DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000500100001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 24, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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24 October 1951
CIA No. 49395
Copy No.
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIA, DOS AND USAF REVIEW COMPLETED
143
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA,
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECTION 1 (SOME
la USSR. Soviet note re ected by US HICOM$ Austria: In a new exchange of
notes, the US High Commissioner in Austria has flatly rejected the Soviet
element's sharp note of 20 October which was in reply to American protests
over Soviet confiscation of 500,000 maps prepared by the American
Federation of Labor showing sites of slave labor camps in Russia. The
Soviet note had vigorously attacked the AFL pamphlet and charged that
American authorities in Austria were engaged in the "psychological pre-
aration of the Austrian population fora new wax."
25X1
Comment; The incident of the slave labor maps and the attendant
Austrian popular interest has touched a sensitive Soviet nerve. The affair
is a phase in the US offensive in the Allied Council regarding the whole
record of Soviet kidnapings, censorship,, and detentions in Austria.
2. RUMANIA. Jewish immigration to Israel.may be cut down: Accompanying an
increased anti-Zionist press campaign, Communist Party activists in Rumania
are calling on some 3,000 Jewish families awaiting exit visas to explain
that 'good" Jews do not wish to emigrate and to sell a propaganda program
of expanded employment for "good" Jews. A campaign of factory lectures in
this vein is also being carried outs
25X1
Comment: The Rumanian Government's treatment of its Jewish minority
closely parallels recent moves of the Bulgarian Government with regard to
the emigration of ethnic Turks[ I It is probable
that Rumania also may be finding it advantageous to o on to all available
manpower. In March the Israeli Minister in Bucharest stated that between
200,000 and 250,000 Jews still remained in Rumania, and that if the flow
of refugees continued at the same rate, most of them would have been re-
moved from Rumania within three years. However, because of difficulties
in securing exit visas, the Rumanian ship Transilvania, which is the only
means of exodus permitted by the Rumanian Government, has not been carrying
capacity loads in its last few voyages.
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40 YUGOSLAVIA, Yugoslavs move to gain Western support for "national"
Communism-, According to Party theoreticianvDjilas,, the USSR has brought
the word "Communism" into such ill repute that the Yugoslav Government's
greatest propaganda task is to convince the rest of the world that
communism can be divorced from aggression in order to elicit Western
support for the Yugoslav experiments. Ambassador Allen believes that the
British Titoist Zilliacus is urging the Yugoslavs in this direction.
Allen is inclined to believe,, however, that Yugoslav leaders are gradually
coming to realize that Communism will never achieve support in the Western
25X1 world o
Comment-. Djilas' statement is apparently an amplification of his
recent complaint to General Collins that US support for Yugoslavia was
based primarily on Yugoslav political and military defiance of the USSR
rather than on its social and industrial policies. His statements suggest
that Yugoslavia may be planning an intensified campaign to obtain greater
Western support for its internal policies. It is quite likely that the
Yugoslavs will use the Zagreb Peace Congress this week to feature this
line by distinguishing between Yugoslav Communism and Soviet imperialism
and emphasizing the thesis that equality of nations permits peaceful
co-existence.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
2? PAKISTAN. Government maintains stabi?~ lit, The US Embassy in Karachi
reports complete calm prevailing in Pakistan following the assassination
of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. It notes the absence in the press of
any incitement to violence and states that an alert of the Pakistani
armed services was canceled within tto cb.ys after the assassination.
Finally, the Embassy remarks that the choices of Ghl'iam Mohammad and
Khwaaa Nazimuddin as the new Governor-General and P.rimc Minister are the best
o-ssible under the circu.mstaixaes.
25X1
Commento It appears that the Pakistani Uovernment has retained
control of the situation for the time being and that there is little
immediate danger of war either with India cr Afghanistan.
3. dRM.A INDIAN Ird1?an_ A,nbas dor h ittles KJL-Hshnu me According
tc. the Ircian Ambassador in Rangoon, no important decisions are likely to
be reached at the forthcoming meeting of the Indian and Burmese Prime
Ministers. In support of this view, the Ambassador stated that Thakdn.
Nu would confer with Nehru for only two days, while spending five in
visiting various religious centers. The US Embassy commen+e that
the general composition of Nu?s entourage substantiates these statements,
but it points out that Myint Theirs, former Ambassador to China and senior
member of Burma's diplomatic: corpswas included -w presumably to advise
the/ Prime Minister on foreign affairsq
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Common s All reports concerning this meeting indicate that import-
ant matters will be considered, but that little in the way of concrete
action is likely to result.
