DAILY DIGEST APRIL 28 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000200010001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 28, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGECJ] AG) CY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST
Date: APR 2 8 195
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the internal use of the.
Office of Current Intelligence. VIt does not
represent a complete coverage of all current
reportq in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
3. Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
"A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
"B" - important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
"C" - other information indicating trends
and potential developments
State Dept. review completed
39
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
25X1
{ n.-ti- u.. os av ora an a.
an appreciable amount of Cominform propaganda material is
being srriu ;g ed into Yugoslavia from Trieste mainly through the agency of 25X1 C
the Trieste Communist Party. ship-
ments of such material into Trieste from. Moscow and the Satellite capitals
havo been so voluminous that the post office has had to call up the Party
to remove them in order to keep its space clear. Little is known of the
means used to infiltrate this material into Yugoslavia,
the material is
taken into Yugoslavia by regular couriers to Fiume and Pola but also 25X1 C
directly across the Zone A .- Yugoslav' border, From information available
in Trieste the anti-Tito propaganda material routed through Trieste con-
sists largely of publications of pro-Cominform Yugoslav emigres in Mos-
cow, Praha and Sofia. There are no indications as to whether Trieste is
a routing point for Albanian or Rumanian propaganda against Tito. II 25X1
CO1411ENT Ther -6 is considerable. evidence that
0 ormists have been successful in their efforts to smuggle literature
into Yugoslavia, The Yugoslav White Book specifically mentions several
such incidents.
25X1X
25X1 C
25X1A
25X1X
"B" YUGOSLAVIA. Dedi ?er Restates Yugoslav- Attitude Toward. Alban a i Po
.-
ents, Yugosl r theoretician V.ladimer Dedijer
has exp azne that e purpose of his recent Borba article regarding
the dangers of Western machinations in. Albania was to rebut Moscow's
Izvestia accusation that Yugoslavia was collaborating in plans for an
attack on Albania. He asserted that both leaflets and parachutists.,
intended for Albania., had been dropped' in Kossovo and Netohija areas of
Yugoslavia by planes coming from Italy. He also declared that similar
activity had been undertaken from Gr eece$ but that he ha,,-!. refrained from
mentioning specific acts in his article because of the disturbing effects
it might have on relations with Greece, asserted that this activity
on Yugoslavia soil did not cause his Government undue concern because it
was kept completely under control by the authorities, but that the Yi-Lgo?-
slav Government was seriously concerned. that the Soviet Union might
utilize the current Albanian crisis to involve Yu oslavia as an alleged
aggressor against Albania. COty o Dedi.jer's 25X1A
reference to his attempt t U, a roe in .-western machi-
nations in Albania is another evidence of Yugoslavia's desire to promote
closer ties between the two countries. In his article on t- bania Dedijer's
only reference to possible Greek complicity was a statement that certain
Greek circles also hold similar aspirations for the overthrow of the
Albanian Government,
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SECTION 2 EASTERN
"B" IRAN. Prune Minister Ala Resi s,
Fl cabinet tendered their resi atisns2w April Prime Minister Ala and
This action followed by one day the Parliamentary' ilcCommission's nre,o
mendation that Parliament vote on its; recent proposal (26 hat~
nationalization of the oil industry be speeded up by the establishment of
a 12-man board of Iranians to "take immediate control of the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company" (AIOC). Press reports state that the Parliament (Majlis) on'
28 April asked the Shah to a
Mohammed Mossad ppoint as the country's new Prime Minister Dr.
5X1 A resources* The oil
CC)
WjTp.VT
The choice o ossa e
b
re
oc-
q
y Vie is way
3. 8
cupation with oil nationalization. However, it islsomewhat szrprisingGin
view of Mossadeq's previous preference for remaining outside the Govern-
ment with the concomitant privilege of criticizing it. Even if
which is doubtful in view of the Shah's dislike of the National Front nand.,
the terrorist methods which it has exhibited following the assassination of
Prime Minister Razmara, it is debatable whether Mossadeq would be able to
form a cabinet satisfactory to the Majlis. Whatever action the Shah takes,
the situation will remain tense, and the oil issue will continue to dominate
the situation,
"B" ISRAEL SYRIA. Israeli Broadcast Calls for A_
on p y Action. Tel Aviv broadcasts
3 A ril heara in Damascus called for decisive action by the Israeli A
to deal with the "intolerable" situation in the demilitarized zone. While
the US Legation in Damascus is unable to judge whether the broadcasts were
"authoritative," it notes that there is local concern lest the present lull
in the UNSC proceedings might permit Israel to present the world with another
fait accompli." UN officials and observers have not only expressed disil-
lu is o-' rmien- t d frustration over lack of
guidance to the Legation,but have also let their opinions besknown tosthe
press. The Legation has been infon ed by a Syrian army staff officer that
,the Syrian will open fire if Israeli "i
5X1A 'zed zone,y units nvade" the demilitar-
Israeli bro cas s anstrong s?a 'men s by-- NS. l Despite threatening
specific data which would indicate that large-scale ostilitiesarelikely
to break out. However, until the UN machinery in Palestine is strengthened,
the development of frictions is encouraged, and resort to violence remains
a temptation.
