DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000400130001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 12, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For ReILe 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00130001-4
TOP SECRET
12 September 1951
CIA. No. 49343
Copy No.
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE .AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400130001-4
 Approved For Rel a 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP79T01146A0C 00130001-4
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
USSR. East Germany sent aid to North Koreas The German Democratic Re-
public has sent "large quantities" of medicine and clothing to North
Korea, according to a Telepress report broadcast by Radio Peiping. In-
cluded in the consignment are two ambulance cars, 1,893 cases and 30
barrels of medicine, 801 cases of textiles and clothing, 154 cases of
varied gifts and eight million marks collected during the past year.
(R FBID, 10 Sep 51)-
Comments This is the first mention of East German aid to North
Korea.
2. FINLAND. T Communist leaders reported to have been in Moscow: The US
Legation in Helsinki reports that the three top leaders of the Finnish
Communist Party departed for Moscow during the end of August, ostensibly
on a recreation trips Another report states that
the three Finnish Communists were in Moscow, and that they returned to
Fixiland during the first week of September.
Coincidentally, at the time of the trip the Helsinki press discussed
reports of dissatisfaction within the Communist-front Socialist Unity
Party-over the question of subservience to the Communist line. Denying
reports of a split, a party spokesman declared the party plans to publish
an organ of its own. In comment, the legation points out that since such
a publication has little prospect of being economically rewarding, an in-
creasing sense of individuality on the part of the members of the party
is indicated. (R Helsinki, JW 35D 31 Aug 51; 10
Sep 51)
.Comments In June certain members of the Socialist Unity Party were
reliably reported to be endeavoring to break their party away from the
Communists, and apparently achieving some success. Loss of control over
this party would be a distinct setback to the Communists, and could cer-
tainly account for the trip of the Communist leaders to Moscow. Not only
is the Socialist Unity Party the most effective Communist approach to
Finnish intellectuals, but dissidence within this party has previously
showed signs of spreading into the Communist Party itself. It is also
possible that the Finnish Communist leaders received instructions in
Moscow concerning-new tactics to be used in a renewed campaign among
Finnish labor groups.
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-IDP79T01146A00040013000'I-4
 Approved For Re a 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146AO 00130001-4
TOP SECRET
POLAND, Pastoral letter indicates Church not intimidated-by trials of
.Priestss In a strong pastoral letter on 2 September, Polish Catholic
Primate Wyszynski affirmed the resolution of the Church to maintain "its
right" to provide religious teaching as an integral part of the education
of Polish youth, The letter also contained a stun warning to those
parents who might decide to compromise with their Catholic faith and per-
mit their.children to be brought up without religious education. The US
Embassy in'Warsaw comments that the firm tone of the letter and its em-
phasis upon the divine rights of Polish citizens seems to indicate the
recent secret trials of the Catholic clergy have not shaken the deter-
mination of the hierarchy to resist further encroachments of the Polish
Government into the religious life of the Polish people. (C Warsaw 229,
9 Sep 51)
Comment; The Church is not in a position to enforce the teaching of
religion in the state controlled schools, The-call by the Primate to
parents to give their children religious education at home is an effort
to circumvent the weak position of the Church in regard to religious
education in schools,
4. YUGOSLAVIA, Yugoslav actions further jeopardize Yugoslav Italian rela-
tionso Within three days after the postponement of the Trieste elections,
the Yugoslav Government has taken a stand which will make bilateral nego-
tiations over Trieste more difficult. On 8 September the Yugoslav Foreign
Office protested the anti-Yugoslav campaign being conducted by Italian
Government spokesmen and propaganda organs. In a 9 September speech cel-
ebrating Yugoslav Navy Day, Marshal Tito denounced Italy?s anti-Yugoslav
campaign and Irredentist claims. R'e stressed Yugoslavia's desire for
peaceful relations with Italy and a settlement of their outstanding is-
sues, but warned that Italy should not forget it is dealing with a new
Yugoslavia that "knows what it wants and what it must do to defend its
peaceful life,?B (U Belgrade 326, 10 Sep 51; R FBID, 10 Sep 51)
Cpmment; These actions are another indication that the Yugoslav
Government has no desire to settle the Trieste issue at this time. Prior
to the postponement of the Trieste elections on 6 September, Yugoslavia
had maintained a relatively moderate tone regarding the anti-Yugoslav
campaign in?Italy.
