CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100500001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 27, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CENTRAL, INTl;h]"i G NCN A(-',Y1rJ0Y
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST
Date: APR 2 7 1951
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the internal use of the
Office of Current Intelligence. It does not.
represent a complete coverage of all current
reportq in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2, Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
3. Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
"A? items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
?311 - important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
"C" - other information indicating trends
and potential developments
State Dept. declassification .& release instructions on file
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SECTION 1 (SOv]ET)
"A" USSR, Embassy Views Soviet Intentions Unaffected by Year's Setbacks, In
their preliminary annual report on Soviet intentions., Embassy Moscow notes
that the USSR is employing separately and in combination politicaly psycho-
logical, economic and military weapons in the prosecution of a total war
against the free world. (1) Politically - psychologically, they concurrently
use "peace" campaigns and increasing war-scare tactics; (2) Economically,
they continue to build USSR military potential and consolidate Satellite
economies to this end; (3) Militarily, they have committed subservient
regimes, which they covertly support, to open aggression. Believing that
the Kremlin will intensify to the maximum the drive toward their objec--
tives, the Embassy anticipates that the Soviet leaders are prepared to
incur major risks.of precipitating global hostilities. However,, probably
because they are presently uncertain of victory in war? they wish to avoid
committing their own armed forces, and instead apply continued pressures
of the types mentioned, believing they will eventually create a situation
more favorable to "engaging their ultimate weapon." Nevertheless, the
Embassy and particularly the service attaches, feel that the USSR's
present relative military strength and its future diminution as a result
of Western defense efforts could lead the Kremlin to "cast the die with-
out delay." The Embassy feels that Korea and implementation of NATO have
been setbacks to the USSR during the past year, but concludes that main-
tenance of the present uneasy balance and eventual improvement of the
situation depends on the West's determination and unity in rapidly
increasing resistance forces to the extent necessary to convince the
Politburo of the inevitable disaster of a military adventure. The Embassy
is convinced that Western Europe is still the center of danger for the
US, but that threats to Asia and the Middle East are of "serious import."'
(TS Moscow 1869, 25 Apr 51).
"B" MoscowAtnounces May Day Slogans. The slogans, issued by the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks,, again proclaimed
May Day as a day of "proletarian solidarity" to be celebrated in a "battle
for peace" against Western aggression. The first 12 of the 59 slogans
deal with international affairs, hailing all peoples fighting for peace.
Special greetings were sent to the Chinese people "who have won freedom
and independence," and to the peoples of Korea, Germany, Yugoslavia,
and colonial countries, who are fighting for "national independence."
The remainder of the slogans exhort the workers of the USSR to further
economic successes;, linking the struggle of economic rights with the
struggle for peace." (U FBIS, 26 Apr 51). COPVENT: The May Day slogans
are always a recapitulation of practically all major themes of current
Soviet propaganda, For this reason, four new slogans were interjected to
bring last year's list up to date. (1) Greetings to the freedom-loving
Korean people. (2) "Long live the foreign policy of the Soviet Union,
a policy of peace and security, equality of rights, and friendship of
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peoples." (3) Reference to the National Economic Plan for 1951, (4) Call;
for the successful constructions on the Volga and the Dnieper, the Don
and .lam-Darya. In additions last years term "warmonger" was spelled out
to mean "US, British, French, and other millionaires."
"B" EASTERN EUROPE. CZ'ECHOSLO AKIA. Qatis May Be Used in Possible Clementjs
Trial. US Ambassador Briggs cables from : Praha. that the arrest of William
F.,, Oatis (see OCI Daily Digest, 26 Apr 51) may be an integral part of
Communist plans for a trial involving Clementis and numerous others,
possibly including the Fields,, with important albeit undisclosed :issues
and purposes. He states that charges against.Oatis follow the usual Cow-
nist pattern, in which the sense of justice is so perverted that there is
practically no chance of obtaining Oatis' release prior to. the trial and
that his conviction is virtually assured regardless of his innocence.
Briggs advises that a cautious approach may be best for Oatis; however, a
protest alone would probably be futile.,, Cautioning that the US must
recognize the limitations and possible consequences of actions that it
ma take,, the US Ambassador suggests two possible courses of action:
(l) retaliation against Czechoslovak correspondents in the US or Germany;
and (2) prohibition of all non-official US travel to Czechoslovakia and
the immediate departure of all non-official US citizens from the country.
(S Praha 363, 26 Apr 51).
