OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000300030001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 28, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY NO. 39
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
Dates
DAILY DIGEST
JUN 2051
NOTE: 1. .14s saimary of significant reports has been
prepared prikaray for the internll use of the
Office of 'Current Intelligenceo it does not
represent a Complete coverage -of all current
reports in CIA or in the 'Office of Current
Intelligence.
Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
30 Marginal letter indications are defined as
followes
State Dept. review completed
tiAlt ? items ,Wicating Soviet?Communist
intentions or capabilities.
Important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Cannuaist intentions or capabilities
other information indicating trends
and potential deVelOpments
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SECTION l'(SOVIET)
25X1
UUMMEADIT:8 xugoalav fear of a Cominform attack has
25X1C apparently subsided sin; Yugoslav officials have expressed no concern to
the US on this score in repent Weeks-. A relative lack of Yugosla appre-
hension is als revealed by a Current increase of Yugosla subversive activ-
ity against Albania despite previous Yug.slav warning to the West that
clandestine activities in Albania might bring on Soviet reprisals.
Anti-Tito Elements Admit Tit -Stren th. The visit to the US of Yugo-
slav Chief of Staff9 Colonel General Koca Popavic reportedly is regarded
as one of the greatest vidtoriea of th- Tito Gayer' nt. The feeling is
current in Yugoslavia that because of extensive US military aids, Yupalavia
will now have the most modern and best-equipped army in the Belkansj, and
Tito will be in an excell?nt position to defend Yugoslav independence. I?I 25X1
!there la growing doubt among nti-Tito elements
25X1
that the Tito regime can be 0,erthroWn because of the sunoort rqceived from
25X1A the US. 4 OOMMENT8
Recent US',.....moey 1-upuruo irom lugoslavia nate indicated that the Tito Gov-
ernment seems in no danger of internal overthrow despite the need for
ridding it of some die=hard grthod x Communists who oppose Tito2s pro-US
orientation.
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US Sk and Satellite Representatives Temporarily Reverse Hostile Attitude.
The US Ambassador in Belgrade reveals attempts of Soviet orbit diplomats to
resume more normal relations with foreign diplomats? As examples, he cites
the courtesy call which the new Bulgarian Charge paid on the Yugoslav Foreign
Minister, a formality which Bulgarian representatives have ignored for three
years, as well as a statement made to the Israeli Minister by the Soviet Charge
after returning from Moscow of his desire to make social contacts with for-
eigners again? (C-Belgrade 1987, 26 June 51)? COMMENT8 Little significance
can be attached to any purported change in Soviet attitude from these inci-
dents since the USSR and its satellites alternately reveal friendliness and
hostility in their diplomatic and social contacts in every capital.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
440. NEAR EAST. t eek Orthodox 13isho in Jerusalem offered Mone BLD1q11. The
77c Zsul General in erusa am ormethe US te , riera7r-there
that reports of a Russian offer to Bishop A,thenagoras of 1,000 gold pounds
repor dly converted, into 20,000 Israeli pounds were correct. The offer Iva&
refused on the gounds that the Greek Patriarchate was physically in Jordan
controlled territory and the Ha Sherni, to Ki'ngdom would look unfavorably on
any organization receiving assistance from the USSR. ( Jerus em 239 27 25X1
25X1 jun 51). - cclaziar;, r
UCV
This most recent
attempt by the Russians o penetrate the Greek Orthodox Church underscores
Soviet determination to use this MallS to further its subversive and polit-
ieal potential in the Middle East. In February 1951, the US Embassy in
Athens suggeeted that the US give financial, assistance to the Greek Govern-
ment to establish an emergency fund to be used for hampering such maneuvers.
IRAQ. IralW,12.The orte Oil Discussions Broken. Off, Suspension of nego-
Trition7
between the ,raq erFEIWITToraiSlarTratfid Iraq for a new oil
ageement was announced by the Iraq radio on 27 June. Officials of the
Iraq Government and the 1PC in Baghdad have refused to comment. US Embas-
sy London has learned from IPCIrs Amerelean partners that the compel-1,y is
cuerently endeavoring to a ee_on a plan for the payment of a basic royalty
in oil iwhile it is still working out details as to a.mounts? arrangements
for the company to purchase royalty oils, and an option for Iraq to market
the oil if it desires. The interested Americans indicated to the Embassy
that IPC would attempt to reach'an agre,ement with Iraq on the main topics
of a new settlement by mid-July. Details could then be worked out without
pressure since the new agreement would be retroactive to 1 January 1950.