2 12 Sep. 51
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400130001-4
 Approved For Rise 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP79TO1146A 400130001-4
SECTION 2 (=ASTERN)
1, ISRAEL. Israeli Prime Minister still unable to form governments Israeli
Prime Minister Ben Gurion, leader of the moderate socialist MAPAI party,
after six weeks of negotiations has not yet managed to form a government.
Ben Gurion, whose party obtained only a plurality in the 30 July elections,
has been trying to reach accord with the next largest parties, the conserva-
tive General Zionist and the extreme leftist MADAM.
Failure to include the Zionists or MAPAM would force the Prime Minister
to form a coalition with five splinter groups or admit his inability to form
a government. (C USARMA Tel Aviv 573, Weeka 9, 10 Sep 51)
,Cmts The.Prime Minister disagrees strongly with the General Zionists
on many domestic issues. He disagrees even more strongly with the MAPAM on
major foreign policy issues.
Unless either. or both of these parties considerably modifies its
position, Ben Gurion will have to turn to smaller parties more in accord
with his position. Such a coalition would give him only a slim working ma~,.,,.
jority and would leave him a strong opposition.
2. INDONESIA. Tt~aonesia Chinese students ~rwad t PeipingAr sneEial four
year co: urseForty Chinese students left Djakarta in June for Peiping, where
they will attend a special school of politics run by the Chinese Communist
Government. The course is expected to last.four years and will include com-
plete indoctrination in Communist ideology and propaganda methods.
The trip was organized by the Chinese Communist Embassy in Djakarta,
which also supplied the studen+.q with ial letters of introduction to
prominent Chinese in China.
mmen s Small groups of Chinese students frequently leave Indonesia
to pursue higher education in Communist China. It is not known whether ar-
rangements similar to those mentioned in the above report have been made for
other students.
The Peiping regime is known to be training agents for overt and covert
operations throughout Southeast Asia, but the existence of a training pro-
gram of the above duration has not previously been reported.
IND NA. Vag Minh action ex seta s The Viet Minh is definitely preparing
a new campaign, according to French intelligence. It is expected that the
attack will be aimed at areas to the north and west of the delta. (S 0ARRMA
MC 235-51, 9 Sep 51)
TOP SECRET
3 12 Sep 51
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 CIA-RDP79 T01 146A000400130001-4
 Approved For Fase 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T011460400130001-4
TOP SECRET
No time was specified for the beginning`of the attack.
Democratic Fa?ty .gin Cambodian elections, Results 'of the
National ,Assembly elections of 9 September give the Democratic Party 53 out
of a total 78 seats in the assembly. The next largest vote went to the
Liberal Party, which won 19 seats. (U Pnom Penh 15, 11 Sep 51)
o nt- This pattern of voting is similar to that in previous Cam-
bodian elections. The Democratic Party has shown itself slightly more in-
clined than the Liberal Party to resist French control.- All parties in
Cambodia are, however, essentially conservative. All have as their slogan:
"For King and country."
C ^'""" st roub seen a t s A high
-Im
5. PHILIPPINES, Sera Sin P. R
level Communist liaison group, apparently distinct from other Party organ-
_.._ 4-4 -_ The 25X1C
lzations 7.Y1 laiiq a tiJ. n ary~ uew, ?_ - - r
group, which is reported to include both Chinese and Filipino mem ers, but
to be directed from China, appears to be primarily concerned with improving
the military capabilities of the Huks and with settling differen en ~5X1A
regard to the policy line and tactics of Philippine Communists.
The Chinese Communist Party is believed to have an important rol e
Philippine Communist movement, directed in part toward integrating it with 25X1A
international Communism throughout the Far East. Philippine leaders appear
to depend upon superior Chinese security enforcement. Dissension may arise
re ult of the traditional Filipino fear of the Chinese.
The Chinese role in the Philippine Communist movement has
been obscure. This report supplements others which indicate increasing
Chinese participation and which are supported by the logic of the situation,
therein the Huks, who have virtually embodied the movement, find their capa.
bilities at a low ebb. Chinese Communist assistance to the Philippine Commu-
nists in ideological and tactical matters may reflect increased activity by
the VWTU Liaison Bureau in Peiping. The Liaison Bureau was created under
Soviet auspices in late 1949 apparently~as an instrument for providing
assistance of this nature to Communist movements throughout Asia, but little
has been learned of its subsequent operations.