25X1
4, ~UIMAv Army A aehe comments on Burmats security problem: The US Army
Attache in Rangoon believes that Burmese Communists are capable of cap-
turing Mandalay within forty-eight hours. He believes, however, that a
more serious threat to the government is the possibility of a Communist
attack in the north coordinated with a Karen campaign in the south.
Ccarr~~nzs The Attache's estimate of the vulnerability of Mandalay
to Communist capture accentuates the weakness of government forces in
north-'central Burma. It also emphasizes the necessity of a government
rapprochement with the Karens before control of upper Burma is entirely
`most.
5+- Pry AInister shows timism in Indian Burmese Prime Minister
Thakin Nu., currently in India to confer with Nehru, told a press confer-
ence that five more years would be required to quell completely the
rebellions against his government. He added, however, that the situation
was improving and that "the three or four thousand" insurgents were no
longer considered a serious threats
Comment- These statements offer at least two glaring contradictions.
Only a few months ago Nu stated that his "peace-within-one-year-plan"
had been 95 percent successful and that henceforth Eurmans should shift
their efforts "from peace to rehabilitation," As to the seriousness of
the insurgency, the Burmese War Office now estimates that there are
1$,,500 active insurgents, and the Burmese Commander-in-Chief recently
admitted that the initiative had passed from his hands to the rebels.
6, THAI AJND. D czrt es__-sail for China.- On 17 October, 231 Chinese deportees
sailed from Bangkok for Swatow. Although 181 of these were criminal
offenders, they were given a "royal sendoff" by the Chinese community.
The Communists are expected to make additional propaganda use of these
deportees when they arrive in China. The US Embassy in Bangkok attri-
butes this approbation to (a) the Chinese belief that the deportees are
victims of Thai discrimination and (b) a desire to ai n favor with the
25X1 Chinese Communist. regime.
Co?mrt,. This is the first group of deportees that the Chinese
Communists. have accepted in some time. It ends the problem for the
Thais--until the jails are filled again. While the propaganda the
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Communists may derive from this development will be of little practical
values, the prospects of discovering able agents for future use in
Thailand certainly must be attractive to the Communist authorities.
7. Effor to reduce animosity towardsolice reuortedm Police
Director General Phao has announced that all invesitgative personnel will
soon chenge to mufti, leaving only the enforcement elements in uniform.
Phao himself will henceforth assume a civilian title. One purpose of
these changes is to dispel public notion that the police are becoming
an armed service." The US Embassy comments that these actions constitute
an official admission of widespread criticism that the police force is
a P9fr?eewheeling" armed force capable of challenging the army. In ad-
dition, the Embassy believes that putting large numbers of policemen in
mufti will make them less conspicuous, but probably will improve Phao's
25X1 secret service.
8. ZNDOCI3IIA TTietamesvilakaax him b military 4 ?a ions An
official of the US Special Technical and Economic Mission reports that
an attempt to provide relief supplies to Vietnamese civilians caught up
in recent French clearing operations has miscarried, owing to the failure
of the Vietnamese authorities to clear the project with the French and
owing to the decision of the local French commander to "punish" some
10,000 military-age Vietnamese guilty of passive complicity with the
Viet Minh. It was not clear what this punishment was to consist of, but
the STEM official saw several thousand of these prisoners in a stockade
with no shelter in evidence and, according to local reports, without
food for two days. Another STEM official reported that 80 percent of the
cases in a hoapital at Nam Dinh were civilian casualties of military
operations. Both sources report that the depredations of French Union
troops have created extreme sullenness among villagers throughout the
area, and the sources question the wisdom of associatin American relief
efforts with these operations.
9. D re makga trig rnph I etux?no Returning to Indochina
after more than two months of consultation in Paris, Washington and
London, General De Lattre received the most grandiose reception ever
witnessed at the Saigon airport and eloquently reaffirmed his champion-
ship of Vietnamese -.ndependence, Minister Heath found it significant
that banners eulogizing De Lattre remained standing over night, which
would not have been the case ae"a year or so ago." In contrast to Presi-
dent Huuas reception a week earlier, there was little participation by
Vietnamese school children and few Vietnamese were seen, although a
holiday was declared for banks and business houses--an honor which had
25X1 not been accorded Huu.
