OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100420001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 18, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST
APR 18 1951
Date:
NOT3E: 1, This summary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the internal use of the
Office of Current Intelligence. It does not
represent a complete coverage of all current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
3.
Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
"A" - itemo indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
n$e
important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet
Communist intentions or capabilities
other information indicating trends
and potential developments
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SECTION I (SOVIET)
USSR, Announcement of Fourth Five-Ye x Plen_Cornple-ion, According to
an AP dispatcb..the successful completion of the latest Five-Year Plan,
in four years and three monthsswas announced Monday, 16 April 51 by
Moscow Rad&.o. While success was not claimed in every field of pro-
duction, 'the most important tasks of the plan have been considerably
exceeded.'' The production of ferrous metals on the whole went up 45%
instead of the target figure of 35%; oil production was listed as 22%
above the prewar figure and exceeded set goal; coal production had
beaten the five year target, going up 57% over the prewar figures;
electric power production was reported 87% above the 1940 figure, beat-
ing the goal set, and reconstruction of hydroelectric plants destroyed
during the war was completed. No figures were given for non-ferrous
metals an, significantly, the announcement did claim their production
targets had been reached. (U NYT, 17 Apr 51), COMMENT,. The claimed
production figures are in line with Bulganin9s speech of November 1950,
which gave the figures for the first ten months of 1950 using 1910 as
a base, The announcement now clears the way for the introduction of
the next FYP (the Fifth) which might possibly be discussed at a Supreme
Soviet session, as yet unannounced, during the summer. The claim that
the FYP was completed nine months early probably refers to a Malenkov
election speech of March 1950, in which he claimed that the planned rate
of production had been reached, This, however, did not refer to actual
production.
nC" EASTERN EUROPE. FINLAND, Soviet Pronagaz _AccukeE Finns of Recruiting
Korean Volunteers, Recent Soviet propaganda has accused "certain pro-
American Finnish politicians" of directing a nationwide recruitment of
volunteeers to fight for the West in Korea at the instigation of the US.
Allegedly 20 Finns have already left Helsinki for Korea. It is further
charged that the Finnish Security Police, though aware of this activity,
have not taken any steps to prevent it, (R FBIS, 17 Apr 51), COMMENT-.
While this particular propaganda attack might be a forerunner of a
Soviet recruitment campaign for North Korean "volunteers" in Eastern
Europe, it is more likely that these charges area part of the continuous
propaganda allegations that the USSR makes against Finland.
"B" YUGOSLAVIA. Conditions in Macedonia Relatively Stable, US Embassy Belgrade
does not believe that Macedonia should be considered a weak point in Yugo-
slav determination to resist Bulgarian threats and does not, anticipate
serious internal trouble for the regime there, either within or outside
the Communist Party. The Embassy is of this opinion despite a recent re-
port from the British Consul in Skoplje that four former officials of the
Peoples Republic of Macedonia were arrested in December and January, The
Embassy points out that none of the four was influential in the Macedonian
Communist Party and their arrest appears to have no great significance.
The Embassy reports that its sources of information including US food
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observers, newspaper correspondents, and the British Consul in Skoplje,
agree that the Macedonian populace is relatively satisfied with conditions
and that there is little pro-Bulgar sentiment among Yugoslav Macedonians.
Many qualified observers are of the opinion that, as a result of the
cultural and political autonomy which the regime has granted, Macedonians
in Yugoslavia today are more contented with their political and cultural
situation than they have ever been. (0 Belgrade Despatch 701, 21 Mar Sl).
