OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T01146A000100310001-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 4, 2004
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 5, 1951
Content Type:
SUMMARY
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CIA-RDP79T01146A000100310001-7.pdf | 825.69 KB |
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COPY NO~ 3 ?J
APR 5 1951
S1'OTIIh 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the internal use of the
Office of Current Intelligence. It does not
represent a complete coverage of all. current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
3. Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
"A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
- important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
- other information indicating trends
and potential developments
DIA AND DOS review(s) completed.
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,, e to FormeFrench
eign Off-line Agrees to 'ra .W?it Sasso
F
,
or
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Chi g6 :an eoul. US Minister Bohlen reports from Paris that the Soviet
Foreign Office agreed two days ago to traiia_+1.t a message from the French
Ambassador in Moscow to the former French Charge in. Seoul, who has bee
sing since the North Korean occupation of Seoul last June..
0
P?LA1 ERMN. USSR Re ?rted y U QxMosed to Oder-Neisse Talks. According
to an unconfirmed report broadcast by the Northwest-German Radio,., the
Soviet Union would raise no objections to a discussion of the Oder-Neisse
problem at a possible Four Power Conference. C:
The alleged Soviet readiness to discuss the Oder-Neisse oun ary with the
Western Powers does not conform to.previous Soviet statements on this issue.
In the past the USSR has maintained that the boundary issue was irrevocably
settled at Fotsdam;. Pending confirmation, therefore, the reported Soviet
policy shift must be regarded 'as doubtful,
YUGOSLAVIA. Formal Hungarian Protest to Yugoslavia, The Hungarian Govern-
ment in a formal note to Yugoslavia, reiterating its earlier verbal pro-
test against the recent alleged attack on the Hungarian Charge d'Affaires
in Belgrade has demanded "satisfaction
without delay for the unparalleled insult." The Yugoslav Government, in
turn, has rejected the note because of its' provocative tone and falsifi-
cations, and accused Hungary of provoking the incident in order to further
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woxrsenrelations between the two countries. The Bulgarian press has taken
up the affair and declared that the Yugoslav Governnent owes an expla-
nation to Bulgaria also, since the incident involved a Bulgarian Legation
vehicle. The Yugoslavs previously claimed that the Bulgarian Military
a eioen
Attach was accompanying the Bungarian Charge at the time of the
and participated- n th9,street fight which followed.
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SECTION 2 (EASTF .N)
"Ali GREECE. ComT1 UNSCOB (United
-Alligts Reor anize and Ex .an' Activities.
Nations Sub-Committee on the Balkans observers have informed the US
Ambassador that Greek guerrillas, specially trained in Czechoslovakia
and Hungary, are arriving in greater numbers than in the past in
Northern Greece. Their aim is reportedly to reorganize sympathizers,
to spread propaganda and to obtain information. They also plan to re-
establish an Agrarian Party as a Communist front organization. While
these bands are well armed, apparently they have instructions to avoid
contact witi tY e peliae and to employ arms only when absolutely necess-
ary. Greek military authorities do not believe the uerrillas are plan-
ning to renew armed activity on a serious scale. 25X1
COMMENT: Testimony of captured Greek guerrilla, slows 775t e n ro-
duction of such bars F,into Greed is part of the Communists' long term
plan to reorganize and expand their activities-,in Greece. The re-
establishment of the Agrarian Party is one of the methods to be used.
Apparently the Greek Communist Party (KKE), whose activities in Greece
were seriously hampered by Security Police action last fall, has again
resumed its'program: ` ..
"C" IRAN, Locust Plague Adds to Iranian Worries. Prime Minister Ala has
informed the US Embassy that the locust plague, which is the worst in
SO years, threatens to devastate crops in five provinces, and that Iran
is unable to control the situation. The Shah has imposed on the army
a state of siege in order to combat locust invaders, and the Prime
Minister is appealing to friendly nations for aid, particularly the US
and UK. The question of appealing to Russia was discussed and rejected.
