DAILY DIGEST JUN 22 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000200470001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 22, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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COPY NO. 39
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
Margirnal letter indications are defined. as
follows:
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reporta has been
prepared primarily for the internal use of the
Office of Current Intelligence. It does not
represent a complete coverage of all current
reports in-CIA or in-.the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments represent. the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
.3.
JUN 22 1951
Date:
- items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities.
"B" - important regiorial developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
"An
"C" - other informattor indicating trends
and potential developments
DIA, DOS, USAF Declassification/Release Instructions on
File
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"B" USSR, Builders Reprimanded for Shortcomings. According to a Pr a editorial
of 19 June.- many building organizations are not taking advantageofavailable
opportunities allowing for speedier building., increased quality of construction,
and further reduction of costs, The editorial warns, that the "tremendous pro-
gram of capital works in 1951 demands a fundamental improvement in the organ-
ring of construction works and an ever-increasing development of Socialist
competition from economic heads of construction sites and Party and trade
union organizations." Delays at many construction projects are attributed
to the fact that building organizations have not taken the necessary steps to
insure that sufficient builders and "engineer-technical staffs" be made avail-
able., nor have they secured the requisite material and technical resources for
the sites, Chelyabinsk., Yaroslavl, and Sverdlovsk are specifically mentioned
as localities where building is proceeding at a very slow pace., Local Party
organizations are called upon "to head the struggle for the fulfillment and
overfulfiliment of building plans," Party organizations at the sites are ad-
vised to improve their efforts., broaden mass political work among the build-
-ers, and draw the workers more thoroughly into Socialist competition. (B.FBIS,
21 Ji xie 51.). CON1MENTs Evidently difficulties are already being encountered
by'96viet builders in meeting the goals of the State plans for 1951 which de-
creed that the cost of construction work be reduced by 3 percents and that
productivity of workers engaged in construction be increased by ll percent.
"C" EASTERN EUROPEg POLAND., Br
z1+Iinc Reported to have been Ousted, 25X1
25X1C Hilary Mine. Deputy Prime Mixes
st r Charge of Polish conomic lanning, has just been ousted, 25X1
is of'the opinion that this move-will initiate a ,wholesale change in
structure of the present Government. 25X1A
CO o Mine has long been the subject of such reports, primarily because
of a middle-class bourgeois background which-logically would render him sus-
pest. By virtue of his training and ability, Mine holds the most important
ecorcinio posts in Poland, i,e. Chairman of the State Economic Planning Commis-,
sion, and Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers. His
continuance in office depended upon his indispensability to the Goverment and
the lack of a qualified replacement. During the past year there have been in-
dications of his gradual eclipse. His removal would undoubtedly bring about
personnel changes within the office which he headed,, but not necessarily ex-
tending throughout the Government,
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"B" YUGOSLAVIA;, Tito Bids for "Peace" Leadership Against Soviet Bloc. The Yugo-
slav National Committee for Defense and . Peace. has announced 23-26 October as
the date for the anti-Cominform international peace congress at Zagreb, which
marks the most ambitious Yugoslav step in Tito's political warfare campaign
against Moscow. Although the conference is purportedly unofficial, the pro-
posed agenda indicates that it is intended to expose the Soviet-sponsored Peace
Appeal and the World Peace Congress. The suggested agenda includes: (1) the
tendency toward domination and lack of respect for the equality of nations as
One of the fundamental reasons behind the danger of war; (2) the condemnation
of all aggressive acts and pressures; (3) the reduction of armaments; (4) the
struggle for the principles of the Charter; (5) assistance to undezdeveloped
countries and the free development of economic cooperation and; (6) cultural
cooperation among nations based on mutual respect. The Yugoslav peace com-
mittee apparently intends to enlist the support of prominent anti-Soviet
liberals, in order that the conference will be an imposing rally against the
pseudo-pacific aims of the Soviets. (U-New York Times,.22 June 51), CO RENT.
The Yugoslav sponsored international peace meeting was originally scheduled
to open on I September, but was postponed after Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt re-
portedly agreed to attend the meeting if it were held in October. A preys
report revealed that the Yugoslav Government intended to, invite prominent ITS
organizations and individuals to attend the meeting and. thus ?Lf?ford it a max-
im= of prestige.
"Cu CURRENT COMMUNISM. Malik Intends to Receive World Peace Council Delesati.on.