6. CHINA. Estimate of air =gt Cx ommunist China now 1.255& The US Far
East Air Force estimates that 1,255 combat aircraft, including 650 jet
fighters, are now in Communist China. This represents an increase of 205
aircraft over the June estimate. Over half, or 755, of these aircraft are
believed to be in Manchuria. FEAF estimates that at least 2,000-2,500
Chinese are qualified combat pilots, and an additional 4,000-5,000 are in
training. FEAF expects Chinese pilots to replace Russians gradually until
TOP SECRET
12 Sep 51,
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : *IA-RDP79T01146A000400130001-4
 Approved For Rele, 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP79T01146A0p0130001-4
the CCAF becomes a truly Chinese Communist force.
1 Sep 51)
(S FEAF Tokyo, Ax 3273,
Common s These figures correspond roughly with the current Washington
USAF A-2 estimate of 19260 combat aircraft, of which 600 are jets, in Commu-
nist China. The large number of Chinese pilots estimated to have completed
or to be in training (69000-7,500) is an indication that the CCAF will con-
tinue to expand.
7.
25X1 C
9.
who obtained his information from a Peiping in Orman
,
reports that the Chinese Communists plan to establish a parachute factory at
Tsitsihar in northwest Manchuria. The.USSR will su pl machinery and tech-
nicians from a Soviet parachute factory, believes that 25X1C
this plant is to be opened by the end of an -o employ 250 workers. (S
s The Chines, Communists are reported to have recently opened
parachute factories in Hangehow and Canton.
Liu Pcmch9 ~n ~~.+~~ ~ 'n relieved end rwtg rrari s. General Liu Po-
ch?eng, long-time commander of the Chinese Communist 2nd Field Army, based
in the Southwest, is reported-by Nationalist intelligence to have been 're-
lieved of that command and transferred to Nanking to head a military school,
Ho Lung is said to be the new commander of the 2nd Field Army. (S Alusna
Taipei, C-3, 1006242 Sep 51)
jgMR2Rj& Similar reports of Liu?s actual or impending relief and trans-
fer have been received periodically for several months. Although Liu was
the only commander of a Field Army not to be accorded favorable mention in
a recent official history of the Chinese Communist Party., reports of his
fall from favor are still regarded as doubtful. If Liu has indeed been re-
lieved and transferred, Hoy Lung would be a credible replacement..
Anpoi tmenta to Ccminf rm a~encv el e.g g Nationalist intelligence
reports the appointment of Liu Shao-ch?i as *Chief of the Par Eastern Intelli-
gence Bureau for the Cominform,a and of Cho en Shao-yu as Chief of the Intelli-
gence Committee,0? The alleged area of operations includes Japan, much of
Southeast Asia., and Hong Kong and Macao, agents bring trained in Peiping and
shuttled through Hong Kong. (S USARMA Taipei AT Al., B-3, 9 Sep 51)
Nationalist and other sources persist in citing an "Asian
Cominform& and/or Far Eastern bureaus of the Cominform, and identifying
Chinese Communist leaders as officials of such organizations. These. reports
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/065: CIA-RDP79T01146A0004001,IMG91e# 51
 25X1 C 10,
11.
Approved For Rely 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP79T01146A0QD 0130001-4
TOP SECRET
derive from a widespread confusion between the old Comintern (Communist
.International) and the new Cominform (Communist Information Bureau). The
Comintern was a Soviet-controlled international directorate for the world
Communist movement, operating in large
part occupied$ under Soviet direction, with ieologicallquestions ?affecting the
world Communist movement, and operates overtly, The covert functions of
the Comintern are believed to have been assumed by the Foreign Section of
the Soviet Communist Party?s Central Committee when the Comintern was dis-
solved in 1943. The nearest equivalent to the Cominform in Asia is the WFTU
Liaison Bureau set up in Peiping in late 1949,
der re rte d r
i
that L -s en. Chairman
o e Kuomintang Revolu onary Committee (KMTRC), was placed under house
arrest in early August to prevent his escape and defection. Other
party leaders are similar treatment,
Commen s The Communist press has admitted the arrest of a number of
puppet party members, but reports of the arrest of leaders re unconfirmed.
The D a lv D t of 13 July, reporting rumors of Liss main imminent defection,
regarded it as doubtful that the Peiping regime would give Li or other dis-
affected leaders an opportunity to escape. The Communists are doubtless
aware of the disillusion of these figures--the result of the collapse of
their hopes to play a significant role in the regime =and have permitted
none of them to move freely inside China or at all outside China.
e
erv ce Attaches in Taipei have reported that the
recent attempt of the noted educator, Diu Shih,, to resign from a Taipei news-
paper indicates the active dissatisfaction of the liberal elements in the
Nationalist regime. They also cite the cabinet resolution, passed through
the efforts of liberal elements, stating that the powers of the police are
to be confined to clearly subversive or military cases, leaving all others
to civil courts.