COMMENT: While the Embassy's estimate of conditions in Macedonia may be
somewhat optimistic? it is noteworthy that, unlike Croatia and Servia,
there have been almost no reports in recent months of resistance to the
regime in Macedonia. Since the arrival of the US food observer in
Macedonia, the British Consul in Skoplje has spent much of his time
traveling with the American and acting as his interpreter.' In this
capacity the Consul has had a greater opportunity than previously to
move about the area and observe conditions firsthand.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"C" TURKEY. Turkish Concern Over Iranian Develorments, On 11 April, the
Turkish Secretary General of Foreign Affairs handed a note to the US
Embassy, summarizing the Turkish view of the Iranian situation. The
Turks regard the Iranian problem as one which is of imirediate importance
to their country. Turkey fears Soviet encroachment on Iran and considers
that the lack of coordination in the policies of the US and the UK, and
the inadequate nature of each, has facilitated the task of the USSR, The
Turks believe that the present Iranian government should be bolstered by
financial and military assistance, They consider that nationalization
of Iranian oil has become a symbol of national sovereignty, and that any
government which would. reconsider or evade nationalization would condemn
itself to public hate and would. play the game of Moscolr,. Ho?,rever, the
Turks think that a modus vivendi with the Angle-Iranian Oil Company can
be worked out, and they sug:-est that an effort be made to keep ahead of
the Oil Commission in its study of methods of implementing na.tioneliza.-
tion. (C Ankara 642, 12 Apr 51). COMMENT: This note reflects the
attitude previously taken by the Turkish press. Believing that a
collective security agreement among the western Powers is the best method
of containing Soviet expansion, Turkey has always been concerned over
any divergence in US and UK policies. Moreover, Turkey, which has in the
past pressed for more aid to Iran, was probably not unaware of this
opportunity to advocate additional assistance to the Near East.
"B" IRAN. Prime Minister Ala Receives Vote of Confidence. US Embassy Tehran
reports that on 17 A.nril Prime Minister Hussein Ala received a vote of
eonfidenee.(77 to 1) from Parliamentos lower house. Members of the
National Front abstained and the one opposing vote was from Qavamas
supporter, Ashtianzadeh, who has consistently opposed Ala's government.
Prior to receiving the vote, Ala informed the US Ambassador that the
situation was improving and that if confirmed by the Majlis he would
then begin to take strong measures to suppress the increasingly open
,activities of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party. Ala also expressed his concern
over UK actions in the.present crisis; he stated that the Shah felt that
the UK was not only undermining the present government but the Shah as
well. In this connection Ala expressed a strong belief that no UK frigates
should be sent to Abadan. (S Tehran 2450, 17 Apr 51). Q_QM ENT: The vote
of confidence given Ala by the lower house of Parliament should strengthen
further the stability of the government. However, Ala's confidence con-
cerning an improvement in the situation is not echoed by other reports
from Iran which state that the situation. is worsening, Despite the im-
position of martial law, the appeals of various political leaders~includ-
ing National.Front member Mullah Kashani, and the reported agreement of
many of the strikers to return to work, the Abadan refinery is still
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shut down and disturbances reportedly continue at Isfahan. Furthermore
Iranian resentment against the British will undoubtedly increase if, as
reportedly planned, the UK sends HMS FLAMINGO "slowly past Abadan" on
21 April.
"C" LEBANON. Preliminary Election Results. The US Legation in Beirut reports
that on 15 April the Lebanese national elections took place in comparative
quiet with almost 55% of the electorate voting. Nineteen former deputies
were defeated for re-election, 37 were returned, and 39 new deputies will
sit in the new Chamber. Elections for one seat remain to be run off on
22 April. The Legation states that political alignments are not yet
predictable, but it expects a stronger opposition than in the last Chamber.
The five Communist candidates were badly defeated, the Phalange and
National Bloc made poor showings, but Kamal Jumblat"s Socialist Party
reportedly gained-in strength. (R Beirut 575, 17 Apr 51). COMMENT:
Widespread dissatisfaction with the Government among the poorer classes,
which some observers felt would result in a Communist show/of strength
in the elections, may be reflected in the apparent gains by Jumblat and
his Druze followers, whose hostility to the former al-Sulk Government has
in the past led to occasional outbursts of vi?lence. Possibly explaining
the Communists" failure, unconfirmed reports indicate that the candidacy
of Mustafa al-Aril, a leading Communist, alienated the anti-Communist labor
unions who had previously cooperated with Communist-dominated unions in
support of the powerful labor leader, Henri Fir"awn. The relative calm
surrounding the elections is somewhat surprising,since the Government had
anticipated difficulty in maintaining order,
"B" INDIA. Internal Economic DevelopmentSuffers. Mr. L0 K. Jha, India's
Chief Controller of Imports and Exports,,has stated on a personal basis
to the US Embassy, New Delhi, that, (1) his Governments policy of main-
taining a high level of exports during 1950 has denied to the Indian
people commodities much needed for internal consumption and (2) +11.e Indians
have been further deprived of important commodities because the effects
of rupee devaluation and the rising prices of foreign goods have reduced
the quantities of Indian imports to about half of the 1948 level. (C New
Delhi 2812, 13 Apr 51). COMMENT: Internal economic development will be
delayed as long as India is forced to maximize exports and minimize
imports in order to cb.tain and conserve foreign exchange.
