DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000400160001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 17, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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17 September 1951
CIA No. 49346
Copy No.
DAILY DIGEST
DIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1, USSR- Moscow's propaganda media marking time: An FB]I3 survey of Soviet
radio output of the past week disclosed scattered indications of a pos-
sible Soviet desire to shift away from aggressive propaganda attacks on
the West. The indications include a low volume of attention to the "Wes-
tern aggression" theme; the continuing absence of militancy in "peace"
propaganda; ashift from denunciation of US bases abroad to protests over
the growing burdens forced on Western workers by the rearmament drive;
and the relative absence of atrocity charges in comment on the Korean
War. (C FBIa Trends and Highlights, 12 Sep 51)
Co a t: While this slight trend toward a moderate tone in Moscow's
attacks on the West is noteworthy, there is insufficient evidence to
indicate any major change in the Kremlin's propaganda tactics. This
softer key has had short-lived tryouts in recent issues of the Soviet
journal, News, and in various contributions on the "coexistence" theme.
One possible explanation is that Moscow is marking time while awaiting
Gromyko's personal report on the San Francisco Conference, and a turn of
events in Korea, before setting a more positive line.
At present, the Kremlin's puppets - especially Peiping - are pur-
suing a vitriolic propaganda line on the subject of US-Western "aggressive"
intentions,
2, Soviet Navy Chief"of Staff probably replaced: The omission of Soviet
Navy Chief of Staff, A. G. Golovko, from-the. signatories of Col. General
Shchadenko's obituary is the second indication that Golovko was probably
released.with Admiral Yumashev, former Navy Minister.
Embassy Moscow notes that the second-ranking navy figure now appears
to be Admiral Zakharov, who in the space of one year rose from Chief of
the Political Administration to Deputy Navy Minister, The Embassy notes
the recent appearance in Red Fleet of an article on security questions.,
and concludes that Zakharov's increased prominence may portend a tighten-
ing of political control in the Soviet Navy. (S Moscow WEEKA, 7 Sep 51)
CoxVnt: The significance of the changes in the Soviet Navy command
since July is by no means clear. Admiral Kuznetsov, who replaced the
politically minded Admiral Yumashev as Navy Minister, is a competent pro-
fessional but was convicted three years ago of divulging military secrets
during wartime. "
3. Japanese POWs sent to Manchuria: In early May 51, about 5,000 Japa-
nese POWs were sent from Siberia to northern Manchuria, according to a
These POWs were turned
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ec
o
est
rn relations and stated
that. Western Europe under US leadership, is trying to blockade Czecho.-
slovakia, replied that the US would never, in
his opinion, a an on its attempts to free Otitis.
In concluding the interview, remarked on the
fine weather and observed, pointing to - e open windows, that international
owever, Gottwald & erne the subj
~jW
e
t e
es'
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over to the Northeast Military area to be incorporated into artillery and
mechanized units of field armies en route to Korea. Over 200 junior and
non-commissioned officers were sent to China proper as instructors in
srAr4 Atia .. Arz t i__ _ ? _
25X1A
Washington C=eaj: This may confirm similar information re ort
in greater detail by Chinese Nationalist sources.
Cow: Utilization of Japanese in various capacities, usually
technical, by the Chinese Communist forces is generally accepted. To
date only one Japanese, an artilleryman, is known to have been captured
in Korea by UN forces.
4. ALBANIA, Tternal resistance rosin awaits aid: It is reliably reported
that the National League of the Mountains, a.resistance organization in
northern Albania, has submitted an appeal for aid to the "free democratic
notions," A resistance leader who received this appeal connented that
the organization has not yet carried on any activity, He stated that,
nevertheless, some of its leaders are eager to act, enjoy considerable
freedom of movement, even though suspected by the Albanian Government,
and exercise considerable influence among anti-regime elements, However,
he concluded that they could make a worthwhile contribution only if
aided "morall v_ maters ~,
d _.:' -e_ __ . > .
an
,22M2nit This is the first report confirming the existence of the
National League of the Mountains, The Albanian security forces are pro-
bably countenancing the movements of the resistance personnel in order
to identify specific anti-Hoxha elements.
5. CZECHOSLOVAKIAN Czechoslov Prime Minister perturbed b
-- --- --.,., w.&.wu i ..
Siroky on 13 Sentembnr_ +t,o
impression that the Czechos ova vernment is "considerablyddisturbed
by recent developments" in Czechoslovak Western relations. The
th r purpose
of the interview was to notif
y
zech Government formally of the
n
2
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relations might be less strained if equally ventilated. Gottwald responded
byysourly pointing to the US flag flying on the US chancery.
believes that Gottwald intended to convey the implication that-his view
was spoiled as long as the US flag was visible. (S Prague 214, 14 Sep 51)
Go nr : The interview with the should serve to
impress the Czechoslovak regime with t e w_~ espre support in the West
of the US position on the Catis case? Czechoslovak propaganda has recently
shown sensitivity to the adverse reaction to the Oatis case in the West.