The report explains that these incidents reflect two conflicting trends
in the political scenes (1) the necessity and desire to please America,
and (2) the conviction that a further tightening of centralized control is
required at the present critical time. In recent months the advocates of
highly centralized control have been in favor, with the more liberal ele-
ments complaining of increased infringements on freedom of the press and
personal liberty, (S Alusna Taipei. Joint Weeka 36, E3 Sep 51)
o tt Althdugh Premier Chen reportedly is convinced of the need
for curtailing the activities of the military and police. the strong
TOP SECRET
S i 11. iv i n is as i :
The US Minister and th
25X1A
6 l2 Sep 51
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00040013000T-4
 Approved For Rel 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP79T01146A06Q&W130001-4
TOP SECRET
25X1X
12. CHIN-AZ-KOREA, October Commtanist offer .jye in Korea predicted: Chinese
and Korean Communists plan to resume the offensive about 1 October
,'ported by nearly 2,000 tactical aircraft,
from a Chinese Communist in Peiping. Source c aims
that all these aircraft, which comprise 16 divisions, are in Manchuria.
Chinese have recently been replacing Russians as pilots of jets and
other aircraft.
Comment-. Communist forces in Korea have long been building up for
a possible new offensive, and many sources have predicted the launching
of such an offensive on some definite date; thus far, all these pre-
dictions have been wrong. The source's estimate that 2,000 combat
aircraft are in Manchuria is considerably higher than the US Far East
Air Force's latest figure of 755.
13. KOREA. South Ko,ean anti~Jannese feeling believed irrational"
Commenting on recent ROK anti-Japanese public statements and editorials,
the US Mission in Korea observes that the "tactlessness and ill considered"
timing of this manifestation is motivated by "pique, jealousy, and
frustration" at Japan's acceptance in the international community without
ROK sanction. The Mission observes, however, that the Koreans do have a
very real fear of future Japanese economic and military domination. The
fact that the adoption of such an anti-Japanese attitude may prejudice
future ROK relations with her more powerful neighbor seems to have been
overlooked in South Korea. (S. Pusan 245, 11 Sep 51)
C~Mgp&.- ' Korean emotion, engendered by 40 years of Japanese
domination, frequently overbalances common-sense in dealing with the
subject of Japan.
14. LA-PAN. Government orders inreased suryeilla ov r. ri htlat organiz
ations$ The Japanese Attorney General?s office has issued instructions
to local authorities to exercise vigilance over the activities of rightist
organizations, which are expected to become more active following the
signing of the peace treaty. Officials state that there are now about
550 organizations of rightist complexion which have registered with the
government, and that while these organizations are pro=American and
anti-Communist on the surface, they are actually pushing nationalism
under the slogans of ".Arianism" and "racial independence." (R FBID
Ticker Tokyo, Jiji, 11 Sep 51)
CQmmQa -. Since occupation directives prohibit the existence of
ultra-nationalist organizations, the post-war extreme right has adopted
anti-Communism as its main theme, at the same time avoiding any anti-
Western activity. The war in Korea, the government's anti-Communist
7 12 Sep 51
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400130001-4
 Approved For Rel 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP79T01146A006660130001-4
TOP SECRET
campaign, the creation of the National Police Reserve and the peace
treaty unquestionably have strengthened nationalistic sentiment, but it
is unlikely that these rightist organizations will be able,for some time
to come, to achieve the influence over Japanese life held by their pre-war
counterparts.
15. Peace treaty signing observed quietly ire Japans The signing of the
peace treaty and security pact was observed quietly in Japan, with the
joy of most Japanese tempered by anxiety over the future, according to
the US Political Adviser in Tokyo. There were no public demonstrations,
and comparatively few shops and homes showed the national flag. (U
Tokyo 517, 10 Sep 51)
QpMMentL- Several editorials just prior to the conference deplored
the festive attitude of many Japanese toward the peace treaty. With the
long-sought peace finally attained, there apparently has been a sudden
realizati^n of the many problems facing Japan, foremost of which are
futurerelations with the USSR and Communist China and the attainment of
economic stability.
