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CIA-RDP79T01098A000100060001-9
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Publication Date:
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I?nalyst:
(Project 11.6545)
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NUMBER OF COPIES
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GROUP 1 ( 9 - 3 6 - 43)
Excluded from automatic
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Addressees for NC Machine Tool Paper
_44.; ,:??"242.2.--
.5.-1-Mr. Arthur P. 1---
7Deputy-DIrector-Ahd-Chief-Trade-and-CammadiIips
--141.NR71-REe/TC)
Office-af-Economku-Res-earrh-and-AysIs
4INR/DFR/RECY-
Bureau-of-InteITT4dhCe-and-Rearch
State- Department
Mr. Frank H. Perez, IN/1i
2
-
Director, Office of Strategic and General Research
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
State Department
Mr. Robert Wright T,
4t Director, Office of East-West Trade
Room 3819
State Department
Mr. William W. Clarke
Director of PRC Affairs
Bureau of East-West Trade
Commerce Denartment
Maurice Levinsohn
Experimental Fabrication and Engineering Division
God 28O
Goddard Spaceflight Center
Greenbelt, Maryland 20771
.._,, I 4
el _1174, .
_ ut c
) Mr. John M. Evans, Jr.
Staff Assistant for Automation Technology
Center for Computer
Sciences & Technology
National Bureau of Standards
COmmerce Department
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Industry Addressees*
STATINTL
*- All members of the Numerically Controlled Machine Tool Technical
Advisory Committee sponsored by the Bureau of East-West Trade,
Commerce Department. They are cleared through "Confidential" and
have secure document storage facilities.
-4-
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Addressees for NC Machine Tool Paper
/2/1,
Mr. Arthur P. Allen)
Deputy Director-Alia-Chief Trade and CommDditips
-Divls-i-eft-tINR/REC/TC)
Office Jaf-Zetanornic- Res-tarch and Analysis
-(INR/DFR/REC
Bureau of -Intelligence and Research
State Department
Mr. Frank H. Perez, //Vie //25?G. 2--
Di rector , Office of Strategic and General Research
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
State Department
Mr. Robert Wright / Pd 1r; 3/
Director, Office of East-West Trade
Room 3819
State Department
Mr. William W. Clarke
Director of PRC Affairs
Bureau of East-West Trade
Commerce Department
Mr. Maurice Levinsohn
Experimental Fabrication and Engineering Division
Code 280
Goddard Spaceflight Center
Greenbelt, Maryland 20771
Mr. John M. Evans, Jr.
Staff Assistant for Automation Technology
Center for Computer
Sciences & Technology
National Bureau of Standards
COmmerce Department
tit -yit aa-4-)21,a-ie
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7/
Mr. C. A. Somme,r Acting Assistant
Dire or for/ Intelligence Analyses
and N t A essments
Division qi International Security Affairs
US Atom4,d Energy Commission
Room C 17
AEC H adqu rters
Ger ntown Maryland
copies
y Assistt Secretaryof DefepaeN
ction nginee_Kin-g-'- and Materials
cqul tions
ATTN: OASD (I&L) WP
Mr. Howard A. Millbourn
Room 23282
Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310
Off' f thesp is_tapt Secreta
In.e a tonal ,cicufitt-_,Af,fairs
ATTN: t, D SA) IT
Mr. MI Peterson
Room ,111838
Pen agon
W hing on, D.C. 20310
Mr. William W. Jeffers
Department of Defense
Product Engineering Services Office
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Va. 22314
AYaense-
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Commander Foreign Technology Division
US Air Force
ATTN: PDTI (C. Edward Butler)
Wright Patterson Air Force Base
Ohio, 45433
CoMmander US Army or ign S keve
and--
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TATTN-1--"AMXS SD Capt. Harold Mashburn)
Federal 0 ce Building
220 7th S et N.E.
Charlotte e, Va. 22901
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Soy% e 4 i c.c..), .....?...-4.? Zja4..e.., r r...1. 5 15u.'.' 6,
OPEN LITERATUkE: 0
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OTHER:
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01 08
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05 M
07 IR
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confidential
USSR Pushes Production of Numerical Control Machine Tools
Confidential
ER RP 73-6
May 1973
Copy N9 94
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
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Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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exemption category 513(1),(2),(3)
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Foreword
Numerical control (NC) machining technology was
developed in the United States in 1952 by the Mass-
achusetts Institute of Technology for the US Air
Force. During the 1960s, NC technology developed
rapidly in the United States and spread to Western
Europe and Japan. The international COCOM embargo
and unilateral US restrictions on exports of stra-
tegic goods effectively curtailed the export of
this technology to the USSR. As of 1968 the USSR
was far behind the United States, Western Europe,
and Japan in the design, development, and production
of NC machines. In that year, however, the USSR
launched a program to accelerate the introduction
and production of NC machine tools and by 1971 had
become the world's largest producer, although in
level of technology and quality it still lagged
far behind the West.
This publication examines Soviet progress in the
development and production of NC metalcutting
machine tools* and Soviet efforts to accelerate
* Numerical controls are also applied to certain
types of metalforming machine tools and other
machinery (such as drafting machines). However,
these applications are insignificant.
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progress through technical cooperation agreements
with firms in Western Europe and Japan. It also
includes, as background, the production and use of
machine tools generally in the USSR and compares
Soviet machine tool production with that of the
United States.
Preliminary definitions of NC technology and
related considerations are discussed first (para-
graphs 10-19), followed by a general discussion of
the production and uses of machine tools in the
USSR (paragraphs 20-37). Discussion of the Soviet
NC program proper begins with paragraph 38.
ii
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USSR Pushes Production of
Numerical Control Machine Tools
Summary and Conclusions
1. Numerical control (NC) machine tools repre-
sent a revolutionary innovation in metalcutting
machining technology. One NC machine tool is cap-
able of replacing two to four conventional types.