6. YUGOSLAVIA.- Goverment protests increasing Hungarian border incidents:
The Yugoslav Goverment has protested against fifty-two provocations com-
mitted by Hungarian frontier guards between 11 July and 19 August, The
Yugoslav note does not cite several grave transgressions which had been
protested previously. According to the Yugoslavs, the violations were
committed on an average of two every three days, (R FB1D, 13 Sep 51)
C net: There has been a continuing increase in the number and
scale of border incidents since May. Early in August the Yugoslavs charged
the Hungarians with corrnnitting thirty-eight provocations between 28 May
and 14 July? Yugoslav officials have expressed some concern, but believe
the purpose of the attacks is to heighten internal tension in Yugoslavia.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. GREECE. Political leader states vigwss on amnesty, and on US aid to Greece:
General Plastiras, leader of the National Progressive Union (EPEK) has ex-
pressed himself as strongly favoring a general amnesty for all political
prisoners regardless of the extent of their Communist connections, in a
recent post-election conversation with US Embassy officers. Stressing his
determination, once in power, to effect a general and complete amnesty,
Plastiras stated that the system of judicial review established for such
cases was too time-consuming and involved by red tape to satisfy the "people's
demand for immediate release of prisoners." He added that he favored a
liberal-EPEK coalition government headed by himself, even if it meant relying
on the support of the extreme left for a majority in parliament. (C Athens
1241, 13 Sep 51)
C nt: Although Plastiras advocated amnesty for political prisoners
in his pre-election campaign, it is doubtful that he would be in a sufficiently
powerful position in the event of a liberal-EPEK merger to carry out such a
program. More moderate advisers in his own party, as well as the necessity
for cooperating with the liberals, would prevent successful implementation
of his program. While the possibility of a liberal-EPEK merger cannot be
ruled out, it is considered likely that the two parties would place them-
selves in a position which would permit the Communist-controlled left to domi-
nate their program.
2. Communist vote in 9 Sertember electionss The Communist-dominated
EDA Party received approximately 11 percent of the total vote in the 9
September Greek elections and will receive 10 seats. Most of the success-
ful EDA candidates are in prison as Communist Party members or sympathizers,
or in exile in some Satellite country. (C Athens 1218, 12 Sep 51)
Comment: The 11 percent of the total vote won by the EDA may be lowered
somewhat when the army vote is counted, but this probably will not materially
affect the number of seats involved. Although this percentage is somewhat
higher than the 8.4 percent received by the Communists in the 1950 elections,
the Communists suffered substantial losses in the urban areas. The increase
can be accounted for chiefly by the fact that the leftists had candidates
this year in all electoral districts. The election of Communists now in
prison or in exile will force the courts to decide on their eligibility.
Both Marshal Papagos and General Plastiras, whose parties gained the largest
number of votes, expressed their approval of amnesty for political prisoners
in their pre-election speeches.
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3. ETHIOPIA. Ethiopia and Italy agree to exchange ambassadors: After final
negotiation by the Italian Undersecretary of State who visited Addis Ababa
in early September,, Ethiopia and Italy have agreed to resume diplomatic re-
lations. According to the US Ambassador in Addis Ababa, the formal exchange
of ambassadors is to occur within a month. He also notes that there are
still anti-Italian elements in Addis Ababa who consider the movement toward
closer relations with Italy as being too rapid, (C Addis Ababa unnumbered,
8 Sep 51; C Addis Ababa 115, 4 Sep 51; U Rome 1161, 10 Sep 51)
Comm en e The reestablishment of formal relations between the two coun-
tries has been a tedious and trying accomplishment,, chiefly because of
Ethiopian distrust and bitterness. Italy will make a strong effort to foster
good relations with Ethiopia. If in turn Ethiopia discourages the anti-
Italian elements inside its own frontiers and in Eritrea,, considerable pro-
press toward stability will have been made.
