OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000100030001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 3, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC
Date: MAR 3 1951
490 G
COPY NO 39
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared for the internal use of the Office
of Current Intelligence. It does not
necessarily represent a complete coverage of
all current traffic in CIA or in the Office
of Current Intelligence.
2. Comment represents the preliminary views of
the responsible analysts and not necessarily
the final view of the Office of Current
Intelligence.
Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
other information indicating trends
and potential developments
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
EASTERN EUROPE. YUGOSLAVIA-. Tito Interview. In a long Reuters inter-
view on February 28, Marshal. Tito expressed the following views on im-
portant current problems-. 1) satellite attack: Yugoslavia would have
no special difficulty in resisting a combined Satellite attack unless
the Satellites were aided by Soviet "volunteers". Tito based his
estimate primarily upon the lack of "political, psychological,, and
moral preparation" of the Satellite peoples in contrast to Yugoslav
will to defend their independence.. 2) Cominfotmism within Yugoslavia.
There were a few individual cases but these persons were motivated
not so much by ideological differences but by political cowardice and
fear of the USSR. 3) Reconciliation with USSR: There may be Soviet
maneuvers with specific aims but there will be no sincere attempt by
the USSR to correct its attitude toward Yugoslavia. 4) Council gi
Foreign Ministers. At the present time West German rearmament is
not the correct thing to do to achieve a "peaceful settlement." If
the CFM does not produce a solution and the USSR proceeds to arm
East Germany, his attitude might change. The CFM should also discuss
the rearmament of the Satellites in violation of their Peace Treaties.
If this problem is not settled in any other manner, it may come before
the UN. 5) Tr?iestea Tito is still of the opinion that this question
for the moment should be left aside since there is no mutual desire
for settlement and it is not very important at the present time.
6) Formal Western Guarantee and Western Pacts: He is not against
the principle but there is no need for written or other formal agree-
ments at present. Formal agreements are no more certain than verbal
statements and under prevailing international conditions in the event
of a war, UN members would fulfill their duty within its framework.
Moreover, since Soviet propaganda is still able to deceive and in-
fluence many people, it is better to be outside any pact so that
people outside Yugoslavia will not get the impression that Yugoslavia
is not "peaceloving." 7) Relations with Britain: The recent exchange
of official visits between Yugoslavia and the UK has been mutually be-
neficial and promoted a better understanding between the two countries,
but the visits will not result in "new special formal contacts."
8) Food Crisis: Yugoslavia will weather the present food shortage.
The rising costs of food and transportation, which have reduced the
food Yugoslavia will obtain under its present loan, is proof that
Yugoslavia?s request for a $1,000,000,000 loan was not too high. De-
spite shortages in fats, sugar, and wheat, pressure will not be applied
in order to increase production since that would make the political
situation worse. (R FBIS Ticker, 1 March 1951).
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YUGOSLAVIA. Cominform Night_.F Litsover Yugoslavia. Yugoslav Govern-
ment is planning to institute regulations limiting all future commercial
flights over Yugoslavia to daylight hours. Because of frequent un-
authorized flights across Yugoslavia between Cominform countries and
Albania, Yugoslav military authorities wish to be able to instruct control
points and observers to regard any planes at night as unfriendly. Since
such regulations might interfere with Pan American flights across Yugo-
slav territory, Ambassador Allen has been assured that no action on
this matter will be taken until the Yugoslav Government has discussed it
with Pan American Airlines officials, (S Belgrade 1202, 2 March 51).
COMMENT: Night flights of unidentified planes over Yugoslavia have been
reported sporadically ever since Yugoslavia placed restrictions on Comin-
form overflights in 1950.
YUGOSLAVIA, Innovations in Yii slay National Assembly. New York Times
Correspondent Handler reports that the Yugoslav Government is planning
to establish paraliamentary clubs in order to encourage debate in the
Yugoslav National Assembly. Parliamentary clubs will serve as training
grounds in the lost art of extemporaneous debate in Communist Yugoslavia.