16. ]Basin j nci des foram met ~ou_ced ~?~ Democratic _Paztva The
Democratic Party has announced the following basic principles that should
guide Japan's rearmament plans.- (1) no member of the Japanese armed forces
shall be sent abroad to fight in foreign wars; (2) the prerogative of the
supreme command shall not be independent of the government; and (3) the
sum to be spent annually shall not exceed yearly occupation costs. (R
FBID Ticker Tokyo, Jiji, 11 Sep 51)
Co e .- Occupation costs are now running about 100 billion yen
annually -- a sum which would maintain less than half of the 200,000 man
army advocated by the Democratic Party. The Japanese Economic Stabilization
Board has estimated the cost of a well-equipped division at 20 billion yen
annually. The budget for the 75,000-man National Police Reserve currently
is 16 billion yen, with a 12 billion yen supplementary appropriation
anticipated. The Democrats' enthusiasm for rearmament is not shared by
the Liberal government.
8 12 Sep 51
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400130001-4
 Approved For Rem 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP79T01146A0e900130001-4
TOP SECRET
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
I~ GERMANY. Long range adverse effect on Berlin economy seen: Although truck
r is on the Berlin West Germany autobahn appears to have returned-to
normal,., the recent Soviet move in imposing a prohibitive road tax on this
traffic is likely to result in the long run in further harm to the West
Berlin economy. At the present time, the tax has apparently been absorbed
by the German firms and, although imported commodities will probably contipue
to be available, there is likely to be an increase in their cost. The possi-
bility exists that some Berlin industries will become less competitive
through price, increases.
Local US officials, in evaluating the possible Soviet motives, assert
that the tax, coming on top of other recent restrictions, is the latest in
a series of steps designed to lead progressively to a new blockade, or at
least a situation equivalent in its effect on the economy of West Berlin,
with the ultimate goal of making the Allied position in the city untenable.
They feel that the move may also be designed to force the conclusion of the
interzonal trade pact, or to divide and confuse the Western camp on the
whole Berlin problem. (S Berlin 373, 8 Sep 51)
Comment: The precarious West Berlin economy already requires extensive
support from the Allies and West Germany. Further impairment of this economy
would increase the unemployment, already serious, and require additional
subsidies from the West German Government, thus adding to current West German
dissatisfaction with the burden on the Federal budget.
FRANCE. Duclos urges Communist leaders to action: In his report to the
nunist y cen r committee an eder secretaries meeting on
7 September, Acting Secretary-General Duclos set the stage for an intensi-
-fied 'struggle to obstruct the French economy and defense effort. Duclos
mentioned in particular the usefulness of the mass strike as the weapon
to prevent dictatorship, adding that "no good could come from inaction."
The current party line. as outlined by Duclos, varies from the policy
established at the last national congress, April 1950, only in its increased,
emphasis upon national independence _? from the "American imperial yoke,"
The Duclos report was devoted almost exclusively.to national, as opposed to
international. problems
In playing up the Communists as a great national party, Duclos was
attempting to dispel the growing popular awareness of the party's anti-
national character and to counter the appeal of Gaullist nationalism.
Nevertheless,., he concluded with a pledge of "unalterable" attachment to
the USSR. (C Paris 1533, 9 Sep 51)
TOP SECRET
9 12 Sep 51
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 CIA-RDP79T01146A000400130001-4
 Approved For Rye 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP79T01146A00130001-4
TOP SECRET
Comment: This convocation may have been intended as the opening gun
for concerted strike activity by the Communists, The wage increase just
granted by the government, however, will probably blunt the Communist attack,
and the party may go slow rather than risk the loss of the labor support
gained last spring,
UNITED KINGDOM. Government opposes seat for Communist China in International
_..._ .~. ni., h Tnl-crnat~ nnA f
lk4VLl,C. VCC3. au,+a...a a. .e ..... .? -rr-- -- -
onetary Fund by supporting the US motion to defer consideration of the.
Czechoslovak resolution to oust Nationalist China's representatives in favor
of those from the Peiping regime. According to press reports, Western,
European delegates viewed the stand as a significant departure in British
policy toward Communist China. (U NY Times 11 Sep 51)
Comment-. This vote was in line with British assurances to,the US in
early summer that they would support postponement of the Chinese Communist
representation issue in all UN bodies including the General Assembly. Previ-
ously, even after the General Assembly "aggressor" resolution, the UK had
supported favorable action upon Chinese-Communist-,representation in those
UN bodies it considered competent to act on the question, For the past
several months Britain, while still recognizing Peiping, has displayed less
inclination to conciliate the Mao regime in the light of growing Foreign
Office concern over divergence with the US on Far Eastern policy, and in the
light of public reactions to British casualties in Korea at the hands of the
Chinese.
