DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000500180001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 5, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECURITY INFORMATION
5 November 1951
CIA No. 49416
Copy No.
1 E
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA,
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
State Dept. review completed
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1. USSR. d s osition of Soviet Air Force fighter units in Occupied Europe
25X1 C may be under way: re-
ports that as of 1 November it was confirmed that one Soviet Air Force
jet fighter division (three regiments totaling about 100 MIG-15's) had
departed ,eastward out -6 Germdhy 1by, rail. The: 'departure 6f another
fighter division fro'm'Germany'by rail had beenreported,'but'hbt'defii
nitely confirmed,.and the aircraft of a third division cannot be located.
25X1
25X1A
25X1
one regiment of a fourth fighter division
has changed its base wi in erman durin the past week. No new air
units have arrived in Germany.
Comment: Previous reports indicate that the aircraft of three
Soviet Air Force divisions (about 300 MIG-15's, constituting half the
jet fighters in East Germany) have been missing from their bases since
early October.
These recent moves may be part of a Soviet redisposition program
within Eastern Europe to improve tactical air capabilities in that area,
or may represent the departure of some units to reinforce another area.
Less likely explanations are: occupation of new airfields; a re-equip-
ment or modification program; or maneuvers.
The evidence to date does not support the 'conclusion that a major
reduction in Soviet military strength in Occupied Europe is under way.
The full extent of the air redisposition is not yet known, there is no
evidence of a reduction of ground forces, and the preparation of per-
manent military installations in Germany continues.
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3. ALBANIA. Cominform radio station reported in Tirana: The Cominform has
reportedly decided to set up a powerful radio station in Tirana to broad-
cast propaganda aimed at the Middle East, Italy and France. Experimental
programs will be broadcast in December with a regular schedule begi
in January 1952.
Comment: Moscow in March 1951 began the practice of appropriating
time on Satellite transmitters for the purpose of relaying its inter-
national programs.
A press report from Belgrade on 30 July stated that a 50 kilowatt
radio station was under construction in Tirana. Radio Tirana on 10
October announced vacancies for announcers in Arabic, German and Spanish.
4. RUMANIA. Decree tightens navigation controls The Rumanian Council of
Ministers on 29 September amended the 1950 law on sea and river naviga-
tion to extend Rumanian "territorial waters" to 12 maritime miles. The
amendment prohibits the following in territorial waters: navigation
without a pilot, fishing, measuring water depth or temperature, taking
photographs, carrying on "research work of any nature," and the landing
of passengers or goods outside of ports. Any vessel, regardless of
nationality, which navigates in the territorial sea without a pilot
shall be stopped, searched and brought to a Rumanian port. (British-
US Rumanian Press Summary, 30 Sep 51)
Comment: The USSR similarly claims that its territorial waters
extend for 12 maritime miles.
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25X1 SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
25X1X
EGYPT. NATO m mb rshi for E t to be pro osed b Ital s Italy,
is ready to propose a solution of
the Anglo-Egyptian dispute by suggesting that Egypt be admitted to
NATO. This action is to be taken with the understanding that Egypt will
then make available military bases, including the Suez defenses, under
the same conditions as facilities furnished by other NATO members.
The proposal would permit British forces in the strength provided
for in the 1936 treaty to remain in the Canal Zone until NATO arrangements
25X1A have been finalized. for critical
security reasons this report is not to be further transmitted within the
United States, or beyond the borders of the United States, without the
express permission of the releasing office.)
Comments There is no confirmation that Italy is about to sake such
proposals.
A proposal of membership for Egypt would be unacceptable to most
NATO members. If it were seriously considered, the now pending ratifications
of the protocol for admitting Greece and Turkey would be imperiled,
especially in those NATO countries which already fear over-extending NATO.