25X1C 4. SOUTHEAST-ASIA. ti2,ipAtes in
report of
25X1C concludes that in the event of an
armistice in Korea, the Chinese will attempt to step up the tempo of the
war in Indochina by sending additional aid to the Viet Minh. The committee
also foresees an effort to overthrow the Burmese Government by (1) increasing
assistance to the Burmese Communists for the establishment of an expansible
base in northeast Burma, (2) encouraging separatist nationalism among the
Shan and Kachin minorities,, and (3) exploiting the above ground pro-Commu-
nist Burma Workers and Peasants Party. While the.report indicates that peace
in Korea would have little effect on Chinese intentions regarding Malaya and
Indonesia,, the UK Commissioner General for Southeast.Asia believes that the
infiltration of agents into Indonesia will continue on as great a scale as
possible. (S Singapore 3129 13 Sep 51)
5, B. Foreign Office implicated in anti-US etatemento -According to a mem-
25X6 ber of.the in Rangoon, the Burmese Ambassador to Peiping?s
statements t a t e was supporting the Chinese Nationalists in Burma (see
Daily Dis , 11 Sep) were contained in a letter from the ambassador to the
press. The source implied that the Burmese Foreign Office had prior knowledge
of the existence of this letter, but he did not say whether the letter had,
been prepared in Rangoon. (C Rangoon 275, 13 Sep 51)
6. THAILAND. Political assassinations reported imminenta
Attempts on the
25X1 C
lives of Premier Phibun and Air Marshall Fuen are imminent)
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Comment: Political assassinations are common in the Far East and both
Phibun and Fuen have many enemies. However, there is no other information
to substantiate this reports
7e INDOCHINA. Chinese advisers to Viet Dinh nWeda An informant of the US
Consulate reports that the Chinese guerrilla leader Chu Chia-pi is now
acting as military adviser to Ho Chi Minh's headquarters, and that Chen
Keng, Deputy Commander of the OCA Second Field Army., is now north of Hanoi
setting up a headquarters for a potential BOvolunteer army.' (S Hong Kong
1046, 13 Sep 51)
gommo s This source's testimony is contradictory, since he has also
stated that Chen Keng is anti-Communist--in which case it is not likely
that he would be with Ho. Cb en Keng has frequently been mentioned as
commander of the actual or prospective 'volunteer army,'
g, INDONESIA. Determined anti-guerrilla ceaapai?a in Celebes still del v ds
Although the government's decision to launch a: determined campaign against
guerrillas in the 0elebes is still apparent., to date it has engaged only in
a. series of minor skirmishes. The Army Attache comments that sufficient
reinforcements probably have not yet arrived to risk a major operation.
Rigid press\censorship continues. (S USARMA Djakarta,, 11 Sep 51)
C omen a Lawle' ssness in ether areas of Indonesia does not appear to
have decreased appreciably in spite of a five-months' security campaign and
widespread arrests in August. Sudden troop withdrawals, particularly from
Java, to support the Celebes operations could have serious consequences,
CHINA. Ching.se Communist "war sustaining x~lan'f rex~orteds
reports that a 'war sustaining plan" was adopted by
the Chinese Communists at a meeting in Peiping in late July and was
implemented by the end of August. The objects of the plan are to
(1) maintain the national defense force at three million without weaken-
ing the war effort in Korea; (2) continue troop rotation in Korea,. and
(3) give combat experience against US forces to as many. troops as possible,
25X1A
Comment: Although there is no confirmation of this plan, the recent
appearance of new Chinese Communist units in Korea lends credibility to
the report. Furthermore, it appears to be a reasonable tactic for the
Chinese Communists. The figure of three million troops is considered
low, as the most recent reports estimate 3.7 million men in the CCF,
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10. CnmmT'ni st intentions re QuenQy Formosa I pg Kong. Macao are
asessed. An S'September report
25X1C estimates that the Chinese Communists (1) are
likely to attack the Quemoy Islands (east of Amoy) at any time, (2) will
not attempt to invade Formosa unless US "covering forces" are withdrawn,
(3) will not assault Hong Kong until prepared to risk general war, and
(4) are not likely to attack Macao, in view of the colony's increasing
economic usefulness to Communist China. (S Singapore 312, 13 Sep 51)
C; en s The Peiping regime regards each of the above areas as
a.part of China and is committed to the eventual recovery of all of theme
operation against the Quemoy Islands has long been expected. An
attempted invasion of Formosa is not indicated in the near future,
although it is conceivable, as some reports have alleged, that Peiping
will obtain Soviet assistance for a Formosa operation in spite of the US
commitment to the island's "neutralization." There are no indications of
an imminent assault on Hong Kong or Macao--both of which continue to be
of more value to China in non-Communist than in Communist hands--although
Peiping could launch an attack against either colony with little warning.
11< KOREA. Chinese PW reports offensive for 15 Sentembero iA Chinese
Communist prisoner of war captured on 13 September in the west-central
sector stated that an offensive would begin on 1 September. The fields
comment on the PW s statement adds that "although a limited objective
attack by the enemy is possible, all other available information does not
indicate an all-out attack now." (S CINCFE Telecon 5159, 15 Sep 51)
C.mm s Communist forces in Korea are capable of launching a
powerful, sustained offensive where and when they choose. There have
been, however, some recent unconfirmed indications that the enemy may
continue on the defensive for the near future.
