DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000800130001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 4, 1952
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/07 :CIA-RDP79T01146A000800130001-6
4 March 1952.
OCI Noa 3885
Copy Noo
251.
DAILY DTGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant rep of Currentelntell gen a ~~ lIt does
for the internal use of the Uffice
not represent a complete covera ence. al Comments reprtesent the
or in the Office of Current Intell g
i~r~mediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
~~AI, R~p,R~
5E-GREY
~ RE
AG~~
S~
HIV
~~Sta73
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/07: CIA-RDP79T01146A000800130001-6
25X1
SEC ~,~T
SECTIQN 1 ~S?VIz?aTt
USSki,. Soviet element yin Austriahblaock~gintheer~o~nsitro~-a
1.
,~Q et of -:~.c1a s are xeparte y
goads to the western pones eon-ferrous metalsallocationsa~s
unwillingness to increase n During
to the Soviet~E~t650rands7a0 ~hipments~wer.e held up, and
]~ebruary betvrde which need
metal processing pla.nts~in the we~,ffected~es9
Soviet gone scra~~, a7e .~eriausly
The Austrian Trade P,~inistry T+lans to negotiate with
the Russians, but proposes to maintain its t~asiuaaranteet
USIA allocatiu~~~~'~~llarev~rtntouthe Austrian economy.
that end rod
Comment? It is likely that if consumer ~-,ricer are
lowere~c ~~~11 y savings passed on tee the public will be
rent retail sales,
Cammenta This report xs a urre5sjire an the Austrian
Soviet- a~ u~~?rities are increasing p
ecanomy~ .
It is not cer?tain to what extenresblablyadirc'ctedlcia~.s
will pursue this ~aolicy, but it is p
against broader ~a,.rgets such as the Austrian campaign
against recent jJSTA ac~i~htaneUSlA,da,llacatian~s~aloneade
control program, rathe
Na Soviet ~1larch retail price cuts announced> ~,etail
2 ? announce in t e aviet ~Jnicn yin 1 March
price cuts usually ~ eculation among Russians
have not yet been forthcominga p be no price cuts this
reflects the feeling that t~iere may
ye~.r , ar tla.at a sanall cut m~.y be annaunced later .
The ~mba~sy believes that if a price cut :i_s actually
sever~.l reasons may have prompted a notay+ct~be
scheduledN
its announcemerat~ The planned 1952 budget may
fixed far the i~~eeting of the Su~7reme Soviet next we~=k?
be a desire, far propaganda pur~,ases, to time
There nay
the anraouncementr?fl a The lateewinterhfaodrshortagenris
Conference in A7 and a ~~r ice
mare than usually acute this year in Moscow,
cut announcement could have are a ravatin effect on cur--
-----
------------
f Cher i nflicat ion tha
SEGRT;T
4 Mar 5'2
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SECRET
~:maller than in 19489 1949, and 1951, when they averaged
about l? percent ora esseaatial consumer goods. In com-
parison these reduce~lwholesale priceslonrindustrialegoods,
already effected f
4, k~UNGARYo Cammixnist Party striving for elecresaries~ofTthe
~nnua.l Corr~~~?~~ce of the-district arty
Unnga.ri~,n iYorkers party ~Cc~mmunist~ was told by thethat
Seex~et~.ry of the Central Committee, Istvan Kovacs,
preference for quantity x?ather than quality in party
members must give way to stricter membershonesmldlions?
With the number of. Communists approaching
party offici~.ls were instructed to concentrate ?themlinng
the ideological level of the members, educating them
the fighting spirit of R~ia,rxism-Leninism, converting
into party activists and including them in party work.
I~ew members should be wage raduetionvarad2showins exem lorry
are working in industrial p
beha?a; ~,~' ; ~ both F~?duct ion and social work ,
SECRET
,~ 4 Mar 52
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Commenta High officials in the party criticized
e ection last f~,11 of offxcersofuo~ intellectu~.lseandaf
the erienced
party organizations because not en cases old, exP
technicians were elected and in many
leaders were not re-electedaccountifor the~concernaof the
turnover in leadership many which has developed in
warty hierarchy with the 'laxity
the admission standards and the ideological training of
,
5.- Y ? icyo oreign
s i ~ ~n art __. ~,~ n?-tv
members.