"B" Rt3MAUA. Rumanian Manpower Pool Increased. The recent mass dismissal of
white-collar and other employees in State and other offices and plants is
estimated by legation Bucharest to approximate 20 to 40%. Although dis-
missed employees were reportedly told that the reason was "budgetary,"
the legation speculates that a more important reason may be the urgent
need for manpower in Government electrification, industrialization and
construction programs. A recent presidium decree, which cuts the period of
schooling for Rumanians from 11 to 7 years, is also probably intended to
increase the manpower pool. (C Bucharest 704, 20 Apr 51).
"B"
25X1X
Transport Workers Dismissed.
formerly from Ploesti, reports at in mid-March at eaE
railroad personnel in Bucharest were dismissed and replaced by
"young graduates who are thorou hl indoctrinated with Communist Party
creeds." CONY ENT: Although it is possible
that the dismissals.may be a part of the general dismissals taking
place in Rumania of State employees, it is more likely that the reported
dismissals of railway employees are indicative of tightening Soviet
control of the railroads, A decree of the Rumanian presidium reported
in early April (OCI Daily, 10 Apr 51) created a separate Ministry of
Transport in conjunction with reorganization of the old Ministry of
Communications.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
GREECE. US Embassy Analyzes Municipal Elections, US Embassy Athens
reports that most-Greek municipal election returns are now in and that
in general there has been a slight swing to the right., some decrease
in leftist strength and a slightly lower vote for the left-center
National Progressive Union (EPEK) of Plastiras than was predicted,.
The Embassy cpmments that the most important results appear to be that
the fear,-,d swing to the left did not materializes the women's vote did
not tip the scales in favor of the Cormnunists, and that the-government's
tenure has not been seriously jeopardized by the results. While the
municipal elections appears on the wholes to have been beneficial since
they decreased fear of the lefts the general feeling continues to be
that national elections will be necessary by the late summer or early
fall. (C Athens 3623., 25 Apr 51; U Athens 3474, 16 Apr 51). C010AENT:
The general effect of the elections appears to have been to strengthen
slightly the current goverment in Greece. EPEK's relative political
standing is apparently not strong enough to challenge the government
successfully., although EPEK has retained and perhaps increased its
strength in some areas. Moreover, while leftist dominance in a few
areas seems certain.., municipal governments in Greece do not have much
powers and leftist representation in municipal councils is not likely to
do much ham or to advance the Communist cause appreciably except possibly
in. propaganda, matters. While Plastiras has reportedly reaffirmed his
support of the present government., agitation for national elections will
undoubtedly continue., and they may well be held next fall.
"BO IRAN. Parliaments Commission Ur es Government Control of Ark lo-Iranian
. Oil Company IO , A special Parliamentary Oil Commission voted on 26
April to ask Parliament to set up a 12_ man Iranian government board to
"take immediate control of the AIOC.". This move followed rioting in Resht
where a number of persons was in4""red. Parliament is expected to meet
Saturday or Sunday to act on the proposal. If it is approved., the 12-man
board would be empowered to take over the activities of the q.IOC
immediately. (U New York Times., 27 Apr 51). COM ENT: The dt-fficulties
involved in Iranian control and/or operation of do not in any way
seem, to have daunted Parliament's enthusiasm on the issue. There is no
indication that either the AIOC or the UK., which have apparently been bank-
ing on the assumption that Iran would not go through with the proposed
nationalizations has taken any positive steps to forestall such action.
While the board proposed by the Oil Commission would appear to be an interim
control body to be succeeded by an Iranian operating company., it is doubt-
ful whether the UK-Iranian cooperation necessary to assure the UK any real
voice in that company will be forthcoming.
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88C99 SYRIA. Lt. Col. Shishakli Becomes Chief of Staff, On 23 April the Syrian
Ministry of Defense announced the appointment of Lt. Col. Shishakli as
Chief of Staff replacing Lt. Col. Bannud who was designated Military Attache
to Turkey. Field Comment: The elevation of Shishakli to Chief of Staff
seems to foreshadow no change in Syrian Army policy but confirms behind-the-
scenes control of the army which Shishakli has exercised since the coup
dfetat of December 1949. The fact that Bannud is a relative of former Prime
Minister Cads whose cabinet fell recently-probably also enters into his
removal. CO LENT: Shishakli has managed to remain somewhat in the back-
ground taat has been the real power in Syria since December 1949. The recent
di..,sc asions held by Shishakli in Cairo with Egyptian officials and. Prince
Feisal9 Saudi Arabian Defense Minister9 strengthened Shishakli's position
in the Arab world and probably improved his personal relations with the
Saudi .Arabian Government.