Among industrialized countries, NC technology is
most advanced in the United States, followed close-
ly by Western Europe and Japan, and is least ad-
vanced in the USSR. Currently, Soviet NC technology
lags 7 to 10 years behind that of the United States.
2. Despite a technology lag, and a belated
start in production, the USSR now produces more NC
machine tools than any other country. Output in
1972 amounted to 3,038 units, nearly double US out-
put.
3. The USSR also is the world's largest pro-
ducer of machine tools, mostly highly standardized,
general-purpose metalcutting machines of the type
that are easiest and least costly to produce. The
USSR tends to produce general-purpose metalcutting
Note: Comments and queries regarding this publica-
tion are welcomed. They may be directed to
of the Office of Economic Research, Code
143, Extension 6901.
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machines, rather than special-purpose types, be-
cause they can be mass-produced. As a result, much
of the Soviet machine tool output fails to meet
the needs of users and, indeed, forces users to
manufacture, at high cost, their own specialized
machinery. Thus, although the USSR economizes on
the production of machine tools through mass-pro-
duction techniques, it loses out on the economies
of specialization; hence it tends to produce cheap
machine tools but expensive final products.
4. Large requirements for general-purpose
machine tools are generated by Soviet efforts to
modernize the entire stock of machine tools in use
in production and in a large and scattered repair
network. About 17% of the Soviet machine tool
stock is 20 years old or older and in need of re-
placement. A significant percentage of machines
10 to 20 years of age also need to be replaced be-
cause, relative to new machines, productivity is
low and costs of operation high. About one-third
of all metalcutting machine tools in use in the USSR
are used for repair and for production of spare parts.
2
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5. The effort to modernize the stock of
machine tools in both production and repair may be
misdirected. The Soviets need to replace only
those in production but should reorganize the re-
pair network to reduce the need for more machines
and to serve as a second-hand market for older ones
now in use in production.
6. Two parallel programs for NC development
and production are in being in the USSR: one in
the aviation industry to service industries pro-
ducing aerospace and military hardware; one in the
machine tool industry to service the needs of
civilian industry. In 1970, about 35% of the total
output of NC machines was for aerospace and military
uses. Aerospace and military production also ab-
sorbs a large proportion of the annual output of
NC machine tools in the United States.
7. A major Soviet effort is under way in the
current plan period to accelerate output of NC
machine tools. Planned output in 1975 is to be
four times that of 1970. Several firms in Western
Europe and Japan have entered into cooperative NC
production and marketing arrangements with the
USSR. For example, Alcatel of France, Saab-Scania
3
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of Sweden, and Siemens of West Germany are shipping
NC controllers to the USSR for mating with Soviet
machine tools. Some are to be sold subsequently
in the respective domestic markets of the supplying
countries. Fujitsu of Japan has agreed to provide
NC production technology to the USSR.
8. NC machines can be helpful to the USSR in
the modernization of its machine tool stock. How-
ever the impact of this technology on Soviet ma-
chinery production is likely to be less than in
the United States and may fall far short even of
Soviet expectations. To an important extent, the
effectiveness of NC machines in the USSR will de-
pend on whether plant management is sufficiently
flexible to use them properly.
9. Furthermore, the Soviet NC machine tool
program appears headed in the same direction as
conventional machine tool production. Emphasis is
on large-scale output of NC machines that are
easiest to produce, mostly point-to-point types
many governed by obsolescent plugboard controllers.
Moreover, unlike the United States, the USSR is
not designing and building NC machines as fully
integrated systems. Instead, controllers are
4
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mated to existing models of conventional machine
tools that have been suitably modified to receive
them. Such machine tools lack the durability, pre-
cision, and flexibility of integrated systems.
Discussion
Background
What are NC Machine Tools?
10. NC machines are machine tools such as lathes
or milling, drilling, and boring machines whose
movements are controlled automatically by a con-
troller instead of by a human operator. Generally,
controllers are electronic,1 although some devices
that are essentially electromechanical in operation
-- so-called "plugboard" or "dial-programmed" sys-
tems2 -- also sometimes are classified as numerical
controllers. Relatively simple in design, and
severely limited in capability, these systems are
obsolescent in the United States, although they
continue to figure prominently in the Soviet NC
program.
11. Normally, a numerical controller is dedi-
cated to the control of a single machine tool and
is not a computer. However, in some advanced sys-
1. A machining program (instructions) is fed into
the controller on magnetic or punched tape.
2. Machine instructions are entered by plugs and
dials or by adjusting rheostats or valves.
5
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tems of NC technology, in which simultaneous con-
trol over the operations of more than one machine
tool is carried out (direct numerical control --
DNC), the controller is a computer.
12. Two types of control over the movement of
the machine tool may be distinguished. First,
point-to-point (or positioning) control, the most
common type, is basically a point locating system
used primarily with drilling or boring machines to
machine a workpiece at one or more discrete points.
The system is relatively uncomplicated, requires a
small volume of input data, and is manufactured at
relatively low cost. Second, contouring (or con-
tinuous path) control generally is used with lathes
or milling machines to machine a workpiece con-
tinuously into complex shapes or contours. Con-
touring requires constant synchronization of the
tool's motion in at least two axes. Hence, it re-
quires a large amount of input data, high-speed con-
trol logic, and powerful servomechanisms. Contour-
ing control of three or more axes usually requires
a computer to prepare the machining program.
13. An advanced type of NC machine tool that
provides for automatic changing of cutting tools,
6
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performs multiple machining operations (for example,
milling, drilling, and boring), and can be designed
for either point-to-point or contouring operations
is called a machining center.
14. An advanced technique for maintaining
optimum metalcutting efficiency and precision by
automatically adjusting the speed and feed of the
cutting tool according to sensor feedback is called
adaptive control. It compensates for variables that
are subject to in-process change such as workpiece
hardness and thickness, cutting tool wear, and
rigidity of both tool and machine.
