DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000400170001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 18, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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18 September 1951
CIA No. 49347.
Copy No. 14 1?
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1. USSR: Purge of Ukrainian textbooks decreed: The Central Committee of
the Ukrainian Communist Party recently decreed that all textbooks should
be revised by June 1952. Existing textbooks were criticized for failing
to show: (a) the leading role of the great Russian people among the
fraternal peoples of the USSR; (b) the help given by the Soviet people,
primarily the Russians, to the Ukrainians; (c) the position of the
Ukraine as an integral part of the USSR; (d) the importance of Stalin
linguistics; and (e) the influence of advanced Russian literature on its
Ukrainian counterpart. (S Moscow Weeka 37, 14 Sep 51)
Comment: There have been numerous official criticisms of so-called
"ideological" distortions and deviations, all of which culminated in the
recent condenmation of V. Sosyura's poem, "Love the Ukraine." It is
interesting to note that this poem was censured by the party for the
same five reasons enumerated above.
2. ALBANIA: Premier Hoxha reported in Moscow: A fairly reliable Albanian
source in Italy reports that Premier Enver Hoxha is now in Moscow.
Italian intelligence considers the visit "highly possible." (S Rome
Joint Weeka 36, 7 Sep 51)
Comment: There is no confirmation of this report. A visit to
Moscow by Hoxha cannot be considered unusual as he has traveled to
Moscow on the average of twice yearly since the Tito-Cominform rift.
His last visit was during April and May of 1951.,
3. BULGARIA: Exiles report plans for entrance of Soviet troops: -
that on 20 August a conference of Bulgarian and Soviet staff officers
was held in northeastern Bulgaria. The conference decided to evacuate
Bulgarian forces from southern Dobruja immediately, and to increase
and improve military installations in order to accommodate two unident-
ified Soviet divisions that were to arrive in October 1951. The
decisions were reportedly taken as a security measure against the "offen-
sive aims" of Greece and Turkey resulting from their forthcoming inclus-
Comment: There is no evidence to substantiate either this report
or a previous report of a high level
Soviet-Bulgarian conference purportedly held in Sofia on 16 July to
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discuss the entrance of Greece and Turkey into NATO. Both reports
appear to be from the same refugee sources, whose reliability in un-
known.
4. POLAND, Polish radio commentator assassinated: Stefan Martyk, the
o s io s vituperative and c e
ver connnentator who specialized in
diatribes against VOA. BBC and Radio Madrid broadcasts, was reported by
the Polish press to nave been assassinated on 9 September by "Fascist
brigands in the employ of imperialist patrons." The US Embassy in
Warsaw states that, according to local rumors, an armed band forced its
way into Martykl s flat and shot him. The band reportedly apnaunced
that this shooting was only the first in a series which will exterminate
the "traitors who have delivered Poland to Soviet domination," The
embassy comments that this assassination is the boldest direct action of
anti-Soviet Poles in some time, and provides sn indication of the deep
resentment felt against Soviet domination. (S Warsaw 245, 14 Sep 51; R
Warsaw 241, 12 Sep 51)
Comment: The rumors of how Martyk met his death may be c.orreo-b.
The story is certain, in any event, to provide a temporary boost to the
morale of Warsaw's inhabitants, The method described was frequently
used by the Polish underground against particularly objectionable and
cruel German occupation officials during World War II
Aimy technicians and specialists not to be released Former army
technicians and specialists who were recalled to active duty for a
period of six months in preparation f
or this year's maneuvers will not
be released at the end of their term of service, as; had been promised.
According to the US Embassy in Warsaw, it appears that all techni-
cians are being held in the armed services and will assist in training
the class of 1931 and deferrees of former classes, both groups of which
are currently being inducted? (See OCI Daily Digest 7 Sep 51, p. 1
(S Warsaw 245, 14 Sep 51) )
Comment, The retention of technicians and specialists supports
other recent evidence of a planned increase in the size of the Polish
Army. Former army specialists are being recalled to active duty for an
indefinite period on the basis of training and experience, iot'of class,
age, or branch. In addition, the class of 1928, scheduled for release
this fall, continues on active duty.