3. MA INDIA., Indian official comment on-Nu-Nehru conferences A
high official of the Indian Foreign Ministry told the UK High Commissioner
in New Delhi that the Thakin Nu-Nehru conference had been confined
largely to generalities. He indicated that India ""was alive" to the
situation in Burma, but did not take as gloomy a view as did the
British. The official also stated that Nu had been "relatively
optimistic" in his conversations. The High Commissioner felt that the
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Indians were not "entirely convinced" by Nuts bright outlook, but under-
stood.that they had not been able to make a good case for settling the
Karen problem as they appeared to be without any practical suggestions
which might conceivably be accepted by the Burmese. (S London 2146, 1
Nov 51)
Co~ mmento This report indicates that India, as well as the UK, has
failed to adopt a constructive policy towards Burma, despite the growing
threat of Communist control over large parts of the country.
BURMA. T~1 ; _ t4ryiewgd_ky_., press i C &u ? Before leaving India,
Burma's Prime Minister Thakin Nu indicated to a press conference in
Calcutta that Asian solidarity, while desirable, would not be possible as
He added that
long as some countries, such as Indochina,, were not free.
it was his opinion that China would like "any plan of Asian solidarity."
With regard to Burma, Nu told the newsmen that a Karen state would
ldebein
established as soon as the Karen insurrection was completely quelled
certain areas. He emphatically rejected a suggestion that Burman-Karen
differences be mediated. Nu stated that the Communists and other insur-
gents were not strong enough seriously to challenge government forces,
but admitted more troops were necessary to bring them under control. Inn-conclusion, the Prime Minister stated that Burma had two five-year plans--
one to end the insurgencies and the other to nationalize all land through
the payment of compensation. (U New Delhi 1539, 31 Oct; U Calcutta 224,
31 Oct 51)
Comment: This press interview is a striking illustration of Thakin
Nuts penchant for mixing undue optimism with ill-defined foreign and
domestic policy concepts.
5.
Ba Swe see working toward premierships The US Embassy in Rangoon
reports that there are increasing indications that Ba Swe, the influential
leader of the Burma Socialist Party, is maneuvering to become Prime
Minister. The Embassy states that this is further indication of a rift
between leftist ard..oderate Socialists, and that there is danger Rang
goon
rapprochement between the former and the pro-Communist BWP o
439, 2 Nov 51)
Commen : Ba Swe has been reported by at least one other source to
He remained with the Socialists
have ambitions to.become Prime Minister.
when thp founders of the BWPP broke away-from that party, but his subse-
quent speeches have closely followed the., Communist line.
Should Ba Swe become Premier, the Burmese Government's drift to the
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right would be abruptly reversed, US-UK influence would be reduced to a
minimum, closer relations with Communist China encouraged and
the prospects of Communist domination of Burma would be greatly enhanced.
6. War Office acts aaainstforeign contacts. The Burma War Office has
directed the graduating class of the Staff College to decline invitations
to the annual graduation luncheon given in their honor b'the various
military attaches in Rangoon. NN - it is no
longer possible to ignore the "bamboo curtain" which has been lowered on
all governmental activities, particularly those of the armed forces. (C
Rangoon 439, 2 Nov 51)
agent. This "bamboo curtain" is a tribute to the effectiveness of
leftist criticism of the government, led by the BWPP. The sensitivity of
the Burmese Government to this type of criticism prevents it from taking
the necessary steps to strengthen itself in the face of the growing
Communist threat.
7. Bur g"eftists on way to V iennao The US Embassy in Rangoon has
been informed that Thakin Lwin, head of the BVJPP, is en route to the
forthcoming World Peace Conference in Vienna from Peiping, where he attended
the celebration of the second anniversary of the Chinese Communist Govern-
ment. He is said to be traveling by way of Siberia and to be accompanied
by the President of the Burma Students Union and an MP. (C Rangoon 439,
2 Nov 51)
8. Leftist ail,,, ance_formed. The Burma Workers and Peasants Party, the
Peoples Peace Front under sung Than (the late .,dung San's brother) and Ba
Maw's Mahabama Party have announced the formation of a "triple alliance."