OSLAVIAo Yugoslav Forei n Minister admits leftward
U('
var ar e t a mi e d t nati ~ u~ """'..."--- u ie t
nis er
of .Yugoslavia has vart~dregularsloverirecentroffciade de-
l
y
~
garde
the misgivings of p
viations from classical Communist theory.
dared that further_rurCl^~~ssaofZ~'peasant collectiveand
associations." He maintains
ro ram is based upon the minimum industrial ~-za-
investment p g lavia?s current needs.
tion required for Yugos
arty policy
d sh
~he., Past month.
Com~~m~ t o A significant leftwar
has become ~-ncreasingly apparent during
Increased official anti-religao~ciplinelhighlightethissis
on the need for better party
recent trend.
SECRET
3 4 Mar 52
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. T
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
25X1
1, INDONESIA. Economics Ministry official may visit Satellite
countries: semi-of icla news agency reporte t a r.
smaun, an official of the Indonesian Economics Ministry, will
visit Satellite countries ,early in March. It is believed that
he will study possibilities for establishin trade relations
with East Europe:~.~~. countries .
Comment: Tndonesia hashoslovakiaadandgPolandts Undergthee
past year with Hungary, Czec
agreements small quantities of rubber and tin are being exported
to those countries. The government has not commented on the
report of Dr. Asmaun's visit or the possibility of further trade
relations with the Satellites; it has. officially denied reports
of trade negotiations with the USSR.
2. BURMA. American prestige reportedly .suffering: The American
m assy in .Rangoon repor s at a i s personnel "emphatically
agree" that the prestige of the United States has "suffered
perceptively" as a consequence of the widespread feeling that
it could do more to relieve the Chinese Nationalist problem.
The local Communist press has seized u on this issue to rovide
fresh appeal to its propaganda .
Comment: The Chinese Nationalists have been a source of
irritation in American-Burmese relations for over a year, and
the current flareup threatens the good will that has been so
tediously developed since Burma became independent in 1948.
The Burmese Government, nevertheless, has caustically
denied the Cominform report of an American deal with Premier
'I'hakiri Nu whereby the Nationalists would be retained in north-
eastern Burma as a buffer
4 Mar 52
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., v~r V
4. INDOCHINA. Chinese Nationalist-.official urges repatriation of
n oc ina interneeso T e ~nese Natrona is onsu enera
in azgon to d French Minister for Associated States Letourneau
on 25 February that the morale of the interned Chinese National-
ist troops in Indochina had sunk to "a new and dangerous ebb."
He urged their immediate repatriation to Formosa as the only
solutiono
The Chinese official said that Letourneau, while not yet
prepared to advocate outright repatriation, stated that it
might be possible for some such organization as the International
Red Cross or a specially constituted UN committee to solve the
internee issue
The Consul General also told Minister Heath that both
Acting Commander in Chief Salan apd Inspector of Overseas Troops
Commenta The late Marshal de Lattre consistently opposed
repatriation of these Nationalist troops, which. originally
numbE.-cd about 30,000 men. However, an official of the French
Foreign Office stated~i.n January that his successor, General
Salan, favored their release but had advanced no proposal to
effect ito
5. CHINA/KOREA, MIG sorties over Korea decrease: Visual recon-
naissance of tie air ie d at ntung on an 29 February
revealed that no MIG-15's were there< The Far-East Command
notes that total MIG sorties over Korea for trxe last week in
d
February dropped sharply to 548, comparP~ with the recor
number of 1,387 the previous week.
Comments The Antung airfield was a main base for enemy.,
combat operations in 1951 and early 1952? One explanation
advanced for the absence of aircraft there is that the planes
are based at fi.>:u-~s deeper in Manchuria and staged through the
Antung area to Korea. The Far East Air Force noted evidence
in early February of such a system.