12. JAPAN. Claiiagso Communist ?n n ion toward Japan? 25X1C
estimating ommun st na s
short-term intentions toward Japan, may at first prefer a policy of
ingratiation rather than open hostility toward independent Japan. The
committee believes that the Chinese will attempt to neutralize Japan, and
spread Communist influence by political and economic contacts.
commenting on the above conclusion, stressed
the enormous mpor ance to Japan of trade with China, which gives the
latter a weapon with which to exert economic and political pressure.
(S Singapore 312, 13 Sep 51)
Comm s Japanese officials are fully aware of the need for
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continuing rigid economic policies toward Communist areas during the time
Japan is dependent upon the non-Commminist world for the bulk of its raw
materials and imported foodstuffs. There will be pressures, however, for
controlled trade with the Chinese, which, the Japanese feel, will work to
the advantage of the Western World.
Politically, the Chinese can hold little immediate hope for creating
an anti-Western attitude among the Japanese, although considerable
potential exists for arousing neutrality sentiment. Chinese propaganda so
far has pursued simultaneous policies of conciliation and threat coward
the Japanese, citing the advantages of accomodation on the one hand, and
the disadvantages of opposition on the other.
13. _Treaty to be ratified in Octobers The Japanese peace treaty be ratified at an extraordinary session of the Diet to be convened on w121
to 16 Octtber, according to a press announcement. No commitment has been
made relative to the US-Japan security pact. (R FBID _, Jiji, 13 Sep 51)
C amen o Conservative control of both houses assures speedy
ratification of the peace treaty. The US-Japan security pact, on which
the public and oppositidta parties are demanding further details, may be
in for a more difficult time.
14. Socialists' issue ioint statement with Indian Socialist PartY8
The Japanese and Indian Socialist Parties, in a joint statement on 14
September, announced their intention to fight for a Socialist Asia in
rejection of both the capitalist and the Communist world. The joint
statement also said that the two parties hoped to call a conference for
all Asian Socialist parties soon. (R FBID Tickers Tokyo Central News,
14 Sep 51)
COMM2 s Failure of the Japanese Socialist delegates at the
international Socialist meeting last summer to support an anti-Communist
resolution increased the Japan Socialist PartyFs internal dissension
which arose over its unrealistic attitude.toward the peace treaty. This
new development appears to be a shrewd move to unify the party and at
the same time to assime a more positive party platform, centered around
paa sianism.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
1. GERMANY. Adenauer indicates anxiety over Allied talks on Germany: West
German Chancellor Adenauer has indicated that he is most concerned over
the Washington talks on Germany's new status and -its defense role. He
stressed that his whole future and that of his government coalition are at
stake. The chancellor's emissary, in a talk with the US Deputy High Com-
missioner, asserted that rifts were appearing in the coalition and that the
chancellor was being criticized for going too far to meet Allied wishes,
The chancellor, therefore, was particularly anxious that an agreement ac-
ceptable to the German public be reached in Washington.
25X1C Meanwhile
have commented that the Germans are
in substantial agreement on the issue of German rearmament. Reports that
the Bonn government favors rearmament and the Social Democrats oppose it
are bound to be misleading, they feel, since these reports underestimate
the determination of the government as well as the opposition to hold out
25X1A for certain rere uisites. .(C Bonn 162, 12 Sep 51;
Comment: Adenauer has been forced, partly by the intransigent Social
Democratic attitude, into a position where, in order to sell rearmament to
the German people and to the parliament, he must present the rearmament
issue in conjunction with some sort of Allied agreement restoring German
sovereignty. Although the details of the Foreign Ministers' agreements on
Germany are not yet clear, the Washington accord appears to have answered
many of the government's conditions,
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3. FRANCE. Anglo-French conference proposed to alleviate disagreements over
Middle Eas : The Bri is Foreign Office confirms that the French Foreign
Minister s proposed a conference with Great Britain to discuss "inter-
national questions of common interest" in view of the danger of Anglo-French
disagreements, particularly on Middle-East and North African questions. The
Foreign office expects a general conference some time after the French Foreign
Minister's return from Ottawa, (C London 1380, ill Sep 51)
Comment: Since France was excluded from the Anglo-American bilateral
discussions on Mediterranean defenses in Malta last spring, fears of American,
and especially British encroachment upon French influence in the Middle East
have been increasing.
