CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100280001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 2, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CENTRAL I1J LLIC+NNCH A( .`l=;N Y
OFFICE OF CUNT INTFILLIG1 NCE
DAILY DIGEST
Date: APt 2 1951 ?~
NOTE: l.. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the internal use of the
Office of Current Intelligence, It does not
represent a complete coverage of all current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence,
3, Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
"A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
"B" - important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
"C" - other information indicating trends
and potential developments
State, JCS declassification & release instructions on file
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18?
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"A" USSR. USSR Int~c~~ ~ rty Da. utc~_ cam ~I?arm C ,rsri td t of I' ogr Embassy
Moscow comments on signs of a Soviet intra-party dispute on the farm
consolidation program. An apparent attack on Politburo member
Khrushchev's recent article regarding consolidation of collective farm
villages has been made by Armenian party boss Arutyunov in the Armenian
provincial press. Arutyunov attacked "comrades" who "tended to disorient"
the Party on objectives of the campaign for consolidation of collective
farms. He asserted that the main task is consolidation of farm work,
not consolidation of villages. The Embassy believes that the sharp tone
of Arutyunov's remarks reflecting on a Politburo member is significant,
even though it was announced in PRAVDA on the day following the appearance
of Khrushchev's article that the article had. been published for discussion.
(S Moscow WEEKA, 30 Max 51). COMMENT: The new Soviet policy on consoli-
dation of collective farms initiated under Khrushchev after his appointment
as Moscow party boss in December 1949 appears to be, as the Embassy sug-
gests, a long-standing subject of disagreement at the top level of the
Party. Another Politburo member, Andreyev, was publicly rebuked for his
views on the organization of collective farm work a year ago.
"C" German Specialists to be Recruited by t S. West German sources pre-
dicted that there would be a new East German campaign to recruit German
specialists for work in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Control Commission
allegedly instructed Herbert Warnke, Chairman of the East German Communist
Trade Union Federation, to open the campaign both in the Soviet Zone and
West Germany shortly. The specialists, including scientists, woula be
invited to sign three-year contracts. Contracts of many German specialists
taken to the Soviet Union immediately after the war are expected to expire
25X1C this year. Several hundred have already returned to East Germany in the 25X1C
past six months. (U FBID ticker, 30 Mar 51), CD ET1.
engineers in Sov Zone factories were being asked to fill
out personal history questionnaires. dis- 25X1C
tributign of these es ionnaires might be pre arations for deportation
25X1C to the USSR. German and Austrian
scientists and technicians in the Soviet Union have revealed that many of
them were being allowed to return home with their families at the expira-
tion of their contract period.
"C" KOREA. Moscow Press Plate Up Chinese Reactions to MacArthur Statement.
PRAVDA's rehash of the Chinese Peace Committee's rejection of MacArthur's
truce offer says MacArthur aroused the indignation of other peace-loving
people as well as Chinese, and caused confusion and embarrassment among
ruling circles in Americanized countries. The "bourgeois press hastened
to show that MacArthur spoke on his own without securing agreement of the 25X1A
US Defense or State Departments." The PRAVDA article
was restrained in contrast with Chinese declarations quoted. The sugges-
tion that even Western ruling circles do not see eye to eye with MacArthur
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may be designed to quiet jumpy local nerves, Slightness of attention
given'the MacArthur offer of a field armistice probably does not
indicate consideration of the offer, but rather inability to use it as
a good target for counter-propaganda, (R Moscow 1750, 1 Apr 51"),
"B" EASTERN EUROPE, ALBANIA Italian TheorT on. Current Incidents in Albania.
the belief 25X1 C
is current in Albania that the bombing of the Soviet Legation in Tirana
on 19 February was a ruse on the part of the Soviets to justify severe
25X10 repressive measures and to strengthen direct Soviet control, 25X1C
the only -persons killed by the bomb were minor of-
25X1A ficials, COMMENT: The theory that
the Soviets nee. to j'L.S y .auner n merely impose more repressive
measures would indicate that Soviet control may not be as secure as it
has been. Underground resistance activities, therefore, appear to have
achieved a measure of success, 25X1C
"A" Arrest of Vice Premier Jakova Rumored.