(U NY Time_ j.,s 28 Jim, 513 C London 684 26 Jun 51). COMMENTz Negotiations
h.Zb on 7 June with the departure of 1PWes ch3:67-. ligEotiator from
Baghdad, and IPC has been reported to Wish to delay reaching any agreement
while the Iraqi Parliament is recessed. (001. Daily Digest, 26 June 51.)
The radio announcement bt this particular time :may reflect a strengthening
of nationalistic sentiment in Iraq which might favor more extreme demands,
SYRIA, Anti-Weetern Leader Elected President of Parliament. After a last
minute rZua?R1.7(`)Tforinealfine Quisi to acceptthJ office, a com-
bination of the Populist Party and the Islamic Socialists on 23 June elected
Maaruf Deevalibi President of the Parliament. The President of the Parlia- 25X1
ment, as the next in line to the President of the Repablie, is an important
figure in Syria. US Legation Damascus comments that Da.walibies election
in the popular mind will seem to be a vindication, if not a reerard? for
his neutralistic, anti-Western, stand. In the opinion of the Legation the
influence of the Islamic Socialiste on the Populist Party will vitiate
any liberal tendencies of the new Populist Cabinet. (C Damascus 7480
25 Jun 51) e COME: Dawalibi, head of a edielently nationalistic -party,
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stated last summer .that Syria shtould ally with the USSR rather than with
the US. The election of a man of such extreme views indicates that the
US will probably meet difficulties in getting Syria to agree to ay pro-
grams the US favors. I,211 par tioular. Syria will continue tp,, maintain its
intransigent position Ofer the dispute with Israel in the Lake Huleh
region. Continuation of political instability in Syria is. anticipated.
First Jute Mill Officia 4.- . On 3.9 May 1951 Pakistanis-
te Ettriarar cia ope longs to the 13awa Jute Mills.
:
,....
Ltd. least Pakistan, and is ctserently producteg 100 maunds (about 8.200
lbs.) of jute yarn per &eye It will start to manufacture hessians and
gunnies as soon as 2.400 spindles azd 300 looms arrive from abroad.
(U Karachi Desp, No. 1735, 25 May 51). COMIENTe Heretofore. Pakistan
has had to send all its raw jute a d =Malty to India - for conver-
sion into nramea c tyre d good . It will be iome years. however. before
Pakistan can process any appreciable part of its arAnual jute crop in its
own mills.
PAKISTAN. Japanese-Pakistani
7r6"0,11 firNa ituted. Accord-
panese p.prig service alcistan
to Ye established shortly. The fif Japanese vessel. the SIMKO MARU of
the Nippon Yusen Keisha (YerK) line. is ,expected to call at Kara.chi, about
the end of June. (U Karachi Desp, 1735, 25 May 51).
9g C W SOUTH ,A,SIA. IndeeTaki sta1 Pact?........__Tinfulfilled. Recrimination has
recently broken ou eewe Pakiste.n regarding mutual non-
fulfillment of the 1951 Indo-Palcistani trade pact. To date, neither
side has delive.red the agreed- quotas of its goods (mainly coal from
India and jute from, Pakistan). and each accuses the other of being the
greater malingerer; (R fl , Far East. 25 and 26 Jun 51)e ..._CavIMENT
In :
1951. as in 1950. both, India and Pakistan have failed to Tip to
th terms of their trade agreements within the periods specified in the
pacts, thereby illestrating once again that these cowitries find it
difficult to maintain friendly relations over questions other than that
of Kashmir.- It is possible however, that the present back-biting will
cause each nation to speed up ite shipments to the other in order not to
lose face.
