DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000300350001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 8, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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& Aug st 19 51
CIA-.No. 49296
Copy No.
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in. the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the. Office of Current Intelligence..
State Department review completed
DIA and PACOM review(s) completed.
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1, USSR, Propaganda reflects increased Soviet interest in East-West trade:
An Izvestia article and a Moscow home service broadcast attacked the pro.
posed US bill for cutting off aid to countries shipping strategic mater-
ials to the Soviet bloc as "dangerous to East-West peace." The bill was
branded a "weapon in the hands of US imperialists, directed toward pre-
paration of a new war," and "constituting open pressure by the US monop-
olists on their Western European vassals." The broadcast added a plug
for the World Peace Congress resolution calling for an international
economic conference in Moscow before the end of the year.
Comments Soviet phraseology attempts to conceal the Kremlin?s con-
cern over economic bans against the Soviet bloc while placing emphasis
on the so-called encroachment on Western Europe?s sovereignty.
Second quarter results of 1951 State Plan: Results of the State
Economic Plan for the second quarter of 1951 were published in the Soviet
press on 4 August. Compared with the same period last year, gross value
of output rose 16 percent, and productivity of labor increased ten per-
cent. The spring crop sowing plan was described as having been overful-
filled, with the total 1951 sown area augmented by six million hectares
over that of 1950. The wheat area was expanded by more than four million
hectares, and cotton by almost 400,000. It is claimed that in state and
cooperative trade, the population of the country sold 14 percent more at
comparable prices than in the second quarter of 1950, Kolkhoz market
sales are also.said to have risen in the second quarter of 1951 compared
with the same period in 1950.
Field Comments Embassy Moscow observes that in format, timing and
content, second quarter results parallel their first quarter predecessors
and are similarly devoid of practically all "meaningful" data. The Em-
bassy feels, however, that the trade data may have some significance in
that the 14 percent increase in state and cooperative sales appears to
be the lowest gain on record in the postwar period (1948 data lacking),
The gain of 16 percent in gross industrial output may have been caused
by reconversion, but the Embassy says that it Is impossible to know
whether the second quarter increase is due to rising military or civil-
ian production.
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4. Anniversary ?_ Mo o i EPA?~9e?s R 30th A celebration
commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Mongolian revolution was held
in Ulan Bator on 9 July. In addition to the Soviet Ambassador To Ko
Prikhodov, the USSR was represented by an official delegation headed by
M. P. Tarasov, (Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet and Chairman of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet). The
group also included G. I. Tu nkin, head of the first Far Pastern Section
of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Tayrempilon, the Chairman
of the Cocncil of Ministers of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR. Other gov-
ernmental delegations at the festivities included those from Communist
China, North Korea, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish Republic,
the Bulgarian People 0e Republic, and the People?s Republic of Albania.
Comments The fact that two such prominent officials as Tarasov
and Tunkin were sent to attend the Mongolian festivities reflects the
desire of the Soviet Government to lend an aura of prestige to one of
its lesser known, but strategically located Satellites.
5, EASTERN EUROPE., CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Foreign Mice -protests Sudeten re-
iisionist activity West Germanys The Czechoslovak Government has
protested to US Embassy Prague against the alleged toleration of "hos.-
tile" ex-Sudeten activities in the US zone of Germany, The note re-
views previous exchanges on the same subject dating back to 1947 which
stress that US occupation authorities have condoned the formation of
"independent organizations, whose principal purpose is political activ-
ity directed against the Czechoslovak Republic." The note refers to
a revival of BOHitlerite1, Pan-German aggressive nationalismB?, US support
of "German chauvinist militarism " US promotion of 10revieionist
activities.4
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Comment o Nearly two million Sudeten Germans have been expelled from
Czechoslovakia since the end of World War II. These transferred Sudetens
have held numerous meetings in West Germany during which revisionist as-
pirations were expressed. Such expressions of irredentism have greatly
assisted the Czechoslovak Communist regime in capitalizing on popular fear
of West German rearmament and have provided it with an issue around which
to rally otherwise divergent Czechoslovak elements. US Ambassador Briggs
in Prague suggested in May 1951 that in order to reduce the effectiveness
of such propaganda, the US High Commissioner in Germany officially dis-
claim US support of Sudeten aspirations.