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6. TRIESTE: Independent parties reportedly planning to protest election
postponement: Independent parties in Trieste are reportedly panning to
forward a resolution to the UN and AMG, as well as to the US and UK,
protesting the postponement of the Trieste elections as an illegal and
undemocratic move. The resolution is expected to demand that a new
election date be set immediately and that the present administrative
officials in Zone A be replaced by a special commission to handle the
affairs of the Zone until after the elections. Trieste, 25X1A
10 Sep 51)
Comment: Popular reaction in Trieste to the postponement of the
elections has been strong, but not vehement, among the parties opposed
to the return of the Territory to Italy, The independent parties
condemn the postponement of the elections because they believe their
present strength would give them an advantage in the elections, and
claim that the population is losing confidence in Allied Military
Government. The Slav parties condemn the postponement as-evidence of
pro-Italian favoritism, while the Communist Party claims it proves that
the Western powers are preparing to hand Trieste over to Yugoslavia.
7. YUGOSLAVIA: Tito criticizes peasants and clergy: On 14 September in a
second major speech within a week, Marshal z to pointed'out that friendly
relations with the West did not mean that Yugoslavia would give free rein
.to }'reactionaries and individual clergymen." He declared that the govern-
ment regarded religion as the private concern of individuals but de-
manded that the Church be free of all political elements. Tito also ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with existing agricultural production, and warned
the peasants that the government had "not finished the revolution" and
would not abandon its program to socialize agriculture. The speech did
not refer to Italo-Yugoslav relations.
The US Embassy in Belgrade comments that Communist Party leaders
may attempt to blame the Church for the trend among peasants to withdraw
from cooperatives. (S Belgrade, Joint Weeka 37, 14 Sep 51; U Belgrade
348, 15 Sep 51; FBIS, 14 Sep 51)
Comments During the past several months Tito has made an increasing
number of public speeches on the government's revised foreign and
domestic policies. These speeches have been designed to bolster popular
morale by promising a brighter future and to explain to party members.the
necessity for the government's current policies. Although the govern-
ment's policy toward religion has become less rigid, the government's
determination to maintain the cooperative farms may lead to increased
pressure on the clergy in an effort to find a scapegoat.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. GREECE. Post-election problems: Marshal Papagos has categorically refused
to collaborate with either of the other two major parties, the US Embassy
in Athens reports. Papagos feels that the only solution is a new election
under the majority system, which he could win. The embassy sees three dis-
advantages to immediate new elections: (1) there would be two additional
months of neglect of pressing economic problems.- (2) a prolonged bitter
political campaign would deepen the rift between right and left; (3) there
is some doubt that Papagos could win a significant number of votes. New
elections could result in a new realignment divided about equally between
the left and the right. (S Athens 1266, 15 Sep 51)
Comment: The 107 seats won by Papagos, while greater than either of
the other two parties, still does not give him an absolute majority. A
Plastiras-Venizelos combination might give such a coalition a bare majority
but it is unlikely that these two parties would cooperate successfully.
Papagos, meanwhile, is demanding Venizelosa immediate resignation and a man-
date from the King to form a new government, hoping that he can win over
enough of the opposition deputies to make his attempt successful.
2. AUSTRALIA. Anti-Communist referendum campaign intensified: As the day for
vo ing on the anti?Comunist referendum 2 September approach6s, the gov-
ernment is conducting a studied campaign in support of its proposed consti-
tutional amendment while the Labor Party, particularly its leader Dr. Evatt,
is becoming hysterical if not desperate in attacks on all aspects of govern-
ment policy. Sectarianism has entered the campaign, with Catholics support-
ing the government and some prominent Anglicans supporting Labor. The voters
seem to lack enthusiasm. The weight of opinion still predicts a government
victory. (R USARMA Melbourne, C.-t7, l). Sep 51).
