DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000600090001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 4, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION
4 December 1951
CIA No.. 49458
Copy No.i 4 5
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
State Dept., USAF reviews completed
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
25X1A
1. TJSSR. Arrival of Soviet personnel at East German airfield: Two trains
carrying Russian airforce personnel and two aircraft arrived in the
Russian zone of Germany and proceeded to Koethen airfield on 14 and 15
November respectively. These trains were in addition to those pre-
viously reported, which arrived at Grossenhain and Kdther on 8 and 16
November. this may indicate the early return of the jet fighter regi-
ments withdrawn from the Russian zone of Germany in mid-October. It
could not be determined that the Koethen-bound trains carried units
from the USSR,.,since the numbers observed on the aircraft now at
Koethen have been reported exclusively s in the Russian
zone. F
Comment: While the Zerbst airfield was undergoing repairs during
the summer, the two regiments based at Zerbst-operated out of Koethen.
When construction was completed, the regiments returned to Zerbst.
Possible re-deployment of three divisions of the 24th Air Army,
based at Finow, Grossenhain and Alt Loennewitz,has been observed and
reported. The arrival of trains carrying personnel at an airfield
other than those belonging to the three divisions suggests-Rare general-
ized 24th Air Army shifts. While it is impossible to determine the
status of the new personnel at Koethen, they may be new pilots and
ground personnel from the USSR.
2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA-HUNGARY., Trade agreements with GDR sired: Czechos
lovakia and Hungary have signed new trade agreements with East Germany.
On 29 November Hungary and the'German Democratic Republic signed a
trade agreement for the year 1952, which reportedly provides for a
considerably larger exchange between the two countries than last year.
Long-tern exbhanges until 1955 were also agreed on.in principle. The
GDR will export primarily machines, electr.otechnical and optical pro-
ducts and instruments, chemical products and fertilizers. Hungary will
export diesel engines, agricultural products, and bauxite.
The reported Czechoslovak-East German trade agreement is a three-
year pact under which Czechoslovakia will ship tires, machinery and
spare parts to the GDR in exchange for machine tools, optical instruments,
mining equipment and chemicals. (R FBIS, 29 Nov 51; U Washington Post,
3 Dec 51)
Comment: With the decrease of trade between West and East Germany,
it can be expected that the GDR will turn to Eastern Europe for more and
more of its trade. East German officials stated that other pacts will
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be signed soon with Communist China, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania.
3. HUNGARY, Propaganda attack shiftsto Tito: After several days of violent
press and radio attacks against the Mutual Security Act and the espionage
and sabotage activities of the US, an editorial in Szabad NepA the
Budapest Communist daily, shifted the attack to Tito and identified him
as the spearhead of American aggression against Hungary. It stated: "On
reading a list of American crimes one remembers the ignominious activity
of the Tito gang, this most treacherous agent of American imperialism,
these Belgrade murderers who are foremost in outrages committed against
Hungary." The editorial added that the "Tito Fascists" were doing the
dirtiest work in the UN in the "American campaign against the Soviet
Union and Satellites." (R Budapest 348, 29 Nov 51)
Comments In the Tass dispatch announcing the whereabouts of the
US C-7 which was lost two weeks ago, the USSR claimed "that the air-
craft's flight to Yugoslavia was to enable Yugoslav spies and diver-
sionists to board the plane and to parachute them on the territory of
the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies."
4, Purge of Army officers under During the past two months 36
army officers have been removed from office, according to the US
Legation in Budapest. Legation sources have no information regarding
the rumors of more extensive purges among officer survivals of the old
regime. General Radvanyi is the only high ranking officer mentioned,
(C Budapest 354, 30 Nov 51; S MA Budapest 2741, 24 Nov 51)
Comment: General Radvanyi was replaced as chief of the presidential
group of the Ministry of National Defense last summer. This is the first
reported purge on such a scale since July 1950 when fifteen high ranking
officers, including the Chief of Staff, were arrested. Those officers
have never received a public trial.