INDIA. Government Bans Export of All Rubber Tires and Tubes. On 1.9 April
the Government of India banned the expor off all varieties of rubber tires
A..d tubes. Various Government officials stated., however., that (1) tire
and tube shipments to Pakistan might be permitted under the trade agreement
with that country., (2) it might be difficult to prevent the export. of war
surp"Las tires under the embargo as the Government had sold many tires to
Indian buyers during the last three years with a guarantee of the right to
exp'.5'te a:.~~ (3) the ban might be relaxed shortly to allow exports9 probably
by manufacturers only., to "traditional markets". Trade circles in, Bombay
considered the ban a step to clear the air prior to renewal of tire exports
under a new system of controls. (U New Delhi 28579 16 Apr 51; C New Delhi
2889 16 Apr 51- C Bombay 554, 18 Apr 51). COMMENT.- Many Indian tires
and tubes have apparently been finding their way into Communist China., and
the US has approached the Government of India with a view to ending this
traffic. The present ban on tire exports may therefore result partly from
US representations and partly from Indian embarrassment over the publicity
these exports were receiving though the G0I would never publicly admit that
the embargo was aimed primarily at China. As the above comments by Indian
officials and trade circles suggest,9 however., the ban may be neither
absolute nor lasting. Indian friendship for China as well as Indias
99neutral" foreign policy will undoubtedly affect a final decision regarding
permanency of the ban. Repeated US protests against continued exports to
China or threats of a US embargo on carbon black (which is necessary for the
manufacture of tires) may raise Indian outcries of "economic dictatorship"
or "power politics".
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"B" INDIA. Trade With China. On 19 April, Indian Commerce Minister H.K. Mahatab
told Parliament that during 1950 India's exports to China were valued at
Rs. 24,000,000 (45,01.0,000), and included chemicals, shellac, and :rubber
products. Imports from China, worth Rs. 5,000,000 ($i,o5O,OOO), included
drugs, medicine, camphor, machinery, cotton, and raw silk. The balance of
trade was favorable to India by Rs. 19,000,000 (63.,990.,000). (U New York
Times,, 20 Apr 51). COMhi1ENT If India has to import considerable quantities
of Chinese grain, in 1951 to ease its current food crisis, it will face a
reversal of its balance of trade. Since India would undoubtedly wish to
prevent: an unfavorable balance of trade if possible, it might be disinclined
to yield to pressure to limit the export of rubber tires and other automo-
tive equipment to China.
"B" INDONESIA. Coalition Cabinet Formed. A Coalition cabinet including pri-
marily members of the Masjumi (Moslem) Party and the Indonesian National
Party (PNI) was announced on 26 April. The new government is headed by
Chairman of the Masjumi, with Surirjo of the PNI as Deputy
Prime Minster. Other parties represented in the cabinet are the Greater
Indonesian Pa.,.ty, the Indonesian Catholic Party,'the Labor Party, the In-
don-sian Christian Party, the Party of Greater Indonesia, and the Democratic
Faction. The Sukiman Cabinet's program, as announced, is based.upon the
following points;: (1) preu:rvation of domestic security; (2) drafting and
im:la:1.~q;nta?;ion of a national tirulfare program; (3) preparations for a general
eltuueetion; (4) enactment of labor legislation; (5). pursuit of an independent
foreign policy; and (6) revision of Netherlands-Indonesian relations.
(P. FMS Ticker Djakarta, 26 and 27 Apr 51) CO'~,IENT: The new cabinet, although
headed by the Mas juini, indicates definite concessions to the PNI and a trend
toward the left. Although it has stronger parliamentary support than the
previous government, its members generally are less capable than those of
the N?tsi.r cabinet. Two of the most able men in the former gov--rnment--
both 71-imbeers of the Mas juini.--Foreign Affairs Minister Rum and Finance
Minister Sjafruddin--Subardjo, an opportunist who claims Masjumi affilia-
tion but whose past career includes cooperation ;Frith Tan Malaka's "national
Communist" movement. Sjafruddin has been succeeded by Wibisono of the
Jasjun:1i--a person of considerably lass, ability than his predecessor. The
new Justice Mni_ster, Mohammed Yamin, a non-party man, has distinguished
himself chiefly in recent months by noisy demands for Netherlands New
Guinea, and like Subardjo, worked with Tan Malaka in 1946. It may be
significant that included in the cabinet are three of the four members
of the Indonesian delegation to Moscow sent in April 1950 to discuss the
establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet. They are Yamin,
Wibisono, and Hadinoto--new Minister of Commerce and Industry. Apart from
personalities, the Masjumi conceded to PNI demands principally in the
realm of foreign affairs,having agreed to supplant the Netherlands--Indonesian
Union charter by an orthodox international agreement and to accelerate
revision of other agreements reached in 1949 between the two countries and
to nullify those which are clearly inimical to Indonesian interests. The
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chief asset of the new cabinet is the fact that its inclusion of repre-
sentatives from the two largest parties in the country should ensure
strong parliamentary support. For this reason the government may feel
capable of taking stern and necessary measures toward the achievement
of law and order.