Following a request from Joliot-Curie, President of the World Peace Council
(), Soviet delegate Malik. in his capacity as President of the UN Security
Council for the month of June, has agreed to receive a W'PC delegation in New
York on 25-27 June. TheyUS delegation to the UN believes that this and other
developments may indicate a Soviet intention to use the 2.5th June anniversary
of the Korean invasion as a sounding board for the "peace campaign." Among
other possible steps, Malik may call a SC meeting for 25 June with the in- 25X1
tention of making a propaganda speech. Malik is presently scheduled to make
a radio speech on the "Price of Peace" radio series 23 June,, He might in such
a speech, in addition to general remarks along the *peace campaign" line in
dicate whether he plans C meeting.
COMMENT. e de-Legation mentioned in
u
e prevented by a US State Department refusal to grant entrance visas,
v, u-Lopa a!` n uu secretary general Lie with demands for a revision of UN'
policies, particularly with respect to KQjrea. Lie has refused to see the del-
egation in New York., although he had at one time agreed to meet it in Europe
which, however, was declined by the WPC. Melik's reception of the delegation
co
ld b
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SECTION -2 '(EASTERN)
"C" LEBANON. Yafi ' Goverzent Receives Vote of Confidence on Presentation,,
Of Its Following six hours of -heated but orderly debates,
Prime Minister Yafi on 19 June received a vote of confidence of 52 to
23 on a program which includes cooperation with the Arab League and
the UN o an economic-agreement with-Syria., electoral and agricultural
refox, and improvements in health, educations, law einforcement9 and
finance. US Charge Bruins comments that the program sounds encourag-
ing although most observers are adopting a "wait and see" attitude as
to the general effectiveness of the government. He considers'it sig-
nificant that for the first time Lebanon has parliamentary oppositions,
regardless of the fact that it is currently split between the Reform
Front-Liberals and reactionary landowners and professional politicians.
(R Beirut 878, 20 Jun-51). COMMENT- Prime Minister Yafi9 who took
office on 6 Junes, has been aamentary Deputy since 1937 and was
Prime Minister in 1939? -He is well-balanced and moderated and although
a known friend of France, he is also friendly toward the US. The com-
bination of the Prime Minister Ds liberal program plus a parliament
which does not contain merely the same old faces makes it hopeful that
the country will have a more stable and effective goverrmient.
"B" INDIA. Prime Minister NW= Reported to be en-Minded On Kashmir,
& June, t.: e g ommissioner in Indig'd a were a 'VI I at
Nehru regarding the latter n s 11 June speech accusing the UK and US of
aiding and abetting Pakistan in d o ing the Kashmir crisis. Nehru
took the "blast" reasonably and calmly and left the High Commissioner
with the impression that he might not, after all, have a completely
closed min-. on the subject. (C New Delhi 3710,9 20 Jun 51). CO MENT-
For the past three years9 Nehru has alternately appeared first 4kit9
then malleable on the question of Karo The problem is still unsolved.
"C" Politics in the Indian Air Force. The US Air Attache in New
Delhi reports that we problem of naming a' successor to the present
C do in-Chief of the Indian Air Force, who is rumored to be re-
tiring net December, is a hot one politically. Air Vice Marshal
erj eye, how second in c . 9 is allegedly lacking in 'fi racial
support and tends to be too pro 4Testerno ` Air Commodore Engineers, a
rich Parsi with less pro-Western feeling., apparently has the best
chance of,. becc9 inng Commander-in-Chief. According to the US Air
Attache, Air Vice Marshal Mukherjee's morale is low and he is consid-
ering retirement.
COMMENT.- Herstofo!Fe Me yarn arse d services have been relatively 25X1A
ree rom pcliticc~ control. This evidence that views on the East-
West question may be affecting promotions is a further disturbing
indication of deterioration ' in the calibre of the armed forces. (See
001 Daily Digest, 12 Jun 510 )
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*B" INDOCHINA. Political Reliability of Some Vietnamese Officials
is ~haestionable. In discussing, with US Consul Blancke in Hanoi,
a security problem connected with the ECA missions, the North Viet-
nam security director asserted that he never took up security
matters at the level of department heads. The security director
states these officials were completely passive on the subject
and never investigated their own personnel., in an attempt
completely to avoid assuming aIv political hue. Blanoke ob-
serves, generally, that the view is interesting that officials
at the level of department heads can consider themselves un-
committed fence=sitters; and., in particular, that the chief of
the Vietnamese American Aid Department and his immediate
assistant have sometimes been suspected of at least passive
sabotage of the ECA program. (C Hanoi 7549 21 June 51).