5. POLAND. Polish Government protests US Mutual Security Act: The Polish
Minister of Foreign Affairs has formally protested the recently approved
US Mutual Security Act. In a note of 1 December to the US Ambassador
in Warsaw, the US is charged with brutal interference in Polish internal
affairs, abuse of diplomatic privileges in the past, liaison with anti-
Polish terrorist bands, and organization of subversive centers-among
Polish refugees. The note ends with a demand for the immediate an-
nulment of the ac-t. (R Warsaw 406, 1 Dec 51; R FBIS ticker, 2 Dec 51)
Comment! Poland, like Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, has followed
the example of the USSR in sending a note protesting the US Mutual
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Security Act as evidence of aggressive US intentions.
The tenor of Poland's note, like those of the other Satellites,
suggests a feeling of alarm at the implications of the US Mutual Security
Act. Such alarm is probably due in part to the anti-Communist resistance
and widespread unrest reported from certain of,the Eastern European
countries.
On. the basis of these protests it is possible that steps will be
taken by some of the Satellites to reduce further the effectiveness of
existing US diplomatic establishments in Eastern Europe.
6. RUMANIA. Rumanians set up new office to service Diplomatic Corps, The
Rumanian Foreign. Office has informed the American Legation in Bucharest
of the establishment of an "Office for Servicing Diplomatic Corps" to
provide and maintain housing for offices and personnel and to find
necessary office, technical, and domestic personnel for diplomatic
offices and members thereof. (R Bucharest 237, 2 Dee 51)
Comments This move was forecast by a confidential informant in the
Rumanian Government in June 1951. The proposed office is a counterpart
of the Soviet VBurobin,"
7. YUGOSLAVIA. Tito promises Yugoslav support against Soviet aggression;
During interviews with Congressmen, Tito promise hat the es- c ul.d
depend on Yugoslavia's being actively on its side in the event of a war
in Europe, whether Yugoslav territory was attacked or not. Tito added
that Yugoslavia had made a great mistake in the last war in thinking that
it could remain aloof. Moreover, he repeated the conviction that col-
lective security was the only way to halt or overcome a powerful ag-
gressor. Regarding aid to Greece and Turkey, Tito said that specific
Yugoslav commitments could be given only to the extent that reciprocal
undertakings were assured in return. (S Belgrade Joint Weeka 48,
30 Nov 51)
Comment: Tito's answers to Congressional questioning conform with
recent policy statements concerning Yugoslav attitudes toward regional
defense projects and Western defenses. He probably predicates his
promise of Yugoslav participation on the assumption that Yugoslavia -can-
not possibly hope for immunity from any Soviet-Satellite military attack
in Europe. Yet the Marshal has been careful to avoid any outright,
unequivocal statement that Yugoslavia would "go to war" to defend
Western Europe.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
25X1X
1. B,n ~u? srosition reort~dlro~ secured The recent flurry of reports that
Prime Minister Thakin Nu would be replaced have died down. 0
25X1 X US
Charge during his recent visit to Rangoon that his observations supported
the probability that Nu would continue in office. The US Embassy comments
that Nuts political durability and popularity with ethnic minority groups
are factors in his favor. (C Rangoon 520, 30 Nov 51)
o: Thakin Nu unquestionably possesses important political
attributes, not the least of which is his reputation of being a devout
Buddhist. Nevertheless, so long as conditions continue to deteriorate in
Burma, the appeasers are likely to become increasingly evident and insistent
upon a change in leadership.
2. pegee a th. K gen~ t e Press reports that efforts were
being made to end the Karen insurgency have been confirmed by US Embassy
contacts. (C Rangoon 520, 30 Nov 51)
The end of hostilities between the Burmese Government and
the Karens would be the most important step towards establishing stability
in Burma since the various insurgencies began in 1948. Since Karen-Burman
animosities are of such long standing and have been severely aggravated
during the past ten years, no truce would be perfect and would require
extremely delicate handling over a prolonged period. However, even a
state of armed neutrality between Karen and Burman would reduce the
Communist threat to Burma.