Albanian Premier Enver Hoxha and Vice Premier Tuk Jakova
25X1C are at odds and Jakova is under arrest. It is not known whether Jakova's
arrest on or about 12 March is connected with the attempt on the lives of
the Soviet officials. By 5 April all Communist Party members are reportedly
to be called to their respective Party centers to discuss the situation
created by the bombin of the Soviet Legation in Tirana and Jakova's ar-
25X1A rest. COMMENT: 25X1X
wheat. Vice Premier Jakova, if he has actually fallen into disgrace,
will probably be dealt with by the Minister of Interior, Mehmet Shehu,.Iwho
as head of the Secret Police, and leading Soviet agent in Albania, will
spearhead the campaign against deviationists,
t.v .....-..o v.~...,. wEyv..i aavv v... r,.rvv~.vv dGt/i caoyvi7 iuct~,a c.i.~Gr'7, \~7vG V~V1. .Y .LL,y Ll tl5b~
31 Mar 51). It should also be noted that, according to a Tirana broad-
cast, Jakova visited Durres on 29 March to welcome a shipment.of Soviet
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Czechoslovak Ambassador To France Not To Return To Paris.
The American Embassy in Praha has been reliably informed that Dr. Adolf.
Hoffmeister, Czechoslovak Ambassador to France, will not return to Paris
and that his family is expected to arrive in Praha shortly. The Embassy
adds that no information is available regarding the future status of
Vladimir Outrata and Rudolph Bystricky, Czechoslovak Ambassadors to the
United States and Great Britain, respectively, who were still it Praha
during the week ending 30 March. (C Praha 603, 30 Mar 51). COMMENT;
The probability of a purge of the Czechoslovak diplomats who had been
recalled to Praha during February was discussed in the O/CI Daily Digest
of 9 Mar 51, More recent evidence continues to support this hypothesis.
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RUMANIA. Formation of a "SpecialrygaA
the formation in the Timisoara area of a
motley brigade of about 2,000 Yugoslavs, Hungarians, Bulgarians, a small
number of Greek veterans of the Spanish civil war and a few White Russians 25X1A
who have been promised rehabilitation in Soviet eyes if they joined t
brigade and served with good records,
CQMMMITg The existence of camps for guerrilla training near Timisoara and
the motley nature of the trainees are supported by other information. How-
ever, the existence of an "International 'Brigade-' organized for combat has
not been substantiated.
"Bn YUGOSLAVIA. Lull in Satellite Ins_ tia bated Bor .er incidents. According to
N.Y.Times correspondent Handler, Yugoslav sources reported on 21 March that
the Balkan Satellites have refrained from provoking any border incidents
since the Deputy Ministers convened in Paris on 5 March. The Yugoslavs
believe the lull in border incidents to be a temporary move designed to
strengthen the Soviet position at the Paris meeting. By this tactic, it
is believed the USSR may hope to cast doubt upon repeated border incidents
reported by,the Yugoslav Government and thereby indirectly undermine
Western accusations that the Soviet Satellites are rearmingillegally. The
Yugoslavs also believe-that there is some connection between the quiet along
their frontiers and reported events in Albania. The Yugoslavs fear that the
USSR may attempt to blame Yugoslavia for reported disorders in Albania and
use this as a pretext for armed intervention. (U NY Times, 1 Apr 51).
COMMENT: It is impossible to judge the accuracy of the reported Yugoslav
statement that no frontier violations have occurred since 5 March since the
Yugoslavs have never reported every incident as it occurred. During the
month of March, however, both Hungary and Bulgaria have addressed notes to
Yugoslavia charging the latter with frontier violations. The Yugoslav ac-
count of the relaxation of pressure on their frontiers may reflect their
apparent fear of Western intervention in Albania.
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licit RUMANIA. T?ormation o a t'Secae~l 8.cgs
the formation in the Timisoara area of a
motley brigade o? a ou. , 000 Yugoslavs, Hungarians, Bulgarians, a small
25X1C number of Greek veterans of the Spanish civil war and a few White Russians
who have been promised rehaabilitation in Soviet eyes if they Joined the
25X1 C
COM14ENT: The existence of camps for guerrilla training near Timisoara and
the motley nature of the trainees are supported by other information. how
ever, the existence of an "International Brigade" organized for combat has
not been substantiated.
