DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000500260001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 16, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
1.6 November 1951
CIA. No. 49430
Copy No.
143
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1. USSR. Soviet Union reportedly sends 15 Austrian oil technicians to Iran:
The Soviet Oil Administration in Austria (the SMV) has reportedly sent
15 oil technicians to Iran to instruct the Iranians.
25X1 C the group consists of engineers and drillers and is ctiown as the
Austrian drilling delegation.
Comment: The processing of oil technicians in eastern Austria,
for possible work in Iran, has been reported several times in the past
months. There is no evidence to date that any technicians have arrived
in Iran. Skilled technicians could be spared from the oil operations in
eastern Austria, however, if and when they might be accepted by the
Iranian Government.
25X1 C
25X1A
2. Increased Soviet activity near S itsbeige 25X1 C
25X1 C Soviet merchant tonnage in the Barents
ea has increased by ships (160 of which are trawlers) since March
1951. Although there has been a growing demand for fish by the increasing
population of northwestern areas of the USSR, the 25X1A
increasing activity may be related to the recent strong Soviet notes to
Norway.
25X1 C the increase of merchant shipping plus
the presence of three Soviet cruisers and smaller naval units suggest the
possibility of a move a ainst Spitsber en, which would not have been possi-
25X1A ble last year.
Comment: The increase of shipping activity since March may be ex-
plained by the normally increased shipping during spring and summer months,
and the usual presence of Soviet shipping fleets in northern waters.
3. BULGARIA. Importance of women in leadership stressed: In speeches de-
livered before the third national conference of distinguished agricultural
cooperative workers on g and 9 November, Premier Chervenkov and Minister
of Agriculture Stoilov laid great emphasis upon the importance of women
in the cooperative movement. Remarking on the hesitancy shown by the
cooperative workers to elevate women to positions of leadership, Stoilov
stated that "we-must at all costs put more women in managing positions."
Urging that more women be offered positions of responsibility and leader-
ship in the cooperatives, villages, okoliyas, okrugs, and in the national
government, Chervenkov noted that women "represent a great power. A
broad road must be cleared for this power; it must be given priority."
(R FBIS Sofia, S, 9 Nov 51)
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25X6
4.
25X6
25X1 C
5.
25X1A
Comment: The strong emphasis given to this prdblem during recent
months would appear to reflect a growing shortage of labor within Bulgaria.
services in Bulgaria are operate by T BSO, which is said to operate ten
DC-3 type aircraft of Russian construction. International flights are
routed through Sofia-Bucharest-Prague in agreement with the Czechoslovakian
airline, CSA, and through Sofia-Bucharest-Odessa-Kiev-Moscow by arrangement
with the Soviet Civil Air Fleet. Occasional special and charter flights
to Budapest, Warsaw and Berlin are also said to be arranged by TABSO.
(C Rome Desp. 871, 9 Oct 51)
Russian general reported civil airline chief:
25X6
he chief of TABSO, the Bul arian-Soviet Air Transport Company,
s a Russian general. all scheduled civil air
Comment: This information contradicts an August report concerning an
alleged incorporation of Satellite state-owned airline companies into the
Soviet Civil Air Fleet. (See O/CI Daily, 23 Aug 51). If this estimate
concerning TABSO equipment is correct, doubt is also cast upon recent
Bulgarian claims of significant improvements in civil aviation, including
acquisition of i?new and comfortable" equipment. (See O/CI Daily 31 Aug 51)
This is the first indication that TABSO might be directed by a Russian
officer.
RUMANIA. Rumanian amphibious maneuvers reported:
amphibious maneuvers involving Rumanian army, navy, and
air elements were held in mid-October in the Mangalia-Albesti area south
of Constantsa, Colonel General Emil Bodnaras, Rumanian Minister of the
Ground- Forces and Soviet mi icials reportedly were in attendance.
Comment: This is the first report of amphibious maneuvers and is un-
confirmed. Although Rumanian naval forces probably have had training exer-
cises of this type, the level of army training for this type of operation
is probably low. It is, therefore, doubtful that the army attempted
maneuvers of such complexity. An army unit, the 25th Motorized Brigade,
subordinate to the commandant of the sea forces, has responsibility for
defense of the Black Sea Coast and could well have been involved in a
coaetal defense maneuver. Soviet forces are also present in the area.
6. YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslavia sends notes to Bulgaria and Rumania charging
unfriendly acts: Yugoslavia has officially protested against the ag-
gressive policies of Rumania and Bulgaria. The Yugoslav notes to Bucharest
and Sofia call attention to a number of border violations perpetrated by
25X1 C
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its two eastern neighbors. The Rumanians are charged with 24 provoca-
tions in 35 days, from 10 September to 15 October, and Bulgaria with
140 provocations during the ten-month period from January to October.