Costs and Benefits
15. Typically, in the United States, NC machine
tool systems cost two to four times as much as
analogous non-NC machines and range from as low
as US $25,000 for simple point-to-point types to
more than $500,000 for highly specialized types of
contouring machining centers. In addition, NC
machine tools require larger support costs -- main-
ly for programming and tape debugging -- and extra
maintenance expenses for specialized electronic
equipment and tooling. Costs or prices of NC
machine tools in the USSR generally are not avail-
7
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able. The one price that has been published --
13,700 rubles for a contouring system -- appears
to be very low and suggests that NC production in
the USSR may be heavily subsidized.
16. The relatively high initial cost of NC
machines in the United States is more than offset
by gains in productivity, savings in labor costs,
and reduction in other operational expenditures.
NC machines also have unique technological ad-
vantages; they make possible the machining of in-
tricate parts that is not feasible using conven-
tional manually operated machine tools. In addi-
tion, they make possible greater precision (closer
tolerances) and a high degree of uniformity in
the precision of similar machined parts (repeatabi-
lity). Generally, NC machine tools are used under
conditions of low-volume production.3
17. Large increases in machine productivity
are possible with NC technology because human in-
teraction with the machine tool during the machin-
ing process is greatly reduced.4
Also, manufactur-
3. For high-volume production, automated machine
tools and automated transfer machinery are more
efficient.
4. For example, reduction of operator fatigue and
non-productive activities such as checking parts
tolerances between operations, constant reviewing
and checking of blueprints, and handling and re-
setting of workpieces.
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ing leadtime and setup time are shortened because
machining program tapes can be stored and quickly
interchanged at the machine and because complicated
templates, jigs, and fixtures are eliminated. Thus,
in US experience, an NC machine tool is able to
cut metal 80% (or more) of the time versus 20% for
conventional machine tools; in effect, one NC
machine does the work of four or more conventional
ones. Furthermore, NC technology cuts costs
in parts inspection, scrap and rework, and finished
goods and spare parts inventory.
18. The productivity of NC machine tools, how-
ever, depends to a large extent on the quality and
training of plant operating personnel and the man-
ner and degree of integration of NC machines into
the plant production process. Hence, whether the
USSR can maximize productivity gains from the use
of NC technology to the same extent as the United
States will hinge on the flexibility of Soviet
plant organization and management, as well as on
the quality and capabilities of the machine tool
itself.
19. Because of unique precision machining
characteristics, NC machine tools continue to be
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used extensively in aerospace and military industry
production in the United States. Because of their
extraordinary productivity and versatility relative
to manually operated systems, however, they are
now applied widely in civilian industrial produc-
tion as well.
Significant Aspects of Soviet Machine Tool
Production and Use
Production Characteristics and Comparison with
the United States
20. The USSR is the world's largest producer
of machine tools (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Total
output in 1972 amounted to about 254,000 units, or
more than two and one-half times that of the
United States (95,000). Annual output of metal-
cutting machine tools, in particular, is enormous.
In 1972 the USSR produced about 210,000 metal-
cutting machine tools, or about five times the
number produced in the United States (about 42,0005).
However, in 1972 the United States imported as
many metalcutting machine tools as it produced
(about 42,000 units), mostly high-quality general-
5. Excluding those valued at less than $1,000 --
mainly household types that have no direct counter-
parts in the USSR.
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Table 1
USSR and US: Production of Machine Tools
Units
Total
1950
1955
1960
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
USSR
78,284
134,217
185,833
220,737
230,612
238,126
242,728
247,969
243,528
249,496
253,900
US
N.A.
NA.
74,214
112,005
134,299
140,633
141,050
137,658
107,614
81,943
94,789
Metalcutting
USSR
70,600
117,100
155,900
186,100
192,200
197,000
200,600
205,300
202,260
207,200
210,000
US1
N.A.
58,000
42,914
68,005
80,673
86,014
70,520
65,169
49,314
32,443
41,589
Meta!forming
USSR
7,684
17,117
29,933
34,637
38,412
41,126
42,128
42,669
41,268
42,296
43,900
US
N.A.
N.A.
31,300
44,000
53,626
54,619
70,530
72,489
58,300
49,500
53,200
1. Excluding metalcutting types with an average value of less than $1,000.
Production of Machine Tools
Thousand Units
300
200
100
USSR
Figure 1
r
," Meta!forming
1950
515949 5.73
55
60
65
70
11
NA
Metalcutting?
50 55 60 65 70
*Excluding metalcutting types with an average value
of less than $1,000.
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purpose machines from Western Europe and Japan.6
Soviet output of metalcutting machine tools was
two and one-half times as large as US output plus
imports.
21. At the end of 1971 the total Soviet inven-
tory of machine tools amounted to 4.4 million units,
including 3.6 million metalcutting machines. Thus
the Soviet inventory of all machine tools was 52%
larger than that of the United States (2.9 million),
and the pool of metalcutting types was 64% larger
(2.2 million). These relationships are striking
because Soviet industrial output is substantially
less than that of the United States.
22. The USSR also produces metalforming machine
tools in large quantity -- 44,000 in 1972 compared
to 53,000 in the United States -- but they account
for only about 17% of total Soviet machine tool
output, compared to about 56% in the United States.
In many applications, metalforming machine tools
are more productive, require less labor input than
metalcutting types, and save on metal. For these
reasons, the Soviets have planned for several years
6. Machine tools made in Western Europe and Japan
compare favorable in quality and technical capabili-
ties with those made in the United States and are
cheaper.
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to increase the share of metalforming machines,
thus far unsuccessfully, and to expand the product
mix. Most of the metalforming machine tools pro-
duced in the USSR are relatively simple types:
general-purpose mechanical presses, hammers, shears,
and bending machines. The USSR does not produce
nearly enough high-speed hydraulic presses, pre-
cision forging machines, hot and cold stamping
machines, and other modern, automated types.
