CENTRAL INGELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100470001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 24, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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COPY NO _ 3 9
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE Or CURRLNT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST
Date: APR 2 4 1g51
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the internal use of the
Office of Current Intelligence. It does not
represent a complete coverage of all current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
?AN - itemu indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
"Be - important regional developments
not necessarily related to soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
R00 - other information indicating trends
and potential developments
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
""B" USSR. Reported Visit to Abadan of Soviet 3rd Se eats n 3?~h .
AP from Abadan reports the visit there of the 3rd Secretary of the
Russian Embassy in Tehran. According to AP, he arrived by plane
21 April, and left the next day by auto having had no visitors, A
Reuters despatch, reported over Baghdad radio, claimed that 2 Soviet
officials had made the visits, and not only moved around the oil areas
but received a number of visitors. (U AP NYTimes, 24 Apr 51; R P'BIS
Baghdad. Home Service, 23 Apr 51). COMMENT,. These conflicting reports
on the not surprising show of Soviet interest in the confused situation
in the oil areas must be viewed with skepticism until evidence is re-
ceived confirming what Soviet officials were involved, and the extent
of their alleged activity. Outside of Moscow's open propaganda interest
in the progress of events in the disturbed oil areas, the USSR has
followed a policy of non-interference in the situation pending concrete
moves on the nationalization issue and possible steps on the part of
the British. In view of the conflicting reports from Abadan, it is a
natural step for all interested powers to try and attain more information
on the situation.
Progress is Slow on Much Touted Rvciroelectric Pr?JeG s. Recent
reports in the Soviet press indicate that transport and supply diffi-
culties are adversely affecting the planned tempo of construction on
the great canal and hydroelectric projects announced last year. PRAVDA
reported confusion existing at the port of Odessabwhich has been delaying
the movement of machinery up to ten days. IZVESTIA describes a serious
.transportation problem in connection with the projected giant Stalingrad
hydroelectric station. Evidently there is only one daily passenger
train from Moscow to Stalingrad and also from Krasnodar and Kharkov to
Stalingrad. This greatly delays the arrival of technicians, specialists
and workers. (U NYTimes, 24 Apr 51). COlkNT: The fact that this
machinery is arriving at Odessa by sea, probably via the Baltic and.Black
seas, for transshipment may be indicative of the general transportation
problems in the USSR and a desire to take the burden off the railroad
system.
"B" EASTERN EUROPE,' PQLA1 D. Evidence of Soviet Direction of Inter ~tel.lite
Trade. The concluding clause of an industrial contract between government
enterprises in the GDR and Poland specifies that in case of unresolvable
differences between the contracting parties, the differences are to be
submitted to the "Soviet Chamber of Commerce in Moscow" for arbitration.
The contract in question was concluded in July 1950 under the broad terms
of a Polish-German Technical-Scientific Cooperation Agreement signed on
15 July 1949. (C HICOG Des 663, 29 Mar 51). COMMENT,. The Soviet arbi-
tratioxi agency designated in the above agreement is probably the Permanent
Secretariat of'CEML,which sits in Moscow rather than the Soviet Chamber
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of Commerce. This report is a useful example of the extent and mature
of Soviet direction of inter-Satellite economic relations and is indica-
tive of Eastern Germany's increasing integration into the Satellite orbit.
YUGOSLAVIA. Tito Condition "Good". The Yugoslav Foreign Office has
assured Ambassador Allen that Tito's condition following his recent opera-
tion is "good" and that he is expected to be well enough to review the
May Day Parade in Belgrade. (C Belgrade 1555, 20 Apr 51),
Yugoslav Defensive Preparation in Vojvodina. US Embassy Belgrade
reports that observations throughout the Vojvodina area in northeastern
Yugoslavia suggest that the Yugoslav General Staff does not intend to
defend this area with army formations at the border. No appreciable
number of Yugoslav troops are evident on the Rungarian.and Rumanian
borders. There are indications, however, that Yugoslav partisan formations,
together with some army troop units, will be employed to engage any in-
vs.ders in the villages arxd along the roads leading to the frontier. Extensive
trench systems have been prepared on either side of the main roads and on
the northwest side of towns from Srbobran to Sombor and spider-type fox-
holes have been dug along the Sombor-Subotica road. (S Belgrade YUG 378,
JOINT WEEKA 16, 20 Apr 51). COMMENT: The Yugoslavs have been preparing
trenches and observation posts in the Vojvodina area for many months. It
has been generally believed that they were constructed to delay any enemy
attack and no attempt would be made by the Yugoslav Army to make a stand
in the northeastern plains above Belgrade. Of Yugoslavia's 33 divisions,
only 2 are known to be stationed north of the Danube in the Vojvodina.