"B". YUGOSLAVIA. Tull in Satellite Insti'ate.d Border Incidents. According to
N.Y.Times correspondent Handler, Yugoslav sources reported on 21 March that
the Balkan Satellites have refrained from provoking any border incidents
since the Deputy Ministers convened in Paris on 5 March. The Yugoslavs
believe the lull in border incidents to be a temporary move designed to
strengthen the Soviet position at the Paris meeting. By this tactic, it
is believed the USSR may hope to cast doubt upon repeated border incidents
reported by the Yugoslav Government and thereby indirectly undermine
Western accusations that the Soviet Satellites are rearming illegally. The
Yugoslavs also believe that there is some connection between the quiet along
their frontiers and reported events in Albania. The Yugoslavs fear that the
USSR may attempt to blame Yugoslavia for reported disorders in Albania and
use this as a pretext for armed intervention. (U NY Times, 1 Apr 51).
COMMENT: It is impossible to judge the accuracy of the reported Yugoslav
statement that no frontier violations have occurred since 5 March since the
Yugoslavs have never reported every incident as it occurred. During the
month of March, however, both Hungary and Bulgaria have addressed notes to
Yugoslavia charging the latter with frontier violations. The Yugoslav ac-
count of the relaxation of pressure on their frontiers may reflect their
apparent fear of Western intervention in Albania.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"B" ULAN. Parliament H.ec;o verses To Vote 0 I BStia l wo The Majlisp Parlia-
mentfs lower house, was to return from its hDliday recess on 2 April to
vote on the government's -recent declaration of martial law in the oil
fields of southern Iran, according to press reports from. Tehran, The
Senate planned to reconvene to discuss the subject on 5 April. (U FBIE
31 Mar 51; AP Tehran l Apr 5l), CQMMENTs Parliament is now legally re-
quired by law to ratify any declaration of martial law imposed by the
Government while the Majlis is not in session, The Government has been
using martial law to round up some extreme nation.listss~ The National
Front Party, which has accused the Government of using martial law to
persecute those whom it disapproves, will probably attack it on this
issue. The session will be critical., since it should show whether the
Majlis is still in an unreasoningly nationalist frame .of mind or
whether, during its short recess, It has 'become are of the serious- _
ness of the present situations
"B." PHILIPPINES, LAS Business CommunNt r erla i a3 ~ According
to an unofficial survey by the US Embassy, a considerable portion of
the Americans business community favor returning 'their dependents to the
US. The survey also revealmdo (1) businessmen in Huk-infested areas
nperate only by paying tribute to the Huks; (2) two recent raids in-
volving Americana are considered evidence that such tribute can no
longer provide protection; (3) most businessmen and employees believe
the Quirino administration, even with US guidance, is unable to cope
effectively with this situation- and (4) until the law and order situation
improves, it will be the general policy of most American companies to
halt further commitments of funds to " ,er'nri -?eoept to
those in process of establishment ixs required. to investments
already made, (C Manila 2959, 3C Mar 5l), LjGMME o 0ircums?,ances of
the two raids involving Americans indicate that tribute may not have
been paid to the Huks, thus suggesting a possible motive for the attacks. 25X1C
"A" INDOCHINA. New Military Plans "Democratic RnulicetmB?_ _(Vot_
25X1 C
25X1A
25X1 C
the DRV command has now decided to beat the arrival of
French reinforcements by opening as soon as possible a limited. offensive,
rather than the lame-scale coordinated offensive which was originally
planned, CGMMEI~ The DRV military
command has undoubtedly become aware of an taken account of General
De Lattre?s successful request for 13,000 French reinforcements for
Indochina. the DRV is not yet in a
position to sustain a coordinated offensive for more than a few days,
owing to lack of ammunition. Reports on recent fighting in Tonkin indi-
cate that the DRV is striking at local targets rather than attempting a
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general offensive within Tonkin._
"A" Military Engagements. DRV (Viet Minh) forces are continuing to probe
French defenses in the Dongtr'ieu area north northwest of Haiphong apparent-
ly in an attempt to draw French forces into piecemeal ambushes. The French
refuse to be tricked and are for their part attempting to attract DRV forces
into open areas where the French hold the advantage. Conversations between
Hanoi Consulate officials and. high French military officials indicate that
some thought is being given to the possibility that current DRV action is
designed to cover the entry of Chinese Communist "volunteers". French
concern in this regard has been sharpened by a marked drop in trans-border
intelligence during the past few weeks. (S Hanoi 527,1 Apr 5l)e
"A" DRV anounces "General Countar Uffensi *allo Pamphlets clandestinely
distributed in Saigon have announced "to all; asses of the Vietnamese
people" that "the day of the general counter-of-fensive has come." It is
predicted that the DRV will triumph "with the formidable forces of the
Russian Red Army and those of new China to help us." (C Saigon 1751,1 Apr 51).
