DAILY DIGEST MAY 17 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000200190001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 17, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTFMIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST
Date:
MAY 17 1951
COPY NO.
NOTE: 1. This saamary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the internal use of the
Office of Current Intelligence. It does not
represent a complete coverage of all current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
3. Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
HAI!
- items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
"B" - important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
UV"
- other information indicating trends
and potential developments
*Army, DIA and State Dept reviews
completed*
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SECTION I (SOVIET)
EASTERN EUROPE. ALBANIA. Refugees in Greece Envision Reconauering Comm.!
nists. The US delegation of the UN Special Committee on the Balkans
TEWOB) reports that the prime motivation influencing Albanian refugees
to seek asylum in Greece is a belief2, apparently founded largely on
rumor and the dropping of leaflets in Albania ,,that either a committee or
an armed force exists in Greece or Italy which they might join in order
to free their country. Accordingly, the refugees have been disappointed
to find that no such organized force exists in Greece. As these -refugees
have been chiefly farmers who lived near the Greek border, confiscatory
Communist taxation or outright confiscation of cattle and lands also
played a part in inducing them to risk reprisals on their families by
crossing the border. (S USDELUNSCOB 219 Athens, 17 Apr 51)0
"B" BULGARIA.es ft or Are -?
-!tari s Cont e Re?
Turkish,Zularian immigrants arriving in Turkey report that in mid-,April
some sixty rail carloads of Turkish-Bulgarians in the Nevrokop (Greek
border) area, who previously had rejected the opportunity to emigrate
to Tnrke3? yere deported to the north-central region of Bulgaria. The
Pex Ren,-4;irz -Unit at Istanbul compares the move with the
re-o Bulgars (Pomaks) from the border areas during the
Greek guerrilla war in 19A7-48, (C Istanbul D.566, 20 Apr 51). COMMENT:
Since the =Wile of 1950 the Bulgarian authorities have been transporting
groups of a:Tipat'ei unreliables in the areas adjoining Yugoslavia and
Greece to --,ta-mouned destinations in the central part of the country.
"B" HUNGARY.2....z-egm_11111.2k122_Engmay, A drive to collect scrap metal began
15 May. I,,,gatio: Budapest reports that Hungarian industry is believed
seriously hit by shortages of steel and "colored metals; and that extra-
ordinary efforts are being made to fina substitutes and economize on exist-b-
ing stooks. (.5 Buda-lest NA 2521, 11 May 51). COMMENT,: This is part of the
austerity program adopted by Hungary in January in an effort to secure
additional raw materials for?the expanding heavy industry. Similur samp
drives have been undertaken In East Germany and the USSR.
"A" 20a000 eight (s to Retired to, GDR by ,US.
The terms of a tr-rffic aroenent between the GDR and Poland appear to
confirm that a.a initial return of 20,000 freight cars will be made tcy
the USSR to the, Eastern Zone of Germany vitwva the next three monthOs
The agreement, which provides for the passage of 400 trains of fifty
cars from the USSR via the Polish rail system, indicates that the GDR
purchased this rolling stock from the Soviet Union. In order to effect,
the transfe4 eight trains of fifty ears each will proceed from the GDR
to four specified crossi-og p,:,Ints on the Polish-USSR border loaded with
European gauge axles. CINCEUR Heidelberg comments that the return of agy
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further rolling stock will depend upon the GDR's ability to provide
European gauge axles. (S CIECEUR Heidelberg, SX-1115? EUCOM WEEHA 18,
7 May 51). COMMENT2 A near critical current shortage of rolling stock
exists in East Germany, there being approximately 80,000 cars in the
East Zones operational freight car pool. The cars being returned to
East Germany were acquired as war reparations by the USSR and probably
will not be in too good condition after five years in the Soviet Union.