However, units of 2 other infantry divisions are so located as to be
readily available for action in the area.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"B" GREECE. Greek Government Requests US Szpeort for Secure Council Seat.
The Greek Government hn.s formally requested US support for Greece's candi-
dacy as a non-permanent member on the Security Council replacing Yugo-
slavia. The Greeks attach considerable importance to a seat on the SC
particularly since Greece has been passed over in a number of previous
elections to UN bodies, and because of their support of the UN, especially
since Korea. The Embassy believes that the Greek request has considerable
justification in view of Greece's past and its continuing contribution to
UN activities. (C Athens 3545, 21 Apr 51). CONIMEN S Although Greece's
geographical position enables it to represent either the Eastern European
or the Arab-Near Eastern nations on the Security Coimcil., Greek candidacy
for the seat now held by Yugoslavia stands little chance of success. The
Soviet bloc would argue that Greece does not properly belong in the Eastern
group. The non-Soviet bloc similarly might oppose Greece on the grounds
that Soviet fear of a preponderately Western membership on the Security
Council would only aggravate East-West tension and encourage the USSR to
establish a competitive organization of its own.
"Be LEBANON. Criticism Over Inadequate MAC Authority. According to US Minister
Pinkerton in Beirut, practically all incidents along the Lebanese-Israeli
frontier have been simple and have been handled by the UN Mixed Armistice
Commission (MAC) without undue friction. In commenting on the general
Israeli-Arab frontier problems, however, Pinkerton reports that considerable
criticism has been voiced over the fact that the various MAC'S have no
machinery to impose their decisions with the result that no reliance can
be put on the MAC in the event of a serious situation. (See OCI Daily
Digest, 17 and 19 Apr 51). Pinkerton believes that much of this criticism
could be avoided if the chairman of the UN Truce Supervision Organization
(TSO), which controls the various MAC's, would be promptly and. forcefully
backed in the event that either side disregards the TSO decisions, Pinker-
ton states that disrespect for the authority of the MAC's snowballs with
each incident and that unless they actually have authority., the strength
of the personnel is of little consequence. Pinkerton adds that complete
backing for the TSO seems to be the only ray to avoid (1) an increasing
number of appeals to the Security Council, (2) complete loss of confidence
in the UN as an effective body, or (3) an ultimate outbreak of hostilities.
(S Beirut 589, 23 Apr 51). COMMENTS The urgent need for definitive UN
authority so that recurrent 7 cidents along the entire Israeli-Arab frontier
may adequately be handled has been previously stressed by US Ambassador.
Davis in Tel Aviv and US Minister Cannon in Damascus, as well as by the
reports of UN observers and US press correspondents in the area.
"B" IRAQ. French Concerned Over Iraq Oil Problems. French petroleum company
officials in Baghdad have indicated to US Embassy officials their serious
concern over the Iraq oil problem (see OCI Daily Digest., 30 Mar and 5 Apr 51).
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The French officials emphasized among other points the lack of harmony
among Middle East oil companies as to crude price, reduction in steel
pipe deliveries, delays in constructing the new pipeline to the
Mediterranean, and the complexities. resulting from the Iraq Petroleum
Company's (IPC) income being subjected to the tax laws of the US9 Ux,
and France. The French also felt, according to US Embassy Baghdad, that
the Iraq Government might delay action on IPC until the Iranian oil.di.s-
pute is settled in order to adjust any new IPC profit-sharing to the pattern
set in Iran(the recently concluded Saudi Arabian agreement with ARAMCO is
also to be used for this purpose). (S Paris 6407, 21 Apr 51). COMMENT:
The IPC has reacted quickly to the dangers posed against its own operations
by the Iranian clamor for nationalization of the oil resources in Iran.