By encouraging debate in the National Assembly the Government hopes to
encourage the people to participate more actively in public affairs. In
an opening session of the Assembly earlier this week, written questions
submitted by deputies, and addressed to Foreign Minister Kardelj and
Minister of Foreign Trade Popovi!, were discussed and answered by the
latter. (U NY Times 2 March 1951, 27 Feb 51). C0111MENT: These innova-
tions, copied after British Parliamentary practices in which the Yugo-
slavs have recently manifested considerable interest, are part of the
Government's program to carry out successfully the deconcentration of
power in Yugoslavia. As Handler points out, however, there is no pre-
tense that the Yugoslav Parliament will ever come to resemble Western
European Parliaments which perform a policy making function and are em-
powered to vote the Government out of power.
YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslavia Relaxe9 l_qntrols on Farm Products. The Tito
regime has abolished controls over a wide variety of farm products, in-
cluding all agricultural produce except wheat, and has ordered the
restoration of free trading in these products on the basis of demand and
supply. The government has reserved the right, however, to regulate
prices to prevent speculation. (U New York Times, 2 March 51). COMMENT:
These decisions which are designed to stimulate agricultural production
and to draw the middle classes into more active cooperation with the
state, are part of the Government?s program to improve Yugoslavia?s
economic and political situation in the face of a serious internal eco-
nomic crisis and external, aggression. The new agricultural program con-
firms previous evidence that the Government has temporarily abandoned
its collectivization drive.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"A" GENERAL. Greeks Ask Aid in Counteracting Soviet Penetration of_Greek
Orthodox Church. Embassy Moscow strongly supports Embassy Athens2 recent
recommendation that the US give financial assistance to the Greek Govern-
ment plan to establish an emergency fund to counteract Soviet pressure on
the Greek Orthodox Church. The Embassy agrees that the expenditure of
relatively small sums can effectively hamper such Soviet attempts to gain
influence in the Near East. (S Moscow 1583, 28 Feb 51). COMMENT: Soviet
control of the Greek Orthodox Church would enhance Soviet political and
subversive potential in the Near East. Judicious use of the proposed aid
would undoubtedly help to prevent further Soviet penetration of the Greek
Orthodox Church, some of whose leaders are already notoriously susceptible
to Soviet influence. The proposal appears all the more timely since the
Soviets have shown an increasing interest in recent months in attempting to
exploit various religious movements of the Near East.
"B" IRAN. Proposal Simplifying Procedure for Approving EXIM Bank and IBRD Loans.
Embassy Tehran has requested that the Export-Import Bank (EXIM Bank) and
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) approve
the draft of an amendment to the Seven Year Plan which authorizes the Iranian
Government to negotiate loans up to 250 million dollars. The proposed amend-
ment states that all contracts entered into under this authorization shall
be approved by the Majlis Commission of the Plan and that such approval
shall be considered. to constitute ratification by the Majlis. If accepted
and passed it will be unnecessary to obtain the approval of the entire
Majlis for EXIM Bank and IBRD loans to Iran. The IBRD has already approved
the draft. (C Tehran 1936, 1 Mar 51; C Tehran 1939, 1 Mar 51; C State 1496,
1 Mar 51). COMMENT: This amendment, if passed, should solve many of the
present difficulties in obtaining acceptance of EXIM Bank and IBRD loans.
Presumably Premier Razmara will have less difficulty in dealing with the
12-man Commission than with all 136 members of the Majlis.
"B" INDOCHINA. Bao Dai-Huu Conflict Continues. In the course of a long conver-
sation with US Minister Heath on 28 February, the Emperor Bao Dai declared
himself very strongly in opposition to the policies of Vietnamese Premier
Tran Van Huu. Bao Dai stated that the Premier was incompetent and lacking
in political sense. Asked why he did. not simply get rid of Huu, Bao Dai
replied that he conceived his role as Chief of State to be not that of
governing the country but of arbitrating the differences between the three
regions of Vietnam, and that Huu's incompetence would eventually become
manifest. Bao Dai said that, even thdugh Huu1s mismanagement of the Defense
Ministry would result in three or four months' delay in the formation of a
Viet Army, he could not "risk" disposifig?of.Wim at present for fear that
Huu, abetted by the. French, would start ,a separatist movement in Cochinchina.