no 2sarm_elemeljL.arix_ftiltALAL.,41,4 e The latest
unerJticial election return give the ntiFcit Peoples Freedom League
(AFPF1) a redu d lead over their opponents e elections for Pare
iptmentazy state. The AFPFL iffer, saie loss of prestige by the
fe ts of Cabinet Mino ster I W a.i1 U Khin u Lat. (S Rango.n 9599
27 Jun 51) gjata s The less of Hoee and Defei4 Mini ter U Win could
have riou repercusci ne as he is perhapv, most capable mber 1r the
Bur 4ese Cabinet, a etre coat of West rn de ocracy and is3 the o
person who hats vet deroa.tti an ability to exert &IV), ority over Thermals
mercurial Co andsreineChief. General Ne Win0 It i icbb1e that U Win
will o nt1nu in officin at let for a hile. as a "Lime duck" and stand
again fr &moth r CC tituer in one ef the Later electio t be held
bef re next J nuee
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of a Cr4st dx?ve to r
war materialso 000 in. Bagkol ba
in which they have been informed that memb
arrest** and were being held 'gall ransomeC
A legal Chinese newspaper states that the c
the Chine in Thailand and growing every
C* ,4r2 During the past week a]
on of oversees Ctnese have been ra?
(SOC OWE Daily Digests.. 25 an4 27
thi5 fund raising \ccunpaign is gen
probably is being 'conducted wherever there
s enc.) of a
overseas Chinese as
he purchase of modern
received lettere from China
of the families had been
by their overseas relatives.
flu?8s widespread amOng
71I' (8 Bangkok 2218) 27 June 51)*
al reports of Communist
d from Singapore and saigon*
t is now safe to assume that
oat 8o beast Asia end
0 overseen Chinese*
"C "
911pg e j e oe o he 8
al that he is appreh044 he, threet to donesia posed
nosier& Chinese who haVe boen indoctrinated in the 'Coanunist
d' trained in enbversive tacties whUe visiting in China* He
ears that such Chinese eventually way o dice the e4etenca of ,Indonesta
a free state .4, Be admitted, that.the mmuniet EmbaseY in /ndoneela
e center of Chinese Conscnnist ?54. aStivUies there and indicated
he believed .Indonesia made a mistakes recognizing the Chinese Com..
anuaist Government* 18 Hong gong 3916 $.J. 51). 90 Although a few
Uftegiart sotnas.10 'aPPear irecOgni, the threat pose the Chinese,
COManiettiin Indonesia* lLtt1 a.' done to thwart COMUnist activity o One
major exception is the deportation hearing beguta in April against Wang Chi
rank editor of a cameo Communitit newspaper #D$ca.ta and reportedly the
principal contact between the Chinese Embassy and Cominist ,groups44.both
donesian and Chinese* However :$ be. is not yet known to have been deported,
? The Chinese
onne wereary 'of its founding,
has wed a c onology of major eirent&l in Party history arid 'a long
study Of a 1937 article by MAO. Tsa.4ung Theshronolocr represents
MAO a having pursued the correct rom the earliest days of the
Party; and as being the Partyu s only. leader since 19356 The axbticles
embroidering the platitude that' theOry and practice are interdependent
in effect defines the only corrqt poaitianavo4ing '"doctrinairism" on
one hand and 1.'empiricienn Ttowas whatever position was or is
held by MAO Tee*tung# 01, BIS 2),.425 ittene A)* t Considered as
contribttjo to history or phi3.oeopby theme pU ca ons are worthless
but tbiy provide Valuable eidoe at MAOS absolute domination of the
CCP# Earlier Party leaden; are repeatedly:4snoAneed in both /*Pere*
although, those still active* ouches LI L.an and CHIEN,Chacoon* are
not specifically named*, These, earlier leaders were in fact following
the directions of the Comintern* whereas there is strong evidence that
MAO WAS pursuing an independent010#00. imposition of Leninist Party
? .