However, the acquisition of twenty thousand freight cars will represent
a significant increase in the transport capabilities of Eastern Germans
as well as in the supply of railway spare parts by cannibalizing., i
YUGOSLAVIA. ThgosiavsSturester A group of Yugoslav pro.-
fessional men is reportedly being recruited for an official mission to
Great Britain to study in detail the legislative and administrative
methods of the British Labor Government. The Group will reportedly
consist of high ranking Communist Party members from all the Federal
Republics? Similarly the Yugoslav Government has reportedly instructed
a delegation of Yugoslav Jewish leaders now visiting Israel to study
its Labor Party (presumably MAPAI), agricultural collectives, and NAPAM?
the .pro-Soviet Socialist Party. ( I 25X1 C
25X1 C I !COMMENT?, As the Yugoslav Government has gradually aligned itself
more ele)sely with the West, Yugoslav interest in western-oriented
Socialist Governments has increasedias demonstrated by the numerous
exchanges of visits between West EUropean and Yugoslav labor and govern-
ments: delegations? During 1951 Politburo members Djilas and Fijade have
headed two separate Yugoslav delegations to the UK and currently a British
Labor Government delegation is visiting Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Govern-
ment undoubtedly hopes to make the regime more palatable to the West by
adopting usable features of Western Socialist governments without com-
promising the regimevs basic Marxist-Ieninist concepts.
ece Cqe.e.seE3selade Arrested as a Sm. Yugoslav
authorities have arrested as a spy an employee of the military delegation
of the Czeeboslevak Embassy in Belgrade. The Czech employee was allegedly
arrested in the act of receiving ieformation from agents connected with
the Czechoslovak intelligence service. According to the Yugoslav press the
accused has admitted his guilt. A Yugoslav army captain has subsequently
been arrested and charged with spying for the Czechoslovak Government.
(R FBIS? 15 & 16 May 51). CO4MENT2 The arrest of the Czechoslovak employee
may well he Belgrade vs reply to the alleged seizure by the Czechoslovak
Government of the Yugoslav radio operator in Praha in late March. The
Yugoslav Gemernment is now prepared to stage a trial to offset the one
probably planned against the Tito Government by the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment utilizing the Yugoslav Embassy employee as a witness.
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COMMIS ON EAST EUROPEAN ACTIVITIES
Recent reports of open resistance to the Communist regimes of Eastern
Europe are significant as symptoms of the underlying popular dissatisfaction
and hatred of the Soviet-imposed Communist order. With few exceptions,
however, the current outbreaks of resistance are not the planned results
of any underground organizational activity but are rather menifestations
of popular frustration. This prevalent disaffection, marked by occasional
incidents, seems well within current Soviet-Communist capabilities to
contain.
The growth of popular disillusionment and hostility toward Communism
has been stimulated by the arbitrary collectiVization measures against the
peasants, by the enforeed pace and small rewards for labor, and by the
organized attaek on religion. The tendency toward subversion, which had an
earlier postwar start with the basically conservative peasant,may.now be
as widespread among the working class. Thus all social groups in Eastern
Europe outside of the email Communist hierarchy are supporting the spirit
of revolt whieh prevails from East Germany and Poland to the Balkans, and
isceeeent4best evidenced in Poland, Albania and Bulgaria. The repeated
purges of the Satellite Cummunist Parties, themselves, testify to Soviet
comerN eetent of this phenomenon throughout Eastern Europa,
The only two areas in Eastern Europe wheee uraerground organizations
of potential importanee appear to exist are Poland and Albania. In Poland,
the nationwide WIN (Freedom and Tndependence) movement apparently has a
general dieeetiee to abstain from provocative action against the Communists,
while strengthening its organization in the utmost secrecy for an eventual
showdown. The resistance in Albania seems to be compounded of the same dis-
content that prevails elsewhere in Eastern Europe, with added encourage.
ment and support by the Yagoslav Government, as well as by Albanian emigre
groups in the West. Of the Eastern European countries presently under
Soviet domination, Poland, the Sloevair areas of Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria
and Albania generally offer a combination of national characteristics and
terrain features most suitable for the further growth of resistance
activities.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"C" GENERALo King Iodullah Visits rky King Abdullah of Jordan, who
arrived in Turkey on 15 May for a short visits stated at a reception
given him by the Turkish President that his Visit *as pramoted by the
close ties whi:41 existed between- the two countries? In a Turkish press
interview Abdullah likewise emphasized the need for close relations
between Turkey and the Arab States? (R Amman 197s 15 May Si3 U FBIS
News Tickers 16 May 51)o COMMENT% Mile Abdullahvs visit is personal
and unofficial, he is obviously taking the occasion to promote closer
Jordanian (and Arab)?Turkish reLvtions.- Turkeys aware of Arab weakness,
has carefully avoided all entanglements, Although Abdullah may receive-
a sop of some sorts his efforts coming at this time will be of no avail.