"C" AFGHANISTAN. Independent Newspaper ANGAR Banned,
ported that the first independent newspaper in bull hasb be has re-
temporarily because of articles contrary to national unity,
Due to the weakness of opposition groups, the Government had no rear of in
ternal repercussions and it is probably more concerned with outside reaction,
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25
 5X1A
5X1A
25X1 C
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especially criticism from the rTmrAY nm, n+ ,s+' Pn1,- _a-__
25X1A
to be given the impression that it is under fire by an internal opposition.
Pakistan might utilize such impressions to its own advantage in the present
Afghan-Pakistani dispute. In any event, the appearance of a genuinely free
press in Afghanistan is still a development of the future.
THAILAND. General Kach's Return Rumored, Several reports indicate that
General Luang Kach Songgram may return to Thailand. In a recent press
statement, the Premier's secretary-general stated that Phibun had replied
favorably to a letter from Kach requesting permission to return from exile
in Hong Kong. Phibun allegedly told Kach he would first have to undergo,
an investigation. US Embassy comments that it is unable to say whether
or not Kach will return, but points out that there is precedent for an
advance deal between the two avin the way for Kaches return and exonera-
tion COIUA44ENT: Kach was one of the strong
men in q e it is brought Phibun to power. Because of Kach's
notoriously corrupt activities, Phibun was forced to sacrifice him in
order to protect the reputation of his regime. If Kach returns as a
private citizen, no harmful developments are to be anticipated, out his
return to high office woulc cause se ions criticism and a weakening of
Phibun's Government.
"A" INDOCHINA. Ho Chi Minh Forces Prepare foOffensive. Although there have
been several indications, including a radio announcement from Hogs GHQ,
that Vietnamese rebel forces plan to return to guerrilla ir.,,arfare. re
evidence tends to indicate otherwise. 25
indicating an assembly in the Thai Nguyen area ror the "Campaign of Highway
No. 3" (which passes through Thai Nguyen and links Hanoi with the. border
post of Caobang). Air reconnaissance has disclosed heavy activity along
the Langson-Hanoi road which might be interpreted as a logistical build-up
o
f th
r ano er mayor effort just prior to the rainy r ch begins about
one month from'now? C01 44ENT: Unless 25X1A
Ho 's forces attack nov:, r activity will be greatly restricted by the
rainy season, which lasts until August or September. On the other hand,
the period of the Tonkin mist has just passed, and operations of the French
forces during the next month will be favored by excellent flying weather.
The imminence of an attack by Ho's forces has not been reported by other
sources.
"A" CHINA. Communist China's Railroad to Indochina Scheduled for Early Completion.
built by. the Chinese Communists to the Indochina scheduled f
or
completion the end of April. arms and ammunition
25X1 C
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25X1A
"'""'" 25X1C
s
t
or o no Chi Minh 8s forces in Indochina,
'
are already being carried by the railroad as far as its present terminal 25X1A
point at Nanning (about 100 miles from the border) an route from there
other means of tran
t
i
ingits functions, and to dispose of USAmateriel onlymwithoUSlco psent.'m-
25X1X
vide a major transport.arte forrsupplying hthe Cointo mmunist the ,USSR and pro-
na
Indochina. Early completion of this section is expected,sinceemost of
the work on the roadbed has already been finished. The Chinese Communists
are now engaged in laying the ties and rails.