However, the French, as well as other interested parties, recognize that
the complexities of IPC organization and operations make it more difficult
to achieve a satisfactory settlement in Iraq. Possibly as important in
this connection as management problems is Iraq's basically unstable poli-
tical situation which might subsequently force the government to respond
more clearly to popular pressures, such as the nationalization demands,
than it has done so far.
INDIA. floctors Urge Prime Minister Nehru to Rest. According to press
reports, Prime Minister Nehru has been advised to take a short rest since
overwork and exhaustion are threatening his health. (U NY Times, 17 Apr 51).
COMMENT: Nehru has shouldered a tremendous burden for a long time. Here-
tofore, he has shown no signs of weakening under the strain.
No Revaluation of Indian Rupee at Present. The Indian Finance
Minister announced in Parliament on 10 April that the Indian government
has decided it is not now in the interests of the country to revalue the
rupee. (U New Delhi 2773, 11 Apr 51; U New Delhi 2777, 11 Apr 51),
COMMENT: Some Indian economists and businessmen have been urging that the
rupee be revalued, and rumors have been rife that such action was pending.
The government claims that revaluation would produce an unfavorable finan-
cial situation. The announcement by the Finance Minister presumably
scotches the rumors of revaluation - at least for the time being.
INDONESIA. Communist-led Labor Plans Lame Scale May_1aa Demonstrations.
The press reports feverish activity by both the Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI) and the Communist-led Central Organization of All Workers of
Indonesia (SOBSI) in preparing large scale May Day demonstrations through-
out Indonesia. Possibly indicating the direction of the demonstrations is
SOBSI's recent press warning to the prospective Cabinet that it must (1)
repeal the Government's 14 February strike ban, the state of seige le?,
(under which the strike ban was proclaimed), and all "colonial laws"; and
(2) take positive measures against armed terrorist gangs (a statement
obviously aimed at combatting reports of SOBSI support of terrorist groups).
(C Djakarta 1470, 21 Apr 51). COMMENT. Communist groups have been relatively
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quiet during the cabinet negotiations, but with increased evidence of
efforts to form a moderate coalition cabinet--which would exclude leftist
groups--SOBSI and PKI undoubtedly feel the, necessity to reassert them-
selves vigorously.
INDOCHINA. Ho Chi Minh Radio Stresses Long,-term Strut. General Vo
Nguyen Giap, C-in-C of the armed forces of the "Democratic Republic of
Vietnam" (DRV) has announced that "the main objective in the present state
is to annihilate the main forces of the enemy and not yet to liberate
territory." Another broadcast on the same day referred to "this hard,
long-drawn-out resistance of the people." It was also stated that a pro-
duction drive lasting from 1 May to 19 December 1951 would form part of
"preparations for a general counteroffensive." (U FBIS 19 Apr 51).
Intelligence from several sources tends to support the conclusion that the
DPtV is returning to a more defensive strategy and that it will be unable
to launch a large-scale decisive offensive before the end of the rainy
season in September.
De Lattre Fears Teamwork of Chinese and VietnamMse Communists. In
a conversation with US Minister Heath, General De Lattre stated that it
seemed clear to him that the entry into northwest Tonkin of a Chinese
Communist battalion as the result of a request from, or perhaps a bar-
gain with, Ho Chi Minh to support Viet Minh pressure on the French post
at Laichau and thus divert French troops from the delta or, failing that
objective, to assist the Viet Minh in establishing themselves in the Laichau
region. De Lattre explained that his quick airlift to Laichau had forced
both the Viet Minh and Chinese forces back and he expressed the belief that
the latter have now retired across the border. De Lattre saw no indication
of an early invasion in force from China but he is concerned that Ho was
able to obtain the support of Chinese Communist troops. He said this time
the Chinese committed only a battalion but "next time it might be a regi-
ment or more." (S Hanoi 598, 22 Apr 51).