(R FBIS, 13-14 Oct 51)
Comments These latest protests follow closely a similar note de-_
livered to Budapest last week. The timing of the submission coincides
conspicuously with the submission to the UN General Assembly of a formal
Yugoslav complaint charging the USSR and her Satellites with unfriendly
acts and pressures.
25X6
7. The Hague reports Yugoslav trade with the Satellitess US ;Ambassador
Chapin at The Hague reports that following up a hint
25X6 the Embassy learned ~- ---A -A-
!rt Control Program, were transshipped through the Nether-
lands to Eastern Europe: 200 to East Germany, 170 to Czechoslovakia,
25X6 and 100.to Poland. In August, 1,597 tons were shipped to Satellite coun-
tries: 297 to East Germany, and 1300 to Poland. (S The Hague 457,
9 Nov 51)
25X6
There is no'reason to believe that the Yugoslav Government is aware
of the final destination of this shipment. In the past, the Yugoslavs
have attempted to prevent the shipments of their products to the Satel-
lite countries. In late June the Yugoslavs asked AM in Trieste to stop
a ferro-chrome shipment because they had reason to believe that it was
destined for Czechoslovakia. Further, in June, the Yugoslavs turned
down a Swiss offer to buy a considerable quantity of lead on highly ad-
vantageous terms in dollars because they learned that the shipment was
likely to find its way to Satellites.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. GREECE. Greek UN dele ates suggest dissolution UNSCOBs Greek UN
delegates have told US delegates in Paris that, in the opinion of their
government, the Greek situation no longer requires the maintenance of
UN observers. The Greeks believe that UNSCOB should be terminated with-
out a successor body at this time, lf, in the future; Greece feels the
need for renewed observation, this could be arranged through an interim
committee. (S Paris DELGA 139, 10 Nov 51)
Comments Greece has previously favored the retention of UNSCOB
and in this had the support of most of the UNSCOB representatives, if
not of their governments. Recently, however, some Greek officials had
indicated that they supported the US-approved suggestion that UNSCQBbe
replaced with a subcommittee of the Peace Obe ervation Committee which
would not include Soviet or Satellite observers.
Agreement to abandon
any observation committee in the Balkans should eliminate any possible
dispute at the impending GA discussion of the question and make it
unnecessary to urge the POC subcommittee on Turkey or Yugoslavia, who
are reluctant at this time to accept border observers:.
2. r . Iraq Qffers~lan to break ~-nglo E vntian imDpsge Iraq's Prime
Minister, Nuri Said, has suggested a plan to break the currentAnglo-
Egyptian imnaaa^_
25X6
rycu1 appairenti.ty provides that each
Middle Eastern country should have its own "'regular troops""and
should also seek "auxiliary troops" from other nations to supplement its
25X6 own forces. - is reportedly not very hopeful that Nuri's efforts
to conciliate current Anglo-Egyptian differences will produce results, but
it does believe that these attempts, which are Arab in origin, are'in
the right direction. (S Paris SECTO 37 and 39, 13 and 14 Nov 51)
Comme s While Arab leaders continue privately to express interest
in and promote the concept of the Command, their public statements
reflecting popular sentiment resolutely support Egypt.
3. INDIA. Communist Party of India adopts new p olicv; According to the
Indian press, the Communist Party of India has finally adopted the party's
draft policy statement, first published in May 1951 (see Daily Digest
5 Jul 51). The policy aims at creating a united front ofworkers and
peasants under the leadership of the working class to participate in the-
forthcoming national elections. It does not eschew the use of violence,
although the party's General Secretary, A. K. Ghosh, stated on 8 November
that the party would resort to violence only after exhausting all peaceful
methods. The press has also reported that five members of the Indian
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Politbureau, including former General Secretary Ranadive, were suspended
from party membership for from two to six yearso (U New Delhi 1691 and
1694, 10 Nov 51)
Comment: It seems apparent that the united front line of last May
is to be followed until after the national elections and that prominent
Communists, whose names are associated with policies of violence are, at
least publicly, being censured.