"An IRAN. i,:or US Oil Companies Will Not Exploit Iranian Oil. On 14 May
the Department of S ate discussed the Iranian question with representa?
tives of the major US oil companies with Middle East interests the
representatives were unanimous in stating that no responsible company
would, under present circumstances, attempt to secure managerial con?
cession From the Iranian Government, The Department of State suggests
that Ae,F,ssador Grady convey this attitude to the Iranian Governments
avoiding ay imolication that the US Government wIts involved, for
should the Anglo?Iranian Oil Company (AIC) be forced out, the US, with
UK concurrencermIght as a last resort encourage US oil interests to
step in so as to prevent Soviet exploitation of the oil or loss of the
oil to the West? Ambassador Grady agrees that a general US statement
on the oil question is in order, but recommends that such a statement
be made in Washine,ons and not in Iran. (S State 21190 16 May 3 S Tehran
2822, 17 May 51). COMMENT% The Department of State has also informed
Ambassador Grady that oil industry spokesmen could not speak for in?
dependent cperatorp and representatives 'of several smaller oil companies
have reportedly already 4pproached the Iranian Embassy in Washington.
While a US statement would not necessarily convince the Iranian Government
that US companies might not be willing to supplant the AI0Cp it might also
reassure Vthe British public that the US is not planning to take advantage
of the UKcs misfortunes in Irano
"Bn IRAN. feligious Extremist VAxrestedO Abol Qasim Rafiees described as the
chief of the security service of the Fedayan Islam (fanatical Moslem group
responsible for the assassination oi Prime Minister Razmara)0 was ar-
25X1 C rested on 16 May. 1 I Rafiee stated "Mos?
sadeq he present Prime MinisterY is lucky I was arrested, for if I had
not beens he would have been killed within three days," The leader of
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the Fedayan Islam Safavis is also being sought by the police. Acoord-
ing to press reports s he recently attacked the National Front and stated
that other assassinations would occur in the future, Prime Minister
Mossadeq has since taken sanctuary in the Parliament building. (U NY
Times, 17 May 51). COMMENTg Mossadeq's action is probably largely for
effects but he is no doubt also are that his life is in danger. This
last arrest marks the most recent widening of the rift between the National
Front and the extremist Fedayan group which first became apparent when the
Fedayan attacked the National Front in early May. If the Fedayan Islam
resorts to more violence it may induce Nossadeq to take even more repressive
measures against its and thus shake him from one of hie firm tenets of
faiths i.e. freedom of expression and political action?
ARAB STATES/Israel. Iraq Sends Troops To Held Syria, On 16 May Prime
Minister Nuri announced in the Iraqi Parliament that units of Iraqi ,
Guard with anti-aircraft guns and planes had moved into Syria to
aid the Syrians against alleged Israeli aggression. Members of Parliament
applauded. In Tel Aviv an Israeli Government spokesman stated that Iraqi ,
action are_ Syrian efforts to postpone signing of a cease-fire agreement
fomake it apparent that Syria is determined to continue her aggressive'
attacks sgainst Israe101 (U NY Time, 17 May 513 UFBIS News Tickers
16 lay c.,). CONIWENT Iracigs pigUrittous action exacerbates the IsraeiI-
Sian Syria obviously will derive some encouragement from Iraqi
supports arid Iraq's dispatch of military forces mill induce-other Arab
States to consider comewhat more seriously the possibility of giving
direct aid to Syriago-even if for no other reason than to prevent Iraq
from achieviag a special position in Syria,
"B" INDIA. Probable Action in UN on Embargo Against China. On 16 May, the
US Embassy, New Delhi, was informed by the Secretary-Generals Indian
Ministry of External Affairs, that Indiags stand on the resolution for
a UN embargo c strategic materials for China -mould be based on political
conSiderations? not upon its attitude toward weapons and ammunitions of
war. The Secretary-General further said that India could hardly vote
against the proposed resolution in view of Indias attitude toward peace*
nor could its without difficulty, vote in favorssince India had refused
to condemn China as an aggressor. Therefore, India would probably abstain.
(S New Delhi 3239s 16 May 51). COMMENT R The Indian press haa reported
that India watches the embargo plan with considerable anxiety. (See OCI
Daily Digests 25 May 51.)