BWPP ac iyities co t. In a recent press interviews a spokesman
of the Burma Workers and Peasants Party criticized the Burmese Govern-
menus failure to attack the Chinese Nationalist troops in northern Burma.
He stated that ",a certain power" was supporting the Nationalists in an effort
to incite the Chinese Communist Army into a pursuit action and turn Burma
into "another Korea." (C Rangoon 520, 30 Nov 51)
Communist propaganda concerning the Chinese Nationalists has
heretofore been comparatively light. It is not clear whether this report
is the beginning of a new propaganda drives merely an "off-the-cuff" state-
ment, or a threat to the Burmese Government.
4. BURMA CHINA. Chins Comm is rsining_agents for operations in Burman
7 25X1 X
It o nese Communists are training agents in
25X1X
several places in southwestern Yunnan for the collection of military
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intelligence in Burman Other agents are also said to be training in methods
of spreading Communist propaganda and will be used in an effort to induce
the defection of the Chinese Nationalist guerrillas in north Burma. (S FSAF,
AX 71389 25 Nov 51)
C mm n a This report is plausible but unconfirmed.
5., TH? MacDonald comments oTha~ couA4 The UK Commissioner General
for Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, told the US Consul General'in
Singapore that the Thai coup was "a mixture of good and bad." The Com-
missioner General believes there is more good than bad, since Phibun con-
tinues in power. (S Singapore 6309 1 Dec 51).
C en o MacDonald has always had a tendency to be overly optimistic.
The basic causes of instability in Thailand remain and may well be accentuated
by growing authoritarianism on the part of the military regime.
6.
US Emb asv comments on -c-ou o Commenting on the recent coup d?etat, the
US Embassy in Bangkok states that, despite the peaceful beginnings of the
new regime, the situation is comparable to the rise of Fascism in Italy
where accusations of subversion and corruption were used to justify the over-
throw of a liberal, parliamentarian government. The new regime,, according
to the Embassy, is little short of a military dictatorship and represents
a backward step so far as the development of democratic processes are con-
cerned. Pointing to the sordid record of those taking over the administra-
tion in the alleged interest of clean government, the Embassy believes the
Communists have been presented with some "real ammunition"' which they will
not fail to exploit. (R Bangkok 12,x., 2 Dec 51)
Q&MMpgnta The Embassy's critical view of the new Thai Government
appears to be well founded. A more immediate danger, however, is the
probable early reemergence of rivalries within the military clique. A
serious division between any of several factions could easily embroil
Thailand and present the Communists with an excellent opportunity to expand
their influence.
7. INDONESIA. Ca n a oyes draft Dutch-Indonesian ~?eementsg Supomo,
chairman of the committee for replacing the Round Table Conference
agreements, told American Ambassador Cochran that the Cabinet and party
leaders had approved drafts of five documents which his committee will
submit to the Dutch as separate draft treaties. These will deal respec-
tively with (1) general arrangements, (2) financial and economic matters,
(3) trade and commerce, (4) military affairs--principally the Netherlands
military mission to Indonesia, and (5) exchange of cultural objects.
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There is no reference in the treaties to any Dutch-Indonesian union or to
any political or religious relationships. Supomo said these drafts would
offer the Netherlands practically the same rights for holding property and
doing business in Indonesia as provided in the RTC agreements.
Supomo said that although he expects to begin the discussions with
.the RTC agreements, he wishes to negotiate the West New Guinea question
concurrently. He told Cochran that his tactic will be to let the Dutch
know that the more favorably they treat Indonesia on the New Guinea issue,
the more favorably they will be treated on the bilateral agreements, (S
Djakarta 7809 30 Nov 51)
. The RTC agreements of 1949 set up a Netherlands-Indonesian
Union under the Dutch Crown on the basis of which the economic, commercial..
and cultural agreements were negotiated. Most Indonesians consider the
Union a vestige of colonialism and desire its abrogation. The moderate
Indonesian Government wants little change in Netherlands-Indonesian rela-
tions and apparently is renegotiating the RTC agreements chiefly to the
extent of removing them from a Union status and placing them on the basis
of an ordinary international agreement.