CHINA. Nationalist Acceptance of US Aid Terms; The Chinese Nationalists
announced on 26 April their acceptance, on 9 February, of US terms
providing for strict supervision of US military aid. The Nationalists
agreed to employ US aid entirely for defensive purposes, to prevent dis-
closure of classified information to t
COUITF^-"
: Comp et Ion of
e ina sec ion _rom ann ~???""`"-
g co a with the Communist rail
net extending from South Chi
nave een wi e y criticized or compromising previous
us rogramsTb a oo s
~' P g y poor
or frivolous strategic planning, ignoring problems of security, impeding
the implementation of aid programs, and employing such aid for private
gain. The current agreement seeks to guard against such practices. How-
ever the a poii
p of Gen. LIU 25X6
does not n ,,,..A,o , ..
"A" Combined Chinese Communist-Viet Minh General Staff.
the establishment of a combined Chinese Commun s - e? Minh
,.,..general staff at Nanning. Political and military missions, each with an
economic, propaganda, and liaison section are said 25X1 C
Indochina at Moncay, Langson, and Caohang Chinese to be ist perso i
l
with these missions reportedl wear VietMinhuniformo~n~v ersnne
CO_AEWT:
E
igh-level Sino-Vie in meetings e a anning in
December point up the probability of the existence of a combined command
to coordinate any current and proposed joint operations. Despite their
official reluctance to acknowledge outside participation, the French have
frequently mentioned the presence of numerous Chinese Communist advisors
with Ho's forces.
"B" JAPAN. Jaran's Industrial Production Analyzed b SOAP, In a report to the
Munition- aid on Japan's industrial potential, SCAP reports t.h,r indus-
trial production for December 1950, which established a new post-war nigh,
as still only 56% of available capacity. In respect to utilization of
this idle capacity, SCAP points out that Japan's participation in the free
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world's military production program would (1) assist the US in meeting
overall defense requirements, (2.) contribute to Japan's economic survival,
(3) psychologically align Japan more closely with the democracies, (4) edu-
cate Japan in the manufacture of items required for its future independent
strength, and (5) make Japan's ultimate full armed participation in Western
defense efforts more assured. On the other hand, Japan's specific exclusion
from future MDAP production could be construed as discriminatory, resulting
in serious disruption of international good-will, and opening
of approach to Comm appeal in Japan. 25X1A
25X1A COa' RENT: Communes vas markets and its
nuility to provide Japan with needed raw materials at cheap prices has
produced strong sentiment among Japanese industrial interests for an enlarge-
ment of Japan's trade relations with Communist China.
"B" KOREA. US Official Comments on South Korean Economic Situation. Ambassador
Muccio, commenting on-the ROK government's increasing awareness of the
serious inflation and the efforts to combat it, states that the Finance
Ministry's optimistic viers on the size of the deficit are not realistic
and that the best that can be hoped for is a retardation of the present
inflationary rate. The Ambassador singles out the heavy rate of South
Korean currency expenditure by the UN Forces (Won 137 billion total by
21 April) as the most critical factor in the inflation, and adds that the
withdrawal of currency from circulation by governmental action or sale
of commodities and relief goods is in no way an offsetting factor for
this expenditure. The Ambpssador concludes with the pessimistic state-
ment that the "delay in activating UNKRA (United Nations Korean Relief
Agency) and the premature disestablishment of ECA leaves a void in the
Korean economy which cannot and is not being filled" by interim economi
Activities to generate revenue for the ROK. 25X1A
COMMENT: Inflation in the ROK, although becom.Lag Increasing y ere ical,
has not yet reached the stage where the population has no faith in the
currency or the government behind it. Currency in circulation of 21 April
has increased 150% over the December 1950 level.to Won 375 billion.
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COMMENT: The Prime Minister probably feels tha ge ing
sanction for modifying the police decentralization and anti-cartels
laws, both of which are important Occupation reforms, he can avoid inter-
national criticism which would attend such action subsequent to the, peace
treaty.
"C" Yoshida Desires Modification of Occupation Reforms. At a press
conference on 25 April, Prime Minister Yoshida stated that "GHQ is getting
more and more sympathetic with our policy of bringing together the Mari-
time Safety Agency, the local autonomous police and the National Rural
Police." He stated he also hoped to gain GHQ approval for r v' inp, he
law eliminating excessive concentration of economic power. 25X1A
25X1A
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"C" GERMANY, Adenauer to Delay Action on Extending Co Determination.
