CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100400001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 16, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OF'ICN OF CURMNT INTELLIGENCE
Date: APR 16 1951
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the internal ise of ti
Office of Current Intelligence. It does not
represent a complete coverage of all current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
? items indicating Soviet=Communist
intentions or capabilities
"B"" - important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
communist intentions or capabilities
other information indicating trends
and potential, developments
DIA, DOS, USAF Declassification/Release Instructions on File
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"3" USSR. Jewish Refugees Allowed to Leave Manchuria for Israel. US ConGen
Hong Kong reports that 29 Jewish refugees from Manchuria departed. from
Hong Kong on 13 April. The information was attained by a "useful. and
reliable source" who also stated that during the past 18 months over
2,000 persons have traveled from Manchuria to Israel, and that there are
about 300 more to come, The source said that though some held Soviet
passports, they are mostly just nominal Soviet citizens. One such refu-
gee has a Soviet passport but had resided in China since 1922. (C Hong
.Kong 3012, 14 Apr 51). COMMENT: Several hundred White Russians, many
of whom have had Soviet passports, have been permitted to leave China
since the extension of Communist control over the mainland. The largest
.group of these refugees have been of Russian-Jewish descent, although
the alleged total of 2,000 from Manchuria appears to be high. As it is
known that certain of these refugees have previously been in the employ
of Soviet enterprises in China, it is possible that some of them are
Soviet agents of various kinds. However, most of the refugees from
China apparently are regarded by the authorities as unassimilable, and
of no particular value to the Communist cause. Such refugees are proba-
bly allowed to leave for the same reasons as pertained to the Jews that
have left Eastern Europe.
"B" EASTERN EUROPE. ALBANIA. "Resistance Front" Re-ported,- "An Albanian
leader" who has been with a small resistance band in northern Albania has
reportedly received an urgent invitation to meet with members of a
"Resistance Front" in the regions of Shkoder and Kukes in northern
Albania during mid-April 1951. The "Front" is also reported to be seek-
ing contact with the Bloku Kombetar Independent (BKI), a right-wing organi-
zation of exiled Albanians backed by the Italian Government. The "Resistance
Front" is described in the report as a strictly nationalist organization
which is not oriented toward Tito. The "Front" is said to have a. central
committee in Tirana, subordinate committees in each commune, and a military
staff having connections with nationalist bands throughout Albania. The
organization is reportedly strongest in central Albania. and includes
some prominent members of the government.
OO$NENTt This is the first report which definitely names a nationwide
internal Albanian resistance organization. Previous reports have indicated
the existence of a well-coordinated and wel3-supplied Albanian underground.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. French Installations To Be Closed,, According to the US
Embassy in Praha, the French Ambassador to Czechoslovakia was handed two
notes on 12 April by Deputy Foreign Minister Sekaninova (previously
rumored as purged). The first note required France to close the three
French cultural institutions located im Bratislava, Brno, and Praha. The
second gave Prance, until 26 April to close its Consulate-General in
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Bratislava and gave notice that the Czechoslovak Consulate in Marseilles
was being closed. In retaliation, the French Ambassador has informed
his American colleague that the Czechoslovak Consulate in Algiers and
the Masaryk Institute in Paris would be closed. (C Praha 625 & 627, 13
and 14 Apr 51).
HUNGARY-RUMANIA. Soviet Jets Observed. On 12 April the US Air Attache
in Budapest personally observed 20 MIG-151s, 11 YAK-90s as well as 11
F-51's with clearly identifiable Soviet insignia at Budapest's Tokol
airfield. (S AA Budapest K-289 (CAF IN: 73909) 13 Apr 51). Seven Soviet
MIG-15 jet fighters have'been seen at one time at Otopeni airfield
near Bucharest, tending to confirm a previous estimate that a jet fighter
unit is stationed there. Rumors of the arrival of additional jets are
circulating in Bucharest and many more Soviet airmen are seen in the
capital. In addition, an unconfirmed report indicates that a number of
Soviet officers in Bucharest are wearing Rumanian uniforms. (C Bucharest
697, 13 Apr 51). COMMENT: The airfield at Otopeni is one of the three
fields in Rumania at which Soviet Air Force fighter regiments are be-
lieved to be stationed. This report and the reliable report of the
presence of jet fighters at a Soviet-occupied field in gIungary suggest
the probable reequipment of Soviet fighter units in the southeast European
area with jet planes. Such reequipment would follow the pattern set in
the 24th Air Army in the Soviet zone of Germany, fighter units of which
have been almost completely reequipped with jets.
