CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T01146A000100240001-5
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RIPPUB
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T
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 21, 2005
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 28, 1951
Content Type:
SUMMARY
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OFFIC'0 OP CURRYINT INTELLIGENCE
Date: MAR 2 8 1951
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the internal use of the
Office of Current Intelligence. It does not
represent a complete coverage of all, current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. Comments represent the nareliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
"All - items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities.
"B11 - important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
"C" a other information indicating trends
and potential developments
DIA review(s) completed.
NAVY HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION
AND RELEASE.
NAVY and DOS review(s) completed.
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
USSR. Moscow Pushes Scrams, Metal Sa vaZ,_ Q:$rnnsi=n. Considerable internal
publicity is being devoted to the curr nt scrap metal drive,, said to be
"a matter of great state importance." and"essential to the success of
plans for expanded metallurgical production in the USSR." A PRAVDA edi--
torial directed criticism at the Ministry of Transport and at responsible
organizations in the Byelorussian and Kazakh RepubliQa_ scow. Leningrad.
Saratov,, Gorky, Sverdlovsk, and Chelyabinsk oblasts. 25X1
C NTt This drive is quite unusual not only because the use o scrap
metal is seldom if ever mentioned, but also because of the attention paid
to the present, apparently great., need for it. Perhaps as a propaganda
cover, an effort is made to link this drive with such peaceful con-
struction projects as the planned Volga hydroelectric complex.
Soviet Commentator Applauds hinese-.,North K?reara CQeperation. In a
domestic broadcasts a Soviet radio commentator reviewea the history of
Chinese-Korean relations and defended Chinese participation in the Korean
war as a measure to protect China's borders. He professed confidence in
the ability of the Korean people, together wit eerss,
to "resist all attempts of the foreign enemy. 25X1
Cam: There has been no suggestion as yet in Soviet propagainas
the Communists in Korea could expect any additional aid from the USSR.
Neutralit ghdad
nBn Rumored red Soviet Effort to The Baghdad
radio.reported that circles in Beirut learned that the Soviet Minister
at Beirut had told the Lebanese Premier that the Soviet Govt "is very
pleased to see Lebanon adhering to neutrality." The British controlled
Near East Arabic radio reported that the Soviet Minister had informed
the Lebanese Govt t at the USSR desired to see Lebanon neutral in any
East-West conflict.1 -7 Gam: No 25X1
credence can be given the Baghdad report in view of banonis pro-Wes-
tern record in the UN,, excepting perhaps in reference to the Lebanese
Foreign Minister's denial that McGhee had proposed a political agree-
ment between Lebanon and the US during his recent visit to Beirut. The
British-controlled radio report seems more credible since there have
been steady reports all winter of alleged Soviet approaches to Near Eas-
tern Govts on the subject of neutrality, and the neutralization of the
Arab states is a major Soviet aim. While there has been no specific
evidence that any such approaches have been made to Near Eastern Govts
by the USSR since the fall, it is certainly possible that Soviet interest
in the subject could have led them to informal soundings in various Arab
states.
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"B" EASTERN EUROPE . FINT:,A . Trade Delegation in Moscow. US Emb Moscow notes
a total lack of Soviet press coverage regarding the arrival of a Finnish
trade delegation in Moscow on 19 Mar. A member of the Finnish delegation
described the purpose of the visit as one of renegotiating the prices of
1951 trade exchanges. The delegate stressed that the USSR was exerting no
pressure in the negotiations,, and added that the meetings were not con-
cerned with reparations. The Finn was non.-committal regarding any con- V
nection between the delegatiorfs visit andie signing during recent weeks
of 1951 Soviet-Satellite trade protocols. 25X1
COQ I'1MENT: A tripartite trade protocol was signed In Moscow 22 an 1951
by the USSR, Poland and Finland., under which part of Finland's exports
to the USSR are paid for by Polish exports to Finland. On 2 Dee 1950 Fin-
land and the USSR signed an agreement fixing the prices and quantities
of approximately two thirds of the commodities to, be exchanged between
them in 1951. It was also agreed that in the spring of 1951 prices on
the remaining commodities to be exchanged would be determined on the
basis of prevailing world prices, and multilateral deliveries to be
made to Finland by other Soviet bloc countries would be negotiated.