6. Italy to close consulate i Bra~~avao The Italian Minister to
Czechoslovakia has notified US Embassy Pragaae that effective 15 August
the Italian Consulate~Oeneral in Bratislava will be closed. This step
is the direct result of a DOdetevmined u raecessful effortgn by Czech
oslovak border ala to force the Italian Consul-General to open his
diplomatic pouch. 02schosloyaki required to close its Consulate
in Milan, Italy.
.
Coento Austria will be the only Western country to retain a Con,
sulate in Bratislava, a useful observation post on the Danube.
7. . Catholic Church arationalizeda The Presidium of the Albanian
Government recently issued a decree which, In effect, nationalized the
Albanian Catholic Church. Under the terms of the measure the Catholic
Church in Albania no longer has any ties with the Vatican, The Albanian
Catholic Church henceforth will submit to the Canonic code of Rome only
insofar as the code V5 provisions do not contradict the laws of the Alban-
ian People ?s Republic. Albanian Catholic clergy will be trained accor-
ding to the dictates of the Government. Relations with the Church abroad
will be conducted through official channels. In commenting on the na-
tionalization decree, the Tirana press stated that at last the Albanian
Catholic clergy has thrown off the yoke of the Vatican. "which
religion in the service of American Imperialism.
Co ntb Persecution of religious elements in Albania started with
the advent of Communist power in 1946. The head of the Albanian Catholic
Church, Archbishop Prennushi was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment
in 1948 and was reported to have died in prison in February 1949. The
latest measure against the Albanian Catholics, who total approximately
1000 0000 formalizes the break with the Vatican,
8. 9fUGOSI~AVIA. Elba BelgLAde favors lifting US visa restrictions on
T oslav nationalss Emabaesy Belgrade considers that the US program of
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assistance to Yugoslavia could be much improved if it were combined with
a program of technical training of Yugoslavs in the US.
sug-
gests that a clause be added to the current aid bill which would permit
temporary visits to the US by the subjects of nations
a.id programs. In this manner Yugoslav nationals could be admitted with
ng existing visa regulations against nationals of Cominform
states. The Embassy feels that the US should encourage Yugoslav
ness to expose its citizens to Western life as evidenced by the regime's-
recent requests for on-the-job training and scholarships in the US. The
Embassy points out that there is very little would be likelihood that any trainee
anti-Cominf oth s wane np sympathetic to the Cominform since the
te
i
as
n Yugoslavla is extremely severe.
Comment-0 A program of technical training for Yugoslav nationals
would materially and Politically enhance the US economic and military
assistance programs,
trance of all Because present US legislation restricts the en
C mmunistsf, those Yugoslav nationals most likely to be
sent for such training are not eligible for visas.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. INDONESIA Bandits and
Approx:% tel 200 men Islamic fanatics attack D '.kart. described ort area.
fanatics and leftist baedits by an Indonesian official as r+
attacked decorated Tandjong Prioka the Port of Djakarta Isof Djakarta
on 5 August. The attackers carried red flags and wore red headba
,
with both Islamic emblems and the hammer and nds
pose of the attack is believed to have sickle. The
equipment. Fou
been the procurement of arms and
Four ba dits we re
fled eastward, a ty captured; the remainder and
Comrrnt: The
Indo proximity of this attack to the capital city em ha ?
riesiaes serious security
Islam which seeks to set up problem. In addition to the fanatical Darin
numerous armed p a Moslem state by force of arms, there are also
been ous loited gangs operating in West Java, some of which undoubtedly have
Tandjong Priok is by the not yenists. The identity of the band which attacked
yet t known4
2.