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on a peasant base?ani that Moscowns acceptance of M110?s program and
leadership was en act of acquiescence in a fait accompli. The early
divergen ce between MAO and the Kremlin has been. re paired,; EL nee 1935,
MAO has written and behaved like an orthodox Stalinist. Moscowus
recent pronouncements on Woe excellence as leader and theoretician
--
including a deferential review in Pravd% .f the article cited above-
-
may well have been mean t as tokens of its present ccn fidence in MAO,
and amount 1.6 ail admission9 or as near to that a Moscow could come,
that MAO for years was right when Moscow was wrongo
CCP ow Nweber 8 Million,. A Chinese Communist domestic
broadcast states that the Chinese Comannist Party, a t the end of 1950,
had 5.8 million members. (R FBIS 27 June 51). COMMENT 3 The CCP
in one sense is too large and in another too smell. The Party is the
worlds second largest (the Soviet CP totals six million), and in the
course af its expansion from one million members in 1945 has accepted
a hit proportion of unsatisfactory personne4 just last May Day,
P?ENG Chen, Secretary of the Peiping Comnittee of the CCP, promised a
"systematic ad complete reorganization of the Party." Nevertheless,
the CCP is o small for its job; Party membership constitutes little
more than 1% of the Chinese population, in contrast to the Soviet
CP 1s
KCREA. Rath Korean PromoDda Fal1L.1011 Malik Pros_201.
Reuters reports from Tokyo that theNorth Korean " ffic1.,1 radio"
on the evening of 27 ?Tune introduced a change in the long standard lines
"Drive the anew into the sea." The new emphasis was ons "Drive
the enemy thin the 38th parallel." at MIS ticker 27 June). ,
COMME1T 8 While the ?Reuterprepdrt Ass tile, only one received to date on
this North Korean propaganda change, it is a logical development in that
North Korean propaganda is now brought in line with the Soviet approa.ch
subsequent to the Malik statement. Within Korea the new pnpaganda
approach will serve to prepare the Koreans for a possible return to the
status quo at helium.
ROI_Lkgmtgs ,Bitter o ion to Div lo of Korea 8th.
The South Kore.:: n Director of Information issued a statement on
28 June that anyone plotting to separate the people from the "national
and presidential ttitude toward any peace plan which divides the
nation along any artificial border?and whi ch leaves the aggressor in
possession of any part of Korea" would be treated as a traitor?
(ft Reuters FBIS Ticker 28 June). ,COMMENTs This falls in line with
President Rhee Isstatement on 26 June warning the UN of a trap in the
11,41.1.1k proposal but indicating there was s ome hope for peace if all Korea
were united under the ROK and providing satisfact.ry assurances were given
that there would be no future Communist aggression in Korea. Of possible
significance is the fact that Rhee failed to reiterate that South Korea
would fight on alone, if necessary, to the Yalu.
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tql" JAPAN. .1 ane e Su rt of cnt over e tDiOlOOQ Officials
of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign ffairs have disclosed to US
representatives that Japan voted for the Chinese Nationalist Govern-
ment as the representative of China in a recent Universal Postal Union
referendum. They also indicated 'kat Japanese delegates to the June and
August sessions of the International Tea. econummications Unions have been
instructed to sapport the Nationalist Governmen ts, although, in order to
avoid being the object of Conmunist-inspired propaganda, the Japanese
Government is not dealing directly with the Taiwan regime. (a Tokyo
1686 2 June 51). COMMENT: The Japanese Government has indicated its pre-
ference to support the Chinese Nationalist rather than the Comminist
regime. Following the peace treaty, however, it is likely to defer
formal recognition of the National Governmenst in order not to rrovoke
the Communists unnecessarily.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"C" GENERAL. Caution Dominates Pieei'
Leading no7747767015Eigt newspapers in e.s, Germany, ranee, an Italy have
received with caution the Malik proposal for a cease-fire in Korea,
generally stressing that the statement should not be disregarded despite
its Obvious propaganda aspects. Although the West German press comments
were generally pessimistic, ranging from caution and distrust to outright
rejection of the proposal as a propaganda trick, Berlin newspapers reflected
a hesitant optimism. French newspapers tended to show a slightly more
favorable attitude, emphasizing that it would be absurd to reject the Soviet
suggestion just because of its origin, as long as there is a slight chance
for settlement of the Korean fighting. Non-Communist Italian press comment
generally stressed that the move was not solely a propaganda expedient, and
that the door to peace should be left open. Several Western European
publications saw in the proposal a Soviet recognition of military failure
in Korea, and a victory of United Nations policy there. Paris newspapers
generally agreed that the UN goal of discouraging aggression would be
obtained by a settlement on the 36th Parallel. CU Paris 8059, 25 June 51;
U Frankfurt 10490, 25 June 51)
GERMANY., Trade Agreements in Berlin Bo ging Down The Western deputy
commandants in er in ave r ues e approv of the Allied High Com-
mission to despatch a letter to SO A. Dengin, chief Soviet representative
in Berlin, proposing that Soviet and Western experts meet on 5 July to
discuss measures for preventing illegal trade and for ensuring the normal
flaw of legal trade in Berlin. The letter mould express the hope that by
this date, the Soviet authorities will have approved all outstanding West
Berlin export permits of which six thousand are presently backlogged.