"B" INDONESIA. Joint Cabinet Formers AMpointd. Premier-designate Sartono
of the Indonesian National Party (PNI) returned his mandate to President
Soekarno on 18 April. The President immediately appointed as joint
cabinet formers the chairmen of Indonesia?s two largest parties=-Sukiman
of the Masjumi (Moslem) Party and Sidik of the PNI. Shortly before the
President's action, Room, a Masjumi leader, told a US Embassy official
that the Masjumi expected to modify its opposition to the PNI in order to
avert the latter's possible coalition with leftist groups. (R Djakarta
1451, 18 Apr 51). COMMENT: Previous cabinet discussions between the
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Masjumi and PNI have consumed nearly a month's time but apparently have
been successful in swinging the PNI away from many of its leftist policies
toward the moderate position held by the Masjumi. Remaining points of
disagreement between the two parties appear to be (1) choice of the prime
minister and (2) PNI insistence on abrog'tion of the Netherlands-Indonesian
Union and reconsideration of comprehensive agreements negotiated by the
Dutch and Indonesians in 1949 when sovereignty was transferred.
"B" PHILIPPINES. Ouoosition Leader Attacks Government9s Pro-US Foreign Policy.
Claro Recto, a high Nacionalista Party leader, on 17 April delivered a
blistering attack on Philippine foreign policy as being completely and
unrealistically subservient to the US. Recto viewed the present inter-
national situation as a struggle between two great powersp rather than a
conflict between the free world and totalitarianism, He contended that
the Philippines should. have either guarantees at least equal to those
in the NAP or should adopt a neutral position, US Embassy Manila believes
Recto's tirade was motivated by: (1) a desire to attack the Quirino regime
on a new issue (rather than on corruption and maladministration); (2)
possible resentment at his internment by US forces, during the liberation
period, for collaboration with the Japanese; and (3) the anti-US attitude
of some members of his law firm and his advisers. (C Manila 3249? 18 Apr 51).
CQMME T: Recto was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Japanese puppet
government. He has previously deplored the Philippine tendency to rely
so completely on US protection and has advocated closer ties with other
Asiatic nations. Other Philippine leaders from time to time express
similar "neutral" sentiments but such statements have limited appeal..
"A" INDOCHINA. Viet Minh to attack in Northwest Tonkin. The US Military
Attache reports that French forces have reoccupied certain strategic posts
in the Tonkin delta area,.which had been seized by the Viet Minh two weeks
ago, and have repulsed Viet Minh attacks of varying strength in other
parts of the delta. Meanwhile, Viet Minh forces in the rugged mountain
country some 150 miles to the northwest have been preparing to attack
the French-held post of Laichau. The Attache cites a belief held by French
officials that this operatiot is intended as a "face-saving" venture to
compensate for the failure of recent Viet Minh attacks in the delta. The
Chinese battalion,whieh entered Indochina above Laichau two weeks agcy is
apparently still occupying the post of Phongtho and vicinity, but the
Attache sees no indications that a large-scale Chinese invasion is imminent.
(S Hanoi 682, 17 Apr 51). COMMENT: The post of Laichau is significant
only as the focus of converging trails and as a barrier in the path of'a
Chinese invasion from Yunnan. It is located in a country of dense forests
and 10,000-foot mountain peaks and the area is inhabited by primitive Thai
tribesmen of anti-Viet Minh and anti-Chinese sentiment-factors which do
not favor a large-scale Chinese Communist invasion, Although the Chinese
force at Phongtho has been reliably indentified as Communist, the French
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 have interpreted the situation as being only "a little bit more than a
frontier affair". The French contention that the predicted Viet Minh
action has a face-saving motive is the latest'of several different
theories calculated to explain unfriendly activity in this area.