Comment: The referendum is on a constitutional amendment which would
permit the government to legislate on Communists in any way necessary for
the national defense, and specifically would grant it power to pass the
Communist Party Dissolution Act which was invalidated by the High Court last
spring. Virtually all observers concede a government victory.
3. INDONESIA. Grave insecurity continues throughout Indonesia: With a large-
sca e an i-guerre la operation in prospect in the Celebes, the government
continues to be confronted with serious problems in other areas of Indonesia.
On the night of 10 September, 200 terrorists reportedly attacked the town of
Tjiparay in West Java, killing 30 to 40 civilians and police, and burning
and looting homes and government buildings. In northwestern Java, official
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sources have publicly confirmed previous unofficial reports of serious law-
lessness. A new wave of murders and looting is reported in Bali. Govern-
ment forces, according to`persistent rumors, are meeting strong resistance
from remnants of the insurgent South Moluccan Republic, on the island of
Ceram. These rumors are somewhat substantiated by reports of a significant
number of casualties entering Makassar hospitals from Ceram. (C Djakarta
424, 14 Sep 51)
Comment: It has been estimated that dissident forces in Indonesia
number approximately 230,000, of which, however, only a small percentage
are active at any one time. A government security campaign, instituted in
March and still in progress, has failed to reduce lawlessness.
Trade agreement to be signed with Czechoslovakia: The Czech
Government expects to send a delegation to Djakarta during the month of
September to sign a one-year trade agreement. (C Djakarta 4259 14 Sep 51)
Comment: Indonesia's previous annual agreement with Czechoslovakia
expired on 1 August. Terms of the present agreement are not yet available.
However, under agreements recently negotiated with Poland and Hungary,
Indonesia consented to supply both tin and rubber.
5a BURMA. Possibility of Burmese Ambassador soliciting Chinese Communist aid
reported: The US Embassy in Rangoon reports that unless the Burmese Govern-
ment is able to take more effective steps to settle the Chinese Nationalist
problem, U Hla Maung, the Burmese Ambassador to Peiping and "one of the lead-
ing troublemakers" with regard to the Nationalist troop issue, "may attempt
to make some arrangement with Peipinglr to deal with the Nationalists. (C
Rangoon 281, 15 Sep 51)
Comment: It is extremely unlikely that the ambassador would take steps
independently to promote the development his government fears most--a Chinese
Communist incursion of Burma.
6. Pro-Communists invited to Peipin : The Chinese Communists have in-
vited seven left wing, anti-Government Burmese to attend the 1 October cele-
bration of the second anniversary of the Peiping regime. While there has
been some speculation that the Burmese Government may not grant-passports
to some of those invited, the US Embassy believes that political expediency
is in their favor and that all will be allowed to attend the ceremonies.
(C Rangoon 281, 15 Sep 51)
Comment: This development is not connected with the previously reported
agreemen etween Burma and Communist China to exchange goodwill missions.
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The presence of these Burmese in Peiping will offer the Chinese Communists
an opportunity to strengthen their control over the aboveground Communists
in Burma and to coordinate their program with the insurgent BCP. The
propaganda value to be derived from this trip to Peiping will be negligible
to both the Burmese and Chinese Communists,
7. Burmese to tighten controls on tires: The US Embassy in Rangoon has
been informed that the Burmese Government intends to-control tire exports by
designating 62 firms as the only authorized tire dealers. Other importers
will be required to sell their stocks and future receipts to the authorized
dealers,who, in turn, may sell tires only on the presentation of permits is-
sued by the Civil Supply Department, The embassy comments that although this
probably will cause confusion in marketing circles, it nevertheless indicates
that the Burmese Government is making a genuine effort to curtail tire smug-
gling to China. (C Rangoon 282, 15 Sep 51)
8. Japanese peace treaty fading from prominence: Although the signing
of the Japanese peace treaty prompted a number of Communist-like attacks
upon the US in the Burmese press, comment on the reparations issue, which
was cited as the chief reason Burma could not sign, has almost disappeared.