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` SECRET
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
ERN[ANY. Bonn wants to shi scra to Czechoslovakia
1. G
~ ermined,
ue that if the shipments are nat p
The Germans arg out a threat to stop deliveries of coal
the Czechs will carry and that current negotiations between
reement will be jeopardized.
to the Federal Republic,
the two countries for a 1952 trade ag
million tons of
h trans-
The Czechs shipped over one
.Comment: 1850 for industrial use. Hig
brown co~~O Bavaria during infeasible for Bavaria to
portation costs make it economically West Germany's main
obtain brown coal from the Rhine Valley,
producer.
suspension
would further
The-West Germa~pmhCzechoslovakiattoeGermanyryic already
of coal shipments f ubl ,
aggravate the coallciaemands as we11F asebylthepstoppage of East
affected by dourest
German shipments to Berlin.
conomic on erence. oscow c
-,,,~ .aP~ P~ation to the M _ , , .._.. +Y?a~~Pl ers
o important French industrialist Pnanaris r~pordsMosaaw
2. FRANCE. N e merlcan m assy
E onomic Con-
~~ prospe~~1V~ ~------ arz c,ii~y y~,~__..
industrialists
rises for the mos p
key
ference now comp
romote trade: with the
and less important buaitosa,ttend eithergtospme
ommunist-dom-
were initially tempte osition with C
Soviet Orbit or to strengthen haver decided not to risk the pos-
inated unions in France, they
onsequences for their ersonal and business relations with
Bible c
the United States.
Comment: The combination of rrenchtindustrialists.csuscep-
has made F and
an acute ollar shortage Communist China,
tible to offers of trade with twhileSFrance has shown more in-
the Satellites. Nevertheless, other country in Western
terest in thF _,onference than any olitical aspects of the
Europe., enthusiasm has dwindled as the p a arent.
trade overtures have become increasingly pp
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4 Mar 52
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y
3 a :~:~'r-:nuh economic crisis raises fears of Gaullist or
nc ca ine crisis lg -
Communist success: a presen re
T~:~~s~~f`ie now pressing urgency of economic problems and the
possibility that inflation may get out of hands Should this
occur;, the possibility of successful exploitation of the poli-
tical situation by the Guallists or Communists would have to
be reassessed..
The view that Foreign Minister Schuman is too pro-American
is encoura(~in~; rumors that he may be dropped from the next govern-
ment
Comment: Neither a Gaullist nor a Communist accession
to I:~avaer i.~ likely to be the immediate solution of the pre-
sent ?~cliti_cal crisis., The mass of French workers would not
cooperate in an obvious Communist bid for political power,
and the Socialists could be expected to grant grudging support
to another centrist government before permitting the Gaullists
to come to-power under th~~ar own terms,
~,
FRANCE-TUNISIAo
French recognize need for reforms, but not
orma con erences
rea y o ac
on e uni
now
ts an
: ur~ng a series o in
question, the Director of the Protectorates
admitted to the? American
i
vis~on in
Di
i;he
ce
French F'~.reign Off
t stated that
b
.
Ambassador
that
u
certain ~ceforms are necessary,
't d to the Arab men-
a forceful approach i.s the only one sui e
tality~ Yielding too much to the Tunisians now "would be fatal
not only in Tunisia but in the rest of North African" The For-
vi~;n Office recognized the need for a prompt resumption of ne-
gotiations, but admitted that governmental instabilit would
l dela the obligatory cabinet decisiono
Comment: French troops and police have not yet stamped
out rio ~ng.and sabotage in Tunisian The Resident General
claims to have recommended for Paris approval a "concrete
reform program" which includes the displacement of Tunisian
Prime Minister Cheniko
5~ AUSTRIA.. Vice Chancellor hints at__Socialist adamancy on re-
s ~, u ion issue:- oc~.a is ice once or c aer ~.n orme
e merican m asst' prior to his departure for the United
States that-'a "surprise development" may be forthcoming in
the cux?rent 'poli.ti.cal squabble over the- He assert d thatr t e
erty tc ex-Heimwehr. leader Starhembergo
Mar 52
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SECRET
Socialists are determined to take de~eatssbuttwilleaccepte
rather than face a parliamentary
ossible solutions: a plebiscite on the
any one of thr~.e p
issue; dissolution of Parliament and general elections
ost onement until after the next general elections.