Minister Heath comments that the Bao Dai-Huu conflict is a "sort of civil
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war" between the legal central government (headed by Huu) and a second
"cabinet" (consisting of the Emperor and his personal following), a de-
velopment which Heath considers gravely detrimental both to Vietnamese
national reconstruction, to the formation of a national army and to the
prosecution of the "real" civil war against the Communists.
"B" De Lattre Postpones Paris Trip. The planned visit of General
De Lattre to Paris has been postponed indefinitely as a result of the re-
signation of Premier Pleven, an official spokesman stated. (U NYTimes,
2 Mar 51). COMMENT: The main purpose of De Lattre's trip was to have
been to press his demands for an additional 20,000 troops.
"A" CHINA. Possible Operations against Nationalist Islands,
znati ka) an Amoy rumor of laze reo. szatea zna% -one Vomriunlst, wi?i soon
order the invasion of Chinmer and other Nationalist-held islands; (b) a
Communist attempt to invade the Nan Chi Shan islands on 25-26 Feb. was
frustrated by rough seas; (c) Communist forces in Fukien stated in late
Feb. that they would soon invade Ito-chiu island; and (d) Communist forces
in Chekiang were ordered in late Feb. to prepare for a possible attack on
Tung T'ou Shan. COMP,MENT: A number
of the islands of e as _ ____na coast, still held by the Chinese Nation-
alists, could probably be successfully assaulted by small Communist forces
with little advance warning. Such operations are regarded as probable in
the near future.
"A" Formation of Volunteer Corps for Indochina.
ZDAIA a military conference on 12 February to discuss the implementation of
Peiping's order that five Chinese Communist border columns should provide
six regiments for the "Anti-French and Indochinese Volunteer Corps". The
six regiments were allegedly to assemble at T.unghsing at the end of
February, with arms to be provided by the "Support Indochina People's
25X1A Liberation Committee".
COMMENT:
sources have previously reported the preparation oa Chinese Communist
"volunteer" program for Indochina. Although these "volunteers" are not
known to have appeared in Indochina, the implementation of such a program
during 1951 remains a strong possibility.
"C" KOREA. Further Reports on NK Sickness. sources, which re-
port confirmation of typhus in Wonsan area, also report the presence of
smallpox, with many Communist troops suffering from both diseases. All
civilian doctors have been mobilized, while penicillin and other dru s
have been confiscated and civilians have been evacuated.
nee the ommun s s apparently have not adopted such all-out precautionary
measures such as cordoning off the area, stopping the movement of troops
and employing DDT, it is believed that neither the typhus. nor the smallpox
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
ealinr" to the West German Bundestag to unite
T7 it ntl
r
r
p
GER;AINTY. GDR Appeal for Joint German Position before Preliminary Big-
Democrats, as one possibility.
is considering' Walter Wenck, a m'~~t~ aciv~_ser to the Christian
y
-1"
reso__u Lon u
with it in a joint proposal on German unity to be placed on the agenda
of the forthcoming preliminary conference of the Big-Four. The East
German proposal includes requests for a peace treaty in 1951 guarantee-
ing demilitarization and democratization of Germany, restoration of
unity, and withdrawal of occupation troops one year after the signing
of a peace treaty. Pointing out that West Germany has not yet replied
to a previous and similar East German resolution, the Volkskammer urges
the Bundestag to "put aside all formal reservations" and to reply to
this proposal by 4 March, since the Big-Four conference is scheduled
to open 5 March. (U FBIS, 2 mar 51). CODS ENT: The Volkskammer
resolution is the third formal East German request for intra-German
negotiation on the unity question and follows up the 1 December
Grotewohl letter to Adenauer and a previous Volkskammer resolution
of 30 January. The entire campaign is designed to advertise the GDR
as an active worker for German -unity and peace and to discredit the
Bonn Government by implying that the latter is not interested in find-
ing a peaceful solution to the German question.