Cabinet ado is five Dint ro
Indonesian osal on Ja anew ease treat
adJapanese peace treat Government has opted a five point The
expre y which includes a demand foro reparations regarding the
expression of support for Soviet and Co re arations and an
the treaty. Indonesia Communist Chinese
San Francisco Will not decide whether to send aadelegationnton
until it sees the final text of the
on 13 August draft treaty now expected
Comment: Indonesia has
,1apanese treaty, relatively little interest
and the current proposal probabl
seriously. The government had n very
y need not be taken the
reparations would not be large and indicated that its demand for
included in the treaty nd that even if Communist China were not
majority. y negotiations, Indonesia Us uld go along with the
..--CINA Vietnam Government bans exit of men of m litar a
nam Surete in Hanoi received on
National See 3 August an offici dire.etive@fromethe
al
aged 20 et-
urity Service in Saigon that henceforth no
to 45 would be issued exit visas. A check with the
Consulate confirmed that this th the
Suret males
to Vietnamese who have received directive will result in the denial by the
visas
persons legislation, grants under the Smith Mundt exchange of
On 5 Vietnamese
Catholic diocese of .Buic
hu we e Auguststotwo
ed from boarsenarians from the
bound for the US, din an
A' France Plane
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Canto This is the latest in a series of steps by the French-
Vietnamese authorities designed to step up the military effort against the
Viet Minh, and stems directly from Bao Daivs decree of 15 July providing
for the "mobilization of all national resources." This step, however,
threatens to be far more explosive politically than any heretofore taken.
The absolute authority of the French High Commissariat for Indochina and
the French-sanctioned Vietnam Government has, in the past, been tempered
by the opportunity which has been accorded Vietnamese to express their
political views at least to the extent of refusing to cooperate with an
unrepresentative and unpopular government or of leaving the country'alto->
gether. Compulsory military service under a government which is widely
regarded by the Vietnamese as French-dominated, and denial of the right to
go abroad, particularly for educational purposes, will cause intense ill-
feeling. This will be particularly true in the case of projected travel
to the US, whose educational opportunities are regarded by many Vietnamese
as the key to release from subordination to the French. This attitude
toward the US is held in virtually all political circles of non-Communist
Vietnam., and it is extremely doubtful that the Vietnam Government would
have curtailed contacts between its nationals and the US except under
strong pressure from the French authorities. On numerous occasions the
French have manifiested their alarm at signs of closer US-Vietnam relations
and have taken steps to thwart such a trend.
5 French hint at truce with Viet Minh alarms Vietnamese,. Official
Vietnamese circles in Paris reacted with some emotioneo to the hint dropped
by Minister for Associated States Letourneau that negotiations to end the
"civil war" in Vietnam might follow the Korean truce talks, according to
a French Press Agency (AFP) broadcast from Saigon. French political
circles in Saigon were quoted by the AFP as stating that the Letourneau
hint, ven in an interview W; +h . n?4- i, __ --- -,
e
e
d
~
y
gai UC
a ? just a periodical so 9nding-out attempt which
should not be taken seriou
l
it
s
y0
CoMente Although there is probably no serious intent on the part of
the French Government to negotiate with Ho Chi. Minh and although such
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intent has been denied by De Lattre, the recollection of French-Viet Minh
negotiations in 1946 is still fresh in the minds of the Vietnamese, and
even the remotest hint that the French may "sell them out" to the Viet
Minh creates painful uncertainty in Vietnam.