8. INDOCHINA. ECA Chig,_ n h far East Des9imi tic over Progress in Ind. hina:
The Chief of ECA operations for the Far East emphasizes that the -greatest
impediment to US aims in Indochina is the weakness and conservatism of the
present Vietnamese Government. He believes the Viet Minh "'revolution"' will
continue despite massive US military aid and a sizeable US economic program
unless a socially-conscious government with "grass roots" instincts is
formed.
The ECA Chief further believes that French officials in Indochina now
realize they are fighting a war that cannot be won without a political
solution and that the conservative Vietnamese "mandarins" they have been
supporting as leaders will never attract the masses sufficiently to achieve
such a solution. The US official recommends, therefore, that the United
States now consider this problem jointly with the French to the end of
developing a government with a broad popular base. (S Singapore 613, 30
Nov 51
GaUgLIts: There is no convincing evidence available that the French
authorities in Indochina have undergone such a change in attitude as
described by the ECA Chief. Those Vietnamese politicians who have shown
the clearest social purpose are the ones whose political life under the
French-sponsored Vietnamese Government has been briefest.
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My :AP nt~~Vied in proving adiacent to In
HIN' Chi=Ae C mmunist ar
?Bconfirmed" information that the
Chinese Communist 44th Army has moved from Canton to Kwangsi province,
although its exact location is unknown.
25X1 C this brings the number of Chinese Com-
munist armies now in Kwan i and Yunnan to a total of eleven.
25X1A
Comm rto The 44th Army reportedly has been preparing for a move from
the Canton area for the past several weeks.
Elements of nine other armies have been reported moving into Kwangsi
over the past month, but their arrival there remains unconfirmed.
25X1X 25X1X
10. Mohr tprpeds boa r at W h% fo _L area
two motor torpedo boats, with "Europeans"'
2 5X1X on board, were seen at hampoa in the third week of November.
have now been reported at Whampoa. Tientsin. Tsingtao and in the Gulf of
1bA1 A Tonkin.
n & Motor torpedo boats have also been seen at Dairen, where
50 to 80 were reported under construction for the Chinese Communist Navy
in July 1951. MTB?s are the only naval vessels so far known to have been
acquired by China from the USSR, although the transfer of many vessels,
including submarines and destroyers, has often been rumored.
25X1A
25XJX
11. Communists resume in inmHong Kong an( Macaoo After a suspension
of buying activity following the failure of the Nan Kuang Company, prin-
cipal Communist buying agency in Macao, the Chinese Communists have
decided to resume purchase operations in Macao and Hong Kongo According
to the Chinese press in Hong Kong, "limited foreign exchange" will be
available for purchases in December and the first quarter of 1952. Buying
will be more selective than heretofore. (S Hong Kong 1792, 30 Nov 51)
C The Chinese are not yet ready to deprive themselves of the
.services offered by Hong Kong and Macao as sources of supply for Western
goods. Because of Hong Kong export controls, Communist buying will have
to be on a lose extensive scale than formerly. These controls have al-
ready effected a sharp drop in the volume of shipments from Hong Kong to
the mainland.
12. rationalist China warns ofatackon Formosa if acs is concluded
in Koreas Nationalist China should maintain her "political vigilance"
against the consequences of a possible armistice in Korea9 according to
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Tao Hsi-sheng, former. Kuomintang party spokesman. Tao believes that, with
the Chinese Communists 'freed of their commitment in Korea, Formosa would
face a long period of military, political and psychological pressure.
While believing that the military safety of Formosa should not be dependent
upon an armistice in Korea, he stated that an invasion of the island till
not be attempted by the Communists unless considered a "sure gamble."
(U Taipei Pan-Asia, 2 Dec 51)
Corn n o This is one of several Nationalist reports predicting
disaster if American protection of Formosa is withdrawn following an
armistice in Korea. It is probably true that US "neutralization" of the
island is the principal deterrent to a Communist military operation
against Formosa.