"B" INDIA. US Serate Votes Loan for Wheat. On 16 May, the US Senate passed
rErn to lend India $190s000,000 to finance the purchase of 22000,000
tons of wheat in the US, with an amendment specifying that repayment of
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all or part of the loan be made with certain strategic Materials in-
cluuing monazite and manganese. (U NY Times, 17 May 51). COMMENTg
In view of Prime Minister Nehru 's statement on 10 May that India would
not supply atomic material to foreign countries (meOCI Daily Digest,
12 May 51),, the probability. of India's readily accepting a US loan is
somewhat lowaioed by the Senate's inclusion of the above amendment in
its food bill.
"B" IND4.HINk0 Fzeneh Surete Murders "Suspecte=in Reprisal. US
? Legation Saigon has been informed that on 12 May French Surete chief
Jumeau of the town of Dalats Bao Dai's summer "c pitall/; ordered
the summary execution of 20 Vietnam se in reprisal for the murder
of another French Surete agents Victor Ha szs on the preceding day.
Unable to apprehend the rebel assassins who had stabbed Haaszs
Jumeau round*d up 20 Vietnamese - seven women two teen-age boyss
and 11 men - and had thaw conveyed by truck outside the towns where
they were i dietely shot. Bac Dai is reported to be profoundly
shocked by this incident. He has suspended the Vietnamese mayor of
Dalats addrass@ not of protest to General De Lattres and
summoned several high French offioials. (C Saigon 1991s 15 May 51).
COMMENZ8 The Leg tic= has not yet h-ard the French versi.n of
this inaVant, but iespatch by the semiofficial French Press
Agency c,onff.rmE.? the Min outlines of the story. The press version
implies the culpability of Zumeaus stating that he had been "worked
up" for many months ad "went mad" with frustration. This incident,
taken together with the brutal murder during a Hanoi riot on 10
.May of two Vietnamese by Foreign Legionnaire may be expected to
have a profoundly disturbing effect on the Vietnamese population.
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KOREA. UnidentifiedT
kitaajaeliekteml. A delayed report from the US Far Eastern Air Forces
reports a night ttek made on a US B-26 bomber northwest of
Pyongyang on 13 iy0 The two enemy aircraft remained unidentified
although the pilot of the B26' stated he believed them to be
Type4 twin-jet fightere. (S FEAF Tokyo AK 75349 15 May 1951),
COJA NTs Although orT previously rep*rted the appearance of
Type-8 fighter e in this area as " xtremely remote" (CCI Daily
Digest, 2 May 51) several report i%oeived subsequently have re
ported the night interception of UN aircraft by unidentified -
lostep? tentatively labeled as Type-8s or some other type twin-tet
aircraft. The Type4 has aonsiderab1. greater combat radius
than the MIG-15, suggesting that these aircraft, if Type-29
are flown from field other than in Kore
Medical Unit Sent tq_Eiegli_Lgmallpox Epidemic in Koreq.
According te a North Korean broadcast of 16 May, a group of
Soviet physicians has entered Nort Korea "to stamp out smallpox
in a short time." (UFBIS, 17 May). COMMENT Pyongyang Radio
announced previously that a ten-man Sovi t anti-epidemic it
arrived in Sinuiju 20 March. A 14 May broadcast announced that
thc USSR an Peopl gs Democruie had sent relief supplies
inaludiag 400 cases o'f vaccines "for preventiofi of epidemics
end aily neeeeeitlie," to Korea. Communist troop in Korea are
known to be suffering from widespread smallpox, and Soviet
propaganda charges that the "US interventionists" are spreading
the smallpox epidemic among the Communist forces in Korea through
use of baeterIclegieal warfar0
AA-17011Attnrits to Ref a e Ca tured North Koren
Dceume ts Indinat' - A ressivs Intent. A 16 May br.adcast fro
the North Korean radio goes to considerable length Lii offering
eviderme designed to label as US forgeries two captured North
Korean docaments which outline Communist tactical plans prior to
25 June for the invasion of South Korea. (R FB1S Tickers 16 May
1951)0 COMEE The length a*. detail into which the Communist
broadcast goes in their attempt at refutation would seem to
indicate that US release of these documents to the UN is viewed
by the Ceo amiets as threateni*, t undermine th ir own fabri-
cated version of the 25 June inva ion.