6. CHINA. Soviet and Chinese Com
unist influence in Inner Mongolia assessed:
(a)
(b) the Vice Ministers were all Chinese,, and it was the Chinese
who exercised "actual control" over the area;
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Comment: The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, a creation of the
Peiping regime, adjoins Outer Mongolia and Communist Chinaas Northeast,
the Ministers of the Inner Mongolian regime were all Moscow-
trained Mongols who spoke excellent Russian; however,
there was no official Soviet representative in Wangyehmiao, nor
were any Soviet troops or railway guards observed; however,
(d) the study of Russian was compulsory in the area (for officials?),
and many young Russians had been imported as teachers;
(e) the Mongols wished to establish better rail connections with
the USSR by extending the railway from Aershan to Manchuli or
Hailar, but the Chinese Communists would not permit work to be
begun on the proposed line; and
(f) the border with Outer Mongolia was "tightly closed,ts with no
travel except for occasional official delegations from Ulan
Bator (the capital of Outer Mongolia). 25X1
(c)
There has long been specu ,ion as to whether the
Peiping regime would prove willing and able to prevent Outer Mongolian
(and hence Soviet) annexation of Inner Mongolia,
as o 1949, the Peiping regime retained the superior position
in the area. However, in the past two years there have been fragmentary
reports of increased Soviet and Outer Mongolian activity in Inner Mongolia,
and it is possible that the USSR has been steadily increasing its influence
in. the region,
occupying a large slice of the area formerly known as Manchuria.. Little
information has come out of the area; E__ I
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11 7. Communist advance into Tibet reported: The Indian press reports that
(a)
Chinese Communist forces are now only 150 miles east of Lhasa
and have been identified near the Indian border;
(b) Chinese Communist officials who have arrived at principal Ti-
betan trading centers are "virtually in control" of adminis-
trative machinery; and
(c) the Dalai Lama and Chang Ching-wu (Communist military governor
of Tibet) Lhasa ? 25X1
Cc tent: Chinese Communist forces and officials are known to be moving
into Tibet, but the extent of their advance is not clear. The Dalai Lama's
apparent decision to accept Peipinggs terms-.which leave him with no sig-.
nificant authority--will facilitate.the Communist advance. The Peiping re-
gime is expected to be in effective control of Tibet by the end of 1952.
8. Political labor camps proposed for Central-South China: Labor camps
for political prisoners will soon be in operation` throughout the Central-
South China administrative region as a result of plans drawn up at a recent
regional conference on "reform through labor," according to a 27 July commu-
nist newspaper in Hong Kong. The system., which will be decentralized at
first with prisoners working on local projects, will lay the groundwork for
the later use of prisoners on large-scale engineering projects.
The US Consul General in Hong Kong remarks that the establishment of a
system creating a continuous demand for this type of labor would provide an
additional motive for an unending series aigns to arrest counter-
revolutionaries.
Comments Indications of Chinese Communist intent to implement a labor
program of this sort have been observed in an increasing number of reports
alluding to a decrease in the number of death sentences and a concurrent
increase in commutations of sentences to servitude for varying periods.
This is among the first observations of intent to employ prisoners in South
China; other.reports concerned shipments of corvees northwards. The present
development has long been expected.
9. STS objects to Chinese Nationalist conscription plans: The reported
Chinese Nationalist intention to begin the conscription of 15,000 men on
10 August is diametrically opposed to the recommendations of the US Mili-
tary Aid and Advisory Group (MAAG) and was announced without prior consul-
tation with officials of that organization. General Chase., head of MAAG,
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told Chinese officials on several occasions that he opposed any increase
in the armed forces at this time. The ECA mission to Formosa has con-
tinuously stressed that the island's gravely strained economy cannot bear
this burden. As a compromise., US officials hope for a deferment or only
a art? on of this conscription. 25X1
Continent: This incident points up the necessity for establishing ef-
fective US political, economic, and military control over the programs
supported by US aid. Chinese Nationalist preoccupation with sovereign
rights makes the solution of this particular problem difficult. Consider-
ations of "face" further complicate the problem, since the conscription
program has already received the Generalissimo"s signature and nation-wide
publicity.