The US Embassy in Rangoon expects the BWPP, because of its superior Soor)gani-
zation, to dominate this leftist coalition. (C Rangoon 439,
C mmen . The BWPP', the aboveground Communist Party in Burma, has
been making steady progress in gaining political adherents in Burma.
Such a group as the above might be joined by the left wing of the Socialist
Party in the interest of overthrowing the moderate Socialists who now
dominate the government.
PP Banakak A serious
gh-m
9. THAILAND. Rift opens ~~?g an#~ieCo~munist~
split among the anti-Communist Chinese in Bangkok has reached the surface,
according to the US Embassy. The Thai police, on the urging of Chinese
Nationalist General Li Mi, are deporting a group of Chinese who have
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been responsible for the publication of the only anti-Communist, pro-
Nationalist organs in Thailand. Li, who has close and profitable con-
nections with the Thai police chief, is reliably reported to have insti-
gated this action because of his belief that the group represented a
threat to his position and plans in Burma and Yunnan. The prospective
deportees have promised to publish the "full inside story." Li Mi is
reported to be deferring a return to his troops-in Burma until the group
has been deported. (C Bangkok 999, 1 Nov 51)
Comment: This report demonstrates the serious factionalism which
25X1 exists among anti-Communist Chinese in Bangkok.
11. THAILANDA ALAYA. Armsfoor Malaya cap= a: According to an official of
the British Embassy in Bangkok, the shipment of a second load of arms to
Malaya has been frustrated by the capture in Bangkok of an arms cache and
attendant personnel. The US Embassy comments that this is the first
intimation by any British official in Bangkok that arms have been smuggled
into Malaya from Thailand. (C Bangkok 999, 1 Nov 51)
12. INDONESI. Le,rliament defeats mots ding government's segurit
sweep: Parliament defeated by a vote of 91 to 21 on 1 November a motion
criticizing the government's conduct of the August-September security
sweep. The government has emerged from this test with its prestige
apparently strengthened. (R Djakarta 678, 2 Nov 51)
Comment: Parliamentary criticism appears to have been based chiefly
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upon dissatisfaction over the government's arbitrary action without
prior consultation with Parliament. in reply to the criticism, .Pr:Lme
Minister Sukiman revealed the discovery of a plot to overthrow the govern-
ment and assassinate many of its leaders. The discovery of the plot, the
development of an "untenable" situation in West Java, and the fact that
certain members of Parliament had contributed to the developmenl4of the
plot forced the government to take immediate and arbitrary measures.
13. Communist leader in hiding at.Chinese Embass s Alimin, Chair-
Cen ral Coma ee, escaped arrest
part
y.
25X1A man of the In onesian ommun s
in the security sweep and has disappeared. He is believed to have taken
refuge in the Chinese Communist Embassy in Djakarta.
Comments This is the first report on Alimints whereabouts since his
disappearance from Djakarta some time after 12 August. The Chinese Embassy
is undoubtedly a likely haven for him mm so likely that the idea of his
presence there could easily become the source of rumor. It is probable,
however, that Alimin is still in Indonesia and very probably still in
Djakarta.
25X1A
G rnmant issues warning to Chinese schoolss police issued
25X1A
Jove
special regulatiaris to Chinese schools in ura aya last august with the
warning that, if the regulations were not observed, the schools would be
closed. The government notices specified that (1) politics should not be
taught, (2) propaganda for any political ideology must not be introduced,
(3) criticism of the government should not be directly or indirectly en-
couraged, (14) posters and slogans, especially those containing propaganda
ld not be displayed on
h
ou
detrimental or offensive to a foreign. country, s
school premises, and (5) students should not be prohibited from attending
exhibitions of American films. 25X1A
0
Comments There is no indication that any serious attempt has been
made o en orce the regulations.
Similar instructions may have been issued in Djakarta, where police
recently confiscated approximately 10000 geography-books at two Chinese
secondary schools. The books called for the overthrow of the Indonesian
Government by force.:
15. CHINA. UK squelches rumor of Peiping proposal to exchange foreign
na 1onalse A British Foreign Office spokesman as assure a Embassy
tha there is no truth in the reported Chinese Communist offer to ex-
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change Europeans held in China for Chinese imprisoned in Malaya. The
spokesmen commented that the UK would be "only too gladtt to accept~sueh
an offer. (S London 2119, 31 Oct 51)
Comments The Daily Digest of 31 October reported the alleged pro-
posal, noting that ft unconfirmed by British sources.