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New C ese Cc iet Force Ma Attem t Am hibious Landi4g
in Wasterajerea. A Chinese Communist soldier icaptUr Conethe
tip of Ktape peninsula on 16 May, identified his unit as the
64th Regiments 3d Division 4th(T) Chinese Communist Army, The
Prison r stated that his division was to mak an amphibious
leading on the Ximpo peninsula on an unknown date. (S DA CINCFE
Teleeon 4719n 17 May 1951), COMMENTs While the Chinese Communist
64th Regiment is believed subordinate to the 8th Army, both of
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these armies (4th & 8th) are now tentatively accepted in Korea
and are probably acting in concert. A landing on the Kimpo
pe& nsula in the area indicated by the prisoner would be more of
a,rivercrossing thanran amphibious operation. A successful
crossi,* in this area, however, would constitute a considerable
threat to Seoulgs wester* flank. In the light of the general
shift of one.% forces eastward (see below) from the western
sector, the deplo ent of a new Chinese Communist force, plus new
North Korea forcr-s, on the extreM western flank is a definite
possibility.
Easu ard Shift of Communist Fore s Confirmed. A late
r pert fro, th field, included in the 17 May FECOM teleconference,
states that the identification of numerous prisoners, captured ?
on 17 May, from th Chinese Communist 60th and 12th Armies in
th Chunehon area (in central Korea) confirms the eastward displace-
sent of these major fore s from the west central front. ?The US
8th Army, in the same report, gives the current tentative line-up
of Communist force in the battle zone as folloWss Western
Sector - 1, possibly 2, North Korean Corps, possibly a new major
Cines? Communist force ( ee above), and the Chinese Communist
19th A Group; Central Sector - Chinese Communist 60th? 12th,
and 15th Armies, and the 26th and 27th Armies; Eastern Sector -
3 North Koreap Corps. (S A CINCFE Teleoon 4719, 17 May 51).
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
25X1
"A" GERMANY. New Berlin Blockade Considered Unlikely.
in Bert in consiagFi reimposition of the Berlin
25X1 blockade unlikely at the present time. Commenting On recent
speculation in Berlin Communist circles on this subjects, they point
-0u:t. that the SoViets mould probably be unwilling to impose
another blockade now, primarily because this would (1) interfere
with the present political aims of their drives against Vest German
rearilitarization and other EastAest issues, (2) jeopardize the
success of their coming World Youth Festival in Berlins, (3) require
giving up Berlin as a main transshipment point, The Soviets would
only consider a blockade when their current political wooing of
west Germany has outlived its usefulness, and after trade restrictions
make Berlin no longer of value as a transshipment point. These
conditions are regarded-as not nicely to prevail before the end 25X1C
25X1C of 1953.. COMMENT.
previously reported speculation in Berlin Communist circles over
the possibility of a new blockade as a means of exerting pressure
on the Vest at the Big Four Conference in Paris (See CCI Daily
Digest, 2 May 51.) While nothing has occurred in this regard9
the possibility remains that a drastic enforcement of East-Vest
trade controls., substantially reducing Berlinos value as a trans-
shipment point, might hasten Soviet retaliation,
"B" FRANCE. Projected 1952 Militaa7 Expenditures Greater than Foreseen.
The 1evel-Tr7Tench military expenditures now being projectedfor
1952 will probably reach $4 billion. This would be 50 per cent
above the 1951 level and 16.5 per cent of the national income. A
military effort of this magnitude is expected to result in a budget
deficit of $3.1 billion for 19529 as compared to the $2.1 billion
1951 deficit, which already calls for at least $285 million more
in inflationary borrowing than the French say their economy should
carry. In view of the prolonged bickering over the extent of French
commitments following the October 1950 US-French talks9 some officials
hesitate to present the US with this projection and again risk US
disappointment in the event of later reductions, (S Paris 6849,
10 May 51). COMMENTg The $4 billion tentative figure for 1952
military expenditures represents better than a 15 per cent increase
over March 1951 ECA estimates for 1952. The military programs on
which the projected expenditures are based are already under ways,
and at this time there is no reason to expect that the new Parliament
in July would cut back rearmament.