COMMENTs Although this explicit statement of DRV policy appears to be authen-
tic, so many twists have been given during the past two years by DRV propa-
gandists to the imminence of the "general counter. offensive" that this
pamphlet is not necessarily to be considered as representing a decisive
change in DRV strategy. The view that the DRV has not net decided to adopt
formally the slogan of "general counter-offensive" is supported by the
absence, at this writing, of any recent radio broadcast on this theme.
"A" CHINA. Communist China Increases Imports Through Hon Longs The following
table shows the trend of Hong Kong's trade with China (including Macao and
Taiwan) in recent months.
(in Million HK$ -- 6 HK$ equal 1 US$)
Period Imnports From mCh.in a x po ?ts to China
Mo. avg. 1950 80.2 139.1
Nov. 1950 98.4 214.6
Dec. 1950 106.3 191.6
Jan. 1951 867 277.0
(C- State Hong Kong D-1254, 6 Mar 51). CO NTo Hong Kong's exports to
China during January were 45% above the December figure and amounted to
perhaps half of China's total imports from the West, assuming that Jan-
uary 1951 imports from non-Communist countries remained at the high level
of October-Decembet 1950. Chinese Communist purchasing agents in Hong
Kong probably have been in a better position than importers on the main-
land to deliver rapidly many of the industrial and strategic items which
the Communists want from the West. Although the Communists would undoubted-
ly prefer to reduce their dependence on Hong Kong middlemen, they are
apparently more strongly influenced at this time by the desire to speed
up purchases because of the fear of increasing restrictions on strategic
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y from 'western countries to Comnztin st China.
"A"" Sino-Soviet olic; Toward Korea.
25X1C20 MAO Tse-tung returned from Moscow on 5 March
with a seven-point Korean program calling for,- (1) the Chinese Communists 25X1C
to "'concentrate all their efforts" to continue the fight in Korea; (2) the
dispatch of 500,000 Chinese troops to Korea from various field armies;
(3) the Soviet Air Force" +n `,nm,, ?" 1-nses in Japan in the event of UN air
operations against Maichusian targets;, ) the stationing of Soviet troops
in China to reinforce depleted Oninese units; (5) the organization of an
"international volunteer enrps" for Korea; (6) the USSR "to send the
Chinese some navy and air strength" plrs tanks, trucks, fuel ane ammo; and
source has access to detailed information on high level Sino-Soviet de-
cisions. Although much of the above has been reported by other sources
in recent weeks, this report, like most other recent reports of Sino-
Soviet intentions, appears to be largely a collection of rumors deriving
from widespread speculation as to future Sino-Soviet moves in Korea.
"C" j4. North Korean Premier Exhorts the "Sowing Front"o Radio Pyongyang
reports that North Korean Premier KIM I1 Sung has been touring South
Pyongyang Province to learn first hand about spring sowing operations,
The Premier is quoted as saying that in order to win the victory farmers
must provide more food for the nation and troops. "If we fail on the sow-
ing front", the Premier warned, "it will spell out failure on the fighting
front". (R FBIS Ticker, 31 Mar 51). The Premier's remarks are
a part of the campaign to insure a good crop in 1951 and lends further
credence to reports indicating a food shortage in North Korea..
"C" JAN. Growing Ryukvuan Publicity for Return to Japan, The Okinawan
Assembly on 19 March 1951 voted 15 to 3 in favor of the return of the
Ryukyus to Japan. The People's Party at its fourth convention on 18 25X1A2
March voted similarly. The Council for the Return of Amami Oshima 001
(Northern Ryukyus) to Japan is now firml established and has been en-
dorsed by the Communists. The movement for return of the
Ryukyus to Japan is now in full swing, although the ordinary citizens of
central and southern Ryukyus are apathetic or divided in opinion re-
garding their future. The Northern Ryukyus strongly favor the return.