4. INDONESIA. Strict press censorship evident on military movements: During
the past-week the oca press contained fewer reports on insecurity than
during any similar period within the past several months. The Army Attache
states that the complete absence of reports on military movements in West
Java and the Celebes probably are the result of a very strict press cen-
sorships (C Djakarta 701, 10 Nov 51)
56
Police placed under immediate direction of Prime Ministers
The Indonesian "State Police" reportedly have been placed under the immed-
iate direction of the Prime Minister. Formerly, the police were adminis-
tered by the Minister of Home Affairs. The US Army Attache assumed that
the term "State Police" is intended to man the National Mobile Police
Brigade. (C Djakarta 701,, 10 Nov 51)
Comments The Mobile Police Brigade is a force of 25,000 men which
has been intensively used, with the support of Army troops, to enforce
securityo Within recent weeks the Prime Minister has appeared to assume
more immediate responsibility for internal security than either the
Minister of Home Affairs or the Defense Minister. This development and
the transfer of the Police Brigade to the office of the Prime Minister
are probably part of a concerted effort by high level officials to achieve
a more rapid and effective implementation of security decisions.
66 THAIIAND0 Thai concerned over cost of aid programs: The US Embassy in
Bangkok repot s a cons era ion o the 1957 u get has "brought home"
to the Thai Government that the various aid programs of which it is the
beneficiary entail considerable expenditures. While it is the Embassy's
opinion that Thailand is unquestionably able to bear.this financial burden,
the growing Thai concern may necessitate that the US recommendfi,nancial
measures which would obviously be politically unpopular. (C Bangkok 1067,
8Nov51)
Comment. The unpopular recommendations the Embassy has in mind are
tax re orrms'-,, more effective mobilization of domestic capital, and the
elimination of "squeeze," protection and kickbacks in official circles.
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7. Sarit's position enhanoed:s On 1 November the entire Government
lottery board was fired and General Sarit,.assistant Commander in Chief
of the Thai Army, was appointed the new chairman. The US Embassy in
Bangkok comments that the presentation of this "Juicy plum" to Sarit is
evidence of his growing importanc.n d that he may supersede Police Director
General Phao as Thailand$s number one strongman. (C Bangkok 1066, 8 Nov 51)
Comments There have been a number of reports indicating that Premier
Phibun een building up Sarit in order to reduce Phao's increasingly
aggressive influence. The description of various generals as "strongmen"
of Thailand appears to be an exaggeration. Until he is deposed, Phibun is
the dominating authority in the.country.
25X6
8.
oviet position in Manchuria: A former
25X6
power in Manchuria Is in Chinese Communes-, nanas, DU-c znati 1Tupurk'a l%'
25X6 posts are held b Moscow-trained Chinese whose devotion to Soviet interests
is "complete.'' no Soviet combat units have been observed
25X6 recently in Harbin or in u en, nor is there evidence of the presence of
"international volunteers"- and that the Communist authorities, who report-
edly intend to "rid Wanohuria of all foreigners" in the next few months,
are now encouraging rather than hindering their departure. (S Paris 28142,
13Nov51).
COmrnent2- Although other Western observers have also reported that
Chinese authority in Manchuria appears undispute{i, the Soviet position in
the area, which is dominated by Chinese Stalinists under the supervision
of Soviet advisers, is strong. Other sources agree on the lack of evidence
of the presence of "international volunteers" or of Soviet combat units
outside the port Arthur naval base area. It-has long been assumed that
the Chinese Communists intend to expel all remaining Westerners from
Manchuria.
Hong Kong enforces export control regulations- Suspecting that a cargo
of steel consigned to Pakistan was in fact destined for Communist China,
the Hong Kong authorities investigated before the vessel departed. When
the broker would not disclose the owner of the goods nor the documents
of sale, the Government ordered the steel discharged from the ship and
stored in a controlled warehouse.
Upon being congratulated by an officer from the US Consulate-Genera'l
for this prompt action, Hong Kong9s newly appointed Director of Commerce
and Industry declared that it was his intention to administer controls .
very strictly in an effort to reduce clandestine trade with the Communists.
(C Hong Kong Desp. 611, 27 Sep 51)
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Comment: This incident is illustrative of Hong Kong's efficiency
in app ying~its export controls? Since June 1951, Hong Kong has banned
the export to China of a wide range of strategic items. Although permitted
exports from Hong Kong (e.g., of pharmaceuticals) continue to be substantial;
over-all export volume has dropped sharply.