"B" POLAND. Increased Surveillance and Pressure on US Emb Staff. The US Amb
in Warsaw reports evidence of increasing surveillance and pressure by
Polish authorities on the Emb Staff and household servants during Feb-
ruary. This interest was manifest through apparent attempts at infiltration,
harassment of household servants, and unusual surveillance of certain,
American employees. The Amb feels that the situation has at least the
potentialities of a concerted attack by the Polish Govt on the Emb
.personnel's freedom of movement. COI: 25X1
This type of police activity has occurred several. times before, and has
been in some cases a prelude to further inroads on Emb activity, Thus,,
similar harassing tactics preceded last year's request for a reduction
in the number of Emb service attaches,.
"B" Unrest Reported in Szczecin, The US Emb in Warsaw has received two
unconfirmed reports of unrest and labor difficulties in Szczecin (Stettin)
during February. East Germans in Szczecin are reportedly becoming increas-
ingly dissatisfied with their lot and as a result are being repatriated
to East Germany. A more specific unconfirmed report concerns itself with
a Szczecin dock strike sometime in February. The strike was described as
a spontaneous demonstration against the shipping of foodstuffs and manu-
factured products to the USSR. The Emb notes a Polish Navy report, approxi-
mately at the time of the strikes, that foreign shipping was refused entry
into the port of Szczecin, and attributes the Navy action to a possible
desire by the overnment rnt to 1d this una.: est become generally known.
25X1 COMMENT: Other reports in recent months have
noted unrest in 5zezecln., which may in part be accounted. for by the
reported reduction of Soviet troops in the area.
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SECTION 2 (EAST ,R T)
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"B" IRAN, Martial Law Extended to Oil Field Areas. Premier Hussein Ala has
ordered the military governor of Khuzistan to enforce martial law in
Abadan, site of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) refinery, and in
nearby towns in the midst of the strategic oil region. This decision
was reportedly taken following an allegedly Communist-inspired strike
in that area by students and by apprentices of the AIOC. All communi-
cations between this area and Tehran have been cut off. 25X1
25X1 COMMENT: It is not yet possible to e ermine elt er
the rea cause or a seriousness of the strike. The government was
previously restrained from declaring martial law by the necessity of
obtaining Majlis approval; however, following the recent disbandment of A V/
Majlis" it is apparently trying to control the situation by imposing
martial law where it is most necessary. Majlis action on this subject,
when it reconvenes, should provide an important indication of the general
trend of events in Iran.
"A" INDIA. Reported Purge in Communist Party of India. An article by Mar-
garet Parton from New Delhi, in the New York press, reports that a purge
of "Anglo-American spies and Titoists" who are said to hold high office
in the Communist Party of India. will take place this year. Her infor-
mant, an anonymous CPI member, further reports that P. C. Joshi, of
pacifist leanings, and the militant B. T. Ranadive, both former secre-
taries- eneral of the Communist Party in India, are among those under
25X1 fire. COMMENT; This report cannot
be confirmed on the basis of available evidence. It may be an attempt
by the Communist Party of India to lull the Indian Government into think-
ing there is too much confusion within the party itself for it to be an
effective disruptive force. In the case of a recent article by Miss
Parton on the Indian-US grain negotiations, she appears to have been
11talken in" by an Indian informant.
"B" PHILIPPINES. Huk Attack on Chrome Mine. Philippine G-2 reports that a
large Huk band, estimated to number 200, raided a chrome mine in northern
Zambales province (west coast of Luzon).on 26 March. Two American families
totalling six persons were renorted missing. The mine property was
looted and severely damaged COPRIENT. This raid, 25X1
which has also been reported in the press, may be part of Huk plans to
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celebrate their ninth anniversary,, Although press speculation has arisen
that the Huks have discarded their policy of nova-violenco toward US citi-
zens, available evidence is not sufficient to support such a conclusion.