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Comms o Vietnamese are likely to pay less attention to De
Lattre1s promises than to the fact that the French authorities in Indo-
china pay resounding tribute to De Lattre but do not even go to the
airport to meet the President of Vietnam.
10. Local Chin?se s
Cnt invasion with reserves
e-scale
Ibelieve that the rumored imminent Chinese Communist invasion
25X1 under General Cheer Kong will, if it comes at all, not occur for "some
months." Current invasion rumors are attributed at least in part to
25X1 Viet Mir.h recruitment of "Tu-Kung" border tribesmen from both sides of
the frontier. estimate the number of authentic Chinese
advisers and specialists with the Viet Minh at 2,000, and the number of
25X1 Tu-Kung at 10,000.
C mmesn s A large area embracing much of North Vietnam and South
China is inhabited by various tribes which are neither Vietnamese nor
Chinese, Viet Minh recruitment from among these tribes has greatly
aggrava-ed the problem of determining when and to what extent a Chinese
Communist invasion of Indochina can be said to have begun.
25X1
IT. N__o? Chi.. Minh urges solidarity of yellow races A Viet Minh
broadcast of 18 October in the name of Ho Chi Minh urged Vietnamese
not to join Bac Dais army remindin them "You are of the yellow
25X1 r1ace0 9?
This is the first instance of race-consciousness in Viet
Mink propaganda.
12. CHINA_,_, Chiare Kai-hell:forids "irreeularities?? in Formosan provincial
es ;; ions President Chiang Kai-shek, reiterating his determination to
oonursee Formosa to full democratization," instructed Premier Chen Chong
on 21 October to take any steps necessary to prevent possible irregular-
ities and frauds in the forthcoming elections for a Formosan Provisional
Provincial Congress, according to a Taipei press dispatch.
Premier Chen, who reportedly has initiated the self-government
program for Formosa, expressed hope that the voters would not be "cowed
by power and influence." F7 I
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Commen - g On several occasions Chiang has expressed his intention to
assist and cooperate with American efforts to eliminate corruption in the
Nationalist regime. It appears that he has been influenced in this direction
by Premier Chen, who reportedly believes that cooperation with the US at this
time is the last hope of the Nationalists.
Since the advent of Nationalist control over Formosa, the Formosan
people have been agitating for a permanent, popularly elected, representa-
tive governing body, heretofore denied them by the Nationalists. This is
the first indication that the Nationalists plan to comply with this request,
H wever, neither the principles of election to the body nor the extent of
control which the body will exercise is made clear,
13. F r gn 4nUg i CYix e Nationalist Armes The American
25X1 military attaches in Taipei report that Formosan recruits are no longer being
placed in Nationalist infantry units but are receiving specialist training
for service in artillery, ordnance transportation and other special units.
Gen jLts This information is consistent with reports of sizeable numbers
of Formosan recruits receiving specialized training.
Such a move, while satisfying long-standing Formosan objections to serv-
ing in predominantly Chinese units, will also prevent the formation of any
large bloc of Formosan soldiers.
14. P iof- Formosa 0 3 The cash deficit resulting from the heavy
military expenditures of the Nationalists come to 60 percent of all govern-
ment expenditures -n Formosa. The consequent strain on the economy is evi-
denced by the inflation of prices,- retail prices in August were 24 percent
higher than at the beginning of the year. As a consequence of the increase
in prices, there is less inducement to save, the government finds it diffi-
25X1 cult to borrow, commodities are being horded, and interest rates have gone
zap with an attendant discouragement to productive investment. The ECA office
Taipei bssrvea thAt tha a1tn1tion dampens the effectiveness of ECA aid,
omments The Chinese Nationalists, remembering the inflationary spiral
which cost them public support on the mainland, are genuinely concerned over
the.. upward trend of prices on Formosa. On the whole, the Nationalists are
proving themselves fairly proficient in avoiding another inflationary spiral
in the face of the currently large government deficits. Prices are rising
but are not running away. A continuation of the government deficits, however,
would inevitably force a resort to paper money issues. The situation will re-
main precarious as long as the budget is so greatly out of balance,
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15. KOREA. Q i i.ets designate ngw g aers for truce talk : On' 22 October
the Peiping radio announced that the "Chinese People?s Volunteers" in Korea
had designated General "Pien Chang-wuB' to replace General Tung Hua on the
truce team. It was further announced that General "Chen Du kon" of the North
Korean=Arm would replace General Chang Pyong-san.