25X1
Comment: Proposals of the coalisuenwilltbesdebatede nn5on
of In epen ents on the resteachlhaving been deteated in the
March as minority motions,
Judicial Committee by combinations of the three parties. The
Socialists, who have lost ground sincethe vote-~~~ g appeal
victory last`spring, are attracted by avern-
of this emotional issue; while their withdrawaa fearedhdisposed
ment cannot be ruled out, they have, however, pP
to compromise.
vert
d
o
t
a
mi
m
e
e
S
n
lg
em
~g of
ITALY. Government blocks new attemp
g
s
,
Z5'r"G'i ~' n i r s case o i
the Italian Government re-
ra a controls a few months ago, roduced alu-
cently blocked a 600-tan shipment of Italian-p
minum to Rumania. The moadedwin Genoasanla Narwegianfshiphe
United States . It was 1 25X1
25X1 but im ounded in Na les the following day,
Comment: The United States has been arranging for. the
purchas~T5,000 tons of aluminum from Italy during 1952.
To date only part of this has been obtained becricesodemanded
vious Italian commitments as well as the high p
by Italian producers.
f
substantial amounts o
l ,
ed through Italy despite the
aluminum have been transsn~pp
recent temporary suspension of import licences. Some 3,200
metric tons of aluminum-are believ~do Orbitvcountrieslvpad
from or trans~hippc-clthrough Italy
Basel and Antwerp between June and December of last year.
7. Italian Communists strikeoTgaWOrtersmsavelreeused toe
first ins ance in w is a ian p in Genoa.
unload military equipment occurred on 24 February received
The workers began the unloading, but quit when they
instructions from their Coambnithelltalian Army undercmaximume
military cargo was unloade y
security regulations.
SECRET
4 Mar 52
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1.
SECRET
US officials have anticipated such difficulties with the
Communist-controlled port workers in Genoa, and had hitherto
avoided military shipments to that port. The short duration
of the strike suggests that the Communists were testing the
extent to which the ort workers would ollow strike orders.
point at the conference.
8~ SWITZERLANDo Liquidation of German assets will be used as
argaining ppin ~n on on erman e c n erence: e
finis er o wi zer an on a ru~,ry presen a an aide
memoire expressing concern that Switzerland might delay or
prevent a final solution on the settlement of German assets
in Switzerland in order to get favorable treatment at the
German debt settlement conference which opened in London on
28 February. The Swiss Bo~^eign Minister hinted that the Swiss
would use the liquidation of German assets as a bargaining
Comment; The Swiss have continually found one pretext
after ano~e~ to avoid the liquidation of German assets in
Switzerland.
10 4 Mar 52
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a ~ `~'
SECRET
25X6
!11. SWEDEN. Commuaiets losing trade union strength becausQnoafe
~esp onage cases: scan rave a ons o ommun s asp B
n we en eve resulted in unusual losses for Communist can-
didates in current trade union elections. The Communist grip
an the Metal Workers? local in Gothenburg, Sweden's second
largest trade union local and hitherto the Communists? chief
propaganda platform i,n the trade unions, has been broken,
chiefly through the termination of their ten-year reign in the
5,000 man Go?taverken shipyard. In the strategic far north,
iron ore miners at Malmber et h ve also ended a long Communist
rule,
Comment: Since the Czech coin in 1948 Communist stren th
has been ec inin ;
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4 Mar 52
25X1
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25X1
newsp p
complete information on recEnt decisions
hemisphere defense, "because of the interest which the Ar entine
moron defenseo" ~
o
13e ARGENTINA. Mutual Securityo Aet e~ponecaecriesNthepmutualoaid
nis eScartes, repor e
plan and states that all that is needed is for each coup Vern-
to defend its own territoryo The general theme of the g
meet-dominated newspapers is to deprecactstand touclaimpthat
of the bilateral military assistance p to a non-government
the plan benefits only the USo According