13. Psis n lowers eucati nab_ an ar met more inejrso
national conference oft deans of engineering colleges has announced a plan
,for "readjustment" of higher technological training, which is intended to
make more engineers available.to the regime. The plan envisages amal-
gamation of existing facilities, increased specialization and emphasis on
short-term training. The plan recognizes that large-scale expansion is
impossible at this time,. and that an increased number of students must be
trained with existing facilities. The US Consulate General at Hong Kong
notes that the plan would lower engineering educational standards in order
to produce partially trained specialists rapidly, and suggests that this
concept, already introduced in the medical field, was probably adopted
from the USSR. (S Hong Kong 1791, 30 Nov 51)
Comment. The Peiping regime has chosen in many fields to produce
half-trained personnel rapidly rather than well-trained technicians slowly.
This plan is adequate for the operation of most existing industry, but
reflects Peipinges awareness of the probability that industrial expansion
will be limited for some years.
14. ~? n elme4hgMwgL1igh._,deee of centralization- The US
Consulate-General at Hong Kong notes that recent lists of personnel, changes
approved by the State Administration Council clearly demonstrate the high
degree of centralization of the Peiping regime. The Consulate'General
observes that one or the other of the regimes two principal organs must
approve appointments of all officials down to the level of commissioners
of administrative distrietw under provincial governments, office chiefs in
provincial governments, and even members of municipal governments under
provincial governments. (S Hong Kong 1791, 30 Nov 51)
C mm There is evidence that Peiping not only merely approves but
initiates appointments and dismissals of most or all significant provincial
officials, as well as the policies administered by those officials. The
objective of rmaximujn central rno rDl inevitably conflicts with the objective
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of maximum local efficiency. Chinese Communist pronouncements have
indicated Peiping's awareness of, but inability to resolve, this conflict,
15? KOREA. Ilg.' ated '_O November Communist bomber raid re-?nhgsize offensive
ea~ailitvs The Far East Air Force states that the fighter-supported
Communist bomber formation of 30 November, which suffered high losses from
UN interceptors, "re-emphasizes the enemy capability for offensive action
in Korea."
While it is believed that any future offensive action against UN rear
area installations by the estimated one combat-ready enemy bomb abil regiment
would suffer comparable losses, FEAE' estimates that "the vulnerability of
our crowded airfields and the possible destruction of a proportion of our
fighter strength on the ground" might influence the enemy to accept such
losses. (S CINCFE Telecon 5422, 3Dec 51)
Comm n s While the considerable Communist air capability both for
challenging UN air superiority over Korea and launching air offensive
ac-ion against UN ground installations is recognized, the degree of damage
inflicted upon the enemy in this encounter by UN interceptors might well
make him hesitate to take similar action in the future.
In any event, the enemy will probably husband his offensive air
potential until political or military considerations dictate its use.
16.. Unidentifi ,d ie aircraft abx~ear south of battle 3ineo On 3
December four unidentified jet aircraft were sighted over the city of
Seoul from several ground positions. UN F-86 aircraft dispatched to
intercept the aircraft lost sight of them over the Yellow Sea southwest of
Chinnampo.?
Earlier on the same day, three unidentified aircraft strafed a UN
artillery position in the rear of the battle line west of Chcrwon, causing
light UN casualties. A UN ground force officer at the scene stated that
the attacking aircraft had "swept-back wings and red stars." (S CINCFE
Telecon 5422, 3 Dec 51)
? yen ?__ If, as seems probable, these aircraft were Communist, these
incidents represent the southernmost enemy jet penetration and the first
recorded instance of jet action against-UN ground installations.
17? Sher Chinese Communistth Field Arm uni re sans in Koreas
The Far East Command, on the basis of reports received, reaceepts the
Chinese Communist 38th Army in Korea, located in the Sunchon area north
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of Pyongyang with a strength of 35,000. (S CINCFE Telecon 5422, 3 Dee 51)
Comments The reappearance in Korea of this veteran army, after having
been Withdrawn in the spring, signals the reappearance of almost all of the
Chinese Communist units involved in the original Chinese intervention in
1950.