Indonesia has been criticized for its participation, and the US Embassy in
Rangoon believes that Burmese-Indonesian relations are likely to suffer.
(C Rangoon 281, 15 Sep 51)
Comment: The Burmese press reaction to the Japanese peace proceedings
reflects the fact that fear of Communist China far outweighed a desire for
reparations as a motivation for Burma?s refusal to attend the San Francisco
conference. _
9. PHILIPPINES. Huk surrenders continue: The surrender of 840 Huks on the
island of Panay brings the total number of those surrendered to almost 1800
during the past month. Philippine military'authorities believe the Huk
problem on Panay is no longer serious. A former aide of Guillermo Capadocia,
Huk leader there, reports that Capadocia is seriously ill, abandoned by most
of his followers and in fear of being killed by his own men.
In addition to the Panay surrenders, a group, of 112 Huks, of whom 60
were armed, surrendered in Quezon province (East Central Luzon). (C Manila
1032, 14 Sep 51)
Comment: The fact that those who surrendered on Panay did not turn
in any arms indicates that they were Huk sumpathizers rather than active
members. Philippine military compilations indicate a total of over 6600
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Huks killed, captured, and surrendered, for the period 1 April 1950 to 23
August 1951, Although Huk capabilities have been r
this period, their numerical strength has not declinedr o parablycanddislbe-
lieved to remain largely dependent upon the supply of arms,
10. CHINA, Large-scale arrests again reported in Shanghais An
su ar of icia from Shanghai reports
n-
a new wave of arrests, in at city
beginning in early September, and speculates that another "
roundup,, like that of last April may be in process, A large-ffale
icial is
reported to have observed 26 truckloads of victims on one aithorough-
fare, Another source estimates that about 70
been arrested and killed since April (S H a000 persons in Shanghai have
25X1, -9 Kong 1053, 1L. Sep 51; C/Control
Comment: The Communist radio confirmed the arrest of
of counter-revolutionaries)--estimated by non-Communist sources a toebegratp
least 109000 persons--j Shanghai in late April. have continued, on a smaller scale, for the Arrests and executions
lieved, however, that this source's estimate oft 70000 victims in Shanghai
alone should be divided at least by two, ,
Vance to +~ T y `~?? Cpl sneers sent to Sinkian_a: an tfa _
am of abo> t .nn re,?r~ , __ _
_
Sinkiang to engage mainly in industrial and mining enterprises, accordin
to Radio Moscow in Korean, (R FBID 9 22 Aug 51) according
Comment: According'to recent Chinese Communist press reortsre
is a tis ortage of engineers, technicians and qualified workers*[' Intvi ew
of this admitted shortage, the sending of such a large group of trained
personnel to Sinkiang may indicate the importance attached to enterprises
in that area.
12. Nationalist report of aircraft factories in China doubted: The
Ministry of National Defen
aircraft se reports the establishment of Chinese factories at Tihwa, Lanchou, Kaiyuan Communist
mussu. According to this re ort
, Kalgan, Tsitsihar and Chia-
line by March 1952. US Officials in aircraft
Taipeiacrommentomethatoff
these areeprobabl
maintenance deots and assembly points, rather than factories. y
1501002 Sep 51Y
(S ALUSNA,
Comment: The recent appointment of a veteran Chinese Communist mili-
tary eto the post of director of the Aviation Industry Bureau in
Communist China indicates the growing importance of this industry,
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13. Concentration of aircraft in Peipingarea:
The report that on 10 and 11 September a total of 113 aircraft flew fromoChang-s
chop and Ssupingchieh in central Manchuria and from Nanking to the Peiping
area. The aircraft were light bombers and conventional fighters. The Minis-
try of National Defense states that the purpose of these flights is unknown.