10. KOREA CHINA. Chinese Communist press maintains ambiguous tone: A 14 Novem-
ber Chinese Communist press review broadcast comments on the cease-fire
"intrigue" of the UN and observes-that the Chinese will "continuously
intensify their effort to strive.,. .fdr-:sucoess of the Korean armistice
negotiations At the same time, they are fully prepared to fight and
frustr`aie'the American attacks and to compel the enemy to accept a just
peace... .' (R FBIS Ticker Peiping, 14 Nov 51)
Com?nenta This broadcast is of particular interest in view of the
phrase rustrate the American attack.!' While this may be interpreted
in the broader sense of defending China and Korea from American "aggressors,"
it may equally well be interpreted as meaning a continuation of the present
enemy defensive action in Korea.
11. KOREA. Communist counter-propaganda follows UN's atrocity announcement:
Novem errCChinese Communist broadcast for domestic consumption
presented'a Korean commentary on "a? accusation against the American
murderers*` The commentary indicts, on the basis of "ironclad evidence,"
the American "aggressors" as murderers, and asks the Chinese. people to
"avenge the hundreds and thousands of Korean victims murdered by the
American executioners," (R FBIS Ticker, 15 Nov 51)
Comment; Apparently interpreting recent UN charges of Communist
military a rocities as propaganda, the Communist propaganda machine has
reacted by reviving a story of UN, combat atrocities.
Communist atrocity propaganda regarding Korea has nearly exhausted
the possibilities of inhuman behavior, including genocide and the use of
POWs in atomic bomb experiments.
12 JAPAN. Anti-Emeror or anization dissolved: Kyoto University has ordered
the dissolution of the Dogaku-Kass eftist-contra lied student organization
which'allegedly planned the demonstration a ainst the visit of the
Emperor on 12 November. (U FBIS, 15 Nov 51)
Comments The Japanese strongly objected to the Occupation-directed
deletion o the lase majesty clause from the criminal code in 1947? The
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Kyoto incident, which was followed a few days later by the posting of
a anti-mperor slogans in 'Otsu, will lead to, strong pressure for the
reestablishment of special legal protection for the E 1perorts position.
Angry'-Diet members iimiiediate'ly after the'incident demanded remedial
action by the Minister of Education.
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25X6
4. AUSTRIA. Union of Independents charges Socialist-Communist labor
cooperation: The Union of Independents (VdU) newspaper, The Independent,
charged editorially last week that the Socialists and Communists are
cooperating in the current shop-steward elections. The paper alleges
that, through Socialist support, a Communist was named chairman of the
shop-steward council of the Lend Aluminum Works although only three
of the nine council members are Communists. In return for this
support, the paper asserts, the Communists will vote fpr a Socialist
chairman of-the council-in the large Kaprun hydroelectric project in
the province of Salzburg. The VdU organ attributes this Socialist-
Communist "fraternization" to the common Marxist origins of the two
parties. (R FDIS, Der Unabhaen4ige, Salzburg, 10 Nov 51)
Comment: As a result of the shop-steward election referred to
above, the nine seats on the shop council were equally divided among
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the Communists, Socialists, and VdU. This was a very considerable
achievement for the VdU and an apparent defeat for the Socialists,
The Socialists, who are firm in their opposition to the Communists,
have after some equivocation adopted an equally firm attitude toward
the VdU -- which they regard as neo-fascist and disruptive to the
Austrian coalition. It is therefore possible that in western Austria
the Socialists may be willing to support Communist candidates in
isolated instances where the VdU has achieved some successes among the
workers. Such support should not be interpreted as indicating a
weakening of general Socialist opposition to cooperation with the
Communists,
5. Socialist Congress expresses confidence and affirms support
of the coalition government: In the first Congress of the Austrian
Socialist Party (SPOe) since its victory in the presidential elections
last spring, Socialist leaders hailed the strength of Austrian socialism
and of postwar European socialism in general. Pointing to the Socialist
presidential victory and to the success of the party's recruitment
campaign, Chairman Schaerf declared that, in contrast, the Union of
Independents is tottering from one crisis to another and that the
Communist Party loses strength each year. Schaerf continued that,
while Socialist collaboration with either radical party is out of the
question, both the world situation and Austria's internal policy require
the cooperation of the two government parties.. Future Austrian
elections would determine whether the People's or the Socialist Party
is the stronger, but it is unlikely that either would achieve a clear
majority.
Schaerf and other Socialist speakers demanded a continuation of the
housing program, new measures to support the purchasing power of the
schilling, a full employment policy, prosecution of profiteers, and
an anti-cartel law, (R FBIS, Vienna, RAVAG, 10 Nov 51; P Vienna 1710,
13Nov51)
Comment: This strong Socialist support of the coalition government
is in contrast to the frequently expressed view of Socialist leaders
that the coalition is disintegrating because of People?s Party weakness.