4. French see no threat in Soviet note: The French Foreign office,
reports that i s government was not particularly disturbed" by the Soviet
note of 11 September directed against the Schuman Plan and the European Army
project. Rather, the note was regarded merely as a part of Soviet intimi-
dation tactics prior to the Washington tripartite talks. It is "not im-
probable" that the note represents a further build-up toward eventual Soviet
denunciation of the Franco-Soviet alliance treaty of 1944; it may also be
designed largely as propaganda support for the local Communists.
The foreign office has worked out a draft reply defending the Schuman
Plan on its pacific merits and the European Army on its defensive nature.
The French Government, however, feels no need to make haste with an answer.
(S Paris i& 0, 13 Sep 51)
Comment: French reaction to the recent friendly overtures made to
Frenc -representatives by Soviet officials will be cooled off by this note.
The chances that this is a step toward denunciation of the 1944 Franco-
Soviet treaty are slight in view of the recent renewal of the Franco-Soviet
commercial treaty. The French Communists can be expected to make full use
of the note in their propaganda.
De Gaulle complains about defense olicies: In a speech before the
Anglo-American Press Club in Paris, General De Gaulle voiced the most
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vigorous and uncompromising expression'to date of his complaints about the
US and UK defense policies. He repeated his usual objection to the European
Army, and stressed his concern over infringements on French sovereignty
resulting from the establishment of military bases in France and North
Africa. He ended with a hint that Allied refusal to accept his concepts
would result in a neutralist or Communist France. (R Paris 1604, 12 Sep 51)
Comrnentt Spokesmen for the Rally of the French People have heretofore
excusedanti US flavor of their leader's extreme nationalism as a strata-
gem to outmaneuver the Communists. While this speech, directed primarily to
an American audience, may actually be a Gaullist bid for support in the
October cantonal elections, it is also an indication that the general will
not be overly tractable in the unlikely event he comes into power. The cur-
rent dissension among the parties of the government coalition has undoubtedly
encouraged him to believe that dissolution of the present assembly may be
precipitated; but the Pleven government now seems safe until the assembly
reconvenes in November after the prospective fall recess.
Despite the implication in his speech, there is little likelihood that
De Gaulle would not vigorously oppose a neutralist or Communist policy in
France.
6. AUSTRIA. Tito would welcome meeting with Austrian Foreign Minister: The
Yugoslav Minister in Vienna has informed Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber
that Marshal Tito would welcome a meeting in Yugoslavia some time before
15 October. The proposed discussion would cover boundary questions, trade
relations, anti-Soviet tactics, and mutual defense. Gruber refused to commit
himself to the meeting before consultation with the Austrian cabinet ministers.
The US Legation in Vienna is strongly opposed to the discussion and has
considered an attempt to discourage Gruber from undertaking the trip. (S
Belgrade 309, 7 Sep 51; TS/Control Vienna 936, 10 Sep 51; S Vienna 987,
12 Sep 51)
Comment: An Austro Yugoslav defensive arrangement, if it is included
as a subject of `conversation., appears premature in the absence of an Austrian
army, and might cause an adverse Soviet reaction. Since the USSR apparently
has not considered the Austrian treaty negotiations apart from the Soviet
position vis-a-vis Yugoslavia, any Austrian move suggestive of friendship
for the Titoist cause might jeopardize further the possibility of a four-
power settlement in Austria. In view of well-known Austrian antipathy for
Yugoslavia, particularly along the border areas, it is somewhat doubtful
that moves toward closer relations between the two countries would be
universally popular at this time on the Austrian side.
7. Communists planning demonstration in Vienna: The Communist Party
of Austria is reportedly planning a mass demonstration to take place in
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Vienna on 18 September. It is to be coordinated with demo ationsain the
provincial capitals, touching off a Communist campaign against.
price increases. Workers ^from +Su 1eatrfnienthesdemonstration.y~ 41 be 25X1A
mnufists
trianf
dicated that the
i
l
A
n
Comment: Previous reports have
~ o would attempt, to capitalize on the proposed rent law.
have reported that the Communists would encourage tenants in the Soviet
zone to refuse en masse to pay any rent increase.. These officials have
discounted the chances of serious difficulties, pointing out that the trade 'will for
unions support e ts, measure Communistedemonstration
property improvements, .
would occur on 20 September.
8, Soviet interference in local administration adisturbs
Aistri thGo ern-
ment: Foreign Minister Gruber has advised the US Leg
continued Soviet interference in local administrative and judicial matters
has forced the Austrian Cabinet to complain once more to tth~SSo"iGtuHigh
Command, Describing Soviet meddling as perhaps growing o ,
ould
stated that, in the ab~he nci5suecinrparliamentgandstohprotestrtoethewAllied
be compelled to raise Sep 51)
Council. (S Vienna 989, 12 p
Comment: Wide publicity has been given to Soviet unilateral inter-
ferences-Ty the Austrian press in receilc~eeowers by local commandersiactions
usually consist of an assumption of po p
countermanding of Austrian directives, and intervention in court proceedings.