AUSTRALIA. Election Develo-pments. Although all polls show a moderate swing
to the Liberal-Country Party Government, privately some Liberal leaders
have expressed concern over the possible outcome of the election. While
Liberal headquarters is hopeful of capturing enough seats to win control
over the Senate, US Consulate General Sydney feels the vote will be
"shockingly close" in view of the greater appeal which Labor's anti-infla-
tionary program has in contrast with the Liberalse anti-Communist theme.
The US Consulate at Melbourne reports that a Senate deadlock is forecast
and notes that, despite good publicity, formation of a Pacific pact is
felt to be in US interests and has aroused little reaction. (C Sydney
389, 24 Apr 51; C Melbourne 58, 23 Apr 51). 'COMMENT: Unless the Govern-
ment wins control over the Senate, it will again be faced with delays
and opposition to its legislative program thus probably forcing another
election at an early date.
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"Alf CHINA. Pairing's View of, Global Hostilities. A usually reliable source
reports the Chinese Communist view that, while the "capitalist" govern-
ments will inevitably provoke a world war to avoid being overthrown, this
event is unlikely before the end of 1952, due to heavy losses in Korea,
internal conflicts, and incomplete mobilization. Peiping further believes,
according to this source, that Chinese Communist "defense" preparations
will be completed by the end of 19529 and that the Soviet bloc, assisted
by revolutions in Western nations, would win the conflict even if it were
to break out prior to that date. (S Hong Kong 3099, 20 Apr 51). COMMENT:
The above view, insofar as it relates to the causes of a world war and a
Communist victory in it, states the orthodox Communist position. Although
the Peiping regime has clearly been preparing, over the past year or more,
for eventual global hostilities, there has been no confirmation of various
reports alleging that Peiping anticipates such hostilities at some definite
time.
Epidemics Fea?ed in Nationalist, Armies A recent report of several
cases of bubonic plague among Nationalist troops on Chinmen Island has
caused concern over possible epidemics this summer. The shortage of drugs
and vaccines, steady deterioration of general sanitation conditions, and
the' lack of basic hygenic concepts were cited?as factors which could ser-
iously affect the combat efficiency-of the Chinese Nationalist Army.
(S Joint Weeka 16, Taipei, 21 Apr 51). COMMENT. Figures compiled by the
US Army Attache on the ground forces for the summer of 1950 give a death
rate of 8.6 per thousand from illness and.-an average daily sick rate of
150 per thousand among only those ill enough for hospitalization or doctor's
attention. Causes of death, in order of importance, were malaria, dysentery,
bronchitis and tuberculosis. The military attache feels that any increase
in these high figures would seriously alter the combat potential of the
Nationalist forces.
Statement of Tibetan Delegate toPeiping. Chungking radio, summariz-
ing a recent speech in that city by Sawang Ngabo,'head of the Tibetan 'ele-
gation en route to Peiping, attributes to Ngabo the statements that (:1) he
has learned of the "sincere desire of the Chinese Communists...for true
cooperation with the minority nationalities," and (2) consequently, he is
""exceedingly willing to proceed to Peiping to negotiates ^'icoessful :Libera-
tion" of Tibet. Shanghai radio announces the arrival of N?abo at Peiping
on 20 April. (R FBIS 21-23 Apr 51). CON~JIENT: If Ngabo is accurately quoted,
the Tibetan delegation appears prepared to accept Peiping's definition of
Tibet's status.
"C" JAPAN. Preliminary Election Returns Show Conservative Strength. Still
incomplete election returns give an overwhelming victory to conservative
candidates in the local elections held yesterday. Of 165 definitely
elected mayors, at least 140 are considered conservative. The Communist
party failed completely, with no Communist candidate even coming close to
being elected. (R FBIS Ticker 24 Apr 51). COMMENTS The majority of the
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local officials run as independents, so party lines are not sharply drawn.
However, the strong conservative vote had been anticipated, (see OCI Daily
Digest 23 Apr 51), and if repeated in next week's gubernatorial elections,
the Yoshida Government will claim a clean-cut mandate for its pro-Western
policies.