NA" CHINA0 ghinese Communist Threat to Hoag Kont Increasing. The
threat to Hong Kong is gradually increasing, 25X1 C
for the following reasons
trade restrictions are reducing the city?s value as an
entrepot to the-Chinese Communists, (2) unemployment is in-
creasing the internal security risk, and (3) the Chinese Communists
are replacing detached units and formations in Scuth Kwangtung
with complete armies. (S AMCONGEN, Singapore, 23 May 51)
CCs The Chinese Communist potential to mount a s nscessfull
attack on Hong Kong with little or no notice has been generally
conceded, While the indications in the above report certainly
enhance the threat of an assault, there is no other information
available which suggests any aggressive intentions at this time.
Communist troop strength in the general area of South Central
Kwangtung is estimated at 859000, of which 309000 are in
relative pro dmity to Hong Kong9 with 19000 actually deployed
on the border of the colony.
"B" More Mass Executions Belie Pe ?Sufteninf.
A r sport ad
May directive from Peip O CI Daily Digest, 20 June 1951)9
authorizing commutation of death ,tences9 though being imple-
mented, is apparently not interfering with the continuance of
mass executions, acceding to a recent Hong Kong press release
telling of the execution of 284 in Shanghai and 122 In Sian
on 15 June. The 284 executed falls but nine short of the
Shanghai record. Meanwhile, in the same city, a newly established
Committee for the Examination of CountercRevoluti onary Cases"
granted a two=year stay of execution to 19 indl &duals (during
which time, by "showing sufficient evidence of repentance" They
may win reprieves), sentenced 23 to life imprisonment, 92 to
undisclosed jail terms, paroled 12 (involving indoctrination
courses) and released two individua;lla on bondOO. In Sian 21
received a two-year stay of execution, 11 life sentences, 166
indefinite jail terms and 144 were placed under seillance.
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(U Hong Kong AP, 21 June 51). CO s A Communist report of a public
trial of counter-revolutionaries in Lanchow states that of the 203
people tried, 30 were sentenced to death, 17 given a two=year stay
of execution, 19 paroled, and 52 released in i ew of their minor offenses.
Nothing is known of the selective standards employed by the Communist
review boards reportedly handling counter-revolutionary cases,, but
evidently there are still enough irremediable cases to warrant a con-
tinuance of mass executions.
"B" KOFM. EneMy Capability to Continue Night Air Attacks Estimatecd. Noting
enemy has conducted one and two plane night air attacks on UN fields at
Suwon (where one F-86 was destroyed and major damage was inflicted on
four others) and Kimpo. Other sporadic attacks have been lunched
area. (S, FEAF AZ 8878, 19 June 51). COMMENTs Since 14 June, th
the relative case with which the enemy in the past several days has
been able to conduct small night air attacks against forward UN airfields
and ground positions, Far East Air Force Intelligence estimates that
25?40 conventional fighter sorties could be mounted by the enemy per
night without major relocation of his air forces. Fighter types avail-
able for this type of mission would be the LA-79 the LA -9 and the Yak=9,
all of which can reach UN lines from present bases in the Antung-Sinui ju
against Inchon and several forward ground positions.
to Chinese civilian labor in North Korea indicates both the relative
shortage of North Korean manpower and the necessity for utilizing large
amounts of coolie labor to maintain supply lines in the face of UN air
operations.