The west German Government considers the recent legislation granting
co-determination (labor participation in management) in the coal-
steel field a "special case" rather than a precedent, Chancellor
Adenauer is therefore anxious to resist pressure for early passage
of legislation extending co-determination either to all industry or
to any individual sectors of industry. Federal policy will eventual]y
entail support of a general all-industry co-determination bill granting
far less voice to Labor than does the coal-steel law, in an attempt
to maintain coalition solidarity at the expense of rejecting some
Labor demands, But Adenauer will probably delay this action, partly
25X1 A in order to secure trade union support for the Schuman Plan. 25X1 A
CO1f4ENT: Adenauer, in personally con uc
lass-minute negotiations on co -steel co-determination, made many
concessions to Labor which have been strongly criticized ty members
of his own coalition, so that he is likely to.avoid another show-down
for as long as possible,
"A" FRANCE, French Communist "Peace" Policy now Tacitly Admits In-
evi a ility of War. Auguste Lecoeur, Frenc ommunis Party politburo
member, has told the party's Central Committee in a keynote speech
that the threat of war is growing constantly as the balance of power
becomes less favorable to the "imperialist" camp. He reportedly
failed to state that war was not inevitable-a declaration made on
similar occasions by Thorez in September and Duclos in February,
Lecoeur went on to exhort French Communists to be prepared to under-
25X1A take general strikes ven revolution as a wayz to "defend peace".
COLT ENT: Lecoeur's'statement presents.
no new facet of French communist policy, but is noteworthy for its
confident tone, particularly in the sharp reminder of what,is expected
of the party in an international crisis. Some of this militancy,
however, may be explainable as an attempt on Lecoeur's part to regain
the favor of top Communist leaders, since he had previously been
reported as admonished on 12 March for "deviationist" ideas,
"B" Fate of French Stopgap Anti-inflation program will be Decided
Next Week, The National Assemb y yesterday f e by three votes to pass the electoral reform bill over the Council of the Republic's
veto, but another vote has been made possible by subsequent committee
action and will probably be taken early next week, Although Premier
Queuille had stated that he would be unable to carry on without
approval of electoral reform, President Auriol refused to accept his
resignation and the Cabinet then decided to try again. On the as-
sumptiWns that the 'Assembly supports the committee recommendation to
reconsider the bill and that only slight modifications are introduced,
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June elections "appear still possible". 25X1A
COT ,ANT: Immediate approval of electora-L reform to reduce ommunis
representation is the keystone of Queuillees program., which consists
mainly of stopgap economic measures pending June elections, The
present Assembly appears wholly incapable of taking long-term measures
adequate to stem the mounting inflation which is a basic threat to
French rearmament efforts, and the government has a good chance of
mustering the necessary additional votes for the electoral bill,
Queuille has been reluctant to make this bill the subject of a vote
of confidence because his party-the Radical, Socialists--is deeply
divided on the issue. Even should he decide to do so next week,
however, it is unlikely that the opposition would reach an absolute
majority, which would entail the fall of the government and probably
immediate elections, without electoral reform,
FRANCE. Communists Will Not Support b Joint Ticket In Elections.
Etienne r'ajon, french Communist I'arty~F'CF leader c rargew
propaganda and parliamentary and international questions, has told
the Central Committee that under no circumstances will the Communists
present candidates in conjunction with another party, even extremes
left wing sympathizers, in the forthcoming elections. Fajon is op-
posed in principle to inter-party affiliation. This. declaration is
the first official stand taken by the P;F regarding the. ajo-oro
general P1 en M on s 25X1 A
C%..NT: it. e party does
not anticipate any increase in the number of its seats in the
Assembly. 25 X1
"B" ITALY. Labor Discontent Rises. A joint Communist and non-Communist
nation wi e 2 -our transportation strike of 2!~OOOO has been
completely successful. Simultaneously the Communist-controlled
General Confederation of Labor called a sympathy strike (presumably
of short duration) affecting an estimated 600,000 metal workers,
in solidarity for the workers of large industrial plants in Reggio
Emilia and La Spezia who have ben ` le for months owing to a lack
25X1A of orders. COIRvENT: This is the first
time in many months a the ommunists have been able either to call
a successful strike or to obtain the cooperation of the non-Communist
labor unions. Evidence of growing restiveness in other sectors of
the economy is a clear indication that labor as a whole is becoming
increasingly dissatisfied with the cost of living. This problem and
the idleness of metal workers spring from: (1) world-wide inflationary
pressures, (2) poor planning on the part of the Italian economic
ministries, and (3) the procrastination of the Italian Parliament in
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approving the rearmament bill, which would stimulate activity in the
metal working industry and ensure further US aid. The increasing
labor discontent at this time will be cleverly exploited. by the
Communists in the impending municipal elections. It will also lead
to increasing demands within the government for the removal of the
already unpopular economic ministers.