The Communist championing is unfortunate. If any of the islands are
returned, the Communists will claim credit and if they are not returned
the Communists will succeed in planting doubt of US integrity. (S CINCFE
Joint Weeka 13, 31 Mar 51). Cos The strong feeling of the
Ryukyuans on this issue is shared by the Japanese, who look upon the
temporary loss of these "traditionally Japanese" islands as virtually the
only unfavorable aspect of the US peace treaty proposals.
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SECTION 3 (VMS"" ,N)
ward Joliot-Curie.
+C++ FRANGE. French Communists Divided on Palk Ho
rong
Po i uro
PartI{
tu
1
lion h1n e Frenc orrar
favors denouncing the Communist nuclear physicist Frederic Joliot-
- 25X1 C
urie before he follows the lead of tue alleged refusal 25X1C
25X1 C indicates
ed stay
l
ong
by Joliot-Curie. to travel to Moscow for a pro
that although Joliot- 25X1C
believes
an intention to quit the party.
Curie has no knowledge of PCF secrets, his adherence to the party
should be encouraged because of the hi. eem with which he is 25X1A
s
i
.
e
regarded in the Satellite countr
21 Mar COMA` ENT: JolIot-Curie is reported increasing y restive
under PCF orders, but party blackmail based on his alleged collaboration
war keens him in line.
th
e
The
Western Forces
ta o
r
d
in I
-
e P
? t ivide
?fin ITALY. C.omm~nunists Act to Divi
o wo_pronge
ening a
are op
I"t""'?'ian Communists ~rull
the Government forces, already faced with dissension within premier
th-
De Gasperi's Christian Democratic party and with ~ he prohbanble ith-I)
drawal from the Cabinet of the Saragat (right
in order to consolidate with the Unitary (PSU)
Government
leader Togliatti. has repested estern orientations At the same time
willing to reverse Italy pro-
Pietro Nenni, leader of the- ho?-ca 1mh5t~ Communists Party electoral
has been urging that PSLI and il
bloc at the municipal elections scheduled to begin in May, An agree
ment to this end has been reached by the four parties in Faenza
(near Bologna) and has caused some apprehension in Government circles.
(U, NY Times, 2 Apr 51).. COF NT: Togliatti Is repetition of his
recent o er suggests that e conciliatory, nationalistic line of
.the PCI is definitely established. An agreement between the PCI and munic .:the PSLI-PSU seems most unlikely
to Moscow abhor~entrto theidemo~y
Tot only is the PCI s subservience an PSLI?s insistence, to
cratic Socialists but the PSU has agreed,
support NATO as a condition for unificatioxi.
ItC" ECUADOR. Outbreak of Violence. An outbreak of violence in the Plaza
e 5an o D om ngo, ito, occurred on 31 March in connection with an
.
authorized parade of students, laborers and leftist political parties in rtins
A crowd attacked mounted police with stones, and the police, 25X1A
fired on it, killing two people and wounding fifteens
;there were indications of Guevara sentiment on the part of some rio ers, 25X1C
25X1C this may have been.an
and ancheno and Guevara elements
25X1C harassing move.aga~-ns the Government Embassy quito9 on the
in preparation for a revolutionary attempt.
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other hand, feels that the Quito demonstration was probably a peace-
ful protest by leftist organizers which got out of hand, but reports
a similar disturbance the night before in Guayaquil which undoubtedly
was organized-by Guevara sympathizers. The presidential palace has
been placed under heavy armed guard, and the streets ar
by the military and the police,
plan a series of minor disturbances prior to a revolutionary attempt.
(See also OCI Daily Digest, 12 Jan and 15 Feb 51). An alliance
between the fascist-inclined Carlos Guevara Moreno group and the
Liberal-Radical Party followers of Colonel Carlos Mancheno, first
noted in October 1950, has been strengthened in the past few months.
(Guevara himself is still in a Quito jail for a revolutionary attempt
last July). Its leaders may well feel that their movement has now
achieved its maximum potential strength and that they should make
their all-out try soon. They still seem too weak to be capable of
directly effecting the overthrow of the Government. There is, however,
a slight chance that they might unwittingly effect a change in
administration through a revolutionary attempt by providing the
personally ambitious Minister of Defense with an excuse for ousting
President Plaza and taking over with a military junta under the guise
of "protecting" the Government.