"C" CHINA. Sec'a.rity Operations. Recent information brings to 28 the number
of US nationals known to be in Chinese Communist prisons, Chungking radio
claims the capture of 4000 "bandit leaders, secret agents, local despots,
etc.," aid the "wiping out" of 18,000 "remnant bandits" in Testern Szechuan
in the past six months, and the recent."suppression" of 8000 ".counter-
revolutionaries" in Chengtu alone, Nanking radio announces the arrest of
"a batch of counter-revolutionary elements" in. Nanking and a traveller
from Nanking reports 20 to 40 executions daily in that city for the past
month, (S Hong Kong 3042, 13 Apr; R FBIS,,16 Apr 51). COMMENT-. The
increase of 12 in the figure for US nationals in prison (see OCI Daily
Digest, 10 April) represents new information rather than new arrests.
Figures for "bandit leaders, secret agents, local despots, etc." belong
to the "suppression of counter-revolutionaries" campaign, which is increas-
ing in intensity, while the figures for "remnant bandits" are results of
the "bandit-suppression" campaign, which is decreasing. The admission of
8000 recent arrests in Chengtu--a city half the size of Nanking--makes
easily credible the report of approximately 1000 recent executions in
the latter city.
"C" Soviet Troop Movement into Manchuria,
COMMENT: The above is the most recent of a series of reports, largely
mechanized force of 20,000 troops.
the movement into Manchuria, between 20 and 31 March, of a Soviet
25X1C of Soviet troop movements into Manchuria in the
pas' ree mom s. None of these reports has yet been confirmed.
"B" KOREA. Disposition of Chinese Communist Troops in Korea.
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behind front line troops "in order to prevent a retreat". The
during a March meeting in Peiping between
4th Field Army commander Lin Piao and 2nd Field Army commander Liu Po-cheng
it was decided to send an additional three armies of'Liu?s 2nd Field Army
to Korea. 2nd Field Army troops already in Korea are massed in the Kaesong
area (northwest of S,,oul) and have not yet been committed to battle,
COMMENT: It is believed that
the front lines in a reserve capacity, 2nd Field Army unit's referred to
are believed to be the 3rd Army Group, reported moving into Korea, and the
18th Army Group, tentatively accepted in Korea in the general area indicated.
the "8th Army" 'referred to may be the "8th Army Group", elements of which
are in Korea and at the time of this report rer~e deployed in the rear of
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"C" KOREA. Pyone7anff Gives Unusual Emzhasis to Soviet Aide A Radio Pyongyang
15 April broadcast admitted "the Korean People have been receiving
tremendous material aid from the Soviet Union. Even before the aggression
by the American imperialists, the Soviet Union had been extending us
tremendous moral and material support." --- "This international support
means that the American and British imperialists are the enemy of the
people." -- "Today, tremendous relief supplies, comfort kits and muni-
tions are being received from all over the world -?-." (R FBIS 17 Apr 51).
COMMENT: On occasion Radio Pyongyang takes upon itself the task of thanking
Hungary for its medical team and China for its "Volunteers." Soviet aid,
ho'vever, is never spelled out although thanks are always rendered to the
USSR. While the above message is still ambiguous in regard to Soviet
assistance, it does place unusual emphasis on Soviet material. assistance.
"C" JAPAN. Communist Peace Ballot Activity. The "Over-all Peace Patriotic
Movement Council", ostensibly representative of all Japanese "democratic"
organizations but actually a Communist Front, is leading an intensified
drive for an "over-all peace treaty ballot." Council goals, as announced
on various occasions, vary from 40 to 70 million signatures. Party orders
are believed to give this campaign first priority at this time. (S Fecom
Daily Intelligence Summary, 27 March 51). COMMENT-. Obviously the Communists
hope to capitalize on general peace sentiment, as well as on the strong
desire for neutrality still motivating the thinking of some Japanese.