(S ALUSNA, 'aipei, 1/}03049 Sep' 51)
Comment: While the purpose of concentrating aircraft in North China is
not c eat the Communists may plan to conduct large-scale air training'exer-
cises in North China, prepare for an air parade over Peiping on 1 October
(the second anniversary of the Chinese People's Government) or make room in
Manchuria for more combat units,
114.
Chinese military requisitions frei ht cars The Peiping Railway
Bureau on September disclosed that all reight cars in that area were to
be requisitioned on 7 September for milita use, Nationalist report which the Ministry of NNa ional Defenseng to a valuate (MN "C-2011 MND stated that no commercial cargo in that area was moving. (Sd
ALUSNf, VJ6ef, "]40j0,t$ Sep 51)
Comment: There has not been a similar diversion of railroad traffic
from commercial to military use since November 1950, when the Chinese inter-
vened in Korea.
15. Communists continue to an.. US as "wrecker
S s of Kaeson . A 16
eptember hinese Communist broadcast to the US continues to labor the
theme of US responsibility for the breakdown of the Kaesong talks.
Citing the evidence of Kmor.e--than 10,000 direct and indirect witnesses,
South Korean war prisoners, and material and photographic evidence at
Kaesong," the Communist broadcast accuses "Ridgway and his generals" of
committing "everything short of all out air and land attack on the neutral
zone,"' In conclusion the broadcast states that "whether they will succeed
in pushing the Kaesong talks over the precipice remains to be seen,"'
(R FBID, NCNA Peiping,,, 16 Sep 51)
i ream.- Recent Communist propaggnda has striven to document to the
world the responsibility of the US for the breakdown of the Kaesong talks,
While such a stand would necessarily precede a resumption of Communist
hostilities in Korea, no indication of the timing of such a move has been
dectected,
16, JAPAN, poll indicates ove whel_mine support for US-Japan securit ~,Ac+s, A
public opinion poll conducted by the Mainichi, a leading national ynews-
paper, showed that 79 percent of the Japanese people support the US-Japan
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security treaty, while only 6.8 percent oppose. On-the:question of rearrh~Le
bl6niv 76.3 percent- approved while only 12,1 percent disapproved, although
a majority believed rearmament should be postponed until Japan's economy
improved. (R FBID Ticker, Tokyo Kyodo, 16 Sep 51)
Comments This poll shows unexpectedly strong support for both the
security pact and rearmament? Polls takbh oh therlattei question prior
to the peace conference showed only slightly over half the people in
favor. Soviet tactics at the conference, a realization that Japan is now
unequivocally in the Western camp, and a tendency for the Japanese man-in-
the-street to support the decisions of higher authority may all have
combined to produce additional support for rearmament. These figures may
have some significance if and when the government conducts a referendum
to revise the war renunciation clause in the constitution.
17. SOAP to permit textile shipments to Communist Chinas Exports of
cotton and yarn to Communist areas will no longer require SCAP approval,
according to "Kyodo"' news agency, This step is expected to enable Japan
to get coking coal from Communist China. Exports of cotton cloth which is
obviously for military use will be prohibited. (R FBID Ticker, 15 Sep 51)
C mmen s Textile and steel industrialists have been leading a cam-
paign for a resumption of non-strategic trade with Communist China ?- the
former being plagued by large inventories and the latter by high costs.
Although Japanese importers have reported offers of coking coal from
China in exchrnge for textiles, it is not certain whether the shipments
will be approved by the Communist authorities.