23. Soviet metalcutting machine tools lack the
durability, precision, and flexibility of their US
counterparts. For example, Soviet machine tools
require a major overhaul every 7-9 years, compared
with 12-15 years in the United States. Reportedly,
about one-third of the metalcutting tool stock in
the USSR is under constant repair. Furthermore,
users of Soviet tools complain that initial levels
of accuracy of many models are quickly lost. Soviet
gearcutting machines installed at the Gor'kiy
Motor Vehicle Plant in 1970 lost their original
levels of precision within 6 months.
24. Inferior levels of accuracy and durability
are the result of poor workmanship, mismanagement
at the plant level, and poor quality control and
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manufacturing precedures. For example, castings
frequently are not properly stress-relieved (affect-
ing durability) and slide components are not prop-
erly hardened (affecting accuracy) owing to efforts
by plant managers to cut corners in order to re-
duce costs, to increase plant profits, and to reach
targeted output goals.
25. Two major characteristics sharply dis-
tinguish the Soviet machine tool industry from that
of the United States. First, emphasis is placed
on mass production. More than 60% of all metal-
cutting machine tools are mass-produced. In the
United States, most machine tools are produced
in small lots and mass-produced machine tools are
rare. Second, emphasis is also placed on output
of highly standardized, general-purpose machines
of relatively simple design. Basic models are
kept in production, without major modification,
for protracted periods -- many for 15-20 years.
In 1970 the USSR produced more than 61,000 engine
lathes, nearly one-third of the entire output of
metalcutting machines produced in that year and
ten times the number produced in the United States
(see Table 2). Again, the USSR produced more than
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Table 2
USSR and US: Production of Metalcutting Machine Tools in 1970
by Major Type
Units
Percent
USSR
US
USSR
US
Total
202,260
49,314
100.0
100.0
Engine lathes
61,487
6,214
30.4
12.6
Automatic and semi-
automatic lathes
5,663
2,416
2.8
4.9
Milling machines
21,642
11,441
10.7
23.2
Boring machines
5,056
789
2.5
1.6
Grinding machines
17,597
10,109
8.7
20.5
Drilling machines
24,271
3,255
12.0
6.6
Gearmaking machines
4,450
1,036
2.2
2.1
Other
62,094
14,054
30.7
28.5
24,000 upright, floor-type drill presses, its
second largest category of output (12%), or seven
and one-half times as many as in the United States.
Thus, more than 40% of all metalcutting machines
are simple types that are easiest and least costly
to produce. By contrast, most US machine tools are
specialized types that have been tailored to cus-
tomer specifications and needs. Hence, in most
applications, US machine tools are not only more
productive but also are more expensive than Soviet
machine tools.
26. By mass-producing general-purpose machine
tools and neglecting special-purpose types, the
USSR produces cheap machine tools but expensive
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final products. Because general-purpose machines
frequently are inadequate, users are forced to make
expensive modifications, or to build their own
specialized machinery.
about
tools
It
one-sixth of all the
produced in the USSR
is extraordinary that
metalcutting machine
-- 37,000 units in 1972,
an amount nearly equal to total US production of
metalcutting machine tools
plants outside the Soviet
that is, by user plants.
all the "automatic lines"
1970 were manufactured in
tool plants as a sideline.
-- is
manufactured in
machine tool industry,
More than four-fifths of
produced in the USSR in
user plants or by machine
In fact, most of the
specialized machine tools produced in the USSR
probably are built by user facilities.
27. Because the USSR does not produce high-
quality specialized and precision machines, particu-
larly automated types, in sufficient quantities,
it has been unable to meet the demand of large,
new industrial investment projects from domestic
production. Virtually all of the machine tools used
to equip the new passenger car plant at Tol'yatti
came from the West, and the USSR is purchasing
large quantities of machine tools in the United
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States, Western Europe, and Japan for its huge Kama
heavy-duty truck plant under construction at
Naberezhnye Chelny.
nology machine tools
West during the past
tion of other plants
well.
Uses
Other precision, high-tech-
have been imported from the
few years for the moderniza-
in the automotive industry as
28. The USSR has a relatively greater need for
metalcutting machine tools than the United States
because of its overwhelming emphasis on capital
goods production. In many cases, heavy machinery
items can be produced only by metalcutting techni-
ques. By contrast, the United States produces
relatively greater quantities of consumer durables
than the USSR
to the use of
a greater use
-- output that is especially suited
metalforming machinery. Nevertheless,
of metalforming machine tools would
be logical even with the Soviet product mix.
29. Second, large numbers of machine tools are
needed because of the lack of vertically integrated
production in the machinery industry. Reliance on
sub-contracting arrangements as practiced in the
United States would permit wider specialization in
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the production of machinery components and reduce
the overall need for machine tools.
30. Third, the USSR requires a large stock of
general-purpose machine tools to supply the needs
of a huge, largely unspecialized repair and spare
parts industry, which is itself the result of poor
quality of original equipment. Virtually every
plant and farm in the USSR has a workshop set
aside to repair machine tools and other machinery.
In 1970, more than two and one-half million workers
and more than one million metalcutting tools, or
nearly one-third of the entire Soviet stock of 3.4
million metalcutting tools, were used in repair
and to produce spare parts. This is a matter of
grave concern to the Soviets because machine tools
are used inefficiently in this application; accord-
ing to official Soviet data, they are used only
about 40% of the time, and then only to 15%-20% of
capacity.
31. Because one-third of all metalcutting
machines are used in repair work and one-third are
constantly under repair, it may be inferred that
nearly two out of every three machine tools in the
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Soviet inventory, at any one time, are nonpro-
ductive7 -- that is, only about one out of every
three metalcutting tools is actually being used
to produce machinery and other industrial goods.
32. A large quantity of machine tools also is
needed annually to replace the aging and obsolescent
portion of the machine tool stock. In 1970, about
17% of the metalcutting stock was 20 years of age
or older and needed to be replaced, according to
Soviet sources.
machine tools in
According to one
The
use
proportion was
even higher for
in the machinery sector.
