers chartered
under either the United States or foreign flags to the USSR.
Comment. The attitude adopted by the major shipping
countries inindicates that the Orbit will still be able to
charter tankers from western European countries. US efforts
to restrict the amount of tonnage available to the Orbit are
further impeded by the fact that several European countries,
notably Denmark and Sweden, either have constructed or are
constructing a number of tankers for the USSR under previous
trade agreements.
20
GERMANY.
Adenauer?s policies may be threatened
by
new Senate
iT neup.
One of the most important consequences
of
the arch
Southwest State election will be its effect on
the
Federal
Senate's composition, Of the 38 votes in the Senate, the
Social Democrats now control 15, while on a controversial issue
like rearmament, Chancellor Adenauer`s coalition can count on
only 13. The remaining 10 votes are divided equally between
the Southwest State delegation, which is yet to be formed,
and the Bavarian delegation, which consists of Social Democrats
and Adenaueres Christian Socialists, parties which oppose each
other on the Federal level,
Should the Social Democrats enter the new Southwest State
cabinet its delegation to the Federal Senate might be forced
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to follow the Bavarian practice of not voting on highly contro-
versial issues. This would mean defeat for Adenauer's program
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Comment: The Southwest State is actually most likely to
choose a Christian Democratic and Free Democratic coalition
cabinet. Social Democratic participation is not impossible,
however, because of internal dissension in Christian Democratic
ranks; but inclusion of the Socialists would still not give
them a commanding position.
The Bavarian delegation has abstained from voting on
controversial issues, secure in the knowledge that Adenauer did
not need its support. However, Bavaria. has a Christian
Democratic majority in its cabinet, as will, probably, the
Southwest State. Either of the states could compel its Senators
to support Adenauer's policies if it were imperative.
On issues where states' rights are at stake, the Senate
usually disregards partisan considerations.
4. FRANCE. Tool shortage greater threat than Communists to
rent armament pro uctiono serious threat to rent defense
pro uction, with extremely important political and morale
aspects, can be averted by emergency diversion to France of
a small number of critical machine tools now reserved for
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American use, according to the US technical survey team in
Paris.
At the same time, the US military advisory group in Paris
warns that the arms ;:procurement program in France would be
dealt a probably fatal blow by any sweeping decision not to
place armament orders in plants having workers affiliated with
the Communist-led General Labor Confederation. The group
points out that the French Government is certifying to the
security of the firms concerned, and that even in the metal-
working induenry e~cenet favor CGT
ten
only about
that union.
i'rically needed now are not
s
cr
Comment: Some machine
scheduTed-T-0 be delivered until next year, and delivery on others
is well behind schedule.
Although there have been rumors of occasional sabotage in
the past year, Communist attempts to incite French labor against
all faileda
h
ave
defense shipments and production
!or
t
ian tactics on Czech
l
eque
l
g
s
5. BELGIUM-CZECHOSLOVAKIA Be
1vlded
an 1ng r1g sun ec1 ed~ T e
on yvIi ac ion to tahe on Czech attempts to obtain approval of
its proposed Prague-Paris air route. Some officials hold
that the reply to the Czech note should be coordinated with
the Dutch reply, while others believe that Belgium should delay
its answer until after the Dutch have replied. This latter
group feels that the Netherlands may grant the Czechs at least
transit rights within a month or two, although the Dutch have
not clearly indicated this position to the Belgian Foreign Office.
While Czechoslovakia has not pressed for a reply to its
n
note, the Belgian airline,. Sabena, is having difficulties in
dealing with the Czech Government. No reply has
the Belgian request to increase the number of Sabena's flights
per week to Prague.
Comments Although Belgium has indicated that it sees no
basis or refusing the Czech request, the government is
conscientiously employing delaying tactics as long as possible.
Denmark has already a:proved the Czech request, and the timing
operations.
of the Belgian xgr~~oftCzwill depend ech the
reply and and the extent
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6. NETHERLANDS. Dutch Army still fears war in September: The
Dutch Army has no been recep a.ve o a H y eam s comments
that it has enough equipment to field two divisions and a corps
for the September maneuvers. The Dutch are still "obsessed
with the idea" of being; completely equipped because they feel
that the troops in the maneuvers may be called upon to fight.
For many months now, the Military Assistance Advisory
Group in the Netherlands has been unable to convince the Dutch
Army that its training program anc maneuver commitments based
on available assets are adequate when compared to the practice
of nations with more military e;:perience. The US Embassy at
The 'Hague telieves that forceful presentation by SACEUR will be
necessary to _et the Dutch to accept SHAPE`s conclusions.
Comment: Dutch military authorities have already indicated
that iey will not be responsible for meeting their troop
commitments if adequate American equipment is not forthcoming.
In his speech before Parliament on the 19o2 defense budget
at the end of February, the Netherlands Defense Minister stated
that if the training schedule is upset because of the late
arrival of equipment, the recruits will be sent home temporarily
rather than kept "inadequately trained."
The belief that September l 3x.2 is "the moment of greatest
danger" has been current among high military circles in the
Netherlands since last fall.
7. CARIBBEAN AREA. Foreign submarine activity in the Caribbean:
The Commander in rT-iL of he t antic eet as een In ormed
by the Commander of ;::..e Second Fleet that no US vessels were in
the vicinity of the Dominican waters wh re submarines, allegedly
Soviet, were reportedly seen recently
The presence of non-US submarines has created a certain
amount of unrest in the countries bordering the Caribbean.
Traffic in these waters is extremely important today for the
flow of strategic materials into the US, such as manganese
from Cuba, iron ore from Venezuela, bauxite from the Guianas,
and refined petroleum from the islands of Aruba and Curacao.
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The refinery installations on Aruba were shelled by Nazi 25X1
submarines in February 1942. With the largest refinery in the
world after Abadan, Aruba, because of its increased ca acit is
of far greater importancc toda .
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at the most a smal n training
Denmark and some NATO air un
NATO facilities inDes in Denmark for temporary
casionally using b
purposes.
Favorable acti.LV11 ".Y robably envisage
o e e uinfluence Denmark. The Danes p
doubtedlY umber of foreign technicians helping
is oc-
TOP SECRET
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TOP,SECRET
INHEONATIONAL
MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING
THIS
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
793 AND 794, THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC,
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICHYIN ANY MANNER TO AN
LAW-
B
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
Cabinet member sees time not ripe for NATOingses
1. DEN
e Danis Finance ini ,
fusal to authorize
k
re
:
in Denmar
has told the American
regre' over his government's Present
NATO airbases and troops in Denmark,
Ambassador that the Norwegian Government's repeated u
troops in peacetime" might adversely
rejection of "foreign Denmark in the near fl
affect a favorable decision by reparation the
He feels, however, that with some time for preparation
ventuall accept these NATO plans.
lie, will e
t Government leaders a arenti recd nine the
_
r
n
N=O bases in .-/vaa..,....- - u is opinlvt~
need or I-,+ nnnsider t a p nn-
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