25X1 e s No information is available on either of these replacements.
It may be speculated that the North Korean general is a staff officer, in-
asmuch as most North Korean military unit commanders have been identified by
prisoners of war.
16. ~n~?lation y graces ROK leveling offs Although wages
and prices in the ROK continued to rise during September, the rate of in-
crease was considerably less than during the spring and summer of 19510
This was apparently due to a "serious effort on the part of the Korean Govern-
ment to stop inflation through (a realistic) fiscal policy." according to US
economic advisers.
The retail price index for 12 October averaged 3.4 percent higher than
that of the previous month, but two items--fuel and gold--decreased in price.
A:l ther heartening sign is that there would have been a decrease in currency
issue had there not been a won advance to the UN forces. With the 12,500,000
dollars given to Korea as partial settlement for previous won advances to UN
forces, US, UN and ROK officials are currently "working on plans...to decrease
25X1 won in circulation..."
omm is This is the first encouraging note on South Korean inflation
that has been detected since the beginning of the war. A continuously strenu-
ous effort, however, will have to be made to preserve any advances made in
bringing runaway inflation under control.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
1. GERMANYO Soviet harassment in Berlin viewed as move to seed shi ments
ro as Gex~na er can officials e .eve that continued Soviet
amass g o West Berlin is probably aimed specifically at the East-West
German talks scheduled to begin on 23 October on iron and steel deliveries.
East German press and government circles have violently accused the West
Germans of delaying tactics in the current series of East-West German
discussions on implementing the trade pact.
US authorities suggested that the 23 October talks be postponed, and
no agreement be reached with the East Germans until they actually abandon
various harassing measures as agreed at the time of the signing of the trade
2 5X1
pact. So far the British and French continue to.show reluctance to take
such strop counteractions 125X1
Comments Twice in the past week, the USSR rejected large numbers of
West Beexport Permits.' French and British reluctance to take counter-
action may arise partly from the belief that the effect on the Berlin economy
of the various harassing measures has not been extremely serious, as well
as from a general unwillingness at this time to challenge the Soviet right
to control Berlin exports.
;
2. FRANCE. Deteriorating French financial situation threatens NATO interests
file ff Am assa or in Paris is. increasing y concerned" over the deteriorating
French financial situation and_over the "prevailing resentment" of French
officials because of the delay in holding US-French talks on assistance.
The A bbssador proposes immediate consideration of interim assistance pending
the completion of a NATO committee analysis, and urges that the proposed
talks begin at once., since uncertainty on the type and extent of aid will
force the French Government into actions "that may well be injurious to NATO
25X1 interests."
Comment: France wants definite US commitments as ,a basis for defense
expen tares under the 1952 budget.. Because of unfavorable economic trends
in France and the probability of early devaluation of the franc., it now seems
increasingly unlikely that France will be able to meet its defense conpnit-
ments.
AUSTRIA. SHAPE opposes approach to Austria on milita plans: The Commanding
genera of Forces in Austria has been a vise by SHAPE of its concern
that any approach to the Austrian Government with respect to an Austrian
military contribution in the event of hostilities might compromise the
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security of Western defense plans. Any disclosure of an intention to include
Austria in Western planning would provide the USSR with a propaganda weapon
on the occasion of the reconvening of the Austrian treaty deputies. Further-
more, an approach to the Austrian Government would appear to require prior
Anglo-French approval on a diplomatic level. 25X1
Comment:: Vienna, under four-power occupation., does not provide suf-
ficient safeguards for the protection of high military plans. Soviet
sponsored and Communist newspapers have already charged that Western oc-
cupation forces in Austria receive their commands from General Eisenhower.
An approach to the Austrians now on military plans could jeopardize the
chances for conclusion of a state treaty, which is the prerequisite for any
substantial Austrian contribution to Western defense,
Austrian manufacturers deliver embargoed ball bearings to Poland:
The US Lega ion in zenna reports t a the eyr works delivered to Po and
100,000 dollars worth of embargo-type ball bearings during the months of
August and September and will deliver,a large quantity of such types during
October. Deliveries of embargoed items constitute 50 percent of total
deliveries for the first two months and far exceed the quota governing such
shipments,
The: Austrian Foreign Office asserts that the excessive deliveries were
necessary because Western orders had absorbed Steyr capacity in non-embargo
types, and the filling of Polish orders was necessary if Polish coal is to
be received.