Soviet study, a "significant" pro-
portion of machine tools 10-20 years of age also
should be replaced because rising maintenance costs
and declining productivity, relative to new machines,
no longer justifies their continuance in use.
33. In recent years, about 2%-2.5% of the
stock of metalcutting machine tools has been re-
placed annually, representing about 35%-40% of
annual output. This rate has not been sufficient
7. Based on the assumption that most of the machine
tools under repair are those in use outside of the
repair sector. This assumption seems reasonable
since, according to the Soviet press, the machine
tool stock in the repair sector is newer than that
used for the production of machinery generally and,
as has been pointed out, is not used very intensively.
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to reduce significantly the proportion of machine
tools 20 years of age or older and needing to be
replaced. That proportion has declined by less
than 1% per year since 1962.
34. According to Soviet data, a 6%-8% re-
placement rate is needed to modernize the stock
of metalcutting machine tools. Such a rate is
unattainable in practice because it would require
virtually the entire annual output of metalcutting
machine tools and leave only token quantities avail-
able for installation in new plants and for ex-
port.8
35. In the United States, the inventory of
machine tools is older than in the USSR -- the
average age is more than 20 years -- but it is
more modern. It is older because about 30% of the
machine tools in use at the end of World War II
are still in operation; fully amortized, durable,
and in working order, they are still profitable to
use. Older machine tools tend to be taken out of
production in the United States and used for ma-
chinery repair and reconditioning, permitting
8. About 15% of annual output of machine tools is
exported, mostly to Eastern Europe and to the less
developed countries.
20
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newer machines to be used for production. In the
USSR the opposite is true; older machine tools are
retained in production while many new general pur-
pose machines are used for repair work (as well as
production). Hence, the inventory of machine tools
in use in the repair sector is actually younger
than that in use in production.
36. The Soviet effort to replace its huge
stock of general-purpose machines with more
modern ones is probably misplaced. Only the machine
tools in production need to be modernized. Instead,
the USSR needs to reorganize its repair industry
in order to increase specialization and cut down
on the number of machine tools needed. Moreover,
the repair industry ought to become a second-hand
market for older machine tools used in production.
In summary, the Soviets have sought quantitative
solutions to a qualitative problem. The issue is
not to replace all machine tools, but the right
machine tools.
37. Thus the Soviets are faced with two major
problems: a technologically outdated and in-
adequate machine tool stock; and, an organizational
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structure, both of machinery production and repair,
that condemns a significant proportion of the
machine tool inventory to nonproductive or in-
sufficiently productive use. The strategy adopted
to deal with these problems -- replacing older
machine tools with newer ones and increasing the
use of NC machines -- is only a partial solution,
at best. What is needed is a fundamental trans-
formation of the way machinery production is organ-
ized in order to maximize the benefits of both NC
machines and basic machine tools. Also, machine
tool output should be restructured to increase
the supply of specialized, especially automated,
machine tools; to reduce the output of standard,
general-purpose types; and to improve the precision
and durability of all machine tools.
Growth of NC Machine Tool Production
38. NC machine tools for the civilian economy
have been under development in the USSR since the
mid-1950s by a few institutes and plants in the
machine tool industry.9 Until about 1968, research
9. Principally, by the Experimental Scientific Re-
search Institute of Metalcutting Machine Tools
(ENIMS), the Leningrad Machine Tool Plant imeni
Sverdlov, the Odessa Milling Machine Tool Plant
imeni Kirov, the Moscow Ordzhonikidze Machine Plant,
and the Gor'kiy Milling Machine Plant.
22
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and development was phlegmatic and slow-paced. Pro-
duction appeared to lack centralized direction and
strong government backing. According to official
data, the USSR produced less than 150 NC machine
tools in 1967, mostly conventional machines with
plugboard control (see Table 3 and Figure 2).
Table 3
USSR and US: Production of Numerical Control Machine Tools
Units
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1975 Plan
USSR Total
16
NA.
N.A.
NA.
NA.
49
571
1451
197
525
1,687
2,540
3,038
6,720
US Total
402
518
1,047
1,220
1,517
2,100
2,926
2,957
2,917
2,376
1,901
1,238
1,626
N.A.2
Point-to-point
368
454
936
1,098
1,345
1,871
2,400
2,336
1,926
1,477
1,116
527
640
NA.
Of which:
Plugboard
90
146
157
192
200
267
371
286
174
153
83
51
35
N.A.
Contouring
34
64
111
122
172
229
526
621
991
899
785
711
986
N.A.
Machining centers3
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
NA.
NA,
NA.
NA.
N.A.
976
841
651
344
475
NA.
I. Estimated.
2. Probably less than 4,000.
3. Machining centers include both point-to-point and contouring typo.
Units
4000
3000
2000
1000
Figure 2
USSR and US: Production of Numerical Control Machine Tools
USSR
0
1960 65 68
515950 5-73
69
23
70
71
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There is some evidence that planners, for many
years, did not fully appreciate the usefulness of
NC machines in the production of standardized
10
items.
39. NC machine tools have also been under
development in the aviation industry, probably for
use in industries producing aerospace and mili-
tary equipment. Two major aviation institutes in
Moscow11
are known to have had longstanding NC
development programs. Regional aviation institutes
in Ufa, Kazan', and Smolensk are also believed to
be developing NC machines. The types of NC machines
being developed in aviation institutes are not
known. Furthermore, it is not known whether machines
under development by the aviation industry are more
or less advanced than those in the machine tool
industry.
40. In early 1968 the USSR belatedly recognized
the need for NC machine tools and officially
announced a major new program to accelerate develop-
10. However, one Soviet study, in the late 1960s
showed that about one-third of all machinery output
was in batches of 100 units or less, an ideal batch
size for the application of NC technology.