10. KOREA. Commtanists take action against disease threat: A 3 August Pyongyang
broadcast relates that over 836, 000 persons have been vaccinated or inocu-
lated against smallpox, cholera and typhus in one province alone since Janu-
ary, 1951. These disease prevention, measures reportedly are credited with
reducing the incidence of smallpox by 23.9 per cent. 25X1
Comment: During the past winter, the high incidence of eruptive typhus
and hemorraghic smallpox among Communist troops and civilians was a matter
of considerable concern to North Korean authorities.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
la GERMANY,, West German press egresses concern about Communist influence
over ast German youth: In reporting the Commany.i i'Wor Y-c-u i Festival
now going on in East Berlin., many West German newspapers warn that the
Communist youth rally should be viewed by the West as a "significant .
warning signal", and express grave concern lest the Communists win German
youth to their cause while West Germany does very little to arouse enthusiasm
among its own youth for Western democratic ideals. Several newspapers
publish the remark of a well-known news commentator that the influence the 25X1
Communist regime is exerting on youth is "more damaging to German reunifi-
cation than the entire People?a Police". 25X6
2, FRANCE, French fear aviation gasoline shortage is imminent: A severe
,,via ion gas sho age ~s expe~ e ira=rance -by Quo eta it 17 he Abadan
refinery shutdown continues. The French are trying to borrow from SHAPE
enough gas to tide them over, but they fear that they will not be successful
after the freight airlift from Berlin is started. They believe that the
new Soviet blockade of Berlin9s exports is timed to take the greatest
possible advantage of the growing Western European short a aviation gas
resulting from the Iranian, dispute. 25X1
Comment: The Abadan shutdown has deprived Western Europe of 31 per cent
of its processed petroleum imports,, Iran supplied only a slight portion of
total French petroleum imports, but a relatively high proportion of this
was aviation gasoline, and current stocks cannot be entirely replenished
from domestic plants. There is no direct evidence of a connection between
Soviet-inspired economic trouble in Berlin and developments in the Iranian
oil dispute.
3. Further progress is made on export controls.- Recent meetings of
Western Powers participating in East VYes tra e con role have,, in the opinion
of the US delegation, led to "significant further progress toward parallel
action" among all countries represented. More than 60 per cent of the
critical items on which the US had previously been unable to obtain agree-
ment for a strict embargo (US List IA,) have now been accepted,, bringing
to 90 per cent the total number of items so far agreed to for embargo
(US List I). In addition., "advantageous" proposals for handling quantitative
controls and exceptions have been adopted,, and further progress is likely
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to be made by obtaining at least partial control over the remaining US
List IA items.
The US delegates were impressed, however, with the "very firth position",
particularly of the UK and France, against a further extension of the embargo
on basic industrial exports. These countries showed "grave concern" with
their domestic political problems and rejected what they probably viewed
as a US effort to impose its will for complete acceptance of List IA.
F I
Comment: Substantial further progress toward a general embargo on US
List T i ms is not indicated. Furthermore, the other participating
countries have accepted less than 40 per cent of the 250 items on US Lists II
and IIB, which were proposed for quantitative restrictions only although in
practice the US denies them totally to the Soviet Orbit.
The Western European countries are increasingly apprehensive over
inflationary pressures, which some leaders are determined to combat in part
by encouraging imports. These countries insist that they can obtain
urgently needed Eastern products., such as coal, only by offering some
critical items in exchange, Furthermore, the Western European countries are
increasingly sensitive to US leadership and resentful of exceptions approved
for individual nations. 25X1
5. BELGIUM. Decline in effort trade anticipated: Belgium-Luxembourg had a
avora a balance a traden June or the first time in 1951, due to a fall
in the value of imports and a rise in the export level to a postwar high.
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Although the Belgian press welcomes the favorable balance of trade, it does
not consider it a good sign. It believes the drop in imports foreshadows
a decline in exports, and a general slackening of over-all economic activity.