ITALY. Choice of New President of Senate Avoids Renewed friction
in Government. According to he Italian press., the govenrnmet parties
have. decided that Enrico de Nicola., ex-President of the Republic,
will succeed the late Ivanoe Bonomi as President of the Italian
Senate. COYi':.NT: In ex-President De Nicola,
formerly Liberal but presently o- no strong party affiliation., the
government has found a man who will be generally acceptable to the
Senate and to Parliament as a whole. Furthermore, the Christian Demo-
crats, by not proposing that the post be occupied by a member of their
own party (which has a plurality but not a majority in the Senate),
have avoided intra-party dissension over the nominee. Premie?
De Gasperi is particularly anxious that the recently increasing friction
among the right, left, and center wings of his Christian Democratic
Party be subordinated in the face of the forthcoming nation-wide local
elections.
"C" NETHERLANDS. Dutch Commitment for Defense Firm. The official- noti-
fica i o-d-el ivered to US of icials y the Ne erlands Director for
ECA r AP Affairs commits the Dutch Government to its share of the
Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) and implies a 6 billion guilder
defense expenditure over the next four years, provided sufficient
US end item and economic aid are forthcoming. In the event the budget
estimate for fulfillment of the defense program, termed the "maximum
possible", is too small due to price rises and other factors, the-
Netherlands will give budget priority to the TVTTDP. ' 25X1 A
25X1 A COT"U,MNT: The Dutch Government made this c.onnn.l men
in orma y about a month ago. Although the overall defense program
estimate is below the Netherlands' estimated uapabi.liti..es the 1951
planned expenditure of 1.5 billion guilders is probably the maximum
politically feasible at present. The impact of defense spending on
the country's economy may make implementation of the defense program
difficult, although the Dutch., by measures being undertaken to curtail
wage and price rises, seem firmly commi d to sacrifice welfare needs
for defense.
LATIN AMERICA. WFTU and CTAL Sponsor Inter-American Ar.'rari an ('.nnfPrPnnc
Federation of Trade Unions) will come to Mexico on 1 May at the
invitation of Lombardo Toledano to attend an inter-American conference
of agrarian leaders sponsored by the CTAL (Confederaci'on de Trabajadores
x press report states that Louis Saille.n , lea .er of tY-e VVFT`tJ World ~~
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de la America Latina).
25X1 C
25x1 C
1i,omoarao
and otfter CTAofficers met to scuss the pans in ae i on 26 Feb 51,
and evolved a program based upon Mex~can agrarian theories-destruction
of large landed estates; respect for peasant property; establishment
of rural credit banks; technical aid to the peasants from the government;
and agrarian legislation. In accordance with WFTU instructions, it
was planned to attempt to form a single peasant league for all of Latin
America which "serve basis for a world-wide peasant
25X1A federation". COlUNTNT:
The agrarian conference represents ano er ;ace-r, ol Me Communist
executive meeting in uc arest in December 1950 25X1 A
program to establish class solidarity on an international, and potentially
global, basis. Its chief;and immediate effect, however, will be to
establish a new agency through which international Communism can
circulate propaganda purporting to represent the best interests of the
Latin American agricultural worker and peasant.
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SECRET 39
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Cr 9168
DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT
-APR 2 8 1951
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLES
28 April 1951
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"C" INDIA. Hh Government Official Hopes
-^ _ Lie Will Not Visit
India._ In
with
ss
H
-- .,
.vs
endt + ., v_i
Girja Shanker Bajpai on 2 April, Sir
, Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs, stated that he personally hoped Trygvie Lie, Secretary General of
the United Nations, would not visit India in the near future as he would
25X6 s e e no go d e by d:)jW
25X6
commen s -oa.ss or erson
Baj
w e pa s remarks tray not prec rely reflect the atti-
tude of the Indian Gove
rnment, he probably would not have made them unless
he thou ht they d the vi
P
ews o
rime Minist Nh 25X1 A
ereru. 5X1A CNT: Ambassador Henderson has prig>:~tely
expressed an opinion to the effect that India no longer considers the UN
an effective instrument for romoti collective security.
5X1 C
men s may be an a i ion, LE 1U ion o r a s is e Je n the aefficaccye-
of the UN. It shc;zld not be assumed, however, that Indian disappointment
in the UN necessarily means that India.
future. therefrom in the near
.
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