The raid apparently followed previous patterns in which the Huks attacked
weakly defended areas where supplies were available,
"B" INDOCHINA. Viet Minh activities. USMILAT reports that Viet Minh des-
truction of the principal source of water for the port of Haiphong -is not
so grave as earlier reports would indicate, and that reported Viet Minh
attacks on the French perimeter in the Tonkin delta have involved oral
one enemy company, which was driven off. 25X1
"A" Workers' Party outlines international airs. According to the Ho
Chi Minh radio the aims of the newly created Vietnam Workers Party
(Leodong) arms (1) to rally the people against the imperialist aggres-
sors, (2) to render all-out assistance to the peoples of Laos and Cam-
bodia, and (3) to "help actively" the liberation movements of other
oppressed eo es including the Filipino, the Malay, and the Moroccan
25X1 peoples. COMMENT: The intent of the Indochinese
Communist Party for which the Leodong Party is the transparent cloak)
to extend its activities into Laos aambodia has earlier been evi-
dent, but this represents an unprece ently bald statement of the in-
tentions of the Vietnamese Communists. Similarly, the intent of the
Vietnamese Communists to assist rebel movements in other areas has not
previously been expressei so plainly.
"B" CHINA. Taiwan faces,_ serious financial crisis. ECA officials on Taiwan
are again pointing out the unfavorable financial condition of the Chi-
nese Nationalist overnment. Proposals calling for increases in military df
expenditures and related civilian expenditure have worsened the outlook
in the past few months. It is estimated that the government deficit this
year may reach US $4O-million. The foreign exchange deficit is expected
to become worse iin the summer and autumn after exports from the old
sugar crop stop and before the new sugar crop moves in. The foreign
exchange deficit may then run at US $4 million a month. With the Chi-
nese Nationalists having spent about US $70 million from reserves last
year, their present reserve holdings -- aside from the old used for
currency backira -- acre reported as almost exhausted. 25X1
25X1 COMMENT: This warning of ECA officials follows o, ers
a ong s m .ar nes
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"C" KOREA. ROK Government Battles Inflation. ROK Premier John Chang in a
24 March address urged hiscountrymen to take vigorous steps to control in-
flation. Premier Chang stated that the government has decided upon a
drastic tax reform, and that taxes heretofore collected by village authori-
ties will be collected by provincial authorities. 25X1
COIyNT: While Premier Chang's recognition of the serious economic
ficulties of the R0K is in strong contrast to previous irresponsible ROK
fiscal policy, it remains to be seen what concrete steps will be taken.
"C" Communist Propaganda Device. A light Communist plane equipped with
a loudspeaker flew over UN lines from midnight to dawn on 28 March calling
on UN troops to surrender. The announcerQs English was somewhat inadequate
I I
and the only discernible words were "surrender or die
.. VA-Xi
25X1 Cow: This is the first time the Communists have
employed a c t ie; vhich has been used for several months by the UN's
psychological warfare arm.
"C" JAPAN. YOSHIDA Favors Cooperation with the US. Prime Minister YOSHIDA
Shigeru advised a group of Japan's leading businessmen in Tokyo on 28 March
that he wants to see "full political, economic, and military cooperation
between Japan and the US." He added, however, that discussions on rearma-
ment should be avoided because of the unfavorable impression which would
be created among foreign countries. 25X1
COIN Ems: The statement is characteristic of the political tightrope
walking of the Japanese GGovernment#:erearmament discussion is postponed
in order to avoid exciting such World War II anemias as Australia, New
Zealand and the Philippines (and thereby hindering the peace treaty) while
the reference to cooperation with the US may be interpreted as at least
rearmament for self-defense. As a quid pro quo for US economie~,assistamce,
which the Japanese desire, they undoubtedly foresee.rearming for self-
defense. This is one of YOSHIDA's stronger statements on behalf of co-
operating with the US.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
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"A" FRANCE. Communists Read to End Strikes. The French Communist Party
Strike ra egy Committee has recommended to the PCF Politburo
that the current strike wave be ended now so that a new strike campaign
can be planned. The Committee believes that prospects for political
exploitation of future strikes have now improved, inasmuch as the Party
and , the. Communist-led General Labor Confederation (CGT) have recovered
some Prestige and labor's bargaining position is stronger.
COMMENT: This realistic PCF decision follows the
mor gina preerenceo some CGT leaders for strikes of limited duration
which would not overtax labor's present capabilities, and will benefit
the PCF's future strike efforts*.