Chinese Civilian mbar Beim Emnlo ed in Nortflr Ko eao Radio
Peiping on 18 June announced that despite the hazards of 06wcoking
directly under enemy fire, Korean and Chinese civilian workers are
still maintaining a constant flow of goods to the front by quickly re-
pairing damaged bridges.- (R FBIS 21 June). COENrs The reference
Igor ore ana Called on to "- 1o~ i? ~ t Ch~~c~se 0 On both
19 and 20 June, Radio Pyongyang carried speeches eorti the North
Koreans to 00consolidate the good will between the Korean and Chinese
people" and to give 0?warmer aid to the Chinese volunteer .9.90 (R FBIS
21 June 51). COMMENT-0 While the existence of tensions between the
Chinese Communist troops on the one hand and the North Korean civilians
and troops on the other has-been previously noted, the head Radio
Pyongyang emphasis on this topic suggests both the seriousness of the
problem and its continuing natured The Communist military practice of
living off the land has aggravated the problem.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
25X1 C
GERMANY, Personnel Difficulties Cited in GDR Foreign Minist
he c) Foreign
finis ry is having trouble in personnel matters, Jonny Loehr and
Friedrich Wolff were removed from the top posts in Bucharest and Warsaw
recently and have not been replaced. It is also reported that Stefan
Heyman, the Minister in-Budapest., is about - to be replaced as a result of
a recent inspection of his post by a Foreign Ministry official. Albania
is also anxious to exchange diplomatic missions. The GDR Foreign Ministry
is allegedly unable to find trustworthy representatives.of_enough stature
for the various satellite posts. Meanwhile., the deputy Foreign Minister,
Anton Ackermann, is-said to be intriguing against his chief., Foreign
Minister Georg Dertinger, and it is believed that the Communists wish to
name Ackermam Foreign Minister, 25X1A
COMMENT: Indications have been received previously that the GDR was having
Z iculties.in finding competent personnel for top foreign posts; par-
ticularly in Poland., where the task of selling German-Polish friendship
is not an easy one. Dertinger, a former Christian Democrat., has always
been considered as a front man for Ackermann., who is a strong Communist.
"Cu Decision Reported to "Seal Off" West Berlin Short y, 25X1
25X1C_ NMI einric au, as rman is er o anning9
press a over a meeting in East Berlin on 6 June at. which he let it be
understood that a decision had been made to seal off West Germany and
West Berlin "shortly", The meeting., which was attended by several Cabinet
ministers, their deputies, and di...?ectors of certain key industries, was
concerned with a study of measures for improving the administration of
the East German economy and making it independent of the West,, Among the
measures discussed were-the sealing off of Berlin. Informal statements
by some participants at the meeting indicated that new provocations will
be used designed to result in a blockade of-Berlin, 25X1A
25X1A COMMENT: Events of the past week suggest
that the USSR and the East. Germans are anxious to acquire imports, from
pyest Germany, in return f9r which West Berlin will be able to conduct-trade
with the West. The East German economy. has lately been deteriorating, but
it is more likely to be improved by closer East-West German trade relations
than by the "sealing off" of West Germany from East Germany,
"B" ITALY/SPAIN. Italians Refuse Urgent Spanish Request for Wheat Loan. The
Government has informed the US Embassy Rome that i has re used
urgent Spanish requests for a loan of 20,000 tons of wheat. The Italians
are willing to furnish the wheat, which they can loan without difficulty,
provided either a US or British agency guarantees the loan. The Italians
refuse to accept\the guarantee of Spanish banks because they feel economic
conditions in Spain make' doubtful, the repayment of the loan, (C Rome 633,
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20 June 51) COMMENT: The Spanish wheat crop should meet minimum require-
ments; the US 75s granted the Spanish a $5 million credit for wheat, and
the Spaniards, are procuring Cheat on their own account-all of which
indicate that wheat supplies will be adequate; The efforts of the Spanish
Government to obtain Italian wheat may be caused by temporary shortages
in local stocks before the wheat crop is harvested and further foreign
purchases are received. -It is evident that the Spanish regime is ap-
prehensive over the disaffection of the-populace and fears even-temporary
reduction of -the -brew? ration. A wheat loan to Spain might cause the
Italian Government some embarrassment in Parliament at this time,, and the
Italian Communists would probably point to the'loan as another example of
Italian subservience to US strategic interests.
-f- ------- -....,-....~ ?,.... ,+ ~,a.au~, s ~v6s cuu. tit:. cGUK_ t,-%6 X Vd.L_,V'dA
L arse ifficultieso Three years o aid have helped Denmark-achieve
a high level of internal prosperity with agricultural and industrial
production exceeding pre-war levels but the nation still suffers from
a basically unsound. foreign trade imbalance which may require a major
reorientation of .the Danish, economy, The extent to which Denmark can
solve this problem will materially influence the success of its defense
effort; for,, lacking oil, coal,, iron or any other metals,, Denmark must
obtain from abroad industrial raw materials as well as finished military
equipment; 0therwise9 Danish defense efforts will largely depend upon..