11. The Scientific Research Institute of Aviation
Technology and the Moscow Aviation Technology
Institute.
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ment and production. Output was to be increased
substantially during 1969-70 and the groundwork
laid for greatly increased output during 1971-75.
The relatively low state of NC technology and the
slow pace of progress in setting up production were
given as reasons for the new program. Desire to
catch up with US and Western advances in NC tech-
nology and pressures from the Soviet aerospace
industry also may have been important factors in-
fluencing the government's decision to expand out-
put.
41. Responsibility for design and production
of electronic control units was vested in the
instrument manufacturing industry, and for the
development and production of machine tools
proper both in the machine tool industry and in
the aviation industry.12 The State Committee for
Science and Technology was given some undefined
responsibility for the planning of future NC
applications.
42. No division of responsibilities between the
machine tool industry and the aviation industry
12. The announcement of a major new NC development
role for the aviation industry is the first official
recognition that this industry has been engaged in
development and production of NC machine tools.
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was specified, and no agency was designated to
carry out interministerial coordination of develop-
ment and production activities. Hence, it may be
assumed that two parallel, and independent, NC
development and production programs have been put
into force: one to produce NC machine tools for
use in the civil machinery sector; the other to pro-
vide NC machines for aerospace and military appli-
cations.
43. Since the new program was announced in 1968,
production of NC machine tools in the USSR has
accelerated rapidly. According to official Soviet
data, 1,687 NC units were produced in 1970, an in-
crease of more than 200% over 1969 and almost nine
times the number produced in 1968. In 1971, output
amounted to 2,540 units, an increase of about 50%
above that for 1970, and output in the USSR for the
first time exceeded that of the United States.13
A comparison of Soviet and US production of NC
machine tools during 1960-72 is shown in Table 3.
13. Soviet output was still below peak US pro-
duction of 2,957 NC units in 1967. Hence, US NC
manufacturing capacity in 1971 was still larger
than that of the USSR.
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44. A majority of the NC machine tools produced
in the USSR are manufactured by the machine tool
industry. Data on output of NC machine tools by
this industry are available for the years 1965, 1970,
and 1975 (plan). In 1965 the machine tool industry
produced 42 out of a total of 49 units; in 1970,
1,100 out of 1,687; and in 1975 is scheduled to
produce 4,500 units out of 6,720. The residual
output originates in plants and institutes of the
aviation industry and is intended for use in the
production of aerospace and military hardware (see
Table 4 and Figure 3). However, it is possible
Table 4
USSR: Estimated Production of Numerical Machine Tools
for Civilian and Aerospace/Military Industries
Units
1975
1965
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Plan
Total
49
1,687
2,540
3,038
4,192
5,307
6,720
Civill
42
1,100
1,458
1,924
2,560
3,392
4,500
Aerospace/military2
7
587
1,082
1,114
1,632
1,915
2,220
1. Produced by the Ministry of the Machine Tool Industry.
2. Produced by the Ministry of the Aviation Industry.
that some NC machines from the machine tool industry
are also used in military production.
45. Data in Table 4 indicate that output of NC
machines for aerospace and military production
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Figure3
USSR: Production of Numerical
ControF Machine Tools for Civilian
and Aerospace/Military Industries
Units 6,720
7 49
1965
515951 5.73
1,687
1,100
1970
4500
1975
Plan
tion during 1971-75.
substantially greater
amounted to about 15%
of total NC production
in 1965 and about 35%
in 1970. Further, the
Aerospace table shows that the
Military
share of NC machine
tools for aerospace
and military production
will stay at about one-
third of total produc-
However, this share may be
than is implied by the unit
output data if measured in terms of the relative
commitment of skilled manpower and technical re-
sources because types of NC machines needed for
aerospace applications are generally more complex
than for civilian uses and have more exacting
specifications for precision, versatility, and
reliability.
46. Comparison of Soviet and US output on the
basis of official Soviet data is difficult and
even misleading because of striking differences in
the composition of output. Although no official
breakdown of unit production by type is available
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for the USSR, it is believed, on the basis of data
on model types and other information, that most of
the NC machines produced to date are point-to-point
types, many equipped with plugboard type controls.14
Some relatively simple contouring machines have
been produced, but no machining centers are yet
in quantity production.
47. In the United States, highly productive,
technically advanced types of NC machine tools
dominate the product mix. In 1972 most of the NC
machine tools produced were contouring machines
(61%). Plugboard NC machines amounted to slightly
more than 2% of total NC production. About 29% of
output consisted of machining centers.
48. Nearly all Soviet NC systems consist of
conventional machine tools that have been modified
to accept NC controls, unlike current US practice
in which machine tools are designed specifically
for use with NC equipment. Such integrated sys-
tems generally afford considerably increased pre-
cision, reliability, and durability over conven-
tional machines modified for use with NC components.
14. In 1971 the USSR produced 53 different models
of NC machines. About four-fifths were point-to-
point types; nearly one-half of these utilize plug-
board control. Ten models were contouring types.
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Modified machine tools perform adequately in appli-
cations where the work load is light and high pre-
cision is not needed but may be less than adequate
under conditions of heavy or multiaxis machining
applications. The Soviets may be forced to modify
existing machine tools for use with NC equipment in
order to save on extensive engineering design lead-
times, to avoid complicated industrial problems of
changeover to new model production, to stretch a
limited design capability, and to achieve more rapid
increases in output of NC equipment than might other-
wise be possible.