"B" SWEDEN, New Communist Part Chairman. The biennial Swedish Communist
Party Congress,'.e over Easter o idays, elected Hilding Hagberg,
acting chairman of the SKP since 1949, to replace the ailing Sven
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Linderot as party chairman. COMMENT: 25X1
A member of the lower house of the Riks ag from the ommunist s ong-
hold of Norrbotten, Hagberg has been v ce chairman of the SKP, chair-
man of the party's parliamentary delegation 'and a member of the Working
Committee (Politbureau) of the party. As Hagberg is a willing tool of
Fritjof Lager, the Moscow oriented Party` Secretary who controls the
SKP, his succession to the chairmanship represents a final step in
the reorganization of the party as a close-knit "hardcore" group
under the domination of Lager.
"C" ARGENTINA. Argentina Bans "Voice of America' and Other Fo1 ri Radio
Pgrrogramtr Argentine brow casting acilities ave een denied to ie
oice of America", BBC, the Venezuelan Embassy and other foreign /
cultural groups as a result of a government order which established
"the principle of reciprocity as prerequisite to this type of radio
progran%' In interpreting the order, radio stations have banned all
radio programs "dedicated to any given country or under the auspices
of an embassy,, consulate, or cultural institute" j 25X1
COMPJENT: This order repeats previous sporadic restrictions
o . ore gn in off` ion programs and reflects the Perons' bitterness
concerning mounting criticism of the La Prensa affair.
"C" ECUADOR. Attempt to Purchase Naval Vessels from the US. In the hope
triat bargaining power may e e once y Ecua or's participation
in the current Inter-American Meeting of Foreign Ministers, the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Ecuadoran Navy, Cesar Endara Penaherrera, has
departed for Washington to pursue the purchase of naval vessels under
the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. US Emb Quito comments that failure
to obtain the vessels, especially if Peru should receive any military
assistance, would undoubtedly set off criticism of the US and of the
Ecuadoran Government for its all-out backing of US projects.
CO ENT: Ecuador seeks to
purchase two destroyer escorts, an as een negotiating with US
authorities on this matter for the past few months.
"B" CUBA. Camnunist Plans to Infiltrate Non-Communist' Presb An editorial
in-The iario a a Marina states'that roug an organization known
as the InernaTion'_'KL 0 gr anization of Press. (10?) (preswnably the
International Organization of journalists)., located in Prague, an
order has gone out to infiltrate the democratic press in every country.
The editorial adds that the IOP is preparing to hold a series of.
journalistic conferences, and it warns the Cuban press to-be particularly
careful of infiltration activities. It further states that the existence
of the IOP in Cuba, with its program, is a reality and that possibly
the text of the. directives sent from. Prague soon will be known publicly.
COMMENT: The information for the state-
ments in the editorial regarding E IOP is based on material obtained
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by either the Cuban Army or GRAS., the secret anti-subversive organization
of Cuba. Increased exploitation of material published in the demo-
cratic press (whether Communist-in8pired or not) is not apparent in
Cuba but is evidenced. in some Latin American countries. It represents,
one facet of the current Communist program for the' Western Hemisphere
established in recent months-at meetings in Moscow and satellite
bapitals attended by Latin American Communist leaders.
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DAILY DIGEST SUPPI2
MAR 2 8 1951
Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/11E.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"B" FRANCE-NORTH AFRICA VIETNAM. French Foreign Office Version of
Reinforcements for De Lattre. A Foreign Office spokesman, con-
firming press reports that the reinforcements for Indochina will
be drawn from North Africa, advises that the previously reported
total of 13,000 will be "largely cadres" and will be supplemented
by 2,000 "technieianslk.j These reinforcements will go forward
over a "several months' period, commencing shortly, and General
,zie Lattre has revealed a Cabinet commitment that the will be in
addition to the full number of needed replacements.
25X1 COMMENT: During the next "several
months" when t ese reinforcements are expected to arrive in Indo-
china, the French consider a Chinese Commie invasion unlikely,
and hence De Lattre will count on a force which would give him
a "good chance" of repulsing the Chinese.
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