"B" PHILIPPINES. 6?uirino Fears US-Supported COUP
states-, "According to current conjecture among certain influential
Philippine political leaders, President Quirino fears that the US is
planning to support a coup d'etat aimed at placing Foreign Affairs
Secretary Carlos P. Romulo and Defense Secretary Magsaysay in power."
(Quirino is said to be jealous of Romulo's international prestige.) The
President is now apparently endeavoring to remove his family and fortune
from the Philippines in preparation for his own departure.
COMPi4ENT: Quirino's jealousy of Romulo is well substantiated.
~,m assy Manila previously reported Magsaysay's enemies had started a
vicious rumor that the Defense Secretary was plotting an anti-Quirino
coup and that Quirino probably believed this rumor. While there is no
additional evidence that a, coup is actually being planned, should Quirino
be seriousl convinced of such a plot, he would probably attempt to remove
Romulo and%or Magasaysay from office or take other precautionary measures
before voluntarily going into exile.
"B" AUSTRALIA. Labor Gains in Election Campaign. In the last two weeks,
Labor has shown to better advantage and it is generally believed that the
Liberal-Country majority in Parliament may be reduced by the elections to
be held on 28 April. The chances of a Liberal-Country (Government)
majority in the Senate are considered "hardly better than even".. (R
Canberra 300, 26 Apr.51). COMMENT: The Liberal-Country Government is
still favored to retain control of the House.
"A" INDOCHINA. Vietnamese Communists Proclaim Li of Indochina. The adoption
of "The Manifesto of the Joint Conference of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia,"
proclaiming the unity of rebel organizations in the three countries was
announced by the Ho Government radio on 23 April. The decision was
purportedly taken at a conference of 11 March between representatives of
the rebel groups--the Lien Viet of Vietnam, the Khmer Issara of Cambodia,
and the Lao Issara of Laos. The basic task of the "alliance" was declared
to be that of driving out "the French aggressors and the American in-
terventionists." (R FBIS, 26 Apr 51). COMMENT: The intention of the
Vietnamese Communists to establish their control over all of Indochina
has become increasingly evident over a period of several years. During
the early years of its existence (1945-49) Ho Chi Minh's Democratic
Republic of Vietnam (DRV) avoided any suggestion of designs on Laos and
Cambodia. DRV influence in these countries was gradually increased by
*infiltration of DRV guerrillas into the Laotian and Cambodian rebel (Issara)
organizations. During 1950 the initial steps were taken toward organizing
and publicizing joint action by rebel groups of the three peoples.,
6,
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Responsibility for and control over such "joint action" rests almost
entirely with the Vietnamese Communists. There are no truly indigenous
Communists movements in Laos and Cambodia. The effort to establish
hegemony over al of Indochina has always been implicit in the real
name of the organization which controls the DRV--the Indochinese Communist
Party.
"B" Bao Dai Radio Bids for Southeast Asia Pact. In a radio broadcast
denouncing Soviet imperialism, the Bao flai controlled radio at Hue stated
on 24 April that the countries of SEA should unite into one bloc, as did
the Atlantic countries, in order to combat Communism. "If the US helps
Asian countries to realize such a unity? the fight against the USSR will
be more efficient." (U FBIS 26 Apr 51). COMMENT: During the past week
Bao Dai told the US Minister in Saigon that he favored an anti-Communist
pact among South Asian or SEA countries. The above radio broadcast embodies
the first public endorsement by his government of such a pact.
"A" CHINA. Soviet "Heavy" Bombers Allegedly at Hsuchou. 25X1X
25X1X on 20-21 April, 38 Soviet "4-eng:ne heavy om ers
brought 500 Soviet air force personnel under the command of a Soviet
Lt. Col. from Manchuria to Hsuchou. 25X1A
COMMENT: The OCI Daily Digest of 14 April reported the asser ono an
untested. informant that 14 Soviet "lunge-range heavy bombers" under the
command. of a Soviet Lt.-Col. arrived at Changchun from the USSR on 24 March.