While, in terms of past successes with this type of campaign, the Communist
goals are patently grandiose, the campaign may cost the conservative
parties some votes in the local elections In late April.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"C" Communist Success-in Influencing Social Democrats to Sun--
port Anti-Remi.itariza ion aign, U representatives in Frurt
report that the Communist an tip remilitarization plebiscite drive is
getting into high gear in west Germany and that at meetings of the
"preparatory committees" which have been formed on all levels, there
has been considerable Social Democratic (SPD) attendance, SPD leaders
are reported to be seriously concerned at SPD rank and file partici-
pation in the Communist campaign. The Communist plebiscite drive
has been particularly active in Rhineland-Palatinate, where it has
so concerned the government that the Land cabinet has taken action
against the circulation of plebiscite lists, and is seizing signature
lists already collected. (S Frankfurt Telecon, 18 Apr 51). COUNT:.
Popular lack of enthusiasm for German remilitarization continues to
be subject to Communist exploitation. Although the extent of SPD
participation in the Communist drive now appears greater than had
been previously reported, it is not likely that non-Communist partici-
pation in the campaign is yet sufficiently large or well-organized
as to constitute a major deterrent to government remilitarization
planning,
"C" FRANCE. French Retard Talks on Aid to Yugoslavia,, There is a
possibility that the tripartite US-UK-France discussions on
economic aid to Yugoslavia-begun this week in London-will be some-
what delayed by the tactics of the inadequately staffed French
delegation, which is requesting clarification of decisions made at
technical talks to which the French were not invited. (C London 5477,
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17 Apr Si). COI-MENT: French pique at their tardy entry into these
discussions an perhaps resentment over their exclusion from the
US UK talks at Malta may help explain these working-level difficulties.
French policy, however, as indicated by the recently concluded trade
agreement with the Yugoslavs, is clearly favorable to close cooperation
with and support of Yugoslavia.
AUSTRIA. Austrians Concerned over Signs of Increasing Soviet Aggression.
Minis er o- the Inter-3-or Helmer has informe Lega on Vienna o
his fears that the USSR is quietly building up Soviet troop strength
in Austria, and has cited a number. of recent indications as proof of
this build-up. Helmer is particularly disturbed, however, by the
recent wave of Soviet abductions and is convinced that a "vigorous
reaction" by the Austrian Government is required to prevent demoral-
ization of the eastern zone population, including security forces..
(S Vienna 2355, 17 Apr 51). COMMENT: Helmer's reports of Soviet
troop build-up, some of which ave not been confirmed, may be an attempt
to alert US officials to the. seriousness of the situation in which he
finds himself vis-a-vis the Soviet occupation element as a result of
his recent sweeping dismissal of Communists from the Austrian police
force. Nevertheless, Austrian alarm over growing Soviet intransigence
and its consequences for Austrian control of the eastern zone is sincere.
SWITZERLAND. Swiss Unlikely to Increase Industrial Production Beyond
Presen Near C apaci y Levels. Since as September Swiss industry
has been steadily increasing production and today is running at fairly
close to full capacity. This is particularly tr.e in the machine and
metal sectors and the textile industry. The length of time necessary
for the delivery of orders has been steadily increasing as well.
Lastly, the shortage of labor is becoming progressively greater,
another indication of full production. (R Bern, ECA A-65, l)t Apr 51).
COMAENT: Unless the Swiss divert their exports from Eastern Europe
to the West or are assured large quantities of raw materials, it
appears that Swiss contribution to Western rearmament will, have definite
limitations. The Swiss rearmament program will also limit the export
of goods useful to Western European rearmament. It is doubtful that
the Swiss will either modernize further'or expand their capital plant'
at this time, because they fear that the present boom is,temporary
and are therefore unwilling to invest in plant expansion.
PORTUGAL. President Carmona Dies. General C armona, President of
the Portuguese Republic, die on 18 April, after several weeks' illness.
(U Lisbon 424, 18 Apr 51). COPl NT: The Portuguese Constitution
provides that Prime Minister S azar shall assume the powers of the
President and requires that a new President be elected within 60 days.