US largesse. Essentially, the country lives by importing feedstuffs which
it converts into animal products and then exports. However inflation as
a result of the Korean war and the currency devaluation of September 1949
have accelerated the rising costs of these imports, while the price of
major Danish exports- notably such things as bacon and butter to the UK-
have increased only slightly. There is accordingly not a sufficient
margin between agricultural import and export prices to finance the import
of raw materials and finished goods for other segments of the economy.,
and Denmark is-confronted with a chronic dollar-sterling deficit which
ECA'aid has served to cushion but not really to correct. ECA officials
have therefore been urging the Danish Government to consider seriously a
reorientation of the entire economy so as to utilize domestic .feedstuffs
tc a much greater extent than at present,, to depend less on British
markets,, and to be. more diversified in agricultural and 'industrial
production as well as in marketing. Such a re-orientation, however.,
poses major political and economic 'problems (such as changes in the basic
pattern of land use) which any Danish government is reluctant to tac
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"B" __- Government Pressed by Conservatives to take Firm Stand
on Iranian Oil Cr"sls, An holy Eden, deputy leader of the onservative
Party, in opening he 22-June Parliamentary debate on the oil crisis,
stated that a British evacuation of Iran would be disastrous. He felt
that it was the duty of the government, to protect British persoinel and
promised opposition support for any such action, There was a large degree
of support throughout Parliament for the use of military force to protect
British lives, with Conservative backbenchers favoring strong action and
Labor backbenchers fearful of the implications of a show of strengths A
group of the latter, including Richard Crossman, suggested that US oil
interests--were largely responsible'for the present crisis in Iran. These
allegations-were rebutted in some detail by the Foreign Secretarye Mro
Morrison -admitted that the loss of Iranian oil would dislocate the current
supply situation,, but said that rationing in-the UK was exceedingly un-
likely. He said that the US had in general supported the actions the UK
had taken, was anxious that there should be no precipitate manifestation
of military force, but accepted the UK's right to protect British lives.
(R London 6731, 22 June 51) COM ZNT s. -The Government is clearly under
considerable domestic pressure o t e' a forceful stand in the oil crisis.
Present indications are that it will resist this course unless necessary
to implement plans to evacuate British nationals, The care with which
Morrison rebutted the charges against the US oil companies indicates his
concern over the possible development of anti-US sentiment,
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"B" FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA.: Election Trend Toward Right. Brazzaville
authorities are reported to consider the French Na ional Assembly
elections in French Equatorial Africa (FEA) to be asharp defeat for
Communists and the native Communist-oriented African Democratic Rally
(RDA) and to show a strong movement toward the right,- Of the seven
seats allotted to FEA, three and probably four were-won by pro-Gaullists.
(79-Leopoldville 83, `20 June 51) COST; Native voting was closely
controlled to eliminate the'RDA_-can 1 a es., and thus the--vote is not
indicative of local political-thinking. The high percentage of pro-
Gaullist seats is consistent with the extremely conservative and authori-
tarian sympathies predominating among officials, in colonial areas.
" B" CUBA. 'Seized Communist Newspaper Released. The newspaper Hay., organ
of'uba.s Communist P i oo Bocialis a Pop ular has been re urned to
the party in accordance w1. a rul ng of a lower court. In rendering
its decision., the court stated that the government acted illegally in
seizing. and closing down the newspaper plant., and that such action could
be taken only,by "judicial order" and.. riot by aLabor Ministry" order as
was done on 24 August 1950. (U NY-Herald Tribune., 20 June 51., U NY
La P1ensa, 20 June 51) COMMENT:` The closing of Hoy last August, in
response to demands from the non-Communist Cuban e,o federation-of Labor.,
forced the Communist press "underground" and resulted in the sporadic and
ineffectual public4tion of several small clandestine newspapers and pamphlets.
The subsequent establishment of La Ultzxia.'Hora9 which Pas carried no
advertising and has had limited circ a on., ias not nearly compensated
for the loss of Hie The restoration of the latter will enable the Com-
munists to recover the propaganda effectiveness which they formerly enjoyed.