The US Embassy comments that Prime Minister Ala is gravely concerned
over the threat of locust devastations, but that he obviously sees
advantage to be gained through diverting public attention from the
political and economic problems now besetting the country. 25X1
25X1 COMMENT: The locust problem is a continuing one
.In the Middle ast; however, previous reports have indicated that it
was not a serious one in. Iran this .year.. Now, according to an Iranian
report, in some places locusts cover the ground in Iran to a depth
of 10 inches. The US has informed the Embassy in Tehran that it will
render all possible assistance in meeting the locust threat. US aid
would be much appreciated by Iran and in the opinion of the Embassy
should afford a unique and much needed opportunity to improve US-
Iranian relations.
Prime Minister Ala Gains Fres1iZ9;, t11 rGcn binues to Support
Sic Zia. Prime Min: seer Ala appears to have gained prestige in the
past weeks, according to'. US Embassy Tehran. The UK Arab::=;csador,
who was at first skeptical of Ala's strength, ha>. arAy informed the
Embassy that Ala may remain in power longer than originally antici-
pated. Noting that Ala's government might, holuever, fail to get a
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vote of 'zc~en.ce, the Embassy repo: is that Qavam es-Sultanah and Seyid
Zia-ed-dia Tabetabai are currently the leading o sent i mFnt n e e favored by c .. ce i a ,;ion, :. t;
the request of the Chilean Government, of the educational phase of the
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Point : l agreern.ent between the US ?.,Q( Chile, an, by opposition to
Presi&~ --t Gonzalez Videl-'s recent speech ck~rce_~ _ng the Bolivian
corridor Two demonstrations by university students - one
"down iith the US" meeting in front of the US Embassy and another
involving about 500 persons at the Ministry of Education - asked for
cancellation of the educational agreement,, and criticized the Chilean
President's speech and declared that the Government should not resume
negotiations regarding the corridor. Adverse opposition, party comment
to the speech has included a statement by president aspirant General
Ibanez del Campo, who intimated that the effect of a Bolivian corridor
would be "a territorial and coastal zone between Chile and Peru which
could be controlled by the US, with which the hegemony of the South
Pacific would pass entirely into the hands of that great power."
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UUMMEDIT: The termination of the educational ; agree-nent may reflect
successful Communist agitation, and in that -sense may constitute a
Communist gain. The Chilean Government for political reasons made
little effort to defend. the pact against Communist opposition which
commenced in February and some non-Communist opposition during March.
Although the opportunity for Communists to agitate against an agree-
ment which "turns over our education to the Yankees" is removed,
cancellation of the treaty may provide a wedge for Communist action
to capitalize further on "nationalist attitudes" through protests
against US-Chilean Point IV agreements whereby "agriculture and the
technical direction of government activities are turned over to Yankee
control'1 Further.. the revival of the Bolivian corridor issue has
offered the Communistsunexpected opportunities to utilize non-Communist
opposition efforts to embarrass Gonzalez Videla, and possibly
foment anti-US sentiment.
"B,' CT)BA, Proposal for Senate Committee to Ixavesti ate Communist Activity.
Prime Minister Varona has proposed appointment of a special Senate
committee to investigate Comnu.nist activity in Cuba with a view to
clarifying whether or not the Communist Party (Partido Socialista
Popular) has international connections in violation of Article 37
of the Constitution. Or. S ; ch, Miner Varona atated that if
it were found that the PSP has international connections, then
"nothing can stop us" meanin , presuin ibl,r the outlawing of the party.
25X1 C47N~I BI3'i Ti'?.; motion. haa been motivated
by the increase of Communist activity in i oaa since the start of the
Korean war, and the strong opposition of PSP to the proposed
sending of Cuban troops to the Korean front. Iinister' of Interior,
Diaz reportedly considers the ESP as being too close to the Communist
line to be classed as a Cuban political party, t_ts activities,
therefore, being in conflict with the terms of the Constitution,
The Communists themselves apparently consider the ooutlawing of their
party inevitable and are reportedly preparing to go underground, purging
their rake of members of doubtful loyalty in the process,
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