25X1X
16. Impressions of Russians in Manchurian industry given: Russian in-
cen. l descr bed
25X1
while he did not speculate on the total number of Soviet
technical advisers in Manchuria during his visit, said that a few appeared
to be assigned to most plants. There were eight Soviet '!inspectors" at
the Anshan iron and steel mills (probably Chinats most important heavy
industrial installation) but no Soviets were present at the large sulphuric
acid and ammonium sulphate.plant at Dairen or at a number of smaller
chemical plants.
The authority of Soviet advisers varied from plant to plant, often
depending on the pro-or anti-Russian bias of the plant manager, or the
competency of the advisers. These advisers appeared to be paid'directly
by the Chinese Government rather than by the plant. Although in general
25X1 Russians assigned to Chinese industries exercised con-
siderable authority (plant managers were often simply afraid to reject
direct Soviet orders), the Russians at the large steel works at Anshan
25X1X did not interfere with the Chinese management, which made no effort to
consult with them.
was a mos Soviet
engineers in Manchuri=a would be considered it -rate even in Russia."
Many Chinese technicians and plant managers.expressed their
lack of respect for the Russian engineers with whom they were working.
One exception was the synthetic rubber plant at Kirin; Chinese engineers
25X1A from this plant claimed the Soviets working there were first-rate engi-
neers. Stories of costly mistakes caused by poor Soviet technical ad-
were commonly circulated in China (S
Ivice 25X1
25X1X
17. Organization of the Chinese Communist Fifth Field Army reported
-Phe inese -ommun s s in August organiz,aa The 1 eld
T
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Army. It comprises four infantry armies and four mechanized corps of
the same size as a Soviet mechanized corps. It is equipped with Soviet
25X1 A arms.
Comments There have been many previous unconfirmed reports of the
formation of a Chinese Communist Fifth Field Army, organized with Soviet
25X1 C assistance and advice. claime that the Fifth
Field Army was formed under Soviet guidance in a spring of 1951, its
troops being drawn from the North China Military Area Special Army Group,
long known as the "5th Field Army." 'Chile subsequent reports have alleged
the presence of units of the Fift1.Field Army in Korea under Nieh Jung-ohen,
who was and is C,0,of the NCMASAG, no such Soviet-equipped units have been
encountered in combat.
25X1
18. KOREA* Food shortage in North Korea not seen as'acute; In reply to
Comments It has been generally indicated that the coming winter
wil,1workaa~severe hardship on the North Korean civilian population. Fac-
tors, in addition to food, contributing to this suffering will be the acute
lack of housing and a probable shortage of consumer goods, particularly
textiles.
No firm conclusions regarding the stability or instability of the
North Korean regime can be drawn from current evidence. There are indi-
cations, however, pointing to increasing administratibe problems being
encountered in the lower levels of government. The disorganization
following UN occupation last winter, the considerable' loss of effective
administrative personnel by death, defection or conscription, and the
previously observed sharp lowering of living standards must all be con-
sidered in assessing the degree of success achieved by the North Korean
regime in reimposing its previously tight control elystem.
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19. Ste es taken to alleviate refugee problem in ROKs The ROK Minister
of Socialirs issued a statement November 1 concerning the dispersion
of 15,000 refugees from North Korea. concentrated in the Seoul region
"into warm southern areas." This action is part of a Flwinter prepara-
tions" plan which includes the designation of November-as the "month for
refugees entry arrangements" and an appeal for "the public to make pre-
parations for the approaching winter season." (R FBID Ticker, 1 Nov 51)
Comments With 1,500 other refugees arriving in Seoul and its environs
each wee rom all Korea and a conservatively estimated four million re-
fugees throughout South Korea, the immensity of the task confronting ROK
officials is manifest. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to note that definite,
even though inadequate, steps are being taken to cope with this critical
problem.