According to the latest reliable description of airfields in the Hsuchou
area" the long?ast runway is 5,000 feet,wrwhich is insufficient for large
bombers, although it was rumored in November 1950 that the Chinese were
building one of the largest airfields in the Far East at Hsuchou.
"B" KOREA. Further Develorimants in ROK Cabinet Crisis. Ambassador Muccio,
reporting on the Cabinet crisis precipitated by President Rhee ostensibly
over the "Kochang Massacre", states that although Rhee announced that the
"Minister of Defense is hereby dismissed" there is considerable private
speculation that Defense Minister Shin has made his peace with the Presi-
dent and that some face-saving ray of retaining him is being sought. In
this connection, outgoing Justice Minister.Kim is reported by Cent-1 News
Agency to have stated in a press conference that Shin has "misled" the
President and, further, th.ot Rhee is Shin's puppet. (C Pusan 90b>, 27 Apr 51;
R FBIS 26 Apr 51). COMCJYENT: Juctice Minister Kim's attack of Shin may be
attributed to his knowledge that the President is trying to retain the
Defense Minister. A long-standing jurisdictional conflict has existed
between the Home Ministry (and collaterally the Justice Ministry) and
the Defense Ministry. While both the Justice Minister and the Home
Minister are influential members of the opposition Democratic Party,
Defense Minister Shin owes his loyalty to the President. The rumored
replacement for Home Minister Choe Pyongok is Lee Ki Bong, intimate
of the President and thh present competent Mayor of Seoul.
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"B" KOREA. North Korea Presses Spring Planting. Two long boradcasts by the
Communist North Korean radio indicate the emphasis being placed on food
production in North Korea. One broadcast enumerated the number of military
personnel who were using their "leisure" time to assist North Korean farm
families in the "Sowing Front". The other broadcast states that farmers
are making "brilliant efforts---in over-coming shortages of manpower and
animals and perservering in the face of other difficult conditions."
? Following a long account of the acreage sown to various crops in North
Korean provinces, the broadcast stated the "total area sown is 20%
greater than that of last year." (R FBIS Ticker, 26 Apr 51). CQMMENT:
Major limiting factors in agricultural production in North Korea are
the critical shortage of manpower, the loss of most of the work animals
and the lack of sufficient chemical fertilizers. The emphasis placed
recently on the "Sowing Front" illustrates the Communists' recognition
of these problems and the probable necessity of planting greater acreage,
using all available labor, to attain a sufficient yield.
"C" JAPAN. Use of Imperial P aza For May Day Denied by SCAP. According to the
French Press Agency in Tokyo, the demand of the non-Communist trade union
federation (Sohyo) to use the Imperial Palace Plaza for a May Day demon-
stration was flatly rejected today in a SCAP directive. (R FBIS Ticker
27 Apr 51). COMP ENT: There is some danger that this decision,evi'ently
designed to prevent a recurrence of Communist-inspired disorders. on the
plaza, may cause trouble between the police and moderate labor e&_ements -
a situation which the Communists will be quick to exploit.
"Bew National Police Reserve to Assume Military Unit Designators Director-
General Masuhara has announced that the 75,000 man National Police Reserve
will take the form of a four division army next week. Each division will
have four regiments of 3,000 men each, (AP Ticker 27 Apr 51). C014 ENT:
The change from "regional" units to military divisional designations
appears to be a step in the direction of organizing the Para-military
police reserve along tactical lines;
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"C" GERMANY, Federal Government Bans Communist Anti. Remi.l.itarization
e incite. By a unanimous ecision on 2 Apri the Feder Ca inet
armed the Communist-sponsored "plebiscite against remilitarization
and for the cpnclusion of, a peace treaty", and ordered that the corn-
mittees which have been organizing petitions for a plebiscite be
dissolved. The Federal Government is requesting the Land governments
to forbid the activity of the organizing committees u_nl'T' the article
of the Basic Law prohibiting activities directed, against the consti-
tutional order,,, (U FBIS, 26 Apr 51; NY Times, 27 Apr 51)? CO1fflMjNT:
The Communists have been attempting to build up sufficient etass
support to induce the Federal and Land governments to hold a popular
referendum on :the remilitarizationissue, and will now claim that
the government ban muzzles the voice of the people,
"C" Strengthening of Government Coalition. A working agreement
has been en alive y es a is -e-d-1771-le"'
in ie"'West German Bundestag between
the Bavarian Party (BP) and the Chris ;,_tan Social Union (C, U the
Bavarian version of Chancellor Adenauei' vs Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) and partner of the CDU in the government coalition. BP leaders
announce that they have taken the initiative in this move to strengthen
the coalition against the "impossible" obstructive tactics of Kurt
Schumacher and his Social Democrats, While this agreement would ensure
greater dependability of BP support for the Federal Government on
many issues, it might also result in increased opposition to the
government on issues,involving statese rights or the exercise of
centralized authority from Bonn? (C Bonn unnumbered, 20 Apr 51),
COIi NT: Elements within the BP and CSU have been long attempting
-so br ng about a merger or at least a working agreement both at Land
and Federal levels between the two parties, which are not far app-
in po i~1 cy, The BP has in the past often supported the govermient,
but has also led the particularist opposition to the Federal Republic.