The US Legation shares the concern of the Austrian Government that
Polish coal will be cut off unless Austria meets its total commitments and
approves .a. still?endin g contract involving further large shipments of embargo-
25X1 type bearings,
Comment.- Pending a survey of alternative sources of coal, the Austrian
Govermeen and the US Legation agreed last August that the Austrians might
accept sufficient. ball bearing orders to persuade the Poles to begin coal
deliveries - with the stipulation that only distant delivery dates would
be authorized and that actual embargo-type deliveries would not exceed
10 percent of the total. Grave political repercussions will probably result
if there is a failure of coal deliveries during the winter months.
ITALY. Italians seek to continue duty-free status of Libyan imports: The
Ita fans are seeking a waiver from the General Agreement on Tarim and
Trade signatories, authorizing Italy to continue temporarily the present
preferential customs on Libyan imports after Libya attains independence.
Under the present system, Italy allows practically all imports from Libya
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to come in duty-free,. Libya, however, does not grant such a preference to
Italian goods. The Italians have made this offer as their contribution to
assist Libyans economy during its initial period of independence?
The French, Belgian' and Dutch GATT delegates have supported the Italian
position, while the British are awaiting instructions from London. In the
meantime, the Italians have indicated that they will not.present their
request unless they are given prior assurance that they have US support.
25X1
Comment- The Italians are interested in preserving a substantial
economic in Brest in Libya and this is one way of achieving it. The fact
that over one-third of Libya's 1950 exports went to Italy indicates the
extent of Libyan economic dependence upon Italy. However, the uncertain
status of Italians in an independent Libya.may cause an exodus of Italians
and thus alter the present trade pattern between Italy and Libya.
6, Italy seeks council seat in UN Food and Aariculture.Organination&
insistienu Dnat the ui5 support their candidacy for membership in the executive
council of the Food and Agriculture Organization, The Embassy points out
that failure of Italy to acquire a council seat., after its huge outlays for
an FAO headquarters in Rome, would place another weapon in the hands of
extremist critics of the Italian Government, The Embassy urged further that
25X1 "fullest possible Italian participation in FA0 and other specialized agencies
will encourage Italian support of the UN at a time when Italyes continued
exclusion om membership is an important political issue."
Comment: In addition to the fact that ItalyBs agriculture problem is
one o. "its greatest concerns,, the fact that 'the Italian Government has not
yet been admitted to the UN makes it particularly anxious to show the public
that Italy nevertheless has strong participation in UN--sponsored organizations
such as the FAO.
7. Communists threaten large-scale general strikes. In connection with
the Common s sfl plan or e-so e economic" strikes on.the wages issue,
the leadership-of the Communist-dominated-Labor Confederation (CGIL) has
decided to demand general wage increases of about 15 percent, according to
a speech by CGIL chief Di Vittorio at a meeting of the organizations
directing body. He told the meeting that the CGIL hoped to Will increases
"without conflict" through negotiations with Confindustria, the industrial-
ists' organization, but that if the negotiations failed the workers would
"concentrate forces thus unleashing those battles which would become
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Comment-. It is improbable that the CGIL will be able to carry out
large-sca e9 general strikes without the support of the anti-Communist
unions. The latter have announced their opposition to Communist demands
for general wage increases to offset the rise in the cost of living, and
are advocating instead a reduction in the cost of living. If no reduction
is effected, the anti-Communist unions might support the CGIL in short,
general strikes,
Meanwhile, the CGIL, in view of its success during the last year in
negotiating wage increases, may be able to secure further concessions from
Confindustria through bargaining. CGIL success in either negotiations or in
strike action would enhance CGIL prestige among labor at the expense of the
anti-Communist unions,
8. SWITZERLAND. Stockpiling program near com leton: Swiss foreign trade
figures in September shoes an ex )o t surplus fourthe. first time in two
years. Contrary to the normal seasonal trend at this time, imports con-
25X1 tinued to decline.
Comment.- A temporary surplus in monthly foreign trade figures is an
occasion a, phenomenon in Swiss foreign trade. However, a number of reports
have indicated that the stockpiling program has proceeded satisfactorily,
in many cases to the levels established for-the, present. The Swiss may also
anticipate a decline in world market prices, and this may have led to the
reduction in purchases,,
9. UNITED KINGDOM, London Times and Manchester Guardian give their su ort to
Conservative Par: Two days before the 25 October general election, The
London Time s ande Manchester Guardian, two of the most respected inde-
pendent daily newspapers in Britain, have swung their support to the
Conservative Party. In leading editorials both newspapers stated their
belief that Labor Party policies no longer serve the countryas best interests.