Although Salazar is the logical successor to C armona,and his election
to the office of President would not mean any lessening of his political
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power, it would have two effects which would be inimitable to Salaz,ar's
temperament: (1) delegation of greater administrative authority to
.his subordinates and (2) constant appearance in the public eye. He
may, therefore, seek the Amy's concurrence in nominating some other
non-.controversial figure, preferably a general. In any event, CarlRonats
death will bring to the forefront what is essentially the greatest
problem in Portuguese political life, i.e., the question of succession
to Salazar.
"B" DENMARK. Greenland Defense Agreement with US to be Submitted to
ar ament. h e Danes have in ica e e a.nt nn lo-n to su'6m the:
propose S -Danish agreement for the defense of Greenland to. the
Rigsdag when it reconvenes on 24 April. They do not plan to submit
the actual technical schedule for the US operation of several airfields
in northern and western Greenland, but they anticipate that the public
will soon learn the basic fact that the United States is conducting;
such operations. Meanwhile, government circles are eager to announce
that the agreement has been signed, in order to avoid newspaper
speculation as to what may be delaying consummation of the agreement.
(TS Copenhagen 863, 16 Apr 51)e CON NT: The Danish Government is
very sensitive with respect to Greenland and :desires to avoid anything
which can be interpreted as meaning that Denmark is being subjected
to American pressure or is relinquishing in any way Danish sovereignty
over Greenland. This extreme caution on the Governments part is
due partly to fear of providing.. grounds for Soviet protests and partly
to a desire not to excite "neutrality" elements in Denmark.
t'C" NORWAY. Government Offers to.Settle Trade Debt to USSR, The Govern-
ment has offered to pay in dollars Rs , million Made debt to
.the USSR, hoping that settlement at this time would strengthen the
Norwegian bargaining position in any future trade negotiations with
the USSR. With the expiration of the old trade and payments agreement
at the beginning of this year there is no reason for Norway to continue
carrying the debt, for which the USSR can demand payment in gold or
dollars at any time. The Soviets have not yet replied to the offer
and are not likely to"do so until they have further explored possi-
bilities for new trading deals. The latest Soviet suggestion along
this line is an informal offer to exchange this year 2,500 tons of
manganese ore for 1,000 tons of Norwegian aluminum. (S Oslo Despatch
1460, 6 Apr 51). COMAENT: The Norwegians, who have kept the dollar
equivalent of their r c.e debt in a special fund against a possible
Soviet demand, wish not only to deprive the USSR. of this potential
bargaining lever,,but also to obviate the risk of the dollar's being
devalued in relation to gold.
"C" UNITED KINGDOM. Government Reassuring Public on Paris
of State off` r Foreign Affairs Kenneth Younger, speaking a a Labor Party
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meeting on 15 April, warned against impatience at the seeming lack
of progress in the Deputy Foreign Ministers' Paris agenda talks,
He explained that, while the Government earnestly desires a full
conference,, experience has taught the need for extreme care lest
the Soviets capitalize upon a carelessly agreed agenda to their
own propaganda advantage. (U London 5441, 16 Apr 51) COMMENT:
In response to a strong public demand for a four. power conference,
the UK delegation at Paris has been somewhat more willing than the
US or France to make concessions to the Soviet position on the
agenda. Younger's exposition reflects the Government's effort to
lessen this home front pressure, which has been especially strong
among left wing segments of its own Labor Party.