Possible Change in Acienauer's Military Advisers. Theodor
Blank, the co-ordinator for military a--airs under West German
Chancellor Adenauer, is considering replacing or expanding the com-
mittee of military advisers assigned to negotiate with the Allies on
German rearmament. Blank stated that this was no reflection on the
present group, and added that both ex-Generals Mans Speidel and Adolf
IIeusinger, two of his principal consultants, had informed him that
they did not desire to be permanently attached to his office. Blank
is seeking other politically acceptable officers of suitable rank, and
rtcaizie has replaced General Speidel as principal military
adviser to the German delegation at the current Paris talks on a
European Army. According to previous reports, Generals Speidel and
Heusinger have been in close contact with opposition leader Kurt
Schumacher, whose attitude on German rearmament has hampered Govern-
ment progress in defense negotiations. For that reason, Adenauer may
have wanted them removed from Blank's staff, thus widening the split
over. the rearmament question.
Possible Reorganization of the Bonn Interior Ministry.
Theodor B1an may be appointed State ecretary for Secure y Pro gems
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25X1X in the test German Ministry of Interior, 25X1X
Blank curren y iea s ie ice or
ne eDing o , which is directly under Chancellor
Adenauer and is concerned with planning the details of the proposed
West German contribution to a European Army. The Minister of Interior,
Dr. Robert Lehr, has always favored bringing Blank's office into his
1inistry, but hitherto appreciated the need to separate internal
security from rearmament planning. He now feels that, since rearma-
ment will not come about during 1951, Blank's negotiations with the
Allies in the field of security will be concerned mainly with internal
25X1A "problems and should therefore be handled by his Ministry. (S/C
COMT;IENT: Adenauer's policy thus
ITALY. Communists Seek Fall of De
far has emphasized separation of rearmament planning from internal
security duties. There have been no other indications that he intends
to have Blank T s office placed within the Interior Ministry.
longer commands Parliamentary support. They maintain that as a result
of the Government Ts recent defeat in the Chamber of Deputies over a
minor amendment to the economic controls bill, the Government is
defying the people's will by remaining in office. Therefore, the Com-
munists are attempting to foment labor demonstrations against what
they term a "minority government", at the same time urging labor to
protest against defense appropriations and German rearmament. (C Rome
3785, 1 Mar 51; U New York Times, 3 Mar 51). CO:MENT : This is the
firs~ time in many months that the PCI has presse~ c -his charge against
the Government. Such PCI-organized demonstrations will not attract
any considerable popular support. Communist-controlled workers, even
in Communist strongholds, have shown themselves increasingly unwilling
to engage in strikes on non-economic issues. The majority of workers
will assume a ll ait-and-see attitude" regarding the Communist line
that increased defense appropriations will cause a lowering.; of the
standard. of living. A prolonged crisis among the Government parties
over the economic controls issue, however, will strengthen the Com-
munist position against Italian rearmament.
Communists PCI are asserting that the Dc Gasperi Government no
Gasperi Government. The Italian
"B" SPAIN. Cabinet Resignation Suggested. At the Cabinet meeting of
r ebru.air, Labor ~i.nis e.r Giron al egedly suggested to Franco that
the Spanish. Cabinet resign en masse. Franco is rep ortod to have
r' "used the suggestion on the grounds that he saw no need for the
Goverment to change its policies.
25X1A C0 _P ,NT: While rumors of an impending Cabinet reor_;ani-
reports from. the source indic ate that he may be supplying "selected"
information on the instructions of Giron. However, the view at-
za on have son rife for several months, 'there is no confirmation
of the report that Giron suggested. a mass resignation. Previous
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tributed to Praa.ico is believed to be accurate. Ia Banco may effect
some changes in the personnel of his regime, but no liberalization
of basic policies is likely.
tCtt DENMARK. Parliamentary Deadlock over Anti-In'lation Legislation.