In the 1950 general election the Guardian supported the Labor Party, while
the Times remained neutral.
Comment: The decision of these influential papers will likely persuade
many l =era who had intended to abstain from voting as well as many of the
still undecided independents to support the Conservatives. The critical
Liberal vote should be especially sensitive to the views of the Guardian,
which, though nominally independent, has a long Liberal tradition.
10. ARGENTINA. Foreign Minister has offered his resignation: Foreign Minister
ammo emo zr no Ea o ere s resign.- ioon o President Peron as a
result of a disagreement with administration economic policies. Informants
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25X1 sag a it is unlikely that any action w: -i- o ~ d~j ~1 ~? ---
vember presidential election.
~L_ ? T
o
USAF mission contract will not be renewed: The new Air Minister
11. mission o gen ins that Argentina is
has advised e ie o
not-renewing the contract for the retention of that missiono Reasons
given by the government for include"f1rethearequirementdjustment longer
and organization of the Argentine
exists." Arrangements are now under way to transfer personnel and equipment.
25X1 fates that this action of the Argentine
The US Embassy in Buenos Aires s
Government appears to be another anti-US political move. The Embassy believes
ld have referred to retain the mission*
ne it Force wou
tha h r n ?
take lesson from Suez and
Influential news a er sug ests Panama
12. pp at
an i uen i ai y a ores c alms
o
reprisals. It reports, moreover, -1-1, Suez Canal with Egypt having a
ran situa onsa a senses z
"ran has manstrated, as did Mexi hattthe confiscation sagitationn has not
resulted only
in the suggestion that the UN purohase for Panama
voice in the management; it says
now is situation the onlto the Panama
to agitate for concessions e
Canal is parallel. La Hora asserts that the L1S is tooo p reoccupieduwithlt the
cold war to desire ernfUTT with
effect Va small a~~-Ysucand h a conflict in its
25X1 fear that the
Comments La Hora is a noonday Pa~n~ea oCity lder brother of texSPresidented
by ex Pric~ent Harmodio Arias, w
~es
Arnulfo Arias and one of the most influential men in gamma.
A scnd
13. VENEZUELA. Government quells new series of d 9orders in
srineVenezue a: revolt
e Venezu
seri`~???e oT disor ers9 escri e y
by Democratic Action and Cep sannounced tthataarmput ed dCi~viliansustormed an
federal troops. The government
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officers training school and bombed several radio stations, while a
clandestine radio broadcast news of the uprising and urged the public to
participate. The oil fields, where Democratic Action influence is strong,
apparently continue quiet.
In a Havana interview following the incidents, Romulo Betancourt,
leader of the Democratic Action forces in exile, denied that his followers
condone violence as a political instrument, but warned that "Venezuela is
2 5X1 a volcano in eruption and there will be no public peace while the dictator-
ship lastso"~
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 UNCLASSIFIED when bla,,~ ,T~o~ ,~,g gt c gecrE p I I o declassi-
fied when filled in form is ~c efa' c ee rom co ?r~o Wj%do`cu . ' G t ~~ k~QO ~ -~
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
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Sr F73M 26 uaE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. TOP SECRET aD79,
 Approveor Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T146A00050010000r1 6
TOP SE CR E T
24 October 1951
CIA No. 49395-A
Copy No. 49
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TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
CYPRUS. Middle East Command a target of Cypriot Cmmunists: Increased
Communist activity on Cyprus is designed not only to create unrest and em-
barrass the British but also to create the impression that Cyprus is
The US
politically unsuitable for the Middle East Command Headquarters.
.Consul on Cyprus, who expressed the above opinion, reports that the Commu-
nist Party and the Nationalist Party are both renewin a itation for the
union of Greece and Cyprus.
Comments The recent visits of British and American military missions
and the Egyptian refusal to participate in the Middle East Command have re-
sulted in widely spread rumors to the effect that Cyprus will become a
major Western base. The Cypriot Communists have long campaigned for theof
union of Greece and Cyprus,, an issue on which they can gain the support
most Cypriots and most Greeks.
TOP SECRET 24 Oct 51
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