"B" ITALY, Communists Unlike to show sortant Decline in Milan
RUninpal-fleo ions. s a res o poor labor management rerations
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and the negative attitude of a large proportion of Italian business
men, the non-Communist parties do not look for a decline in Com-
munist strength in Milan. While profits are generally highly
satisfactory, low wages and the high cost of living forces an
abnormal number of members of a family to work. This in turn ac-
centuates the number of unemployed in periods of lowered industrial
activity, The development of a strong anti-Communist trade union
movement which would effectively bring the necessary pressure for
wage increase is at this time only a long term prospect. Ca State
Milan Dispatcb, 4539 9 Apr Si; C State Milan, 18 Apr 51). CO! MNT:
The rise of Communism in Northern Italy is in part the result of
short sightedness of local industrialists?amd existing non-Communist
trade unions cannot replace the Communists in fighting for laborse
rights. Under these conditions it appears unlikely that the Com-
munist strength will be reduced significantly in the industrial
centers of Northern Italy in the forthcoming municipal elections,
although Communist municipal representation under the new electoral
law probably will be reduced.
VATICAN, Vatican Re.ortedly Regrets Ciosb'ianks'between S anieh
MACRE
ando Reg
25X1
re a ions be ween Herrera, Bishop of Malaga, and Franco2s Foreign
Minister, hitherto close, reportedly cooled following Herrerags
audience with Pope Pius in the fall of 1950. The Pope was said
to have asked Herrera what was his source of funds, and the Bishop
replied that the only possible source of any substantial amounts
was the Franco regime. The Pope reportedly expressed regret that
the Church should be so linked with the Government, inasmuch as
popular dislike for the regime would be transferred to the Church
when Franco was no longer in powere I I 25X1
23 Apr 51). COMMENT: Although the Vatican has long shown a certain
reserve towaranco by its reftsal to negotiate a concordat, and
presumably does deplore the close association of the Spanish Church
with a repressive regime, the Holy See cannot be expected to take
an official stand in opposition to the Franco Government until it
sees an acceptable alternative which can be arrived at without
revolution. The Spanish Church would have difficulty in disas-
sociating itself from the regime at this time, not only because
of its financial situation, but also because, in the mind of the
Spanish people, the Church (except under the Republic) is traditionally
identified with the Spanish Government.
SWEDEN. Swedes Likei.r to Abstain in UN Vote on Chinese Embargdo.
Ens Swedisfi Foreign 0 ice as i orme Em assy a a ough
recognizing the difference between sanctions as such and an embargo
on the shipment of munitions during actual hostilities, it nevertheless
feels that the proposed embargo on shipments of strategic materials
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to Red China very closely resembles sanctions. The Foreign Office
added that Swedish abstention from the UN vote of 31 Jan branding
Red China an aggressor would be a factor in the 'ultimate decision
of the Swedish Government _on the embargo qnestion, 05 Stockholm
1362,-16 May 51) COMMEtT: This probably means abstention. from
the Membargovote-'31?Tice, the Swedish Government_fears_that sanctions, ,
even in a diluted form constitute one more step towards committing
Sweden to papticiptite in military action against Communist China,
nen ARGENTINA0 Atomic Scientist Richter Re rted Arrested, 25X1
25X1 er? e rnan nuclear
scientist who claimed new atomic discoveries for Argentina, (See
CCI Daily Digests 26 Mar 510) was arrested at Bariloche an 11 May 1951
and at present is under arrest in Campo de Mayo, The arrest was
caused by error or falsehoods in his theories which bave been detected
by local scientists and because of an army report to President Per6n25X1C
on his record in Europe? 1 la
COMMENT: Richter ,3s reported arrest has not been confirmed by other
FEFIEgg.. The repotted arrest not only subject Perton to new
rounds of world-wide ridicule, but mould also increase tension
between him and the army?
"0" BOLIVIA? Pu .ose of Milit (Jou. lained. In a "communique
to the nat on 9 marke by a, reserve tone, he military '"un-ta said
that its action in taking over the Government was not a vu1gar
coup", but instead was dictated by "the desire to maintain public
peace and reestablish harmony among Bolivians". The communique
also said that the Junta mill conduct the government in a "serene
democratic manners repress attempts to Sovietize the nation, respect
its inter-American and international commitments, and control Bolivials
sub-soil resources, which mill be utilited for the peoplevs benefit",
President Urriolagoitiag in his brief resignation note, said that
he chose to turn over power to military in order to preserve democracy
and republican institutions in Bolivia. (C La Paz 540, 16 May Si),
"V 'TRU. Prospects for Firm Offer. of Troo s far Korea,. Embassy.. Lima
reports a Foreign in s er k ag er seep concerned over
the political difficulties that lie ahead of the Governmentlts fulfilling
his written pyomise to US Assistant Secretary of State Miller and
President Odria7s oral promise to Ambassador Tittman that Peru would
provide a contingent of troop e for Korea, Among the political dif-
ficulties in obtaining Congressional approvals Gallagher mentioned:
(1) the effect in Peru of the MacArthur controversy emphasizing
the probability of a long-protracted commitment and the casualties]
that can be expected, and (2) the reluctance or refusal of other
Latin American countries to offer troops, (S TJSAA Lima AFC-19,
11 May 51)0 COMMENT: Gallaghervs concern over Congressional reaction
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A
ib probably genuine, for, while ?dries government is dietatorial,
Odeiadoes not have complete control of Convess-, as was shown in
the last Congrestional session when the Odria-sponsored petroleum
. law failed to pass.