"C" KOREA. US Official Urges Korean Tungsten Output Expansion. Ambassador Muccio
reports that funds turned over to the Army by ECA in Korea do not provide
for equipment for the Sandong tungsten mine. Muccio further reports "he
is informed" that the mine could - at capacity - supply about 25% of the
US annual tungsten requirement. (S Pusan 884, 21 Apr 51). COMMENT: Although
there are divergent views on the reserves of the Sandong mine, it is generally
agreed that it is one of the world's three largest tungsten deposits. ECA
had elaborate plans in 1950 for reviving production at Sandong (in western
Korea south of the 37th Parallel), but'the dislocations of war forced diversion
of funds elsewhere.
ROK Government Upset over UN Delay in Settling ROK Currency Advances
to the UN Military Establishment. Ambassador Muccio reports that both
President Rhee and Prime Minister Chang are continuing to press for dollar
settlement of ROK won advances to the armed forces of the Unified Command.
The Ambassador' notes that it is extremely difficult to convince the Koreans
that dollars received by the UN for sale of ROK currency to individual
soldiers for purchases in Korea should accrue to the US rather than to
Korea. The argument that the ROK is being supplied with consumer goods
and raw material to sustain the civilian economy is wearing thin with the
disestablishment of ECA and the slowness of UNKRA's activation. The Ambassador
believes that some. action should betaken to effect provision of foreign
exchange for necessary ROK purchases in order to keep faith with the ROK.
(S Pusan 892, 23 Apr 51). COMMENT: The necessary preoccupation of the
Unified Command with military matters in Korea has over-shadowed the des-
perate economic needs of the country. Further economic dislocation can
be expected until UNKRA begins active operations.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
25X6 rtc 11
FRANCE. French Communirsts Urge Big-Five Peace Pact. Agitation for
a 17 _b
_g_-give peace pact ecame the principal propaganda theme last
week in the French Communist Party's (PCF) peace campaign, and may
constitute a build-up for a new Soviet diplomatic move. This change
in emphasis from German rearmament was highlighted by a PCF Politburo
communique devoted exclusively to an appeal to Communist militants
and peace partisans for a nationwide campaign for a peace pact in
line with the decisions of the Communist-led World Peace Council.
The French National Council for Peace reinforced this appeal by-
calling for a similar popular mass movement, (C Paris Weeka #169
20 Apr 51). COMMENT: The struggle against German rearmament-carries
an emotional connotation which the 1F has been exploiting very.
effectively. In the event the Big Four Conference fails to materialize,'
this new theme will undoubtedly find considerable support in France.,
particularly if., as a result'of the situation in Korea., a general
war becomes more threatening.
AUSTRIA. Tensions Within Government Coalition. Serious, but not
via , tens ons ave recently developeU in e Government between
the People's Party and the Socialist Party. The general suspicion
of Socialism felt by the People's Party is leading an increasing
number of its members.to favor a dissolution of the coalition. Their
dissatisfaction is focused on Socialist Minister of Transportation
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and Nationalized Industries Waldbrunner, whom they charge with using
his:. office to build "a Socialist industrial empire" and with hiding
Socialist malfeasance in the nationalized industries. (Waldbrunner's
predecessor in this office--a member of the People's Party--departed
amid Socialist accusations of corruption.). The situation is also
aggravated by Socialist fears that in the current presidential campaign
the People's Party would make some kind of deal with the rightist
League of Independents. Nevertheless, the view of the Socialist leaders
is that, despite the antagonistic attitude of the Peoples .'Party,
the :coalition must go on. (S Vienna Despatch 977, 20 Mar 5l). , COAS1ENT:
Friction has developed many times since 1945 between Austriaes co i.1on
partners, but an adjustment has always been made.. primarily based on
the realization by both partners of the importance of presenting a
united front to the Soviet occupation.