20. JAPAN/KOREA. Negotiations deadlocked over Japanese demand for return of
ships Japanese-Korean negotiations in Tokyo struck a snag on 2 November
over a Japanese demand that Korea return.all the Japanese shipping it
had seized, including five "large steamers" presently under Korean flag
operation. The Korean Government is expected to spurn the Japanese de-
mand, as the five ships currently form the major part of the Korean fleet.
(R FBID Ticker, Central News, 2 Nov 51)
Comment: The Koreans claim all shipping in Korean ports at the and
of the war, regardless of registry, while the Japanese recognize Korean
ownership of those ships registered in Korea only..
With several other equally debatable issues to be considered, nego-
tiations will move slowly. Both countries may appeal to the US to sup-
port their individual views.
21. JAPAN. Soviet officials discuss trade matters with Japanese Diet members:
Two Soviet officials in.To yo went to t~i? De onvemtier aInc to
unofficially for two hours with some 50 members of parliament about an
eventual resumption of commercial exchanges between the USSR and Japan.
Representatives of all political parties in Japan, including the Com-
.munist Party, took part in this discussion which covered the importing of
Soviet raw materials in exchange for machines and manufactured products.
(R FBID Ticker, AFP Paris, 2 Nov 51)
Comments Japan's trade with the USSR has been historically insignia
fican in the postwar period minor trade developed, with Japan receiving
coal and wood pulp from Sakhalin and potash from East Germany in exchange
for railroad equipment, tug boats, barges and fishing equipment. It is
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expected, however, that the USSR will continue to dangle before the
Japanese the prospects 'of Chinese and Satellite raw materials, if only
to create further dissension within Japan over the latterts loss of its
traditional source of supply.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
FRANCE. French economic crisis mounts: The EGA Mission in Paris reports
that the French Government is showing increasing pessimism in making the
basic decisions necessary for its 1952 budget and for NATO's current
survey of national capabilities, and is considering a fifty percent
reduction in dollar imports for its current fiscal year.
The Mission believes that the French economic and financial crisis
is now reaching its peak and
have "extremely serious consequences" for the economy and rearmament.
(S Paris TOECA 1380, 31 Oct 51)
Comment: The French had been counting heavily in recent months on
large imports of US coal, cotton, oil, and equipment. A sharp curtail-
ment of this program would be a blow not on?.y to production but also
to the basic French policy of stemming the inflation by increasing
imports.
France's growing economic difficulties can be expected to jeopardize
its present position in Indochina, its willingness to accept a maximum
German contribution to European Defense, and its resistance to Soviet
Orbit demands for strategic commodities in exchange for vitally needed
imports.
2. A "rightist solution" is not imminent in France: The US
Embassy in is concludes onthe -eve of the new Assembly session
that the disunity among the components of the middle-of-the-road
coalition "has at least not worsened and may in fact be less now than
when the Assembly recessed in September." While Premier Pleven has
neither made nor received commitments envisaging more solid Socialist
support of the government, the likelihood of an early deal between the
other supporting parties and the Gaullists appears to have lessened.
The new Secretary-General of the Gaullist party has indicated that,
although the General "realizes he must share the government with others
on a coalition basis," he insists onhaving l)firm leadership of such a
coalition himself. (C Paris 2573, 31
Comment: This is a further indication that the middle-of-the-road
coalition should not be expected to crumble in the near future under
the growing weight of the problems facing the Pleven government.
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3.