RUMANIA. Propaganda. The Rumanian regime is stepping up its hate cam-
paign against the US and UK. The National Assembly at its recent session
ending 7 April pledged "intensive work to unmask American and British
imperialist aggressors." Simultaneously, the head of the Orthodox Church
and the leaders of several other denominations issued similar statements.
On 10 April the campaign for adherents for the peace pact appeal opened
with new tirades against the US and UK. The press continued its charges
that the US is sabotaging the Paris Four Power meeting. In a newspaper
article on the real meaning of patriotism, which has recently occupied
the attention of Rumanian publicists, Leontin Salajan, Army Chief of Staff,
declared that present-day Rumanian patriotism is combined with proletarian
internationalism and that to be a true Rumanian patriot means "to be on
the side of the peoples of the world against the monsters of mankind --
the American and British imperialists." (C Bucharest 697, 13 Apr 51).
COMMENT: Rumanian Communist leaders are now bent on exploiting the conno-
tations of the term "patriotism" for their own ends, similar to the way
in which they played upon the universal desire for peace to obtain a
show of public sentiment in. favor of Soviet propagandapro.iouncemen.ts. So
far, the campaign has focused on alleged misdeeds of American industrial-
ists exploiting Rumanian resources in the period between World Wars I and
II.
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"B"
YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslavs Believe Radio Operatorls Defection in Praha'
Was Porced.. US Ambassador Briggs reports that the Yugoslav Charge
d'Affaires in Praha is convinced that the Yugoslav radio operator who
the Czechoslovak government claims has sought asyluThiinCzecchoslovakia
was forcibly seized on Yugoslav Embassy p ptr Charge' con-
viction is based on his personal estimate that the radio operator was
one of the most reliable Embassy employees as well as on circumstantial
evidence which indicated that the radio operator expected to return to
Yugoslavia on 10 April in accordance with previous plans,-Meantime, in
a oli editorial the Yugoslavs have charged that the Yugoslav
employee was seized against his will and "subjected to the well-known
treatment that leads to confession." Politika speculates that the
radio operator may be used as a witness in a forthcoming trial to prove
the existence of a plot "in the heart of-Praha against the security of
Czechoslovakia and of the mighty Soviet Union." (S Praha 626, 13 Apr 51;
C-Belgrade 1502, 13 Apr 51). COMM~NTo The radio operator disappeared
from the Yugoslav Embassy in Praha during. the early morning hours of
31 March. It was not until 12 April that the Czechoslovak press and
radio announced that he had requested asylum. The 12 days delay be-
tween the radio operator's disappearance and the Czechoslovak announce-
ment suggests that his request for asylum was probably made under duress.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"B" SAUDI ARABIA/SYRIA. Saudi Arabian Indignation at Syrian Charges. US
Ambassador Caffery in Cairo has been informed by Karim Tabet Pasha, the
royal Press Counselor, that Egypt instigated the visit to Cairo of Lt.
Col. Shishakli, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army, to provide a
"neutral ground" where Shishakli might meet Prince Feisal, Saudi Arabian
Foreign Minister. According to Tabet, King Ibn Saud is thoroughly in-
censed over Syrian allegations that Saudi Arabia has financed assassina-
tion plots against Shishakli and King Abdullah of Jordan and has threatened
to sever Saudi Arabian diplomatic relations with Syria unless Syria
position is clarified. Tabet said. that the Feisal-Shi.shakli negotiations
were "going well" and that only "one or two little points of the dispute
were still left." (TS Cairo 1052, 13 Apr 51). COMMENT: In spite of the
professed Saudi Arabian indignation at the Syrian charges, there has been
some evidence in the past that Saudi Arabian representatives have taken
more than passive interest in the internal affairs of Syria and Jordan.
"B" SYRIA. jarlLiamentar-y Vote of Confidence in Azm Government. The US Army
Attache in Damascus rerorts that a Parliamentary vote of confidence in
the al-Azm Government last week was won only because the Populists and
Islamic Socialists abstained from voting. Though the Populist deputies
reportedly could have defeated al-Azm by three votes, they abstained so
as not to embarrass the Government while it attempted to settle the serious
border dispute with Israel. This Populist show of strength, the Attache
believes, seems to present the Army with the difficult choice of working
again with the Populists after the border emergency is resolved, or of
intervening more forcibly than heretofore in Government affairs. (S
Damascus Joint Weeka 15, 13 Apr 51). COI TViENT: The Atlache's belief that
the al-Azm Government remains in office because of the serious border
trouble is supported by available data, Complementary to this inter-
pretation of Populist motives in abstaining fran the confidence vote,
however, is former Prime Minister Qudsi's reported desire to avoid at
present a Populist Party stand on all issues, and thus to leave his
party free to choose its own issues later if new general elections
should be indicated. In the event of new elections, which some
observers consider inevitable unless the Army takes it upon itself to
intervene forcibly in civil affairs, it is doubtful that Qudsi would
permit the Azm Government to remain in office in a "caretaker" capacity.