.R, Emb Quito 303, 1 Apr 51)'. COPd1ENT: This follows 'a report
of 30 March which indicates a revolutionary
plot on the part of Mancheno and Guevara and states.that they might
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DAILY DIGFS .' SUPPLEMENT
APR 2 1951
Not for dieaemin?.tion outaid.e 0/CI and. 0/NE.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLES
2 April 1951
"A" Gromrko Reported Anxious to Proceed With IegaLtiatiom.a. US delegate
Jessup reports an impression received at an informa:`i four power
meeting that Soviet delegate Gromyko is very anxious to have some
Western draft agenda in writing which he could submit to Moscow.
Jessup also reports his impression that Gromyko was instructed to
introduce the Atlantic Treaty item when his 28 March proposal was
not met with a Western draft in order to counteract any impression
of Soviet weakness and unlimited concessions. Gronyko also mani-
fested interest in whether the first Soviet agenda item would be
acceptable if reworded so as to show that "German demilitarization"
could be either a cause or an effect of present international
tensions in Europe. (S S/S Paris 5$39, 31 Mar 51). At the 2 April
meeting the Western Powers are tabling a revised version of their
draft agenda. (S S/S Paris 5551; 2 April 51). CO : Gronyko t s
reported attitude may be indicative of his apprehension that the .
Kremlin is not satisfied with either his conduct of or the progress
of the negotiations. This would be particularly true if Gronrko
had entered the negotiations, four weeks ago with instructions to
obtain an agreed agenda,-which would be of course as close to Soviet
terms as possible,
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"B" TRTF, STE. Italian Encroachment on Trieste Courts. The US Political
advisor in Trieste reports that the Italian Supreme Court of
C,assation is now hearing appeals from sentences of Trieste courts
and in some cases is ordering retrials in Italian courts. When the
Italian courts reach decisions on these retrials, AMG will have to
decide whether or not to ignore the Italian court actions. (S 591
Trieste 30 Mar 51). COMMENT: The issue of Italian jurisdiction
over Trieste court decisions is but one phase of the overall problem
of Italian-versus AMG hegemony over Zone A of Trieste. The Italian
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administrative and social institutions in the city of Trieste, combined
with the Western declaration of March 1948 supporting the return of the
Territory to Italy, have helped Italian officials to gradually extend
Italian influence over Allied Zone affairs.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"B" UNITED KINGDOM. Foreign Office Increasingly Worried by Iranian Oil
Crisis, US Embassy London reports that UK Government officials are now
genuinely alarmed over the prospects of losing British investments in
Iran and the oil supplies which the Government considers vital to the
British economy. The Foreign Office sees more liberal, financial terms
to Iran as necessary, and is pressing the Anglo-Iranian Oil. Company in
that direction, and also recognizes that lip service at least must be
paid to the principle of nationalization- but at the same time it thinks
it dangerous to relinquish title to the oil properties and continues to
believe it will be useless to enter.. into negotiations with Iran until a
.strong government has come into power. (See OCI Daily Digest, 29 Mar 51).
The Foreign Office further indicated that if efforts at persuasion in
Iran are unsuccessful, it is prepared to consider pressure, beginning with
financial measures and going as far as to move British troops to a near-
by base in Iraq and other military precautions if British lives were en-
dangered by a threatened seizure of the oil properties, US Embassy
London feels. it significant that the Foreign Office does not discount the
possibility of employing force. Meanwhile; the Foreign Office is attach-
ing great importance to the high level US-UK talks on the subject scheduled
to begin in Washington on 9 April, and has expanded the UK delegation with
representatives from the Treasury and the Ministry of Fuel and Power in
an effort to emphasize the importance to Brits of Iranian oil and of US
support on this issue. (S SIS London 5142, 30 Mar 51). CO* ENT: The
likelihood of a strong Iranian Government for the British to negotiate
with seems no greater than a week ago. (See OCI Daily Digest, 29 Mar 51).
Furthermore, despite its increasing concern over the situation, the
Foreign Office seems no closer to specific proposals to make to any
Iranian Government. Nor is it clear just how the British believe they
could effectively exert pressure in the present situation,
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