40
French Communists suffer setback in key.industry: The "de-
communization" of labor in the Paris metallurgical industry is being
successfully pursued by the employers' association and the non-Communist
unions. Employers have firmly resisted unity-of-action committee demands,
and the failure of wage negotiations in the metallurgical industry has
given the Socialist-oriented union an excuse to withdraw from the unity-
of-action committee. This union now plans a non-Communist association
of Paris-region metal industry unions. (S Paris 2534, 30 Oct 51)
Comment: The Communists have carefully nursed local unity-of-action
committees since last spring in the hope of gaining 'complete control of
French labor by working from the bottom up. Failure in the key Paris
metal industry is a serious blow to their plans. This may be the
turning point leading to an end of dominant Communist influence in
critical sectors of French labor, particularly if the French Government
successfully promotes a national economic conference excluding the
Communist-controlled union.
Lurid US journalism plays into Communist hands : The US Embassy
in Paris deplores the adverse effects on US interests of articles
stressing the horrors of a third world war, such as the recent lurid
account in Collier's. Such articles have a "most depressing" effect on
informed French opinion and foster doubts as to the stability and intent
of US foreign policy. Thus they reveal "a basic misunderstanding of the
current psychological climate in Western Europe" and strengthen the
position of the neutralists, whose chief appeal is that war is not
inevitable if Western Europe remains "independent." The neutralist-
oriented Paris Le Monde has played up these articles, with the editorial
comment that such terrifying accounts of "the next war" can hardly
serve the cause of peace.
The Embassy is convinced that these "men from Mars" articles, with
pseudo-historical timetables and dramatic destruction, aid the Soviet
peace campaign considerably by associating the US with war-mongering.
(S Paris 2569, 31 Oct 51; C Paris 2568, 31 Oct 51)
Comment: in view of the growing crisis in French opinion concerning
rearmament, such articles are particularly ill-timed. A majority of the
French concur in Western rearmament only grudgingly, and their support
will be further weakened if they are not convinced that the growing
military burden is reducing the prospect of war.
AUSTRIA. Soviet representatives in Vienna show concern over US strategy:
According to Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber, a conversation on
31 October between high Austrian officials and two Soviet political
advisers revolved around the theme of Soviet concern for US strategic
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25X1 6.
25X1
t otherwise confirmed, Austria
defense plans throughout the world. The Soviet representatives said they
were, prepared to make concessions to stop this US aggression," powerand
remarked that in view of Churchill s return to power,,
conference could be held from which favorable results might be expected.
Gruber found the Soviet representatives to be "sensitive" and "on
the defensive" on the subject of an Austrian state treaty.
They attempted on in to connect the treaty iaeSthen rewith fusallofgther~'Yestltorconsent to ane
Western zones of Austria,
investigating commission, thatwthe stationing of
in Trieste. Gruber feels
these same objections in a new meeting of the Austrian treaty deputies.
(S Vienna 1591, 1 Nov 51)
Comment: Soviet officials in Western Europe have recently alleged
inisSestrategy.
that the USSR would make concessions to obtain aorchange
In early 1951 prior to the unsuccessful Deputy Foreign
Conference, there was a series
German fresimilar armamentepo nsthealasteserieswofld
make concessions to stop
l1Sovietschargessof
Austrian treaty talksln the
weeks tthe he repeated
recent USSR
blocking agreement. remilitarization in west Austria have appeared to be laying the foundation
for further objections to an end of the Austrian occupation.
-
Austro-R, mmnian trade ne
assert s, that Austro-Rumanian trade
negotiations have been ^broken off. toereAustturn o Viennaators in Bucharest
Comment: Although this report is no
has heretofore been subjected
discussions centered on Satelliteedemandsrs.
Difficulties have in previous
for Austrian strategic exports., and Austrian insistence on settlement of
Satellite debts incurred under previous trade agreements.
BELGIUM-NETHERLANDS. Discussions for renewal of trade agreements with
The dutch who are currently
Poland not proceeding satisfactori .
conducting trade discussions adlht Poles
the negotiations "are going badly" and no
The Netherlands Economic
offered strategic materials strategic item.
delegation has not been authorized to offer Poland any not
The Belgian Government, also negotstrategic wthtPoland,Phas n in
"admitted contemplating" the supply of ems
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25X1 C
25X1A
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in return for coal. Information to the contrary from a Polish official may
be the result of a free-lance promoter's reported attempts to arrange deals
involving Polish coal with several Western European countries. (S Brussels
602, 30 Oct 51; S The Hague 431, 1 Nov 51)
Comment: Reports of Benelux offers of strategic materials in exchange
for Polish coal emanated from the head of the Polish delegation to the
current Swedish-Polish trade negotiations.