Experience has shown that a "caretaker" .government in Syria would be
capable of considerable manipulation of the vote.
"C" AUSTRALIA. Communists Tighten Party Organization. The Central Committee
of the Australian Communist Party has ordered a review of its entire
membership in Australia. The order states that'there must be a thorough
political-ideological examination of each Party organization and each
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Party member, and that members who fail to measure up to Party require-
ments must be removed from their posts and, if necessary, from the Party
itself. (U FBID 13 Apr 51). COMMENT: The Communist Party is probably
"girding its loins" in anticipation of renewed Government attempts to
dissolve its organization and break its hold over key trade unions.
Aside from its influence in the trade unions, Australian Communist Party
strength has declined considerably in recent years.
"B" Nn~ ZEALAND. Seamen on Sympathy Strike with Dockers. The President of
the Federated Seamen's Union announced on 11 April that seamen in all
main ports of New Zealand would join the striking waterside workers
in a sympathy strike. The seamen,are to join the strike because of the
Government's stringent anti-strike orders,which included outlawing the
Waterside Workers Union,and authorizing police interference with its meet-
ings. The waterfront strike may force widespread shut-downs in industry.
(R FBID 13 Apr 51). COMMENT: The strike has also affected compulsory
military training. With officers supervising handling of cargo at strike-
bound ports, sufficient cadres are apparently unavailable for training
recruits and the Minister of Defense has announced that recruitment will
be retarded.
"B" BU RMA. Froposed Burmese Envoy to Peiping Considered Unfortunate Choice.
The Burmese Government is contemplating extensive reassignments of its top
diplomatic representatives. The most significant of these changes-would
be the transfer of Ambassador Myint Theirs from Peiping to London and his
replacement by Hla Maung, presently Burmese Ambassador to Thailand. US
Embassy Rangoon comments that Hla Maung, a prominent Socialist politician,
is critical of US Far Eastern policy and is neither competent nor objective.
(S Rangoon 717, 14 Apr 51), COMMENTs-The appointment of H1a Maung as
Ambassador to Red China. could have unfavorable consequences for Burma.
It is questionable whether he is willing or able accurately to report and
interpret Peiping's in',entions with regard to Burmay which have recently
become increasingly threatening.
"C" CHINA.
CCAF Potential Against Hong Kong. According to the RAF in Hong
Kong, the Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF) consists of about 400 combat
aircraft, including 100 light bombers and 250 fighter planes. The RAF
estimates that if the whole of this force were concentrated in a 300-mile
radius of Hong Kong, it could'*drop a maximum of 140-150 tons of bombs in
any one day. Additional aircraft under Soviet control might be employed
to defend Chinese air bases. The RAF states that the whole CCAF could
be deployed in the 23 airfields located within a 300-mile radius of Hong
Kong. The US Air Liaison Officer in Hong Kong considers this estimate
of 23 serviceable airfields excessive, and believes that the British
have exaggerated CCAF efficiency and bombing potential. (TS AIRLO Hong
Kong CALHK 357E-51 11 Apr 51). COMMENT: The RAF estimate of CCAF strength
is a little less than the US Air Force's current estimate which lists 440
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aircraft under Chinese Communist control. and an additional 210 in Soviet-
controlled units. The bulk of these aircraft are stationed in North China
and Manchuria rather than South China, where the CCAF is reported to be
in training status only.
"C" Soviet Troons at Changchun. two 25X1C
Soviet mechanized divisions totalling 19,000 troops, plus a Soviet infantry
regiment, arrived from Dairen at the end of February for maneuvers in the
Changchun a rp 'hjIIA+ed on the o of Changchun as of
25X1A mid-March. C0 v;iNT: 25X1C
has reported. the presence of some 10,000 Soviet troops in the Changchun
area as of late January. The OCI Daily Digest of 14 April reported the
assertion of another untested informant that 14 Soviet long-range heavy
bombers had arrived Changchun in late March. None of these reports has
been confirmed.
