OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T01146A000100310001-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 4, 2004
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 5, 1951
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T01146A000100310001-7.pdf825.69 KB
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TOP SECRET Approved For Iease 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP79TO11497 00100310001-7 COPY NO~ 3 ?J APR 5 1951 S1'OTIIh 1. This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all. current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. 2. Comments represent the preliminary views of the Office of Current Intelligence. 3. Marginal letter indications are defined as follows: "A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist intentions or capabilities - important regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/ Communist intentions or capabilities - other information indicating trends and potential developments DIA AND DOS review(s) completed. 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000100310001-7 TOP SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000100310001-7 Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000100310001-7 Approved Fowplease 2004/12/22: CIA-RDP79T01146ik000100310001-7 ,, e to FormeFrench eign Off-line Agrees to 'ra .W?it Sasso F , or ,~ ~~ Chi g6 :an eoul. US Minister Bohlen reports from Paris that the Soviet Foreign Office agreed two days ago to traiia_+1.t a message from the French Ambassador in Moscow to the former French Charge in. Seoul, who has bee sing since the North Korean occupation of Seoul last June.. 0 P?LA1 ERMN. USSR Re ?rted y U QxMosed to Oder-Neisse Talks. According to an unconfirmed report broadcast by the Northwest-German Radio,., the Soviet Union would raise no objections to a discussion of the Oder-Neisse problem at a possible Four Power Conference. C: The alleged Soviet readiness to discuss the Oder-Neisse oun ary with the Western Powers does not conform to.previous Soviet statements on this issue. In the past the USSR has maintained that the boundary issue was irrevocably settled at Fotsdam;. Pending confirmation, therefore, the reported Soviet policy shift must be regarded 'as doubtful, YUGOSLAVIA. Formal Hungarian Protest to Yugoslavia, The Hungarian Govern- ment in a formal note to Yugoslavia, reiterating its earlier verbal pro- test against the recent alleged attack on the Hungarian Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade has demanded "satisfaction without delay for the unparalleled insult." The Yugoslav Government, in turn, has rejected the note because of its' provocative tone and falsifi- cations, and accused Hungary of provoking the incident in order to further 25X1 yes 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004AI92 WRDP79T01146A000100310001-7 2 Approved Forlease 2004/12/22: CIA-RDP79T011400100310001-7 TOP SECRET 25X1 woxrsenrelations between the two countries. The Bulgarian press has taken up the affair and declared that the Yugoslav Governnent owes an expla- nation to Bulgaria also, since the incident involved a Bulgarian Legation vehicle. The Yugoslavs previously claimed that the Bulgarian Military a eioen Attach was accompanying the Bungarian Charge at the time of the and participated- n th9,street fight which followed. 25X1 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2004/1212 CIA-RDP79T01146A000100310001-7 Approved For lease 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP79T0114WO0100310001-7 TOP SECaET SECTION 2 (EASTF .N) "Ali GREECE. ComT1 UNSCOB (United -Alligts Reor anize and Ex .an' Activities. Nations Sub-Committee on the Balkans observers have informed the US Ambassador that Greek guerrillas, specially trained in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, are arriving in greater numbers than in the past in Northern Greece. Their aim is reportedly to reorganize sympathizers, to spread propaganda and to obtain information. They also plan to re- establish an Agrarian Party as a Communist front organization. While these bands are well armed, apparently they have instructions to avoid contact witi tY e peliae and to employ arms only when absolutely necess- ary. Greek military authorities do not believe the uerrillas are plan- ning to renew armed activity on a serious scale. 25X1 COMMENT: Testimony of captured Greek guerrilla, slows 775t e n ro- duction of such bars F,into Greed is part of the Communists' long term plan to reorganize and expand their activities-,in Greece. The re- establishment of the Agrarian Party is one of the methods to be used. Apparently the Greek Communist Party (KKE), whose activities in Greece were seriously hampered by Security Police action last fall, has again resumed its'program: ` .. "C" IRAN, Locust Plague Adds to Iranian Worries. Prime Minister Ala has informed the US Embassy that the locust plague, which is the worst in SO years, threatens to devastate crops in five provinces, and that Iran is unable to control the situation. The Shah has imposed on the army a state of siege in order to combat locust invaders, and the Prime Minister is appealing to friendly nations for aid, particularly the US and UK. The question of appealing to Russia was discussed and rejected. The US Embassy comments that Prime Minister Ala is gravely concerned over the threat of locust devastations, but that he obviously sees advantage to be gained through diverting public attention from the political and economic problems now besetting the country. 