The embassy comments that although no details are available on the sectors
affected by the drop in imports, it seems that the decline occurred primarily
in imports of textile materials and vegetable products Imports of mineral
products, articularly coal, showed an increased
Comment: Belgium-Luxembourg has had a slight yearly balance of trade
deficits usual, both before and since World War II, some decline in over-
all economic activity probably will be evident during the summer? Activity
in the secondary industries, such as textiles, has fallen off considerably
since the first of the year because of the lack of world demand. No improve-
-ment is likely until defense orders are under way and inventories are
depleted. In view of the continued high value of mineral imports, no decline
in the steel and metallurgical industries is foreseen at present...
6. PORTUGAL. Hea vote points u Sal azar2s nationwide prestige: The Supreme
ooday handed down the official returns on the 2 duly general elections,
which confirmed the choice. of General Francisco Craveiro Lopes as the eighth
President of the Portuguese Republic. Although the number of abstentions
and voided ballots was not published,. the unopposed official candidate is
estimated to have polled 80 per cent of the total national vote, 12 5X1
Comment: The real victor in the elections was Premier Salazar, Previous
successes at the polls had been generally attributed to the vote-getting
appeal of the late President C armona, The 80 per cent vote polled by the
regime which, according to a pro-government newspaper, surprised even the
most optimistic observers, indicates that Salazargs party still enjoys a
broad base of popular support. With his personal control of the party es-
tablished beyond dispute, it is believed that Salazar may decide to deal
severely with corrupt office-holders whose scandalous activities, widely
publicized by the opposition during the presidential campaign, are said to
have caused him considerable embarrassment. Lopes, who will take office
on 9 August, visited Washington in 1943. Reportedly favorably disposed toward
the US, he recently said that the strengthening of relations with the US will
continue to be a basic a1m of Portugal9s foreign policy.
7. UNITED KINGDOM. US-UK disagreement over Far East ~olicy seen as probable
er Korean armistice: US Embassy London predicts that British differences
with the US over Far East policy, now held in check in order to preserve
a united front in Korea, will probably revive if a Korean armistice is
achieved,,. The embassy indicates that the British see an armistice as the
first phase in "step-by-step" negotiations leading eventually to a general
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settlement in the Far East., and expect the Chinese Communists to demand
admission to the UN as a prerequisite to an over-all Korean settlemonta
The embassy estimates that the present government would find great diffi-
culty in trying to dodge such a demand in the fare of UK public opinion
on the issue.
On the Formosa issue the embassy reports an increasing conviction of
many senior military and civil officials., including Foreign Secretary
Morrison., that the island would possess high strategic utility to a hostile
power., but estimates that the cabinet nevertheless might be led to over-rule
Foreign Office support of Formosans continued neutralization should it
appear expedient to promote a general Far East settlement.
Regarding the future of Korea once a cease-fire had been negotiated.,
the embassy estimates that Britain might for a time resist pressure for a
total withdrawal of UN forc:es,, but probably would eventually prove willing
to accept some face-saving solution. This would relieve the UK of unwelcome
responsibilities in Korea and though it might leave South Korea vulnerable
to eventual political, absorption by the North Korean Communist regime,
Foreign Office circles
such a development as in any event probable.
I
British still Push adoption of their .28 calibre rifle.
The British Army vm.n uc ors lO -?emone r ion o the . calibre
rifle at the British School of Infantry. US Army Attache London notes a
determined effort to "sells, the new rifle to all interested parties,,
including other NATO members,, lie believes the demonstration has a definite
political aspect, as the invitations for American personnel were handled
through the NATO Council of Deputies and the political the embassy
rather than by his office. F777 -1
Comment: UK Defense Minister Shinwell, on his return to London from
the sma s standardization talks in Washington, reported that otfor the
present" he had failed to get the new British rifle and ammunition adopted
as standard NATO equipment,, that the whole standardization matter had been
referred to the supreme NATO military organization., and that he hoped a
report could be drafted in time for the October Council meeting. Meanuvhile.9
the British Government has decided not to request at this time US financing
of any machine tools for production of 28 calibre weapons or ammunition.