"C" KOREA. South Korean Reaction to MacArthur Issue. Ambassador Muccio reports
that South Koreans,ir. private corversations, generally have expressed
the conviction that c.ily MacArthur would accomplish the unification of
Korea. One editorial, echoing this opinion, stressed South Korean support
for MacArthur's "positive" policy, which it contrasted with the "negative"
policy of seeking to localize the war since the latter would result in
greater Korean sacrifices in view of the Communist intention to fight to
the end. (R Pusan 871, 16 Apr 51).
JAPAN. Axjety Relieved by Return of Dulles. Polad Sebald in Tokyo reports
that the President's address of 11 April and the return of Mr. Dulles
has substantially relieved Japanese anxiety over possible changes in US
policy toward Japan resulting from General MacArthur's recall. Business
circles, however, are expressing some concern because of the belief that
(1) US-Japan economic cooperation may be retarded by the loss of personnel
in GHQ (who assertedly pushed economic programs more than Washington) (2)
GHQ policies may hereafter more closely reflect Washington opinion with
less emphasis on "first-hand" knowledge of the Japanese situation, (3) a
possible lull in the Korean War might cut down on US procurement orders,
and (4) increased British influence on US policy might result in economic
restrictions in the peace treaty. (U Tokyo 1800 13 Apr 51). COMRENT:
Japanese economic circles are habitually pessimistic - in some cases a
possible technique to influence US economic policy. No large-scale plan
for changes of personnel within GHQ has been reported.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"An
(U Rome 462, 12 Apr 51; U Paris 6165, 12 Apr _51; U Vienna ,
12 Apr 51?: U Bern 1421, 12 Apr 51; U Brussels 1660, 12 Apr 1? C
7ESTERN.EUROPE. Reaction to Recall of MacArthur Generally Favorable..
The non- unist press of w`es ern urope, Mich as given extensive
coverage and editorial comment to the removal of MacArthur, has
strongly approved of the action taken and has also exhibited a sense
of relief. While paying tribute to MacArthur's past achievements,
the press has termed the step necessary and has called it an act of
courage and strength. It was also stated that the danger of an im-
mediate conflict had been removed and a serious source of friction
between Western Europe and the US eliminated. In Spain, however,
local opinion has been sympathetic to MacArthur, although the neces-
sity of the action is recognized to* ensure the paramount importance
of Europe rather than of the Fax East. According to the Vatican's
semi-official newspaper, Vatican circles have praised Truman's re-
moval of'MacArthur as concrete evidence of a "desire for peace".
Communist and crypto-Communist press opinion, which has been
continually anti MacArthur, declared that the action was due to the
pressure of world opinion and not to "Truman's love for peace"o
2312
Madrid 923, 13 Apr 51; U Frankfort 8289, 13 Apr 51; R FBIS 25X1A
COMMENT: Europeans will be heartened by roman s
action and will have greater confidence in the stability of US
defense and other policies.
FRANCE-INDOCHINA., French Government Continues to Play Down Possi-
iito Chinese.In ervenion in In oc` a. In.comment ng on the
recently reported incursion o a Chinese force into the northwest
region of Vietnam, the French Foreign Office and Associated States
Minister have stated that the military in Indochina have neither
reported any contact with this force, nor confirmed that it is
Chinese Communist. Furthermore, these French officials believe
that if the Chinese Communists' intended to enter Indochina "in any
force", they would probably do so in the Langson area (northeast
of Hanoi). Embassy Paris concludes from these observations that
the French Foreign Office "hopes and expects" that the incident will
be passed over as a local matter, and does not plan to make an
issue of it. (S Paris 61144, 12 Apr 51). COMMENT: US Legation
Saigon reported its belief in late March to French policy was to
play down any reference to Chinese Communist assistance for the
Viet Minh and to ignore the issue of Chinese intervention as long
as possible, The same report indicated that De Lattre hoped the
improved military situation would make it possible for him to..
negotiate with the Chinese Communists for cessation of aid to the
Viet Minh. Recently the US Consul in Hanoi expressed the conviction
that De Lattre would continue his efforts to keep US observers "on
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the margin of events" from fear of what he considers US "Chinese-
baiting" impulses.
"B" AUSTRIA. Purge of Communists in'Police to be Dro ed Temporarily.
n erior Minister Helmer has orme U High Commissioner Donnelly
in Vienna that he should not expect further overt action at present
against the Communists in the Austrian police because of the current
"tough" `Soviet attitude in Austria. Helmer is particularly worried
about the Soviet refusal to accept the dismissals of Communist police
already ordered by the Austrian Government, a refusal which Helmer
believes may indicate a trend toward the establishment of a separate
Soviet zone police. Helmer also cited as evidence of the Soviets'.