Meanwhile, the interzonal trade negotiations have become deadlocked, as
the East German representative stated that he could not agree to tie the
agreement on interzonal trade to that on the movement of goods out of West
Berlin. The commandants feel that the 'West should be in a position to
impose effective countermeasures, if they are required. (S Eerlin 1550,
26 June 51) COMMENT: When the USSR relaxed its restrictions on Mast
Berlin exportTE717 June, it apparently did so in the hope of coming to
a swift and satisfactory agreement on interzonal trade. Naw that the trade
talks, suspended by the West during the height of -the Berlin dispute? have been
reopened, the USSR appears to be less ready to allow Berlin exports to flaw
freely.
IICH FRANCE. New aovernment Faces an Ur ent Problem in Indochina. The over-
all availa y o un s or e cone uc of opera ions in Indochina is
one of the urgent problems facing the new government and the National
Assembly. Indochina was not an important campaign issue in the recent
elections, and there is now no basic difference of opinion among non-
11C11
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Communist parties on this subject* A decided swing to the right in the
composition of the French Government, however, might result in a less
liberal interpretation of the position of the Associated States within
the Prench Union. (5 Paris 80731 25 chine 51) COMMENT: Although the
strengthened Right in the new Assembly probablyIe inclined to
reinforce commitments in Indochina, it is not expected that operations
there will receive a greater portion of the 1952 than the 1951 military
budget (slightly less than 25%). France's anticipated defense expenditures
for 1952 are estimated at a billion, an-increase of 50% over 1951. This
will increase the over-all budget deficit to more than $3 billion, and
draw strong criticism, especially from the Communist deputies. In the
event that the Gaullists gained power, a less liberal interpretation of
the position of the Associated States 'would dangerously increase the anti-
French sentiment already prevalent in Indochina and weaken support for the
Bao Dai Government. In his press conference on 22 June, De Gaulle stated
that once France is put back in order (i.e0 after he returns to power),
10 divisions, possibly doubling the 150,000 men now on duty$ could be
supplied to Indochina. De Gaulle made clear, however, that the defense
of the metropolitan area would be his first conpideration.
"B" Government Bans Mass Communist Demonstration. The French Govern-
ment has re use permission or e ommunis y F) to hold a mass
demonstration in Paris on 15 July, The PCF expected several hundred
thousand French Communists and members of the Peace Partisans' Movement
to attend a "Rally for a peace pact of the Big Five". CR London Reuters
radioteletype to New York, 27 June 51) COMMENT: This action is in line
with the government's anti-Communist meTiaFgrof the past year. The PCF
would now be quite incapable of attracting even 1009000 for such a rally,
and has failed repeatedly-to hold meetings in defiance of the government's
periodic injunctions.