'While demonstrating some sensitivity to Austrian protests, Soviet authorities
have not heretofore been willing to sacrifice immediate objectives or to
discipline local commanders -- for the sake of good public relations.
9. ITALY. Amount of US aid will directlyaaaffe t nation's defense rogram:
Italy's Minis er o the Bu get e la the rate of progress of his country's defense program and the hope of
securing any additional appropriations from parliament depends. directly
on the outcome of present US congressional action on foreign aid. At the ts may same time, ECA in Rome estimates that Italian mdollar nt?r a Brun
as much as 70 million dollars beyond the 275 million requested
fiscal year 1951-1952.
The Italians will have to make unusually heavy purchases of coal and
wheat from dollar sources. Less coal is available in Europe because of
an expanded defense effort, and the Italian wheat crop is 10 percent below
the 1950-1951 crop. It is anticipated that price rises, the additional'
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costs that they will add to equipment already on order, the cutting off of
Iranian oil, and possible retaliation against Italian export controls by
the Soviet bloc from which Italy gets 10 percent of its coal and 20 percent
of its wheat requirements, will adversely affect the Italian economy,
particularly if US aid is reduced below the 275 million dollars recommended
by ECA. (C ECA.Rome 955, 31 Aug 51; C ECA Rome 994, 10 Sep 51)
10. NORWAY-DENMARK. Governments still planning opposition to Greek-Turkish
NATO membership. According to a Norwegian Foreign Office source, Foreign
Minister Lange now intends to oppose NATO membership for Greece and Turkey
at Ottawa, but will finally vote for such membership if all other members
do. The Norwegians, however, reportedly believe that Denmark is prepared
to veto such membership if it is supported by one other country, presumably
Norway or the Netherlands. US Ambassador Bay points out that, should the
Danes solicit Norwegian support for a veto, Lange would be placed in a
difficult position, because the Norwegian public would then consider that
by taking a stand with Denmark he might have prevented Greek-Turkish member-
ship, (S Oslo 26h, 12 Sep 51)
Comment: Available evidence indicates that Norway will finally agree
to Greece urtish admission, regardless of Denmark's wishes, and that Denmark
will not individually exercise its veto,
11. DENMARK. Poles take difficult attitude in trade negotiations: In preliminary
sessions of the Danish-Polish trade negotiations, the Poles, according to
the head of the Danish delegation, have refused to make any new coal com-
mitment, promising only the approximately 600,000 tons still due under the
current agreement. The Poles attributed the reduced coal shipments to
Denmark's failure to deliver spare parts for automobiles and light trucks.
They also indicated their desire for more ships and Diesel engines for
fishing craft than they received under the current agreement, (S Copenhagen
211, 10 Sep 51)
Comment: The Danes have frequently (see OCI Daily Digest, 11 Jul 51)
expresse eir fear that Poland will restrict coal shipments, upon which
Denmark is sorely dependent (see OSI Daily Digest 15 Jun and 8 Aug 51),
12. CUBA. Communist Party reinforcing cadres of Youth Movement:
reports that the Par i o Socialista Popular (Cuban Communist Party) is
reinforcing its cadres of the Juventud Socialista (Communist Youth Movement
with selected young Communists picked for their knowledge in methods of
indoctrination and agitation propaganda tactics. Flavio Bravo and other
leaders of the youth movement are not able to select suitable young men
from their own limited ranks and, according to the source, they are using
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other young party members to give it strength, The aim is to form a core
of militant leaders which later will take over the leadership of the Com-
munist Party.
At present the Juventud Socialista has about 10,000 members, However,
the party intends to increase this number by recruiting youths from all
the social classes of Cuba, (C Habana 210, 7 Aug Si)
Comment: The Juventud Socialista continues to be of vital interest
to the Cuban Communist Party which attaches considerable importance to the
work of the youth movement members, since they execute the party's principal
propaganda programs by distributing pamphlets, posting signs, and attending
all meetings. The Juventud's activities in support of the "partisans of
peace" movement is its most important function, Recently, the Juventud has
been concerned with the UN entrance into Korea and the publication of its
new youth magazine, Cascabel. It has taken an active interest in labor
questions, and has engaged in disputes with elements of other government-
sponsored youth groups to protect its propaganda?
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 n, a~L,, down raded or declassi-
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FORM 0A UOE PREVIOUS EDIT10'fi"S
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17 September 1951
CIA No. 49346-A
Copy No.