a er the Argentine Ambassador to thandAprojects~forted
overnment attributes to c
Comment: Argentina is not coaching fornbilaterallmili-
American countries the US is app hemisphere
tart' assistance pactso According to Descartes,
defense plans should be carried out through the Inter-American
Defense Board i:n accordance with the Inter-Ameri-can Treaty of
SECRET
12 4 Mar 52
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SECRET
Assistance, which assures national sovereignty
Reciprocal
carries proposal for Latin?reigncalnlsterlreion
,, n~'.R7T ~ Emissary ,,,,a a ~ eruv~an ~ _-;,ao.,t. CTonzalez
-
ag is nis nst ua ~a~ ~__ to ~~,~~~w~. _
a secre emissary Latin American
cen y sen a Dint declartheolimits of their territorial
Videla proposing ~ extending which was de-
ations considerably ro osal, duties
action to the P
d new US
n
The Chilean re
ressed the opin-
waters as retaliation for the propose
signed to serve letely negatives Gonzalez eXP rom ted
on tuna, was comp ~~~ not originate in Peru but was
Ecuador, Chile,
The Latin American countries afaTetperuy
but acute interest in curarent
new tariff on fresh and Mexico9tuna
Costa Rica, Panama, ress has
sessional considex'ation~ f the tariff has beenta
ou h the Argentine P here
US Cong ~~~.dor , Alt g erialism,
only in Peru and Ec` le of US imp responsible
,played up the issue as an ee tines are directly
is nthevcurrenttPeruvianApgoposalo
for
by--Argentine PresiQe11 ?, y .,_ --
xtension of territoriae La~insAmerican westd
Comments S fishing for tuna off th
to obs ruc
coast b the proposed
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4 Mar 52
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TOP SE_
4 March 1952
CIA Noo 49567
Copy Noo
~~
TOP SECRET SUPPLEIVlENT
TO TgE DAILY DIGEST
Not far. dissemination outside O/CI and ~/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
its has been prepared Primarily
This summary of significant repo
or the internal use of the Office of burr 1 ~urrentgreports in CIA
f e of al
not represent a complete coverag
Comments represent the
or in the ~f iewe off thre ~icet ofigCurrent Intelligence.
immediate vi
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t. r
M .r _ ~i,rv
,,.,~
TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
le JAPANo .Japanese-Chinese Nationalist treaty tai s hit snag:
T e main o stac a in a currhina isaaeChineseedemandythat
gotiations with Nationalist C according to the
the treaty must apply to all of China,.
Japanes+~ Vice Minister of ForoethatAJapanscouHd notiaccepte
US Political Adviser in Toky a of the .treaty
.this proposal even. if the terdoiumentlascsuggested by the
25X1 were modi '
tiono
v u i .. ~,. ,,., .. .
Comment: Prime .Minister Yoshida, in his 24 December
letter t~mbassador Dulles, committed .Japan to negotiating
wha.ch should be applicable. to "all terri-
a limited treaty hereafter be under con-
tories which are now or which may The Taipei government,
trol of the Nationalist Government." rotection of its po??
.both for reasons of prestige and for p
sition in the UN and .other ilacksaactual control overetheo
avoid .any admission that it
mainlands
Treaty subsiding: United .States
20 .Reaction to Security
Politica A wiser ebal reports t at .Diet debate apact
emotional public reaction to the US-Japan effective" govern-
~appears to have passed a climaxo .Fairly di-
ment presentation in thefDomttheesubstanceeofetheragreement
verted public criticism uestions of implementa
to .con of the ne otiations and q
ft in criticism from the actual
.Comment: The quick shi
terms o t e agreement to the gov~essehadshopedutp influence
suit the Di..;* suggests that the p exag-
reement during its negotiation by
.the terms of 'the ag
Berating the problem of extraterritorial rights. T e
natural Japanese distaste for continued occupatiohasypro-
foreign troo s, despite its recognized necessiosition par-
v~ided both t~onvenientsissue onnwhichutosattack the govern-
ties with a ~ ected to exploit it to the fulleste
mentd .They are exp
TOP SECRET
4 Mar 52
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