"C" AUSTRIA. Soviet Business Expands in Western Austria. The organization
of Soviet in us rial enterprises in Win ria - U9 I is reported to be
increasing its activities in the Western-occupied zones through an
expansion of its sales outlets, many of which bear the names of
reliable old Austrian firms, Many individuals and merchants, unaware
that the goods are USIA products, are buying from its outlets. USIA
has also begun successful advertising activities. (U Vienna 21h67,
25 Apr 51). COYRENT: Soviet interest in expanding sales, both of
USIA produ'ts and of items illegally imported from the Satellites,
has been apparent for some time. Aside .from the financial profits
of these sales, such expansion of USIA activities furthers Soviet
economic penetration of Austria,
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"B" NETHERLANDS. Transshipment of Copper Plates to Soviet Bloc Completed.
According o US Embassi y o facia s a 'T~neHa ue9, .rme ri. tons o
copper plates from India have been transshipped through Rotterdam
to the Soviet bloc,. although the Netherlands has fulfilled its COCOM
(Coordinating Committee) obligations in this matter, These sheets.,
-which probably were rolled from US war surplus in India, are strategic
material urgently needed for the western European defense effort.
The Netherlands Government supplied the US with all the information
on the forwarder and delayed the shipment for two days. However,
the Soviet-front Banque Commerciale pour 1'Europe du Nord in Paris,
financier of the shipment, is not subject to any controls by the
French Government. Furthermore,. French officials are unable to'obtain
information from French firms engaged in transit activities. (S Hague
1429, 26 Apr 51) o CO1%11ENT: Recent reports indicate the ability of
Soviet bloc countrieso obtain strategic commodities through trans-
shipment and emphasize the need for stricter export control laws in
each country.
"B" SWITZERLAND. Swiss Consider Partisan Warfare. In outlining the
presewiss m31 ry situation, a high official of the National
Defense Commission recently mentioned partisan warfare. This is
the" first time that a Swiss military figure has publicly discussed
this type of warfare. He intimated that any Swiss partisan warfare
would be waged within the confines of the laws of war and that partisan
units would be under the direct supervision of responsible military
bodies. This official also pointed out that the critical period for
the Swiss is from now until 1953 while the army is being reorganized
and reequipped, and that the defense plan of fighting an invader at
any point, and of using the redoubt as a place to fall back to only
as a last resort, was now generally accepted by Swiss military
authorities. (R Bern, MA R-99-51, 16 Mar 51). COMMENT: This is
a further indication of the thorough preparation -na e Swiss are
making against the possibility of Soviet occupation. The Swiss ap-
parently realize that, although they will be able to 'put up a spirited
defense, in the long run such defense will be reduced to well-prepared
fortifications in their national redoubt area, plus such support as
they may receive from partisan units outside this area.
''B" SPAIN. Workers Defiance of Government Persists. Although the situation
ire Basgixe in us rial region 0f northern Spain has generally returned
to normal, on 26 April workers in San Sebastian clashed with police
while protesting the refusal of the authorities to release workers
arrested in the two-day general strike of 23-24 April., (See OCI Daily
Digest, 24 April 51) On the same day workers in suburban districts
of San Sebastian staged a walkout during the morning,, Textile workers
in Manresa, Barcelona province, where the Government on 19. April
closed all factories in order to prevent a "sitdowra" strike in one
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cotton mill from spreading to others, (See 00I Daily Digest,
19 Apr 51).9 walked out in protest against the Government's failure
to accede to their demands for increased wages. (U NY Time,
27 Apr 51). CO1A NT: These incidents show a growing awaisiness
on the part of orkers of their own potential strength. They are,
however, still only manifestations of discontent over economic hard-
ships and do not have any political significance except as a potential
threat to the stability of the Franco regime. The government, while
taking steps to improve distribution and price controls of basic
consumer goods, is also endeavoring to shift blame for the economic
conditions to foreign governments. Industry and Commerce Minister
Suances, has stated publicly that world shortages, coupled with the
hostility of "certain powers" toward Spain, are primarily responsible
for the economic situation and specifically called attention to the
"selfish reluctance" of the US to relieve Spainas most urgent, needs.