Problems in Soviet NC Machine Tool Development
49. Soviet NC technology lags 7 to 10 years
behind that of the United States. Progress has
been retarded by backwardness in electronics and
data processing technology, shortages of high-
quality electronic components and computer hardware,
and by the lack of adequately trained engineers,
designers, and technicians. In very recent years,
shortages of skilled manpower for the development
of NC equipment may have been aggravated by corn-
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petition for computer designers and similar special-
ists from the Soviet computer industry.15
50. The USSR has lagged behind the United States
most notably in the development of NC contouring
machines and machining centers. A few contouring
machines have been built and are in operation in
civilian industry but for the most part are limited
to 2-axis simultaneous control. According to a
very recent source, users of contouring machines
in the USSR are using URAL-4 and MINSK-22 computers
to generate NC contouring programs. The limited
memory capacity of these computers makes it likely
that available programming for contouring is limited
to relatively simple type programs in 2 axes.16
The same source indicated that the reliability of
existing Soviet NC contouring machine tools is low.
One prototype of a 5-axis contouring (milling)
machine, reportedly built in 1970, was seen by US
15. Skills needed to develop electronic numerical
control units are similar to those needed to develop
computers generally. The program to accelerate pro-
duction of NC machine tools coincides roughly, in
time, with a major program to modernize computer
production in the USSR.
16. Generally, at least 32,000 (32K) addressable
units of memory are needed to write contouring pro-
grams in 3 or more axes. The first-generation
(vacuum tube) URAL-4 with a 4K memory and the
second-generation transistorized MINSK-22 with an
8K memory fall far short of this requirement.
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machine tool experts in 1971 at ENIMS, the main
scientific development center for machine tools.
In the United States, most contouring machines
that have been built are capable of machining in
3 axes simultaneously, and many are controllable
in 4 or 5 axes.17
51. In 1972, six prototype machining centers
with magazines holding from 30 to 100 cutting tools
were exhibited in the USSR. However, only one of
these (a horizontal milling machine) reportedly was
capable of contouring in 3 axes simultaneously.
The others exployed simultaneous 2-axis point-to-
point control. In the United States, most machin-
ing centers operate in 3 or more axes with contour-
ing capability.
52. The USSR has not yet developed a standard-
ized computer program for use in generating con-
touring NC routines. Lacking a standardized pro-
gram, few plants would be able to use economically
multiaxis contouring machines even if they soon
became available. Users would be forced to create
their own computer programs which, typically, re-
17. These types are used almost exclusively in the
production of aerospace and military-related com-
ponents (particularly jet engine and airframe com-
ponents).
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quires several man-years of development effort. In
the United States, several standardized programs
have been developed for use with NC equipment and
can be applied to most of the common business com-
puters in use. The Soviets have shown intense
interest in purchasing in the US one such program,
called APT.18
53. NC units in the USSR often do not meet the
needs of machine tool makers. Complaints in the
Soviet press reveal that many NC controllers in
production are obsolete and that newer types of
controllers intended for machines already in pro-
duction are not being produced. Frequently, NC
controllers are defective and the services of the
manufacturers to correct defects are unavailable.
In a very recent case, not one of 25 NC controllers
ordered by a machine tool manufacturer from the
Smolensk plant worked on delivery, and no technical
assistance from the manufacturer could be obtained.
Moreover, plants of the instrument industry are
not meeting planned delivery schedules, and some
18. Automatically Programmed Tool, the most ver-
satile, powerful, and comprehensive NC programming
system available. Originally developed at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, it is now
undergoing further development at the Illinois
Institute of Technology.
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machine tool manufacturers are making their own
control units.
54. In addition, Soviet controllers suffer
from numerous design and qualitative shortcomings.
These include: poor resistance to plant environment
(heat, dust, noise, or vibration), improper tailor-
ing to the requirements of the machine tools to
which they are mated, shoddy workmanship, and poor
quality of component parts, particularly electronic
devices, electrical starting and regulating equip-
ment, and tape drive mechanisms. The poor quality
of Soviet controllers persists because of lack of
customer sanctions against producers and disinterest
by the plants of the instrument industry which,
very largely, are producing controllers only as a
sideline.
55. In the United States, electronic controllers
are built with integrated circuits. This greatly
reduces size while improving reliability of the
electronic portion of NC systems. Soviet con-
trollers generally employ less advanced solid state
circuitry based on transistors and semiconductor
diodes. In the United States, controllers use
mostly 8-track punched tape inputs. In the USSR,
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mostly 5-track punched tape is used, although across-
the-board conversion to 8-track punched tape is re-
portedly under way. Eight-track tape is more
flexible, particularly for programming multiaxis
machining, because it permits more auxiliary
machine operations to be encoded.
56. The USSR is attempting to accelerate prog-
ress in advanced NC machine tool technology. In-
tensive research and development activity is under
19
way at ENIMS, at several machine tool plants,
and in institutes and plants of the Ministry of the
Aviation Industry. In addition to prototypes of
advanced multiaxis contouring machines and machin-
ing centers that have been built, the Soviets are
working to develop even more advanced systems such
as adaptive control and DNC.20
One adaptive control
system reportedly has been built in prototype.
57. The Soviets have demonstrated good progress
in DNC, at least in the laboratory. At the Moscow
"Stanki-72" machine tool show in March 1972, the
USSR exhibited a prototype DNC system called a
"link line" that integrated a mixture of NC machine
tools, including contouring machines and machining
19. Notably, Gor'kiy, Ivanovsk, Leningrad (Sverdlov),
and Odessa.
20. See paragraph 11.
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centers, into a totally self-contained machining
complex. Automatic parts handling devices transfer
the workpiece through sequential machining opera-
tions, and a central computer controls the entire
machining process. The USSR may intend to use
link lines for the production of spare parts in an
expanding network of regional repair centers in
the machinery sector.21
One such DNC system is in
use in the United States, and others are slated to
be produced.
Western Technical Assistance -- Key to Five-Year
Program
58. Since 1968 the USSR has gained access to
Western NC technology through technical exchange
and cooperation agreements with Western countries
and Japan. Since the United Kingdom first agreed
to exchange "technical information" with the USSR
in NC technology in 1968, the scale and scope of
contractual arrangements have steadily widened. In
1970, Alcatel of France contracted to manufacture
21. Centralized repair and spare parts production
for metalworking machinery is being organized in the
USSR under the All-Union Association for Machine
Tool Repair (Soyuzstankoremont) which is subordinate
to the Ministry of the Machine Tool Industry. The
Association currently operates nine specialized re-
pair and spare parts facilities and plans to add
five more during the 9th Five-Year Plan. As yet,
they account for only a small fraction of repair
work.