18. J' AN F Tonal distiu e within Japan Communis Party seen resolved:
CIN FE reports that the-Japan Communist Party has reinstated a Diet rember
who was expelled from the JCP for "internationalist faction" activities.
The Diet member is one of several former internationalists who have sub-
mitted to "self-criticism," -- although they were not expelled from the party,
--and are awaiting readmittance to the centrist faction. CINCFE concludes
that the strong factional cleavage has thus been practically resolved.
(s Tokyo 'Peeks 48, 1 Dee 51)
C.-n nta Intraparty bickering and dissension, which has been going
on in the JCP for nearly two years, has noticeably declined.in the past
few months due in some part to the influence of Peiping and Moscow. Jap-
anese Communist leaders appear to have been eager to correct the problem
for some time, and in the 1951 Party statutes the leaders apparently
adopted a compromise approach which would be acceptable to both factions.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
GENERAL. Latin Americans ma support Byelorussia for Security Council seat:
e chairman of t e Latin American caucus at the Paris UN meeting has advised
the American delegation that the United States should "'not now" count on
Latin American support of Greece's candidacy for the Yugoslav seat on the
Security Council. He added that-the Latin Americans attached particular
importance to retention of "the London understanding on geographic distri-
bution" of Security Council seats and the "right of each region to select
its own candidates." This would lead them to vote for Byelorussia. (C
US UN Del Paris No. 48, 30 Nov 51)
Comment: Support of Byelorussia over Greece would reflect a definite
changef oposition by a number of the Latin American nations. Brazil.g for
example., had informed the US that it would not support any Soviet state to
succeed Yugoslavia.
The attitude of the Latin American delegates at Paris was described as
rpLnging from "disappointed to furious" over the US decision not to back a
Latin American candidate for the seat on the International Court of justice
left vacant by the expired term of a Mexican judge, The Latin Americans
fear that this US move may presage further reductions in their representation
on international bodies.
2. GERMANY. Constitutional Court gets case outlawing Communist Party: The
erman Feder Government has presented its case against the German Communist
Party (KPD) to the Constitutional Court. However, Deputy Minister of Interior
Lox feels that the government may be unable to prove its charges, and thus be
unable to outlaw the party.
The Constitutional Court is concurrently investigating charges against
the Socialist Reichs Party (SRP), the radical rightist organization which
has the largest following of all the neo-Nazi political aggregations, Lex
is confident that the Court will ban the SR?. (C Bonn 534, 28 Nov 51)
Comment: On 17 November the Federal Cabinet decided to prosecute both
parties under the terms of a constitutional provision that political parties
may be outlawed if they seek to overthrow the libertarian democratic order.
The KPD is being charged with, among other things. committing acts of ag-
gression against the present government which are in accord with the plans
of the Soviet Zone rulers. The US element of the High Commission, as well
as important German leaders, regret that the party as a whole is being
prosecuted rather than individual members. Outlawing the party, which as
a legal entity is relatively impotent., will, it is feared. only force the
movement underground where it will be more difficult to observe. Banning
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the SRP, however, will greatly hamper its activities5 because that party
has been comparatively successful in recent elections. Its possible
extinction will probably cause its followers to flock to the German Party,
or even to the Free Democratic Party; and thus these groups might then
assume more rightist tendencies than they now evidence.
The action being taken against the KPD and the SRP is a reflection of
the current drive by liberal and trade union circles against subversive
organizations. In this drive the Christian Democratic Party has been taking
the lead.