18. New Javanese Communist thesis draft for post-treaty activity rex,orte s
The draft of a new J'apane'se Communist Party thesis for post-treaty
activity is reported by CIC to have been circulated in a covert pub-
lication for the study of regional and prefect rklrp,artyl edderg. The
new emphasis is on vigorous opposition to the stationing of US troops in
Japan, an all-out effort to overthrow the Yoshida government as a US tool,
the establishment of a "racial liberation democratic government"' through
revolution spearheaded by laborers and farmers, and the overthrow of the
emperor system. The draft, still unaccepted, makes considerable concession
to the theories of 'be radical "internationalist" faction which favors
violent revolution. ( S Tokyo Joint Weeka 379 14 Sep 51)
C?mmen s The conciliatory gestures towards the internationalist faction
indicate that the factionalism which has rent the party for many months,,
although on the mend still exists. While the thesis contains many articles
designed for farming community consumption, Where communism has been re-
latively unsuccessful, the fact that it calls for the abolition of the
emperor system will undermine its appeal.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
1. AUSTRIA. US Minister opposes concession on air corridor agreement: US
Misni ter Donnel y has advised the British Deputy High Commissioner of US
concern over current Anglo-Soviet conversations regarding a proposed modi-
fication of the air corridor route between Vienna and the British Zone of
Occupation. Donnelly asserted that he could see no justification for amending
the corridor agreement, and that he would not in any case concur with the
suggestion that the Soviet authorities be given prior notice of t1 flights
of military aircraft. The British deputy is in'agreement with these views and
has promised to keep the US Legation informed on the bilateral negotiations.
(S Vienna 1009, 114 Sep 51)
Comment: The Soviet authorities have been pressing vigorously their
proposa o shift the British air corridor north and west of its present
route, ostensibly for reasons of safety (see OCI Daily Digest, 5 Sep 51).
The British have submitted counterproposals involving controlled and vari-
able-altitude flights. Allied authorities are convinced that Soviet Head-
quarters is concerned because present flights permit photographic recon-
naissance of the Soviet military airfield at Wiener Neustadt.
2. BELGIUM. Trade agreement with,Czechoslovakia extended: Belgium has extended
its trade agreement with Czechoslovakia to 31 December 1951. It had already
been extended to 31 August. The foreign office states that quotas in the
basic agreement have been exhausted, and there is no additional provision
for furnishing goods to the Czechs. The reason for the extension is to
continue in force other clauses, dealing with such items as tariff reciprocity,
not related to the volume of trade. (C Brussels 357, 114 Sep 51)
Comment: The original commercial accord, effective 1 October 1949-
1 October 1950, provides that it can be continued in effect by mutual agree-
ment. The Belgians undoubtedly wish to keep an avenue open to obtain the
payments due its citizens as a result of the Czechoslovak Government's
nationalization of property.
3. ITALY. Communist and non-Communist unions join in sup.orting general strike
oo sfate emp oye-es: -our nationwide strike of railway, communications,
an ocal administration workers has been called for 18 September by a joint
meeting of Communist and anti-Communist labor unions. The strike is to
protest as "inadequate1" recent government proposals for. wage increases
averaging 3-4 percent for state employees, with.the greatest benefits for
top-level workers. (U NY Times 16 Sep 51; S Rome Joint Weeka 37, 14 Sep 51;
S Rome .Joint Weeka 36, 7 Sep 1
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Comment: The long-standing issue of wage increases for government
employees is one of the few which has had the support of anti-Communist
as well as Communist unions. The last strike of government, employees for
pay raises, called by all unions on 22 June, was about 6D percent successful.
Italian oil technicians sought by Iran: Iran is reportedly urging
the Italian Government to accept an Iranian economic mission to discuss
oil problems with Italian technicians. Although the initial proposal was
for economic missions only, Iran is now said to desire inclusion of a
political mission as well. The Italians are ignorant of Iran's motives in
this connection, and are attempting to eliminate discussion of a political
mission. For critical security reasons
this report is not to be further transmitted within the United States, or
beyond the borders of the United States without the-express permission of
the releasing office.)