The Netherlands is believed to have sufficient coal reserves to fore-
stall any shortages, provided the winter is not too severe. Belgium does
not generally import large quantities of coal.
b. UNITED KINGDOM. No drastic chap e in British polio toward Spain
The new British Government will not ex ected:
make any major changes in Spanish
policy, according to tentative information given the US Embassy in London
by the Foreign Office. British opposition to Spanish membership in NATO
or to US military aid to Spain and disapproval of Spanish domestic
policies are expected to continue under the. Conservative regime.
Although the Foreign Office anticipates the gradual elimination of
certain discriminatory practices of the former Labor government, the
Conservatives first desire evidence of a more friendly Spanish attitude
toward the British. (S London 2145, 1 Nov 51; S Paris 2588, 1 Nov 51)
Comment: Speculation that the Conservatives would reverse the Labor
government's Spanish policy has not been borne out. The Conservatives
had previously objected to US military aid to Spain, fearing that such
an agreement might cut the flow of arms to NATO countries.
? TUC led e su ort for new overnrnent: A statement by
the Trades' Union Congress (TUC issued on 30 October, following a
meeting of its General Council, states: "It is our long standing
practice to seek to work amicably with whatever government is in power
and through consultation jointly with Ministers and with the other
side of industry to find practical solutions to the social and economic
problems facing this country. There need be no doubt, therefore, of
the attitude of the TUC towards the new government."
The Embassy comments that this statement indicates the feeling of
public responsibility which characterizes the TUC's General Council.
It believes the TUC will endeavor to restrict its influence to the
economic and industrial sphere, and that the Churchill government
will'be cautious in formulating policies which directly affect the
trade union movement. (R London 2123, 1 Nov 51)
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t Comment: The TUC has been increasingly influential in
fj oinwhich it
consultative committees instigatbYtI'he TUG will Labor
be especially anxious
provided powerful political support.
Chanc to maintain the National Coinnittee,sbothCof which ndclude government,of
the Exchequer's Economic
tives
t
.
a
lpresen
trade union, and empoyer re 10. Personal domination of Churchill ensured b cabinet
f the new British Cabinet emphasizes
on o
i selections: The composition
Conservative government.
f th
e
on o
Winston Churchill's dominati t wartime
closes Churchill's selection of his
the extent to
defense ministry ademonstrate fill jobs
and his own retention
which this personal control will be carried.
Although the Cabinet appointments consist mainly fwell-presence
Conservative figures, many of them fill unexpected posts. The
in the government of six peers who will be unable to answer queries
in the House of Corcanoris has evoke~essome umablcriticism
hisnchaices1deliberetely
However, the Prime Minister has presumably made
in order to relieve and CfromeconstanteattendanceminrParliamentlnecessitated
responsibilities
by the slim majority, as well as to bring the men with special qualifi-
cations into suitable assignments. Only two of the,"progressiveiYo ngant n ort
Tory group," I.A. Butler and Sir David MaxwelOc Fyfe, w0re,gi0 Oct 51;
posts. (Information from: C London 2066, 29
2102 and 2116, 31 Oct 51)
11 Peron ma have made an agreement with high army leaders:
25X1 has stated that there is a strong possibility
that .eron as m reement concerning his political future with
Minister of Defense Sosa Molina, Army Minister Lucero, and General Angel
Solari, Commander in Chief of the Army. According to the agreement, e re the military will guarantee that Peron will continue in office regardless
of the outcome of the elections, but only as a figurehead.
should not win the electrons as expdthe
coming into powert a
25X1 "simulated coup" to prevent the opposition
tween Peron and the army is not clear.
b
e
nship
relatio Comment: The
n between
There have been recent indications o of di
that
Sosa Molina, and questionable epors The a asib undisturbed
pp Y
the militar~~ may attempt to force Peron out.
progress of Peron's program for re-election may mean only that the
powerful army generals are adhering to their earlier decision to support
him through the elections (see OCI Daily Digest, 28 Sep and I Oct 51).