FRENCH MOROCCO: Rumored Renewal of.Crisis Unverified.. Press reports
that Resident General Juin is seeking permission to depose the Sultan
and.that he has asked to remain in Morocco were not confirmed by the
French Foreign Office. Juin has, in fact, informed the Foreign
Minister that relations with the Sultan are now without tension,
A .Foreign Office official added, however,. that although Juin is
prepared to undertake his new duties as a commander of the European
Army, he is not averse to rumors that his stay in Rabat may be
extended because he wishes no lag between his departure and the
installation of a successors (C Paris 6274, 17 Apr 51). C01 NT:
A NY Times article of 17 April reported emergency consults ion ns in
Paris concerning the deteriorating relations between France and the
nationalists and Juin's request to remain in Rabat until 1 Dec 51,
The. failure of the Rabat Residency or the French Foreign Office to
deny this dispatch lends credence to the belief that the article was
French "inspired" because of (a) General Juin's dissatisfaction with
the importance of his post in SHAPE, (b) his belief that any successor
would yield to some of the nationalist demands, (c) his belief that
North Africa is more important to French defense than Europe, and
(d) his suspicions regarding US activities in Morocco. In view of
the restrictions imposed on nationalist activity as well as the
pressure of a French army in Morocco large enough to put down native
disorders,, it is not likely that the newly-formed nationalist alliance
could foment an effective campaign in the near future.
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C.,YTRAL INTIILLIGf C1: ,(lGi;rj71r
APR 18 1951
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLES
18 April 1951
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING
"C" UK Solidarity with West Emphasized. The United Kingdom, though still
urging concessions to the Soviets, now may be willing as a last resort to
accept a "split agenda" on the order for discussing reduction and level of
armaments. Meanwhile,_UK Ambassador Franks has been instructed to stress
that once the Foreign Ministers met, the British would be just as firm as
the French and the US. (S S/S Paris 5476, 16-Apr 51, S S/S Paris 6260,
17 Apr 51). COMMENT: While the UK representative, in response to pressure
of public opinion, has placed greater emphasis than the US and French repre-
sentatives on the convening of the Foreign Ministers' Conference - even at
the price of agenda concessions - there are no indications that at the
Conference itself the UK would fail to support its allies. A fundamental
Soviet aim at the Deputies' Conference appears to be to divide the Western
Powers, and the reported British reassurances to their Western partners
reaffirm that they will not allow this, regardless of still unresolved
issues.
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"A" POLAND. US Information Program Faces Elimination. The US Embassy 'Warsaw
reports that the Polish Security Police have demanded under threat of
serious reprisals that USIE's Polish librarian surrender a complete list
of the library's patrons for an official. investigation to begin on 18 April.
The list of 839 borrowers includes many of Poland's outstanding professional,
religious, scientific, and former political leaders who have maintained
library membership as a means of continuing intellectual relations with the
West. The Security Police agent who approached the Polish USIE librarian
stated that the US information program in Poland would probably be completely
eliminated within six months. The US Ambassador noted that if the list is
turned over to the Security Police, the careers and possibly the lives of the
individuals concerned would be placed in the gravest jeopardy. (S S/S Warsaw
816, 16 Apr 51). COMNT: This is the most drastic step that the Polish
Government has taken against USIE and indicates its intention of severing
all intellectual and cultural contacts between Poland and the West. Since
the first of the year, the Security Police have engaged in a sporadic, but
ineffective,campaign of harrassment against USIE patrons.
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SECRET
 Approved Forplease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146&A 00100420001-5
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"C" CANADA. External Affairs Minister Stresses Independence of Canadian Far
Eastern Policy. In a recent press conference External Affairs Minister
Pearson made off-the-record comments clarifying three different aspects
of Canadian Far Eastern policy. In explanation of his much publicized
Toronto speech of several days before on US-Canadian relations, Pearson
stated that formerly Canada had feared that the UK would drag it into
wars, but its worries now center on the US dragging Canada into a war in
China. On the MacArthur dismissal Pearson refused to comment directly,
even on an off-the-record basis, but did say he felt there was now a
better chance for negotiating with the Chinese Communists. On the problem
of Chinese participation in Japanese peace treaty negotiations, Pearson
suggested the US UK dilemma might be solved by inviting no Chinese govern-
ment to sign but leaving the treaty open for subsequent signature by any
participant in the Pacific war. (R S/S Ottawa 258, 13 Apr 51). COMCENT:
Pearson probably felt that no comment on the MacArthur dismissal was
necessary since Canadian sentiment for months past has been strongly anti-
MacArthur. The suggestion on Chinese participation in the Japanese .peace
treaty is essentially the same as the solution worked out recently by the
UK Foreign Office but not approved by the British Cabinet?
SECRET
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