ITALY. Nonni Socialist (PSI) TaCtics Fail to S lit Front of anti-Com-
munist Parties. In maneuvers esigne rvide an conquer e anti-
TgIEUEIgt-Failles, the crypto-Communist Nenni Socialists (PSI) have of-
fered their active support to the democratic Socialists, the Christian
Democratic left-wing and even the Liberals if they should oppose the
government's defense and economic policies. This offer is in line with
previous PSI electioneering tactics of asserting that it was the duty of
all citizens to defend Italy's frontiers against any invader and that the
NAT should be "limited" and defensive ay The PSI blandishments have
met with almost no favorable response. Democratic Socialist leader Romita
has declared collaboration with the PSI is out of the question until Nonni
can give clear evidence that his party is no longer tied to the Communists
and the USSR. Communist defector Magnani, who with Cucchi heads the
Italian Workers' Movement, has asked the PSI whether it rejects the doctrine
of the USSR as the leader-state and admits that the Soviet regime is not
adapted to Italy. US Embassy Rome regards the PSI offer as a tactical
Communist-approved maneuver to divide or absorb the opposition. (C Rome
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5949, 26 June 51) CONNENT: The PSI tactic in general indicates the
extreme left's concern that it may become increasingly isolated. The
attempt to court the democratic Socialists suggests apprehension by the
PSI and the Communists that this new party may eventually become a serious
challenge to their hold on the working class. In a recent meeting of the
PSI central committee, it was asserted that social democracy should be
fought vigorously, particularly in the labor field.
"B" NORWAY. Foreign Minister Su.forts US Position on Communist China Recognition
in-7M T e Foreign Minis er in a recen parliamentary a dress-gfiEgd that
as long as the Korean war continues Norway favors postponement of the question
of Communist China participation in international organizations. He added,
however, that Norway had not changed its view concerning the Chinese
Nationalists but regarded a consideration of the representation question
under the pressure of aggressive mar as preposterous. (U Oslo 12639
25 June 51) CONNENT: Norway recognized the Peiping regime in early 1950,
but noarappeaFFEJ-Fealize that to support Chinese Communist bids for UN
recognition under present circumstances in effect rewards aggression,
Norway, also like Denmark (see OCI Daily Digest, 22 June 51) is undoubtedly
being influenced by Britain's attitude*
UNITED KINGDOM. Press Beginning to Speculate on UN Korean Truce Position.
Mile UK press inte-M-nesi June speec as ocused on e
question of whether the speech was meant as a serious effort to obtain a
Korean settlement, attempts to re-examine the UN position concerning a
truce are now beginning to appear, Prominent themes in this speculation
so far have been 1) there would be little profit in serious Western
testing of the Soviet "proposal", since a cease-fire itself would fulfill
the original Security Council resolution of a year ago; 2) UN governments
cannot let slip any opportunity of restoring peace; 3) if guarantees
against renewal of the fighting can be arranged, it would not greatly
matter if discussion and discord over the question of a permanent settle-
ment dragged out over a long period of time. CU London 6836, 27 June 51)
COMMENT: There are no indications that the above attitudes are currently
strong in the UK public-at-large. However, the UK Government continues
to proceed very cautiously in its public handling of the Korean truce
issue, partially in order to avoid arousing any unwarranted hopefulness
which might eventually limit the government's freedom of action*
Foreign Secreta E slams Intention to Deliver Polish
Tankers. Foreign75.gYFRaryMorr son on June 00 Am assa or i ord
that the scheduled delivery of two Polish Government-omned tankers must
be related to the general British depandence upon East European sources
for timber and grain. Morrison felt that there was definite risk of
losing supplies essential to the British economy if the tankers were
requisitioned. He also referred to resentment in some quarters because
of US pressure for further restriction of trade. Morrison agreed to look
nit
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into the possibility of deferring the date of delivery, though he gave
no assurances on this matter. He expressed full awareness of the probable
adverse US reaction. A Foreign Office .no delivered the same day ex-
plained that since the ownership of the vessels by the Polish Government
is clear, the UK could requisition the taakere only as an ?emergency"
action that would probably provoke damaging Polish retaliation. (S London
68139 26 June 51; S London 6806, 26 June 51) COMMENT: US Embassy London
had anticipated that the British would reject frg7g-protest against
delivery of the tankers (see OCI Daily Digest, 20 June 51),
ten
US Embassy London suggests
Final Deliveries on B-29 Bombers for Britain under MDAP.