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opposition e consonant with the plans of other armed
? not b
Such a decision pelements. A nationalist and a retired
forces and political nate Peron.
army officer are reportedly implicated in a plot to assassalit think e that
The source of this report states "many other Argentines problems.
san assassination is the only solution" to Argentina's p
Dr. Roberto Urdaneta
12. Drdaneta will be sworn in as Presid nt emporar President
COLS IA?
the illness of
Arbelaez will be sworn in to-day, November 5, as t
of Colombia. He will serve CrrBo capacit
0, 1 y 2 Novr51)
President Laureano Gomez. (g Government
rightist bias of the present Colombian
Comment: The Drdaneta since delay in
may be strengthened during the incumbency of largely due to the latter's
advancing Gomez's rightist program has been
ill health. However, the new President is unlikelyoto make any
significant change in Colombia s pro-US .
sordeers:
lead to more serious Montevideo strike situation ma
13. URUGUAY- impasse disorders:
-- -'?"
Th?e US~mbassy in Montevideo states that the continued
strike situation is "creating economic hardship and a sense of
desperation among strikers which might lead to more serious disorders and
the strikers of now ingr, d
The previously weakening attitude of
government.
worker resentment is shifting from directorate Portland (ANCAP) to the Nacional de Corbustibles, Alcohol, y
nthe
The Embassy has been informed that pth urpose CIO of was s to contact military
toeso
Uruguayan Ambassador to the US
port. (C Montevideo 197, 1 Nov 5 )
intervention in the Montevideo p Digest.,
Comment: The growing strike movement (see OCI Daily a show of non-Communist labor strength; and may
22 Oct 51 is apparently osed to lebiscite (the see projected ected constitutional
reflect the activities of forces opposed
reform bill which will soon face a p efforts to mediate the strike
1 Aug 51), The government's foundering
may result from a desire to delay a conclusive settlement until after
the constitutional question is settled.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
5 November 1951
CIA No 49416-A.
Copy No.
49
S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. TURKEY/IRAN. Turkish-Iranian relations deteriorate: Turkish-Iranian
relations have deteriorated as a result of Turkish support of Britain in
the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. Turkey is being denounced as "a stooge
of the British and Americans and a traitor to the Moslem world." Commu-
nists and fellow-travelers are exploiting the situation in order to hinder
the plans for an expanded Middle East Command. (S, S/S Tehran 1641.,
2 Nov 51).
Comment: Although Iran tends to follow the lead of Turkey in inter-
national affairs, traditional suspicion and jealousy of a strong neighbor
have made Turkish-Iranian relations difficult.
2. INDOCHINA, De Lattre denounces Vietnamese premier: General de Lattre's
charges against Premier Huu, the first rumblings of which were heard a
week ago, reached a new peak during a recent interview with US Minister
Heath. De Lattre stated, in a way that implied agreement, that his pre-
decessor as High Commissioner had told him that Huu belonged with the
worst "rabble " of Indochina. The General went on to call Huu a grafter
and black-marketeer. Despite his observation that almost anyone in Viet-
nam would make a better chief of government De Lattre insisted Huu must
remain in office "for a few months" since there is no one capable of re-
placing him. If he had any real difficulties with the Huu government,
De Lattre stated that he would offer his resignation, (S, S/S Saigon 958,
2 Nov 51).
Comment: Early in 1951 De Lattre was largely instrumental in main-
taining Huu in power and in effecting the liquidation of Huuts political
enemies. His statement that Huu, for all his vices, is currently indis-
pensable denotes an unduly low regard for the quality of Vietnamese poli-
ticians. So far as politically conscious Vietnamese are concerned, Huu
has always been expendable. This is the first time that De Lattre is
known to have played with the possibility of resigning.
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