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electronic controllers for the USSR. At least some
of these are to be mated with machine tools pro-
duced by the Leningrad Sverdlov plant and marketed
in France and elsewhere in Western Europe. The
Ryazan machine tool plant also, reportedly, is
manufacturing NC machine tools using Alcatel con-
trols, probably for the domestic Soviet market. In
1971, Saab-Scania of Sweden and Siemens of West
Germany entered into similar arrangements for
supplying the USSR with electronic controllers to
be mated with Soviet machine tools and marketed
in Sweden and West Germany, respectively.
59. In 1972, Japan added a new dimension to
foreign technical assistance to the USSR in the
field of NC technology. Fujitsu Ltd. contracted
to supply the USSR with production know-how for its
FANUC series of electronic controllers 22and
associated hardware (pulse motors). Similarly,
discussions are under way with Olivetti of Italy
for the purchase of manufacturing know-how for
Olivetti controllers.
22. Three different models; the most advanced model
is capable of 3-axis contouring with two simultane-
ously controlled axes.
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60. The extent of Western sales of complete NC
systems to the USSR is not known. Reportedly, NC
machines have been purchased from Sweden, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Japan.
One US executive alleges that Sweden sold 25 com-
plete NC contouring systems to the USSR in 1971.
61. The USSR is actively testing and evaluating
Swedish and Japanese NC machines and their con-
trollers at ENIMS. It has been reported that
Fjuitsu may supply ENIMS with an advanced DNC sys-
tem. In addition, the USSR is keenly interested
in advanced US NC machine tools, especially multi-
axis machining centers. Recently, the USSR has
negotiated with a large US machine tool producer
to purchase three advanced multiaxis machining
centers valued at nearly $2 million to be installed
at ENIMS.
62. The intensive Soviet effort to purchase ad-
vanced NC machines for ENIMS may indicate that
foreign systems are undergoing competitive evalua-
tion as a prelude to future Soviet purchases. Al-
most certainly, it means also that foreign NC
design technology is being extracted by the Soviets.
This approach could save the USSR many costly man-
years of engineering development effort.
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63. The USSR is also taking advantage of gains
made by East Germany in NC technology. East Ger-
many has the most advanced NC capability in Eastern
Europe and is serially producing NC machine tools,
although most are believed to be point-to-point
types. In addition, some machining centers also
are being produced, and a DNC system has been
developed. East Germany sold 80 NC machine tools
to the Soviets in 1971 and planned to deliver 200
in 1972. East Germany has opened a machine tool
center at the Krasny Proletariat Machine Tool
Plant in Moscow to familiarize the Soviets with the
operation of East German NC machine tools and to
train Soviet technicians in NC programming and
maintenance.
Plans and Prospects
64. By 1971 the USSR already had become the
world's largest producer of NC machine tools. By
1975, if planned goals are realized, the USSR also
may have the world's largest capacity to produce
NC machines, by number if not by value. The USSR
plans to increase output at an average annual rate
of about 32% a year -- 300% for the five years
implying an output of 6,720 machines in 1975. Prob-
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ably US output in that year will not exceed 4,000
units. Output in the USSR increased by 80% during
1971-72 and is planned to jump an additional 38%
during 1973. An average annual rate of about 30%
during 1973-75 is needed to fulfill planned output
goals.
65. Despite the high growth rate implied for
1973-75, the USSR probably will meet its 1975 unit
output goals for NC machine tools. High growth
rates are possible because of the Soviet practice
of mating NC control units to conventional models
of machine tools that are already serially pro-
duced. Furthermore, acquisition of Western-made NC
controllers through present arrangements with firms
in Western Europe and Japan will facilitate growth
in unit output.
66. Technical improvement in the quality and de-
sign of NC controllers is planned, including con-
version from transistorized circuitry to integrated
circuits and a shiftover to 8-track punched tape
for most models beginning in 1973. The resolution
of controllers and the machining accuracy of NC
machine tools also are to be raised. The Tomsk
Mathematical Machine Plant is to become a special-
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ized producer of controllers -- the largest in the
USSR. Nevertheless, Soviet machines are likely to
remain qualitatively inferior to US and Western
counterparts. Most Soviet-made controllers prob-
ably will not incorporate modern design based
on integrated circuits, although Soviet NC machine
tools that use Western-made controllers will be
based on integrated circuit designs.
67. Product mix is to be expanded during
1971-75 to include more than 100 models, including
several different models of machining centers.
Eleven models of NC machines are to be serially
produced under conditions of "flow line mass pro-
duction." However, the technological composition
of Soviet output is unlikely to match that of the
United States or Western Europe. Most models in
production will be point-to-point or simple con-
touring types. About 2,500 NC machines, more than
35% of 1975 planned output, will be NC lathes, prob-
ably highly standardized types that are easiest to
produce. Multiaxis (three or more axes) contour-
ing NC machine tools and machining centers probably
will continue to exist mostly as prototypes.
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68. Cumulative output of NC machine tools dur-
ing 1971-75 should total nearly 22,000 units,
about 2% of the planned output of conventional
metalcutting machine tools. The economic effect
of these machines will depend on how they are used
and in which applications. As with computers,
their potential may far outweigh actual performance
in the Soviet environment. In aerospace and civilian
production involving runs of 100 units more or less,
NC machines can be helpful. If, as is currently
the case with many conventional machine tools (and
computers), they are used only part time, as in
repair, their potential will be wasted. The effect
of NC machines ought to be more significant in the
post-1975 period, as the quality and capabilities
of Soviet NC machines improve.
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