7r negotiations between the Conservative-Moderate Liberal Govern--
t
Len
,
g
ment and. the opposition parties (Social Democrats, Nadi cal Liberals,
and. Georgists) failed to achieve a compromise on economic and foreign
exchange legislation. Influenced by the imminent Landsting (Upper
House) elections scheduled for April 3, each party appears anxious to
avoid the onus of being responsible individually for vitally important
v
but inevitably unpopular anti-inflationary measures,
ecome ca tas rophicrln the near future, and the present Government will
remain in office, public confidence in the political parties will be
adversely affected by these maneuvers. Once the prospects for political
and parliamentary gains are eliminated by the Landsting elections, the
parties can be expected to reach a compromise., which -v ill be satis-
factory at least from a political point-of-view.
nUn DO INICATT REPU13LIC. Trujillo Relinquishes Presidency. President
riljIl a as emporari y relinquished he presi ency to his brother,
Sccretar;, of War Hector Trujillo. There is widespread speculation as
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to the reasons for this action. The most tenable appear to be the
desire to enjoy a rest, and to ascertain his brother's capacity to
g . overn with a view toward eventually shifting some burdens of office
and, if Hec himself to support him in the 192 presidential -nro
elections. COIF." ENT: The office
of Vice-President does not exist In t e ominacan I?ep zblic, The
Minister of War is the first in the line of presidential succession,
and. Trujillo's action has been. in accordance with constitutional
provisions. It is not anticipated that this turnover will involve any
changes in the domestic and foreign policies of the Dominican Govern-
ment,
VENEZUELA. Petroleum Labor Contract Negotiations. `h:le Minister of
a? or co Hods announced Fe ruary that he would recognize the
newly formed "Comite do Trabajadores Petroleros Pro-contraco Unico"
as the sole collective bargaining agent in the current negotiations
for a contract to replace the three-year petroleum labor contracts
expiring in February and March of this year, The Comite'compri.ses
representatives of practically all petroleum labor groups, including
not only the distinctly minority legal syndicates but also the
numerically preponderant but unrecognized Accidn Democratica (AD)
and Communist (PCV) elements. Members of the Comite'appear to have
the bona fide support of their respective groups, and it is reason-
able to believe they represent a vast majority of the oil workers.
The only prospect of reaching a voluntary agreement is through such an
on
o
l
.
ivi
a
all-,{fitoup c
COP1f'TNT: The willingness of the Labor Ministry to recognize e Comite'
for bargaining purposes represents a distinct reversal of its clearly
evident previous deternination:l) not to deal with representatives of
the outlawed AD and Communist factions, and 2) to settle the contract
question by issuing a decree governing conditions of employment (after
having permitted token negotiations between the syndicates and the oil
companies). Prior to the Embassy report of 15 February there had been
no indication that a coalition committee was being formed. The most
reasonable explanation of the Labor Minister's announcement is that,
confronted with an at least superficially united labor front, the
Government decided to accept the risk of giving a voice to subversive
AD and Communist elements in order to achieve the advantages of a
voluntary contract. The significance of the Labor Minister's action
is twofold: 1) By preparing the way for a negotiated contract accept-
able to the majority of oil workers, it has greatly reduced the danger
of an oil workers' strike, which would have been a very real pos-
sibility had a new contract been imposed by decree. 2) On the other
hand, by recognizing the coalition committee, which is likely to be
dominated by AD elements, it gives status aid. prestige to an organi-
zation which could presumably be utilized by AD for politically
subversive purposes.
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(S/S Cable Supplement not for dissemination outside 0/CI)
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLE TRAFFIC
3 March 195
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
"A" USSR. Discrepancy in Gro ko's Remarks Concerning CFM A enda. Embassy
Moscow reports that Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko told 25X1X
25X1X that the USSR had accepted the Western proposals existing
love o armaments, problems affecting Germany, and the Austrian Treaty)
for a CFM Agenda. On the other hand, Gromyko told Ambassador Kirk that
the question of Soviet acceptance of the Western proposals would be
discussed at the 5 March Deputy Foreign Ministers' Conference. (S S/S
1591, 1594, fr Moscow, 1 March 51).
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
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