Comment: The Italians have been evading definite commitments to Iran
on the subject of providing technicians to assist in the development of
Iranian oil resources. These negotiations for technical help represent
another Iranian attempt to obtain such assistance from the small countries
in the absence of support from the great powers. It is not clear what Iran
would hope to gain by sending a "political" mission to Italy,,
5a
SWITZERLAND. Wage boosts throughout nation appear likel: The Swiss
Federal Council -.as sent a bill to parliament requesting that federal employ-
ees be given a lump-sum payment amounting to two percent of their salaries
to compensate for higher living costs. If this measure is approved, it may
touch off a round of wage increases in private industry, which management
has been resisting on the grounds that government employees have received
no pay increases. (R Bern Joint Weeka 37, 12 Sep 51)
Comment: The Swiss Parliament has recently shown an extreme reserve
in increasing budgetary expenditures. The fact that this is an election
year, and that the cost of living has risen and shows every indication of
continuing to rise, may cause parliament to approve this modest proposal
for wage increases.
Because of a scarcity of labor and good profit margins, management
will probably follow suit and grant reasonable wage increases. These
increases will have little inflationary effect upon the Swiss economy. The
rise in domestic price levels stems primarily from external rather than
internal factors.
6. SWEDffiV'. Poles will demand ball bearings in new trade agreement: The Poles
have intima ed to KF the Swedish manufacturer of ball bearings in G5teborg)
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that coal may not be delivered under the new trade agreement to be negotiated
in October unless Poland can place orders for the same type bearings it has
purchased in the past, i.e., bearings of strategic sizes. Since February
SKF has not been accepting Satellite orders for bearings which the tripartite
formula considers strategic (see OCI Daily Digest, 2 Mar 51). The US Embassy
in Stockholm states that, since almost 50 percent of Sweden's coal imports
come from Poland, the coming negotiations assume great importance.(S Stockholm
Joint Weeka 27, 15 Sep 51)
Comment: The Swedes are anticipating considerable difficulty with Poland
over coal imports and ball bearing exports (see OCI Daily Digest, 12, 28 Jul
51). Poland, in order to obtain "strategic!' goods, is using its coal to
exert pressure on many Western European countries who need the coal.
12 18 Sep 51
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 TOP SECRET
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18 September 1951,
CIA No. 49347-A
Copy No. ^ ''
S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT,
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. JAPAN. Socialists adopting more positive policy: Commenting on the
14 September joint "third force" statement of the Japanese and Indian
Socialist Parties (see OCI Daily Digest, 17 September), the US?Political
Adviser in Tokyo states that the Japan Socialist Party appears to be
seeking a more dynamic policy which will strengthen the party's present
weak political position and overcome its internal dissension,. He believes
that even the left-wing Socialists are awakening to the negative character
of the three peace principles heretofore dominating the party's policies,
and this more realistic approach is likely to give the Socialists greater
support from labor, the intelligentsia and business. He fears that this
pan-Asiatic approach might tend to orient Japan politically with the Asian
nations, with possible adverse effect on the future US position in Japan,
(C, S/S Tokyo 54+7, 114 Sep 51).
Comment: Neutrality, pan-Asianism, and the development of trade with
Communist China all have wide popular appeal in Japan. The adoption of
these more positive goals by the Socialists should enable them to regain
some of the influence lost as a result of their unrealistic, Communist-
line policies toward the peace treaty. The new line provides a graceful
way to drop a lost cause as well as a vehicle for reuniting the now-
diverging right and left wings, The Socialists currently hold 45 (of 466)
seats in the Lower House of the Diet, and 61 (of 250) in the Upper House.
2, Ouirino allegges Yoshida promised one billion dollars in cash
reparations: During a call on President Truman on 13 September, President
Quirino stated that Prime Minister Yoshida had indicated to the Philippine
Foreign Minister that Japan would pay the Philippines one billion dollars
in cash reparations immediately after the treaty comes into force. This
would evidence Japan's sincerity and would be in addition to anything else
called for in the treaty, The Department of State has requested the US
Political Adviser to ascertain Yoshida's version. (S, S/S to Tokyo 445,
14 Sep 51).
Comment: This sum is approximately equal to Japan's entire exports
for 1950, and even in the form of credits could not be paid by Japan ex-
cept over a several years' period. Moreover, the terms of the treaty would
prevent the payment of cash reparations while Japan was still dependent upon
US aid.
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18 Sep 51