Vice-Chancellor Schaerf informed the US Embassy during.the Socialist
Congress of his fears that the People's Party had insufficient control
over the farmers to permit proper economic controls in Austria. There
is little doubt that the Socialists' support of the coalition is
genuine, as indicated in their moderate demands on the People's Party
and their opposition to the Union of Independents.
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A US
ter now favors renter defense ex endi u defense.
Budget Minister Pella has indicated
Bud et Minis at
ITALY.
6. e enditures for d attitu
o f ac ial in Rotu has wardcgreater Italian
a changed attitude toward g be encouraged in this new will be
that if Pella can adequate Italian defense program
reports ting an adeq
American task of get
greatly facilitated* ill be for political reasons Parliament the same
investment program of approximately w
Pella has indicated that
However, the increase in
i
presented with a he e anded defense programs will be spread
size as that of the exp the civilian investment program
cash expenditures under cash expenditures for the defense
over several years, while increases in
be telescoped. (S Rome TOECA 1240, 6 Nov 51)
Program will adequate defense effort and
Pella has obstructed an ate the
am:t is difficult to anticipate
Cowt'
use of his fear of inflation
rogr
materialization of such a program-
materialization
spending may in part be
Pella's change of attitude on defense spEPU the reduced level of
e Italian surplusesoinltaan industry, and the
occasioned by the large
e metal-mItalyifr msin ustrialists for an adequate
activity in
th in
strong pressurure wi
defense effort.
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10. ARGENTINA. Top army command shifted: The President?s press office has
announced extensive changes in'the top army command ranging from the
Commander in Chief down through three armies and eight divisions. It
was explained that nine of the generals affected had requested
retirement in order to facilitate the promotion of younger officers
to high posts. The new Commander in Chief, who replaces Lieutenant
General Angel Solari, is Major General Alfredo Avalos. (U NY Times
15 Nov 51)
Comment: General Solari has been reported to be the leader of a
revol7u-ti~ nary group, but until now he and other powerful generals have.
continued to give Peron at least conditional support. There have been
indications that the army would prefer to have Peron remain in power
subject to their terms. The retirement of these key generals is
probably a lightly=camouflaged attempt to neutralize army influence,
and it may spark new efforts to oust Peron.
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UNCLASSIFIED Ri er blank-TQ SEC T when attp hjj Tpp Secr t Qoc,~r~ ~q~n~a IcpJ~ ~o~vp cog ,p e,~Ips
fled when filled A~p 'Q\& 1cre@I~r 1 ~aK~ 1l#~IdI /L2 : ~IH-KU 7~ I U"I 46 /y~1000 682 00 "I
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SECURITY INFORMATION
1.6 November 1951
CIA No. 49430-A
Copy No.
S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
49
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
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TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. LEBANON. Lebanon's position toward Middle East Command hardens: Lebanon's
position is hardening against the Middle East Command proposal. It is
rapidly reaching a point where cooperation with the West will be difficult
pending settlement of the Egyptian affair.
The US Minister in Beirut voiced this opinion after noting the govern-
ment's unwillingness to oppose public opinion on the Egyptian issue. The
Minister felt that his general impressions were supported by a statement
made to him by a Lebanese Parliamentary deputy who said: "I think we are
now in a position to dictate terms to you, and if I were the responsible
government official I would make them hard." (C, S/S Beirut 504, 13 Nov 51).
Comments In the past weeks Lebanese officials have not only privately
expressed interest in the Middle East Command but have urged other Arab
leaders to assist them in a cautious promotion of Arab consideration of
Command proposals. If Lebanon, with its progressive and relatively western-
ized population, is now inclined to go along with militant nationalism,
there is little hope that other Arab States Vill react favorably to the
Command.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
2. PERU. Admiral Saldias interested in acquisition of cruisers Admiral
Saldias, during his trip to the US later this month, plans to inquire in
Washington as to whether Peru can hope to purchase a cruiser. If such a
purchase is out of the question, he could be free to dispose otherwise
of the funds now reserved for that purpose. (C, S/S Lima 260, 14 Nov 51).
Comments With the announced successes in Korea of the battalion sent
by Colombia, Peru's traditional rival, Admiral Saldias may be prepared to
discuss the acquisition of a cruiser for the purpose of increasing the
prestige of the Peruvian military establishment. On the other hand, it
is possible that he may be willing to discuss the sending of a contingent
to Korea in accordance with the informal Peruvian promises of last April.
Admiral Saldias is the Minister of Navy and has the reputation of
being more pro-US than most members of the current Peruvian administration.
16 Nov 51
Approved For Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000500260001-9