9. DENMARK,, UK and German coal shortage keeps Denmark dependent upon Polish
coals US o .f~f cials in Copenhagen estanate that that ECA e~r"t~s;'to reduce
Danish dependence upon Polish coal by financing coal imports from the US
will have little effect., unless Denmark can substantially increase its present
imports of coal fr?am. the UK and Western Germany. The UK., for example, has
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committed only 1,1 million tons for 1951 as against 2.9 million exported
in 1950. Failing a marked rise in imports from Britain and Germany, the
only alternative to Polish coal w d be a a tly increased quantity from
the US e
Comment: Since the present coal situation of the UK and West Germany
makes increase in their shipments to Denmark unlikely without special
pressure from the US, it appears that Poland will be able to exert consider-
able pressure on Denmark to export strategic goods as payment for coal when
the current trade agreement expires in October. Reduced UK coal deliveries
have also diminished Norwayls bargaining position with Poland,
.
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FB7RM 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. TOP SECRET (40)
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TO THE DAILY DIGEST
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not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
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TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
25X1
L TRI TF? State Department consideri -postponement of Trieste elections
The Departmnt of State is exploring the possibility of postponing the Trieste
elections, as Premier De Gasperi has requested, on the understanding that the
Italian Government will seriously try to reach agreement with 'Yugoslavia on
the settlement of the Trieste problem, If this plan is implemented, the
Allied Military Government will issue a carefully timed statement that the
elections have been deferred in order to facilitate a mutually satisfactory
Trieste settlement in connection with the larger problem of the revision of
the Italian Peace Treaty, Before seeking the concurrence of the UK and France
TT 1'
in Belgrade and Rome and the tB political adviser in Trieste. 25X1
I I
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
detainees, according to a letter from Premier Yoshida to Ambassador Dulles,
The Japanese are apprehensive that, without such a clause, if either Communist
nation proposed a bilateral treaty identical with the present treaty Japan
might be obligated to accept the proposal unconditionally. If the inclusion
26 of the peace treaty for the return of prisoners of war and civilian
2, JAPAN.. Japan desires peace treaty provision for repatriation.a Japan, con-
cerned over the unrepatriated Japanese for whom the Soviet Union or Communist
China have failed to account, desires the inclusion of a provision in Article
of such a repatriation provision proves impractical, Yoshida suggests a proto-
col joined in by the Allied Powers which would specify that the treaty does
not prohibit repatriation provisions in subsequent bilateral treaties.
25X1
Comments Article 26 provides that for a period of three years after the
peace treaty Japan will not make a bilateral peace treaty with any state which
grants the latter greater advantages than those offered the signatories of the
San Francisco treaty,,
Yoshida very like]4r feels that a small concession of this nature from
the Allied Powers, on a matter as close to Japanese hearts as the subject of
repatriation, will strengthen public support for the peace treaty in Japa
3 Japanese promise to establish overseas ,a enc on Formosa after peace
treaty is consunznateds The US Political Advisor POLAR in Tokyo received
categorical assurance an 4 August that the Japanese Government will open an
overseas agency at Taipei after the peace treaty is signed,
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TOP SECRET
tj.z~70 Ou.Td disoo
~,cap ur puh1ici t
uLa:>
o N t .;~z slist China at th3.s
opposed its f? o ly : a and others who have seW~re ad o with the Nat3ar.~a1,_
Chinese ~~~i.s
the J us zn signing the treatye Sir"or t ke British are adamantly
Nationala sstheo US r e t taking
warns Japanese in this res eot ~roui(T orb any t at fu i the r press ? ? the
US-UK the
China policy, that f'~ thr punity~^o on
e o display the disunity of
TOP SEC-.C,-ET
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