"toughness"; (l) their reopening of the denazification issue, (2) the
renewed cases of abduction, and (3) the Soviet demands that two
police officers in the Soviet zone be removed, that a Communist police
chief, transferred to the provinces, be returned to Vienna, and that
an Austrian gendarmerie school be evacuated. (S Vienna 2308,
12 Apr 51). COMPIENT: The Austrian Government began efforts toward
the end of Marco .effect a wide-scale purge of Communists initially
in the Vienna administrative police at US instigation. The Soviet
authorities have not only reacted vigorously to this action, but
have seized the opportunity to bring countercharges against loyal
Austrian police and to. demand their removal. Austrian capitulation
on this issue will demoralize the police force and result in a
serious weakening of Austrian will to resist further Soviet demands.
"B" ITALY. Communists Intensify Drive to Detach Italy from NATO. In
an obvious attempt to increase Italian ommunis PCI prospects
for success in the forthcoming municipal elections, Togliatti
declared that by forsaking the NAT and remaining aloof from the East-
West conflict Italy would avoid war. In his speech, designed to
foster neutralist sentiment, he conceded that Italy "as a great
nation" should have an army but demanded that the Government give
socio-economic reforms and national reconstruction priority over
rearmament. (U NY Times, 16 Apr 51)4 COMMENT: In view of the
increasing support among Italians,for , t ,ommunist efforts to
appeal to neutrality-minded elements are not likely to have much
success unless.the Far East situation deteriorates. In such an
eventuality, heavier UN military commitments in Korea would be
interpreted by Italians as a relegation of the defense of western
Europe to a secondary position and would thereby considerably enhance
PCI prospects for neutralizing. Italy's participation in NATO.
"C" BOLIVIA. Demonstrations Protest'Paz Estenssoroes Delays Bolivian
PT '
o ice have arrested members o eMoo en o Nacionalista
Revolucionario (MNR) and 18 Communists for their part in e April
demonstrations protesting the delay in Paz Estenssoro's return.
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(See OCI Dail Digest, 4 Apr 51) (It was reported that 20,000
persons ga ered tnJ a Paz to greet Paz,) Police said they denied
Paz entry because the Bolivian President feared an.assassination
attempt on Paz. The'Minister of Government said that the
administration was taking only "simple precautions for the
maintenance of public order" and that it did not intend to impose
a state of siege or postpone the~6 May presidential elections.
__ - _ / xrer \\ -1 L A-- L'1
COMIVIE
the near future it does not clarify Pazt status as the MN R.
presidential candidate.. In addition to Paz'being denied entry into
Bolivia, there is some doubt concerning his. eligibility because he
failed to register in La Paz thirty days before the date of elections.
If it appears that Paz will be prevented from running, the MNR may
well resort to revolutionary activity. The Government is holding
police and army units in readiness to cope with further disorders.
I overnmen o impos e a state of siege if
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CENTRAL INT1LLIGENCE AGENCY
DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT
APR 16 1951
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLES
16 April 19.51
SECTION 2 (EASTERN).
"B"" GREECE. Reported Greek Proposal to Partition Albania clarified. US
Ambassador Peurifoy reports that Prime Minister Venizelos has explained
the reported Greek-Yugoslav plan to partition Albania. According to
'Venizelos when queried on 3 April by the Yugoslav Minister in Athens
on Greek action if war were to break out in the Balkans, he had suggested
that the two countries should protect their rear by simultaneous offen-
sives against Albania. Venizelos explained that his remarks applied ex-
clusively to military tactics in the event of a Soviet initiated war in
the Balkans. He emphasized that he had not intended any reference to
political partition of Albania or to military action initiated by Greece
or Yugoslavia. Ambassador Peurifoy also reports that Sulzberger of the
New York Times believes strongly that Yugoslavia now wishes at least a
basic military understanding with Greece and Turkey. According to
Sulzberger, Yugoslav politburo member Djilas had expressed the opinion
that the three countries should now agree on what forces they would put
into the field in the event of war in the Balkans, gnat had made no
suggestion as to where or by whom the subject should be discussed. (TS
S/S Athens 3375, 10 Apr 51). COMMENT: Aware that an independent
Yugoslavia hinders any successful Soviet-inspired invasion of Greece
from the north, the Greeks have consistently supported Westerr efforts
to tie Tito more closely to the West. Up until the present the Yugoslavs,
however, have resisted any Greek overtures regarding mi.ii.Lary cooperation.