The government is sure to appeal the case to a higher court in view of the
widespread opposition which t1~e courtvs 'ruling has met from various groups
and organizations throughout the country.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
IJ1 2 19
Not for dissemination outside 0/CT and O/NEo
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CU1ENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLES
22 June 1951
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
UNITED KINGDOM/IRAN. UK Foreigm Office Indicates Policy on Iran, The
UK Foreign Office has told the US Embassy in London that measures are
being taken to evacuate Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) personnel
from outlying oil fields into the Abadan area. They will be kept there
as long as possible in the faint hope that a more realistic attitude
will prevail among the Iranians. Permanent Under Secretary Strang thinks
almost all AIOC personnel would choose to leave rather than to place
themselves at the mercy of the National Oil Company, The UK has no
present plan to use force beyond that required to evacuate personnel.,
and even then only in the event of necessity. It does not plan to
use force to protect ATOC property. In the event of a Communist coup
following evacuation, the UK might wish to re-examine the situation
in consultation with the US, The UK estimates the possibility of
the USSR attempting to take control of the oil indu5itry as small.' Although
no final decision has yet been made., the'UK might ask the US to support
an embargo on Iran, and might further ask the US to stop economic end
military assistance to the Iranian government. (S, S/s London 6701, 20 June 51),
COMMEN. There is indeed little hope that a fmgre realistic attitude"
will -be adopted by Iran towards the AIOC. On-23 June., Prime Minister
Mossadeq won a confidence vote from both the N jlis (Lower House). and the
Senate which eliminates any possibility that he might waiver at :this
late date. It appears now to be only a. matter of time before the recent
c,?xarse of events in Iran will be reflected in e, progressive decrease
in oil production in that country.
PHILIPPINES. Romulo Adamant on Reparations, Foreign Secretary Romulo
has informed US Minister-Harrington in Manila, that the Philippines cannot
and will not recede from the position that Japan must pay reparations.
He added that failure to establish Japanese liability would be regarded
in the Philippines as evidence of the Government9s lack of an independent
foreign policy. (S., S/S manila 41338 21 June 51). COMMENT: Any recession
from the position universally held in the Philippines,, that that Japan both
should and can pay reparations will open thyn. Gover nmeni,to very severe
political attack. Romulo has, himself, been considering entering the
senatorial race next fall and is undoubtedly especially sensitive to the
domestic political aspects of the reparations problem,
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JAPAN. US to Delay Announcement on 9Chinese participation Problem.
Ambassador Dulles has advised British Foreign. Secretary Morrison that the
US is disposed not to issue a formal public statement at this time on the
arrangement for Chinese accession and the disposition of Taiwan as now
envisaged in the Japanese peace treaty, The Department of State believes
that it would be more useful quietly to consolidate support for that position
before issuing a statement which under present circumstances would surely
attract counter statements and perhaps political controversy in both the
US and the UK. (S, S/S State 6007, 20 June 51). CO NT.- The Nationalist
Government on Taiwan is already taking violent exception to the proposed
clause which would permit Japan to choose with which China it prefers to
deal subsequent to the=multilateral treaty, (See OCI S/S Supplement 27.
June 51). The Japanese press likewise is expressing some concern over
the reported arrangement, pointing out that the Communist regime is not
likely to accept a settlement of the'type now contemplated, while a
decision in favor of the Nationalist regime would rule out any possibility
of future trade with the mainland.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
DENMARK. .Position on Communist China RecoMnition in UN Receiving
Support. A ,?orelgn Office official has informed the US Embassy that the
Danish delegation to UNESCO has been instructed to vote for postponing
the question of Chinese representation on grounds that such,adecision
should be made by the General Assembly itself according to its resolution
of.14, December 1951. The official said that a similiar attitude would
be adopted in all other cases of Chinese representation in UN organs or
specialized agencies, but that Denmark would not qualify its recognition
of the Peiping government nor allow the decision on UNESCO to "prejudice"
Denmarkvs'vote in the-G& on the issue. He revealed informally, however,
that the previous Danish attitude of sup rorting Chinese Communist repre-
sentation in the UN as a.consequence of Danish recognition of Communist
China was actually in the process of modification, The Embassy attributes
the changed Danish attitude to'Britainos recently adopting a similiar
position in the Trusteeship Council, and comments that it reveals Danish
diplomatic dependence upon the UK, (C, S/5 Copenhagen, 1092, 18 June 51).
_____ g Denmark, together with Norway and Sweden, followed Britain's
example in recognizing the Peiping regie in early 1950, Disillusioned
with the meager results of such a conciliatory attitude, the Danish
Government now is willing to cooperate in preventing the Chinese
Communist regime from gaining_ any standing in the UN so long as its
present aggressive policies continue.b As suggested by the Embassy,
Danish policy on this question will probably continue to be closely
patterned on that of the UK,
11
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