25X1 25X1 COMMENT: The locust problem is a continuing one .In the Middle ast; however, previous reports have indicated that it was not a serious one in. Iran this .year.. Now, according to an Iranian report, in some places locusts cover the ground in Iran to a depth of 10 inches. The US has informed the Embassy in Tehran that it will render all possible assistance in meeting the locust threat. US aid would be much appreciated by Iran and in the opinion of the Embassy should afford a unique and much needed opportunity to improve US- Iranian relations. Prime Minister Ala Gains Fres1iZ9;, t11 rGcn binues to Support Sic Zia. Prime Min: seer Ala appears to have gained prestige in the past weeks, according to'. US Embassy Tehran. The UK Arab::=;csador, who was at first skeptical of Ala's strength, ha>. arAy informed the Embassy that Ala may remain in power longer than originally antici- pated. Noting that Ala's government might, holuever, fail to get a TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000100310001-7 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved Fo release 2004/12/22: CIA-RDP79T0114W00100310001-7 TOP SECRET vote of 'zc~en.ce, the Embassy repo: is that Qavam es-Sultanah and Seyid Zia-ed-dia Tabetabai are currently the leading o sent i mFnt n e e favored by c .. ce i a ,;ion, :. t; the request of the Chilean Government, of the educational phase of the TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000100310001-7 Approved Fon.&-lease 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP79T0114"600100310001-7 Point : l agreern.ent between the US ?.,Q( Chile, an, by opposition to Presi&~ --t Gonzalez Videl-'s recent speech ck~rce_~ _ng the Bolivian corridor Two demonstrations by university students - one "down iith the US" meeting in front of the US Embassy and another involving about 500 persons at the Ministry of Education - asked for cancellation of the educational agreement,, and criticized the Chilean President's speech and declared that the Government should not resume negotiations regarding the corridor. Adverse opposition, party comment to the speech has included a statement by president aspirant General Ibanez del Campo, who intimated that the effect of a Bolivian corridor would be "a territorial and coastal zone between Chile and Peru which could be controlled by the US, with which the hegemony of the South Pacific would pass entirely into the hands of that great power." 25X1 UUMMEDIT: The termination of the educational ; agree-nent may reflect successful Communist agitation, and in that -sense may constitute a Communist gain. The Chilean Government for political reasons made little effort to defend. the pact against Communist opposition which commenced in February and some non-Communist opposition during March. Although the opportunity for Communists to agitate against an agree- ment which "turns over our education to the Yankees" is removed, cancellation of the treaty may provide a wedge for Communist action to capitalize further on "nationalist attitudes" through protests against US-Chilean Point IV agreements whereby "agriculture and the technical direction of government activities are turned over to Yankee control'1 Further.. the revival of the Bolivian corridor issue has offered the Communistsunexpected opportunities to utilize non-Communist opposition efforts to embarrass Gonzalez Videla, and possibly foment anti-US sentiment. "B,' CT)BA, Proposal for Senate Committee to Ixavesti ate Communist Activity. Prime Minister Varona has proposed appointment of a special Senate committee to investigate Comnu.nist activity in Cuba with a view to clarifying whether or not the Communist Party (Partido Socialista Popular) has international connections in violation of Article 37 of the Constitution. Or. S ; ch, Miner Varona atated that if it were found that the PSP has international connections, then "nothing can stop us" meanin , presuin ibl,r the outlawing of the party. 25X1 C47N~I BI3'i Ti'?.; motion. haa been motivated by the increase of Communist activity in i oaa since the start of the Korean war, and the strong opposition of PSP to the proposed sending of Cuban troops to the Korean front. Iinister' of Interior, Diaz reportedly considers the ESP as being too close to the Communist line to be classed as a Cuban political party, t_ts activities, therefore, being in conflict with the terms of the Constitution, The Communists themselves apparently consider the ooutlawing of their party inevitable and are reportedly preparing to go underground, purging their rake of members of doubtful loyalty in the process, TOP SECIET Approved For Release 2004/12/2123: CIA-RDP79T01146A000100310001-7