delivery, expected this weeks of the 70 B-29 bombers allotted to the UK
sut e p ub ici ?e given o he final
under the MDAP program for fiscal year 1.9500 Future deliveries mill be
for attrition purposes. Tha Embassy-believes it could be stressed that
this progran has resulted in eubstantially strengthening the British
military position? CR 6734 London, 21 June; R 6835 London, 27 Jun 51)
COMMENT: Addition of these bombers to the Royal Air Force (RAF) has not
MITITTcreased its striking power but also has boosted morale in Bomber
Command, which for several years has had to yield priority in new.
to Fighter commaftd as the first line of defense. RAF personnel have
taken quickly to conversion trainings and six squadrons of Nrashingtons
(their name for B-29s) had been activated by April 19510 RAF plans are
to use the Washingtons in night bombing tactics similar to World War II
in the next 3-4 year interval while Bomber Command is converting to jet
. aircraft with production increase of the Canberra twin-jet bomber and final
development of the Vickers-Armstrong B.9 four-jet bomber. Then the latter
discarded, probably by also comes into service, scheduled to begin in 1953-4, the B-295 will be
"C? ARGENTINA. Election Date May Be Advanced to November. Pro-government
----.__
newspapers s a e at mit in e no week or IND a sill will be presented
to congress to reform the electoral law in order to bring it into conform-
ity with the new constitution and to establish 11 November as the election
date. The proposed changes will probably provide for direct election of
the president and decrease the minority congressional representation now
fixed by law. OR Buenos Aires 1158, 27 June 51) COMMENT: Advancement
of the election date, which is certain to be appra7471-7-the Peronista-
dominated congress, reflects the goVernmentls anxiety concerning its
stability (see 010I Daily, 23 June 51) and its loss of international
Prestige through the anti-democratic measures and anti-US campaign
employed (see OCI Daily Digest, 8 June 51) in an attempt to promote
PerOn'us reelection. According to the 1949 constitution, March 1952 would
normally be considered the date for the forthcoming presidential and
congressional elections (see )u Daily Digest, 5 May 51).
natt CHILE. Labor rar Situation Co
in ..s
aago repor s a e Macon
emains Unsettled? US Embassy
a unions p esuma y are ignoring a return
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to work order from the Confederation of Copper Workers (CTC) due to
suspicion that the CTC gave in to the government without exacting an
adequate promise of consideration for its demands. The cir order fol-
lowed an independent decision of the Braden unions to end their stoppage
and the 22 June cabinet decision not to deal with the CTC in any way
pending the resumption of work? The Minister of Interior, reiterated the
firm government position on 26 June and added that no agreement had been
made with the OTC. A high ?official source states that continuance or
extension of the walkout mdll bring a presidential request for extraordinary
powers, (C Santiago 640, 26 June 51)
"C" COLOMBIA, Outbreaks of Violeilee, The semi-official Bogod newspaper "El
gra77-7eported that a small battle between the supporter of the adminis-
tration and its opponents occurred in a village in Cundinamarca on 24 June.
A force composed of troops of the army and of the national police were
victorious against a "powerful group of bandits" who had assassinated a
rent collector, his wife and two children, and eleven other Conservatives,
(U NY La Brensa2 AP, 26 June 51) COMMENT: Disorders of this type are
now frequent thi.oughout most of the country, and there are no indications
that the government will gain control of the situation in the near future,
Although President Laureano G6mez retains considerable prestige, continuance
of present conditions will threaten the stability of his regimen
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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
? OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT SA CABLES
28 June 1951
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
?CEYLON. Government Still Refuses to &berm Rubber Exports to Communist
, China. In several conversations with. US EMbassy,officers, the Prim
Minister of Ceylon has stated emphatically that, while he will cooperate
with efforts to prevent rubber from reaching the Chinese Communists, it
would be politically impossible for him to advocate an official embargo
on exports to China. Furthermore, the Prime Minister states that such an
embargo is unnecessary since the Chinese Communists seem unable to arrange
either for payment or fer shipping of the rubber from Ceylon. According to
the Acting Rubber Commissioner, no application forerport has yet been made
though several inquiries have been received. (S, SA Colombo 660, 26 Jun 51).
?CON4ENT3 Despite Ceylon's apparent reluctance to embargo shipments to
Communist China, it is believed that no appreciable quantities of Ceylonese
rubber will reach the Chinese*
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