"C t'
ITALY. Communists Seek to Revitalize Partisans Organization and- t`6
e ruit or heirA`p~ ara o. The Communis Par y PCI is reportedly
pressing "i yout federation (FGCI) members to join the Communist-
dominated. National Partisans Association (ANPI), composed primarily
of partisan fighters in World War II and closely connected with the
Communist para-military organization, the Apparato. (S Rome Weeka #16,
20 Apr 51). COPJNT,,NT: The Communists propably hope by this tactic
to inject new oo into the ANPI, which has lately been losing members
because of dissatisfaction with PCI policy. Incorporation of the
heavily indoctrinated Communist-youth into the ANPI would strengthen
the latter's potentialities as a recruiting ground for the Apparato,
which the Communists continue to build up concurrently with their
peace campaign. On the other hand, it would probably cause further
withdrawals among those members of the ANPI who are opposed to the
Communists' use of their patriotic organization for political ends.
Vatican and P atholic Action Disagree Over Magnani-Cucchi
Movement. The Vatican reportedly disapproves o the pu61 iEywhich
`Eh e p aganda organs of Catholic Action, Vatican lay organization,.
have recently given to.the defections of the Italian Communist Deputies,
Cucchi and Magnani. Catholic Action propaganda apparently extolled
them as courageous in detaching themselves from the Italian Com-
munist Party. Vatican authorities',point out that the two Deputies
"have repeatedly confirmed their beliefs in Communist ideology."
Consequently, as far as the Church is concerned, they are considered
.excommunicated. COMMENT: This
disagreement between cer ain Vatican authorities and at of is Action
leaders reflects the growing cleavage between conservative and
progressive elements both within the Church and among Italian Catholics
in general? The reported Vatican opposition is consistent with the
Pope's previous reservations regarding collaboration between the
Christian Democrats and the democratic Socialists., a stand which he
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later modified. Several members of the hitherto Vatican-sponsored
Christian Democrats now favor the development of a loyal opposition
to the Government, presumably in the shape of the contemplated
fusion of democratic socialist parties., with one component of which
Magnani and Cucchi have maintained close liaison.
"B" ITALY. Local Elections Reportedly to be Fought on International
ssues.. Over two-thirds of the Italian elec orate wi pax icipate
Zee municipal and provincial elections scheduled for the period
27 May-10.June. The campaign will be fought on the basic issues
of Italy's pro-Western orientation and East-West struggle rather
than on local issues. (S Rome 1803, 23 Apr 51). COMMENT: If the
issues are international rather than domestic, the mmnanists will
lose votes to the anti-Communist bloc, which would gain cohesiveness
in the absence of conflict over domestic issues. In particular,
Premier De Gasperi's Christian Democrats will tend to gain support
at the polls from segments of the electorate which might otherwise
cast their votes for the small democratic Socialist parties or for
right wing groups.
"B" SPAIN. Workers' Protest Strike Spreads, A general strike has broken
out in the Bilbao area, province of Vizcaya, scene of the first
organized large-scale shrike. against the", 1947, The
work stoppage involves an estimated 250,000 workers. Preventive
arrests of potential leaders were made over the weekend., and Vizcaya
Governor Riestro Diaz threatened severe reprisals against strikers
who failed to return to work this morning. There has thus'far been
no evidence of repressive.police action or public violence. CC Bilbao 33,
23 Apr 51 and 34, 25 Apr 'al; U NY Times 21 Apr 51). COMMENT: Causes
of the strike are fundamentally the. same as those that pr`~ pitated
the more violent demonstrations in Barcelona last month, namely
discontent with insufferable economic conditions and with maladminis-
tr .tion and corruption in the'Government. Clandestine non-Communist
labor groups, specifically the Basque Nationalist-Socialist-Republican
coalition, are taking advantage of. the Spanish workers' grim. determination
to voice their grievances and of the sympathy` obviously extended to
them by all classes of Spaniards. In this the Bilbao strike differs
from the Barcelona one, in which the Falange apparently was the
principal. instigator?
"B" ICELAND. Strike Possibility Complicates Defense Pact Negotiations.
eCabinet as approve the draft US-Iceland-Defense agreement and
the Government leaders.are now discussing the possibility that the
agreement may not need to be submitted for Althing approval. Mean-
while, the Government has learned that a Communist-directed strike,
which might assume the proportions of a general strike, is tentatively
scheduled for 18 May. The Foreign Minister has therefore expressed
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a desire to have the first contingent of, US troops provided in the
agreement arrive prior to that date, preferably no later than.