SWEDEN, British naval visit disturbs neutrality-minded Swedes-. The pro-
neutrality segment o e we s press as i icated concern over the
allegedly political twist given by the British to a visit by one of their
submarine flotillas to Sweden and Denmark. The declaration by the British
Admiralty that the naval visit, in addition to cementing traditional ties,
indicated that the Baltic is an open sea and not a Soviet mare nostrum,
coupled with another recent British Government statement that NATO forces
stand ready to aid in the defense of the Baltic, are regarded . by. this
element as jeopardizing Swedish neutrality,
The Swedish Government remains silent; and newspapers close to the
government,. after ignoring the visits entirely for five days, have hinted
by their comment that the government also fears compromise to Swedish
neutrality, (U NY Times, 9 & 11 Sep 51)
CComnent: Sweden has been-willing to receive courtesy visits from all
naviesincluding the USSR's, but there has been no exchange with the USSR.
The-Swedes enjoy close ties with the British, and recently there have been
a.number of reciprocal visits by, air force as well as naval elements. What
is probably feared is a Russian belief that Sweden is becoming for all
practical purposes a member of NATO.
10 12 Sep 51
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400130001-4
 Approved For Rem 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP79T01146A00130001-4
TOP SECRET
BRAZIL. Minister of War re-ortedl Tanning revolution: General Newton
=s ac Le , Braz ian Minister of war, is report. ly.planning to over-
throw the government should the opportunity arise. His plans are said to
be directed by "Alberto Padua de Araujo and Colonel Emygdie Miranda, both
known Communists." A counter-revolutionary group,, headed b former Minister
of War Canrobert, has been formed. 25X1A
Comment: It has been only during the past month that there have been
repor -s any cleavage in the army* There is a growing mistrust of War
Minister Estillac Leal whose ambiguous statements appear designed to curry
favor with the radical elements. There is no evidence that he is a Communist,
but many of his actions and attitudes play into the Communists' hands. The
Colonel Miranda mentioned is probably Lieutenant Colonel Emidio da Costa
Miranda, a director of the Military Club and reportedly a friend and godfather
of Communist leader Luis Carlos Prestes. Recent reports have indicated
increased Communist activities in some sections of the armed forces,
General Canrobert, as well as General Goes Monteiro, would be the leaders
of the more conservative and the more pro US group of officers in the
Brazilian Army.
President Vargas, attitude toward the reported split in the army is
unknown. He may be giving sufficient rope to Estillac Leal and the radicals
to hang. themselves, or his failure to take decisive action may be evidence
of weakness and a stall for time, .
GUATEMALA. Diplomatic relations with Nicar ua ma be renewed: Foreign
Minister anue ic: o Guatemala has indicated that his country may soon
renew diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. Diplomatic relations between the
two countries were broken off in 1945. (U NY Times, 11 Sep Si)
Comment: The renewal of relations with Nicaragua may be taken as
evidenct President Arbenz has abandoned the policy of his predecessor,
President Arevalo, which involved nonrecognition of, and overt opposition
to, governments established by nondemocratic methods based on milita17 force-
The termination of the Guatemalan-Nicaraguan "feud" will constitute an
important contribution to international harmony in Central, America,
11 12 Sep 51
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400130001-4
 TOP SECRET
' d or declassi-
bld~SRiL4tE~l@aSlStdc01AA/Q91i `~QFI~-~IAFij'9g6'A~WT-4
fied when d
fied when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
REGISTRY
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION CIA CONTROL NO SOURCE 41 111
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. NO.
DOC. DATE LOGGED BY
COPY NO.
NUMBER OF PAGES
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency
or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or
transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official
duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form
and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and
indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
OFFICE
RECEIVED
SIGNATURE DATE TIME
RELEASED
DATE TIME
SEEN BY
SIGNATURE OFFICE/DIV. DATE
th
i
ropriate spac
es below
e app
n
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed
and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
WNGRADED
D
DESTROYED
O
TO
TO
BY (Signature) -
BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
DATE
OF F I CE A
PI o led For R
f gg V 2001 /09/06: CI
q.@
--K P79T011
OFFICE
6A000400130001-4
TOP SECRET