3. UNITED KINGDOM.. Eden considers European Army situation critical: British
Foreign uecre a r y en views European Army si ua ion as critical and
feels that the whole NATO structure will be endangered if something is not
done about the European Defense Forces. Expressing the view that he had
perhaps been too negative in his press conference statements, Eden asked
Secretary Acheson if a more positive UK contribution could be made by
suggesting some sort of British institutional association with the European
Army, or by statements from Montgomery and Churchill on its military effective-
ness. Eden suggested that the US and Britain devote some "vigorous" thinking
to the European Defense Forces problem, since a really critical situation
might arise by January. (TS Rome Secto 115, 29 Nov 51)
Comment: British concern was increased last week by the report to the
NATO Council in Rome on the status of negotiations for the establishment
of a European Defense Community and for contractual arrangements with the
German Federal Republic. This report showed many points of disagreement
requiring settlement before the February Council meeting,
French Premier Pleven has given assurance of personally pressing the
Paris Conference to produce a draft treaty on the European Defense Com-
munity by the end of this month.
4 Increased production somewhat relieves UK Qs critical coal
situation: The prospect of a critic omes is ue sho age in Britain
haste fished consid'erably9 according to the latest coal production figures.
From mid-October to mid-November, coal production increased by seven per-
cent over the same period in 1950. For the first 46 weeks of this year the
increase averages three and one-half percent above last year's figures.
As of 17 November, coal stocks stood at 17.1 million tons, 1.9 million tons
higher than in November 1950, At present there are
there were a 9,000 more miners than
year ago, (U London Financial Times 28 Nov 51)
Comment: Although these current coal stocks fall short of the target
figure of 1&.5 million, tons for the end of 1951, they are comfortably above
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12 ~I
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the 16.5 million tons estimated last July to be the maximum that could be
produced by November,
If coal production stays at the present level for the remainder of the
year, the recently intensified restrictions on consumption are maintained,
and the 750,000 tons of US coal are imported as agreed during the next four
months, there will be no serious coal crisis within the UK itself, However,
the over-all European coal problem will remain critical, for the UK. will
not be able to export even the same small amount of coal as last year and
by drawing upon U5 coal reserves will divert it from Western European
countries where it is also vitally needed,
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA, South African relationship to the General Assembly
e eriorating on South West Africa issue: The South African Government has
re use o gran rave aci i es o a delegation of chiefs from South-West
Africa who have been invited by the Trusteeship Committee of the General
Assembly to appear before it in Paris to submit their petitions in person.
(U NY Times, 3 Dec 51)
Comment: By this action South Africa is defying a Trusteeship Committee
res.olu ikon requesting that these travel facilities be granted.. Since the
Committee decided on 16 November to give the chiefs a hearing, South Africa
has boycotted its sessions - the most vigorous position yet taken by the
Union on the recurring question of the status of the sparsely inhabited
territoxy held under League of Nations mandate. Minister of the Interior
Donges, who came to Paris especially to plead South Africa's.case, has hinted
at a walkout of the General Assembly; although he personally feels that the
most effective action would be a strong South African protest to the President
of the General Assembly,
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13 4 Dec 51
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SECURITY INFORMATION
4 December 1951
CIA No. 49458-A
Copy No.
45
S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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 Approved For Wease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T011460600090001-7
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
has
FRANCE. French ratification of Schuman Plan uncertainss Pry ier~~Plevenhtened
its I s P s
to-? ld the US assa or that. the Soc
out", the government will have a majority for passage of the Schuman Plan
when it is debated on 6 and 7 December.
The Embassy reports, however, that the Socialists may demand negotiation
of a supplementary agreement covering their objections, a condition which the
government could not accept. The Socialists' votes will be decisive, because
it is now clear that the Gaullists will vote-against the Plan rather than
abstain, and even the Radicals., a rightist group in the coalition, are.re-
ceptive to a current "major campaign" by the steel interests to discredit the
Plano (C S/S Paris 3232, 30 Nov 51; C Paris 32279 29 Nov Si)
In early ?ctoberp Pleven expected the Plan to pass by "a
Comment.
comfore majority"; however., powerful political and economic groups, whose
opposition was evident earlier this year, made their influence felt in the
Assembly.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Socialists, who favor the Plan
in principle, would, in a showdown with the government, accept responsibility
for non-ratification.
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4 Dec 51
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