S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent 'a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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17 September 1951
CIA No. 49346-A
Copy No.
S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. IRAN. Effects of British embargo on Iranian economy: The British embargo
on the export of certain scarce commodities to Iran, according to the
American Embassy in Tehran, will be felt immediately in the case of sugar,
already in short supply. The ban will also affect, although less quickly,
cotton piece goods which can no longer be bought from the US because of
Iran's inability to convert sterling to dollars. (S, S/S Tehran 1017,
14 Sep 51),
Comment: The British action in shutting off these imports will encourage
opposition to Prime Minister Mossadeq among moderates. At the same time, it
will probably result in an even more intransigent attitude on the part of the
present government which will see in this action further confirmation of
"British imperialism."
2. IND1 /`BURMA. India advises Burma to delay submission to UN of Chinese
troop question: India has advised Burma to delay its projected submission
to the UN of the question of Chinese Nationalistiroop activities along the
Sino Burmese border. India has also expressed the hope that the US can do
something toward eliminating this danger to peace in Asia since the US, as
the "chief supplier of foreign arms to Southeast Asia," may be accused by
Communist powers of assisting the Nationalists. (S, S/S New Delhi 956,,
12 Sep 51).
Comment: Last May, when Burma first planned to take this case to the
UN, it was dissuaded from doing so by US representations, Indian admonitions
against hasty action, and the movement of troops in question out of Burma in-
to Yunnan. Now that the defeated Nationalist troops have reentered Burma,
any Western advice to delay may be less successful. If the case is not sub-
mitted, it will probably be largely because of Indian influence.
BURMA. Burma to make peace with Japan: The Permanent Secretary of the
Burmese Foreign Office informed US Ambassador Key that his government expects
to establish peace with Japan through the exchange of notes. Despite the
similarity to the Indian approach to the matter, the official indicated that
Burma was acting independently. (C, S/S Rangoon 276, 13 Sep 51).
4. INDOCHINA. De Lattre reportedly seeks command of all Allied forces in
Southeast Asia:
commenting on De La re's trip to the US, told the US Consul in Hanoi that
in pressing for an advance US-UK-French commitment to act jointly against
any Communist move into Southeast Asia, De Lattre will forcefully nominate
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or command of Allied Forces from Hong Kong to Singapore. The
US is or would be agreeable but.that the
British are unwilling to entrust their area, especially Malaya, to a non-
Britisher. (S, S/S Hanoi 154, 13 Sep 51)9.
Commen : The minutes of the US-UK-French military conference held in
Singapore during May strongly suggest that De Lattre has precisely this goal
in mind,
5. INDOCHIA. De Lattre plans to revive issue of French participation in
Indochinese aid program: General De Lattreys proposed agenda for his meet-
ings with ECA officials in Washington is "highly disappointing," in the
opinion of the US Charge at Saigon. The Charge feels that it indicates
the French attitude towards the US economic aid program in Indochina has
remained the same -- that US economic aid to the Associated States should
not be administered bilaterally, but with official French participation.
The US Charge refers to the original American decision to devise a pro-
gram whose benefits would be applied directly through the Associated States.,
in order to strengthen the prestige of the native governments in the eyes
of the populations. This would prevent the French from diverting the aid to
their own interest, He concludes that if De Lattre&s agenda were made known
to informed Vietnamese, it would violently irritate and offend them. (S, S/S
Saigon 626, 13 Sep 51).
Comment: Although the French insisted almost two years ago on partici-
pation in the economic aid program, they subsequently appeared to accept
administration by the US and the Associated States. De Lattre's reported
intent to revive the issue of French participation is not surprising, however,
in the light of continuing French criticism of the ECA program in Indochina.
6.
French Vietnamese friction over the concept of the French Union
foreseen: The US Charge in Saigon believes that the prospective first con-
vocation of the High Council of the French Union may bring to a head the
problem of whether the status of the Associated States of Indochina is to be
one of genuine association or subordination.
The emphasis which Vietnamese spokesmen have placed on full equality
within the French Union, when compared with De Lattrets statement that common-
wealth dominion status is hardly in prospect for Vietnam, denotes the potential
explosiveness of this issue. The Charge states his belief that implementation
of the French Union, along the restricted lines envisaged by France in 1946,
will be deeply resented by the Vietnamese public and will embitter French
Vietnamese relations for years to come. He urges that no American statement
be issued which implies approval of the organizational aspects of the French
Union. (S9 S/S Saigon 627, 14 Sep 51).
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7.