3 May, by which time he is certain the agreement will be signed.
(TS Reykjavik 210, 18 Apr 51 and 21)3, 20 Apr 51). COMMENT: It is
impossible to assess how serious the alleged possib a-e-mss Erike may
be, since apparently both the Government and the Social Democrats
(the non-Communist labor party) have been taken by surprise at news
of the planned strike, and it is not even reported which Communist
union is behind it. An all-out strike by Dagsbrun, (unskilled
workers in Reykjavik), the largest union in Iceland, could tie up
transportation in the whole island; threats of Dagsbrun strikes
usually appear each spring, but none have been ser-ious in the past
few years. The Foreign Minister in asking for the arrival of US
troops before the possible strike date, indicated that he was thinking
mainly of the practical difficulties that would be caused by their,
arrival at a time when transportation facilities were disrupted.
He has, however, always insisted that US troop arrival should be
almost simultaneous with the signature of the agreement so as to
give the Icelandic public tangible evidence of the increased protection
provided them by the pact.
SWEDEN. Soviet Trade Remains at Normal Level under New Agreement,
he "wedis Foreign Office has announced that the as formally
adhered to a trade agreement, negotiated some time ago, calling for
an exchange of 130 million Swedish kronor ($7.7 million) worth of
goods in each direction. Soviet exports will consist'largely of
raw materials, such as manganese and chrome ores, asbestos, and
animal by-products, while Swedish exports:.are to be iron and steel
and various kinds of machinery. (R Stockholm 1249, 22 Apr 51;
FBIS, 21 Apr 51). COMMENT: This agreement does not represent any
radical change in the pa, tern of Swedish-Soviet trade. However,
Swedish exports to the USSR in accordance with the terms of the
five-year Credit Agreement. concluded in 1916 are not included. Total
Swedish exports to the.USSR, which during 1950 amounted. to 113 million
kr. ($21.8 million) including items delivered in accordance with the
19)6 Agreement, can be expected to rise considerably in 1951 over
the 1950 level, as goods contracted for under the five-year agreement
are delivered..
"B" UNITED KINGDOM, Bevan Resignation May Stimulate Anti-US Feeling
on am Material Problem,... TUS Embassy ,London estimates that a major
immediate effect o a controversial,.resignation of former Labor
Minister Bevan may be to`reinforce the already widely held feeling
that the US defense effort is having damaging consequences on the
British economy by'making certain essential raw materials extremely
scarce. (C London 5571, 23 Apr 51). COMMENT: This estimate is
well grounded in concern previously expresse by UK officials and
the responsible press over Britain's raw material situation. (See
OCI Daily Digest, 21 Mar 51).
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"B" FRANCE MOROCCO. Juin Hesitates'to Leave Morocco. o 25X1C
25X1C Resl en Gener +renc
orocco, Juin is extremely unen us is about serving under Genera].
Eisenhower in command. of a "paper army", and would prefer to remain .
in Morocco where he would be available to head a French Government-
in-exile, should France be overrun by the USSR. General Juin would
like to eliminate the presence of the US in Morocco and anti-US
sentiment which is on the increase among French nationals in Rabat
reportedly stems directly from top officials in the Residency,
25X1A COMMENT: Although rumor
has it that Juin is dissatisfied with-his SHAPE assignment and
wants to remain in Morocco until December 1951, Juin's civil cabinet
.director reports.that the General is anxious to begin his new job
and wishes to remain in Morocco only -until the Sultan signs the
reforms already agreed to. Juin's Algerian birth and long residence
in North Africa tend to give him. an exaggerated opinion of the
importance of that area in relation to Metropolitan France, but his
estimation of the prestige of the NATO position will probably
counterbalance his personal preferences.