In the past, appeals to xenophobic Spanish national pride have helped
Franco ride out crises.
"C" COSTA RICA. Plot Against, the Government Still Active. The Costa
Rican oreign Minister is sai to have received confirmation from
a US arms. dealer of the sale of 3 DC 38s and an unspecified number
of bazookas to agents of the revolutionary leader, Rafael Calderon--
Guardia. The source of this report also states that the airplanes
together with their pilots and 1 others on the-Calder6n payroll are
25X1A in Yucatan, Mexico, awaiting orders.
COMMENT: At least 48 C eronis as have been jailed
by e Cos a Fa.-can government during April in connection with a series
of bombings that were'said to be leading up to an imminent coup.
Three-further bomb attempts have occurred since the government round-
,,up of suspected plotters, however, and it appears that the government
has not yet fully unravelled the plots
"C" ICICO. Regional Meeting of Peace Partisans, An announcement in
Me Mexico M F dally, F Po , indicates that a
peace meeting was scheduled for 22 April. Representatives of the
national Peace Committees of Colombia, Costa Rica, Ciiba, Guatemala,
Panama, Mexico,,. and other countries were scheduled to speak. The
principal topic was "The Conference of Ministers and the Peace".
(U El Popular, 20 Apr 51). COMMENT:, This appears to be a regional
conrerence similar to that he-17 on~13 April in Montevideo, major
purposes.of which were to attack the recent Inter-American Meeting
of Foreign Ministers in Washington and to advance the Communist
proposal for a Five-Power Peace Pact.
"C" URUGUAY. Busworkerse Union Breaks with Communist Dominated UGT. The
rganizacion National e Obreros el O nibus, largest busworkers e
union in Uruguay, has severe I Es i is ion with the Communist-led
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Uni6n General de Traba'adores (UGT) and has resolved to establish
se as an independent union. Disgusted with the.Communist Party
and UGT leadership of a campaign to nullify an increase in bus fares
recently decreed. by the government in order to raise busworkerse
salaries, the union members physically ejected most of their Com-
munist and pro-Communist leaders from a meeting early in March and
voted to break with the UGT in a general meeting on 30 March.. The
., busworkers felt that the Communists holding office were more
',interested in working for the political objectives of the Communist
Party than in supporting the interests of the union.' (U Montevideo
Desp 909, 2 Apr 51). COMMENT: Although the UGT is still the largest.
labor confederation in the country, the separation of the busworkersi
union marks one further step in the weakening of its control over
Uruguayan'labor. (See OCI Daily Digest, 23. Jan 5l). The growing
disinclination of Uruguayan workers to act as tools for furthering
international Communist objectives was recently manifested by the
failure of many formerly subservient key unions to support the general
strike called by the UGT to protest the Inter-American Meeting of
Foreign'Ministers. Further breaks from the UGT appear likely if Com-
munist leaders continue to insist upon interjecting international
political issues into union activities.
"C" ..VENEZUELA. Soviet Embassy Dire ting a Repatriation Program. The
Soviet massy in Caracas is sai . o ae reg ar repatriatingof
a series of largely unidentified individuals, and during February
arranged passage for at least three. One of these was a Pole who
told an airline clerk that he was being repatriated forcibly and
asked for the address of the IRO in Lisbon Portugal, where he said
he ho ed to escape from. the plane.
25X1A COMMENT: This is the second repor.., of Soviet.
n eres in repatriating orbit-connected individuals residing in
the Western hemisphere. (See OCI Daily Digest., 22 Apr 51). Doubt
is cast on the purpose and good faith of the Pole's statements by.
.the fact that he had sufficient freedom to arrange for his own
passage and to reveal his alleged plight.