INDONESIA, Ratification of Japanese treaty probable: US Ambassador Cochran
states that events at the San Francisco conference have sobered Indonesians
generally and weakened the position of those who opposed participation in
the treaty. Cochran believes that when Foreign Minister Subardjo and Ambassa-
dor to the US All reveal the progress they made with the Japanese delegation
at San Francisco, the government -- if supported by President Sukarno, Vice
President Hatta, and the Sultan of Jogjakarta - can obtain parliamentary
ratification of the treaty. (C, S/S Djakarta 421, 13 Sep 51).
Comment; The Japanese delegation assured the Indonesians at San
Francisco that Japan was prepared to negotiate bilateral treaties regarding
the payment of reparations and the regulation of fishing rights in Indonesian
waters. The Indonesian delegation is not expected to return to Djakarta
until 23 September, and a detailed statement by the government describing
their activity at San Francisco will undoubtedly await their arrival.
There is every indication that Sukarno, Hatta and the Sultan of Jogjakarta
will support ratification of the treaty.
8. PHILIPPINE'S, Filipinos study relations with Japan; With regard to the
Philippine attitude on Japanese participation in the Food and Agriculture
Organization, the US Charge in Manila has been informed that the "Philippine
Government is reexamining its position relative to JapanQs membership in UN
bodies." The Charge comments that the reexamination is likely to take at
least a month and that it would be safe to assume that no commitments would
be made before the Japanese peace treaty is ratified. (C, S/S Manila 1050,
14 Sep 51).
Comments The Philippine Government, which has been under attack from
the opposition for being too lenient on the whole Japanese question, is likely
to delay action in this matter until after the forthcoming elections.
9. JAPAN, Airline negotiations bog down: An investigation by the LIS Mission
in Tokyo reveals that the delay in inaugurating the Japanese internal airline,
originally scheduled for 20 August., is due to failure on the part of the
several international airlines participating in the venture to form the
necessary corporation. Several foreign representatives still lack authority
to commit their companies but continue to indicate their desire to partici-
pate in the joint venture, Japan Air Lines., whose franchise expires on
20 September, is now attempting to negotiate with only one foreign company.
to furnish the necessary planes and pilots. (C, S/S Tokyo 541, 13 Sep 51),
Comment: The suggestion for a joint international airline was made
originally by the US in an effort to avoid criticism that the occupation was
showing favoritism toward US airlines. Lack of any restrictions in the peace
treaty on Japanese operation of civil aircraft may have been a factor in loss
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of interest on the part of the international carriers, who realize that the
Japanese will take over as soon as training is completed and equipment ob-
tained.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
lO. FRANCE.
French seek US su
In the 11 rt to revent Moroccan uestion reachin UN:
,September discussions between the French Foreign Minister and the
US Secretary of State, the latter agreed that "no useful purpose" would be
served by raising the Moroccan question in the UN and promised "
influence to discourage" such a step,. The secretary assured the to fuei his
minister that US-French interests in Morocco "coincided" with the views the
foreign minister had expressed, but he noted that the Nationalist forces de-
served "careful consideration." (S. S/S to Paris 15319 to London 1445,
12 Sep 51),
Cot: French sources have already expressed the opinion that the
Arab States are not likely to raise the question of French infringement on
Moroccan sovereignty at the next UN General Assembly
.
General Juin's replacement by General Guillaume has relieved Franco-
Moroccan tension somewhat, even though a softer policy is not likely to be
adopted. Pressure from North African Nationalist forces on the Arab States
may now diminish.
11. UNITED KINGDOM Morrison stresses danger of reef itatin war: In the
course of the 12 September US-UK- France tripartite talks, which generally
surveyed the policy of containing the USSR, British Foreign Secretary Morrison
put considerable stress on the importance of avoiding action which might inad-
vertently precipitate a third world war.
Korea, arming Yugoslavia too extensively, esHe warned against far
tablishing western1airtbases inn
Turkey, rearming a united Germany, permitting West German Anschluss with Austria
establishing air bases in Norway, admitting Sweden to NATO, rearming the Japan-
ese too quickly, and setting up powerful US wireless transmitters on the per-
imeter of the USSR. The West nevertheless must continue to increase its mili-
tary strength, he concluded. (S, S/S to London 1463, 12 Sep 51).
Comment: Objection to many of the projects mentioned by Morrison might
also be explained by the well established British opposition
persal of US commitments, with a smaller share for theUKand France nasvA dis-
result. Several of his statements range so far from the realm of current
issues, however, as to suggest that the foreign secretary was preoccupied
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with the left-wing Labor criticisms of American foreign policy, criticisms
which he anticipates he will have to answer at the party's annual conference
in early October?
Just prior to Morrison's departure for the present conferences, the US
Embassy in London estimated that domestic political considerations would
make him particularly anxious to "bring home some bacon" (see OCI Daily.
Digest, 30 Aug 51)e
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