The current Yugoslav reaction may be caused by heightened concern over the
possibility of military action against her by the Cominform nations.
Venizelos" explanation of his proposal concerning Albania is probably
correct, since Greece is fully aware of the dangers implicit in any inter-
vention in Albania at present and of the opposition any such proposed
intervention would encounter from the US as well as from the Yugoslav
Government.
"C" JAPAN. US to Assume Occupation Costs. A proposed press statement to be
released by SCAP about 25 April will announce that, effective 1 July 1951,
the US plans to pay dollars for a substantial portion of the cost to
Japan of maintenance of US occupation forces in that country. These costs
include rental of buildings, freight and port charges, local labor, mainte-
nance of real estate, utilities, coal and other services. Since the
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occupation forces provide security for Japan, the latter will continue to
pay for a portion of the costs of occupation. US aid probably can be
terminated later this year. (S S/S 6889, 12 Apr 51). COb 'ENT: Net fin-
ancial gain to Japan will be small, since the termination of US aid will
'Just about offset the dollars received for occupation expenses. However,
the Japanese will welcome this new arrangement since it will give them
full control over the use of the dollars earned, and provide them with the
illusion, at least, of being self-supporting.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"C" FRANCE BELGIUM. Current Belgian F"rade Controls Permit Rail Shipment to
China. According to the French Foreign Office, there is "no adequate
basis" for a French request to the Belgian Government to block the ship-
ment of steel rails now en route through Belgium to Communist China (See
OCI Daily Digest, 7 Apr 51), and in any event there is'no Belgian
legislation to stop such transit shipments. Chinese agents are now offering
French suppliers large sums in US or Swiss currency for railway materials,
but recent French regulations prohibit such transactions, and all appli-
cations are to be reviewed to guard against future transshipments. (S S/S
Paris 6208, 13 Apr 51). COMMENT: Belgian officials have in the past co-
operated in export controls to the full extent permitted by existing
legislation, but no change in Belgian regulations to prevent critical trans-
shipments is apprently under discussion. The French have been tightening
their controls considerably in recent months,although they may be doing so
with reservations in view of a recently reported proposal of the French
delegation at the Paris Deputies' Conference to seek trade "normalization"
even if the Foreign Ministers' Conference fails.
"B"' UNITED KINGDOM. Cabinet Dislikes Present Pacific Pact Proposals But Urges
Early Agreement. A UK Cabinet Minister has stated to Embassy London that
the UK, though having serious reservations about the US proposals for a
Pacific Pact, is anxious not to appear to be delaying the negotiations. He
implied that in the circumstances the UK favors obtaining at least an in-
formal Australian commitment before the Australian elections, lest a
possible Labor victory there bring "the unpredictable Evatt" back to the
External Affairs Ministry. The UK Cabinet doubts regarding the Pact arise
in part from the prospective inclusion of the Philippines, which might, in
the British view, at least delay "absolutely vital" Australian and New
Zealand troop contributions to the Middle East by creating an obligation to
contribute to Philippine defense. The British further believe that the in-
.elusion of the Philippines would have a negative effect on Asian opinion,
where the Philippines are regarded as US satellites, and would reinforce the
conclusion that the Pact is a "while man's club". Some Cabinet members also
consider that the Conservative Party could make great political capital out
of a Far Eastern pact not including the UK. (TS S/S London 5423, 13 Apr 51).
COMMENT: Partly as.a result of specific Australian pressure, the UK appears
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100400001-7
 Approved ForlAstease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146J 0100400001-7
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to believe that some sort of Pacific security arrangement, with or with-
out the UK, is a pre-requisite to conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty
with Australian and New Zealand concurrence. But the UK has serious mis-
givings about defense pact proposals which in its view neglect Southeast
Asia,whioh is regarded by the UK as the vital strategic area, and would
further reinforce Indian objections to a defense pact in the Far East,
The UK is also probably concerned by the tendency of Australia and New
Zealand to orient themselves toward the'US.
Approved For Release 2001/09/0': CIA-RDP79T01146A000100400001-7
 UNCLASSIFIED when
o l ac ed Tom con roe J~I~WI~a ac d Tame ~e ocu ocume~~p ~r1ZBP?9"T,4" sq ~ dgd or declassi-
fied when filled in fnt.
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