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39
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT
MAY ?I' 7 1351
49187,_
Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLES
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"A" GREECE, Greee will Sqp_p_9221_my UN Action to Hel Yu oslavia if
Attacked? Prime Ndnieter Venizelos has informed the US Embassy in Athens
that he hasinstructed the GreakiMinister in Belgrade to emphasize an all
appropriate o'..vcasions to high Yugoslav officials that, in case of attack
on Yugoslavia, Greece is ready to fulfill its obligations under the UN,
and to take whe,,aver action in support of Yugoslavia as is recommended by
the UN, (TS S/S Athens 3932, 16 May 51), COMMENT?, The danger to Greece
presented by a Soviet or Satellite occupation of Yugoslavia is well under-
stood by th(-- Greeks and in recent weeks they have been interested in
secvring miatary ocoperation between the two ccuntries. Yugoslavia, how-
ever, has he reluctant to start lormal talks. (See CCI Daily Digest,
15 hay 51).
I/An INDIA, USSR R, orl-edl. Ur ;es India to Call a Five Power Peace ConferenCe?
According to the French Embassy in Washington the French Embassy in New
Delhi-has been infak'med by the Yugoslav Ambassador to India that the USSR
is urging India to call a "peace conference" of the "Big Five" at New
Delhi. (S S/S State 1907, 14 May 51), CONVENT: While there is no con-
firmation of this report, it would be a logical move for the USSR to rinks
as part of its o.,wrent, world-wide propaganda campaign callilme for a Five
Power Peace Patet. India would presumably be considered by the USSR as an
acceptable place in which to hold the conference since that countrygs
neutral attitude toward both the East and the West is well knoWn. Ftrther-
;
more, Prime Minister Nehru might be flattered at the wo pa:0A or being
host to such a meeting. Finally, the USSR has probably shreWdly calculated
that Western refusal to accept an Indian invitation would greatly prejudice
the Western powers In Indian eyes. Since India in recent honths has shown
an awareness of COMNUMiSt propaganda taahniques it is believed that India
will not respond to the Soviet approach?
"B" PAK:1511.N? Za:Ustan Will S end Thz,ostoKorea If US Su oats It A inst
India and krvhaz).7.7.L? Prime Minister Liaquat All Khan of Pakistan has as-
eared US Ambassador Wawran of his G-overnment vs willingness to provide one
division of 4_,Tozps f,,-.3r Ban/116e in li.c)rea if the US is prepared to give
Pakistan aeoatzl- -1-Ate:e.t acr-,aa.Uy important to that ThRde by his county in
siding irre-o-ca ay with the West, Specifically, the Prime Minister suggest
that the US suppd:Nt him against India in the matter of Kashmir and against
Afghanistan in the matter of Puehtoxistan. (S Karachi 1067 15 May 51)0
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"B" INDONESIA? Indonesia Favors Soviet and Communist China Partici ation in
(la ese Peace Treat but will ne otiate re. dless. The Indonesian
Foreign Einister, Subardjo, told US Ambassador Cochran that in line with
Indonesiags independent foreign policy, his government favors partici-
pation of both Soviet Russi and Communist China in the Japanese peace
treaty. However, he said that if this should not prove feasible, Indonesia
would be willing to go ahead without them? (S S/S Djakarta 1600, 16 Nay 51).
CCENENTg Sub jogs statement represents the first firm commitment from an
Asian nation that it would participate in negotiations for a Japanese
Peace Treaty whisla were shunned by the USSR and Communist China? It is
expected, howevet., that all other Asian nations invited to participate
will accept even though several definitely desire the presence of the two
Communist nations.
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