"B" UNITED KINGDOM. Importance of Raw Materials P.robldm Emphasized by
New a inet Appointment ichi o , forneF n ster of Works.,
has been appointed to he Cabinet to replace the late Ernest Bevin
as Lord Privy Seal; part'..,of his duties will be to head a new
department concerned with the procurement and distribution of. raw
..materials. The decision to establish a new department for this
purpose, which was formerly the joint responsibility of the Board
of Trade and the Ministry of Supply, emph.asizes the importance of
the raw materials question which is straining US UK relations., US
Embassy London continues concerned about this source of tension
(See OCI Daily Digest, 2L Apr 51) estimating that the US will., as
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a result of the Bevan and Wilson charges in Parliament, be blamed
by the British public for unemployment and other hardships as shortages
become more acute. (S London 5622, 26 Apr 51; NY Times, 27 Apr 5l).
COMMENT: The new Lord Privy Seal, a prominent arms manufacturer,
seems well-qualified for his new post on the basis of ability and
industrial experience. Though a regular Labor MP since 1938, his
own professional background and his reputation for independence of
mind suggest that Prime Minister Attlee has chosen him partly as a
minister likely to be regarded with favor in American business
circles.
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39
491E67o--
APR 271951
Not for dissemination outside 0/0I and O/NE/
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/5, CABLES
27 April. 1951.
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS" CONFERENCE
"B" Use of "Split Agenda" for Foreign Ministers' Meeting Discussed. In a
meeting on 25 April of the three Western chief delegates to the Paris
Deputy Foreign Ministers' Conference, UK delegate Davie, told US dele-
gate Jessup that he was now prepared to stand firm on the present wording
of the armaments submitemrsince he was convinced the previous day that
the wording of any changes acceptable to the West would not be acceptable
to Soviet delegate Gromykq.. Earlier Davies said that the UK would be
ready to consider the device of a "split agenda" between Western and
Soviet proposals if the West presented an agenda with German demilitari-
zation first, and the Soviets still refused to accept the Western
wording of the, armaments item. Jessup has recently commented that
Gromyko's attitude makes likely a complete impasse on the question of
an agreed agenda. Meanwhile Soviet Ambassador to London Zaruubin has been
reported as observing that a Foreign Ministers' meeting had been held in
1948,although the agenda had not been agreed upon. (S S/S Paris 6455, 24
Apr 51; S S/S Paris 6462, 24 Apr 51; S S/S Paris 646, 25 Apr 51; IS S/S
London 5604, 25 Apr 51). CC NTo Although Zarubin is not necessarily
in possession of Kremlin views regarding a Foreign Ministers' meeting,
this is the first reported conversation between Soviet and Western repre-
sentatives of the possibility that a meeting might be held without an
agreed agenda. British willingness to consider the possibility-of a
"split agenda" and their firmness on the armaments item represent an
approach to the US attitude and a departure from their previous position
of willingness to concede to the Soviets on the armament agenda item. The
change follows US representations to the UK Government over Davies' head,
as well as another week of Soviet intransigence.
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"B" EGYPT. Effect of the Government e s Cou:?ter-Offers to the UK Defense
Proposals. US Ambassador Caffery in Cairo reports that the Egyptian counter-
offers to the UK defense proposals follow the well.?ic.o a. Egyptian demands
for early and complete evacuation of British forces from the Suez area with
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the r.pht of return (1) in case of aggression against the UK, Egypt? or
adjacent countries, and (2) in case of the union of the Sudan with Egypt
and the resultant evacuation of British military and civilian personnel
therefrom. .Pecording to Caffery, Foreign Minister Salaheddin told British
Ambassador Stevenson that he expects to quiet Parliament's apprehensions
with "some very pretty double-talk". Salaheddin left the impression with
? Stevenson that the negotiations might continue for !9a whilq but that it
would not be possible to continue this game for many months. Stevenson
himself feels that the best hope lies in the continuation of talks until
the end of the summer. After that time Stevenson believes that "some
other game will have to be invented" if repercussions are to be avoided.
(TS S/S Cairo 1108, 26 Apr 51; TS S/S Cairo 1105, 25 Apr 51). OCHNENT:
The apparent intention of Egypt's top officials to refrain from making
detailed public comments concerning either the UK defense proposals or
the Egyptian counter-demands indicates Egypt's preference for a continu-
ation of the bilateral discussions to a complete breadownof the talks.
The wide gap, however, between Egyptian and British thinking in regard to
the Suez and Sudan issues - coupled with domestic difficulties within each
country -- makes it difficult for the talks m- or double-talk - to continue
indefinitely when there is no indication at all that any agreement will be
forthcoming.
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