"C" ARGENTINA. Meat Shipments to the UK Renewed. The ten-months'
suspension of rgen ne meat shipments to-Great Britain has been
ended by a new one-year trade and financial agreement (signed 23 Apr'I.1),
which mainly provides for a higher, meat price and remittance of profits
from Argentina to the UK. The agreement, which supplements the 1949
extensive trade and payments agreement, also reduces the stipulated
volume of principal products, such as British fuel and tin and Argentine
meat, to be exchanged.. (U Buenos Aires 931, 23 Apr 51). COTPlEnt:
Meat shipments were suspended in July 1950 after long price scus-
sions during which the British demanded a reduction from the June 1949
price, while the Argentines wanted the price adjusted at least for
sterling devaluation, since all payments under the agreement were
in sterling and the British petroleum price was raised somewhat more
than sterling devaluation. The new agreement should be mutually
advantageous to the UK, whose meat ration has been severely reduced,
.and to Argentina, which has had to subsidize the meat industry.
"C" CUBA. Chan Communists M Attend Ma Day Meeting in Moscow. It
is reported that the Kremlin has Invited prominent Pommu-n-a.-s-t-leaders
throughout the world to Moscow, ostensibly to attend the May Day
celebration. According to. the report, the real purpose of the
convocation is to hold an . important Cominform meeting. The Cuban
Communists are said to be sending four representatives. (S Habana
5o6, 23 Apr 51). COMIv1ENT: It is the usual practice of the Soviet
government to invite Communist leaders throughout the world to Moscow
every year for the May Day affair. No reports have been received
to date which would tend to indicate that this convocation is a
special one.
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M':NTPAL INT I IG7? MTC 7 AC ,NCS' 49164 ,~-
DAILY DIGEST 5UPPLE1v;J NT
APZ41951
Not for d.i ;k;emination out: ids: 0/CT and. 0JNE.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLES
2L April 1951
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"B" YUGOSLAVIA. Quadri artite Conversations Regarding Yugoslav Arms
Aid Under Consideration, Embassy Belgrade recommen that any
quadripartite conversation regarding Yugoslav arms aid be held
in Paris. The Embassy believes that the French capital would be
the best meeting place because of its proximity to SHAPE where
Yugoslav officers could gain an appreciation of Western defense
efforts, and because Paris is the least sensitive of the four
capitals as the locale for Yugoslav military officials to meet with
foreigners. (TS S/S Belgrade 1551, 20 April 51). COM1u1ENT: As a
follow-up to the current US-UK-French discussions on Yugos av arms
requirements, a quadripartite meeting to include Yugoslav military
representatives is being considered in order to further clarify
Yugoslav arms needs. The US and UK have previously suggested either
Washington or Belgrade as a suitable meeting place.
"B" USSR. Soviet Spokesman Em hasizes Importance Armaments Question,
In man 17ormaj. conversation with us Minister o en in. Paris, , Quiet
Ambassador to East Germany, Semenov stated definitely that the
armaments point was the chief Soviet preoccupation, Bohlen informed
Semenov that in his opinion the Soviet purpose at this conference,
was basically to ascertain whether or not the Soviet Union Could
force abandonment of present Western policies and that this was the
real. meaning"behind the discussion of wording on armaments point.
Semenov did not flatly deny this thesis but made an oblique reply
to the effect that in the absence of substantive agreement no power
could be bound. Semenov commented that in his view it was "laughable"
to believe that wording of an agenda could in any way restrict the
right of any Minister to discuss any aspect his government desires.
(S S/S Paris 6426, 23 Apr 51) .
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"A" CHINA. Chinese Communist Helligerencr. US Ambassador at New Delhi
reports information prom I::.,....n . oreign Off .ce to effect that GOI
Ambassador Panikkar at Peiping has advised agairist making sny further
"peace approach" to Communist China at this tine? Panikkar feels
that the Chinese Communists, "particularly" because of alleged bombing
of the Fukien area by US aircraft., are in a"be~,ligerent fraane of
mind". (S S/S New Delhi 2929, 22 lpr 51). COMA: Aircraft of
the US 7th Fleet conducted reconnaissance fl g s over parts pf the
Southeast China coast on 11 and 13 April; the Peiping radio has
alleged that these planes strafed and killed civilians in the area;
and that other US aircraft bombed Manchurian cities inn early April,
It is not known whether these incidents have contributed ~o Petpingis
continued belligerency. There has been no evidence, before or since
the incidents, that Communist China was or is p eparpd to modify its
conditions for a "peaceful settlement" in ~orea,
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