ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE MILITARY FORCES, USSR 1963-76

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01049A003100010001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

Mrase.V?
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.WitA antilitrBUTION TO JAG
=ONO= 21,41CT ArDERNATVIC =IT= FORMS, USSR
1963-16
f'?
alvE
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Olisg,...leiM
I. Introduction.... 4,... * .????? .., 4,4,. 00000 * 0 0 3.
II, Recent Developments in Defense and Economic Growth. 4, 0 4 it a ? a * 3
III. Cost of Alternative Force Level., 3.963-76 . . ? . ? IP ? ? ? 3
XV a Projections of 012, 1963-76 ? ? ? ? ? ** ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? 6 ? $ 3.0
V. Impact of Military Upenditures on Economia Growth. 014,4** ..0 2.3.
A. Military Expenditures as a Share of Gross national Product. ? ? 11
B. Impact of Alternative Military Expenditures on Consumption* ? , tq
-,
C. Differential Impact of Alternative Forces on the
Machinery Industries ? ? * 44 ? 44 * . 0 * * ? . ? 4 * * * 15
VI* Conclusions 4 0 0 ? ? ? ? ? 0 ? ? ? w 4 * * ? 4 ? * ? ? ? * ? ? 16
Appendix. ? ? ? ? ? . ? 00 OM* ????????**Ikik?? ?????? 18
Tables
Average Annual Rates of Growth in Key Soviet Defense and
Economic Indicators, 1956-55 and 1959-63 4 * ? ? ? ? ? 0 ? ? ? ? ?
2. Estimated Military Expenditures Required for Tempe za end IV,
by. Category, Selected Years, 1963-76 . *,, ,,, *o, *?
Hypothetical Average Annual Ratea of Increase in Soviet ONP,
1964-76. ? ? ? ? ? * ? ? ? ? ? * ? ? ? ? 4,- ? ? ? ? ? ? * ? ?
21, Military tcpenditiues as a Share of Gross National Product,
Selected Tears, 1963..76* ???????? ?????? ? ? 0 ? ? ?
rn Average Annual Rates of Orowth in OP and Consumption Under
Alternative Investment Policies and.Pinduativit7tommds,
1964-76. *ea east* * *a. ? woo *as 'ow**
6. Hypothetical Projections of OSP br End Use, MR* Selected
Years, 1963.76 ? ? ? * ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 11 ? * ? ? ? ? ?
? 11, ?
1144.444 .
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'
I. Introductim
The four alternative projections of Soviet military forces described in thie
report are bated 04 the assumption that Soviet leaders. are influenced predemirantly
by po1itica1 and unitary considerations in their choice of amilitary posture
for 1975 and are willing or forced to accept the etonomic consequencee* The
purpose of this Section is to examine the effect of military fore s on economic
growth and the allocation. of retourcee* in asseSsing the economic impact,
attention will be feeeeed on the rate Of growth of Gross National, Product (cUP),
and on the allocation of resource' to the two principal. ton-military claimant's ,
for the economic pie" ? the investment god a industries and the consumer.
HYpothetical projectiens of GNP to 1975 have been developed in order to
evaluate the economic impactef the alternative military forces. The projections
of GNP and other economie indicator* presented in this Section are not
estimates. They are based on seSamptione concerning Teesible wonemic saternatiVe$\
that are available to the Soviet loaners, as well as assumptiOne -concerning
future productivity trona that are eonsistent.vith the economytapest performance.'
Although the projections Of the military forces extend a deoade into the
future- many of the deciaions required to build any one of the for000 Must betted,*
by 1.965 or $0011 thereafter. Tha :univeneca and increasing eophisticatiOn of
modern vcapone .eyetema have lenzthened the lead time required frcx4 the develoment
to the production ataces. In addition, the inereeaina difficulty of convertin
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from civilian to military or from military to civilian rodu.ction !flakes the
"gunitst or butter" decision swear =eh earlier in the economic proceau than Inas
the case during World. War rr. or even during the Korean hostilities. Because
of the technological complexity or modern weapons systems, they require specie.).
equipment, a very highly trained pz'ofecsional labor force, s.nd ft saga cases
'uzique productive capacity. 'The "guns or butter(' decision is not necesearAY
one of use of available productive capacity And labor force, but Of use of
investment resources to Create C certain type a opacity ica, production.
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IX. Moe., jaLIZz..1.22matija
The relationship between economic groirth and military expe3aditures may be
illustrated by a brier review a developments during 2956-0 =4 1959-63# no
shown in Tablo 1.
Table
Average Annual Rates of Growth in Key Soviet
Defense and Roma:do Indicators a
2956-50 and 1959-53
?elven
Indicate
Gross national product
7.3
4.5
Industrial productim
8.3
ie w fixed investment
14.5
6.5
Total defense expenditures
2.5
3.5
Expenditures for defense machinery
and. etluipment
115
ci.TIle base yr ear conwutina ru,t grovth in this and krab equent tabierk
is the year precedina the given period -- for example, the base year for the
period 1956-56 is 2955. All 'iligures have been rounded to the nearest one-half
percent.
? b 2.904, VW used ao the terminal year to offset the anormally low agricultural
production in 1963.
c. Including expeAditures for military hardware spare parts, and RDITZIS (Research,
deve)opment, Terabits, E'valuation, end. Space).
During the earlier period, Soviet defense e emUtx4 declined vher GIP
increased rather rapidlr. liower, during the 08404 195943, when iterate?
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expenditures roc?, rapidly, Soviet GNP grew at a considerably slower rate thsal
vvictua1y. During the earlier period, when new fixed investment ialcreaced
very rapidly, ?expenditures for machinery aid equipment for defense grew very
slowly, LI this later ixtriod) however, when expenditures for macbine%7 and
equipment for defense grew rapial.y, the rate of growth a now fixed investment
decreased.
Those data suggest the effects that variations in defense expenditures
may have had on *concede growth. Investment and, hence* industrial production
and GM' grew fatter when defense expenditures were growing Izore slcml?v or
declining and, conversely, grew slower when defense expenditures were
ccrowing at higher rates.
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III. as.t...9fItel_....E.?nativeimmejec2.1.4.1241-1.6.
In order to simplify the economic assessment of the1nh1its7 forces projected
in this report, only the moat expensive alternative (Force XI) and the least.
expensive alternative (Force IV) win be considered. The economic impact
or Forces X and xn maybe assumed. to be less severe than Force IX but more
severe than Force Ile
? AA noted earlier in this report, Fore') II represents a concerted Soviet
effort across the entire ranee or force components to introduce improved weapons
systems and to maintain forces capable of diverse military actions. Form xy
on the other hand, represents an effort to reduc4 military expenditures by
maintaining a credible deterrent vith a smaller number of strategio nuclear
weapons systems, while improving the capability of conventional fOrces :or
Intervention in 'limited conflicts. The estimated. expenditures roluired to
develop and maintain each of these Corm% through 1976, an in selected
earlier years, are ex:maize& in Table 24,
5
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Table 2
Satimated Military Expenditures Required for Forces XI and /V,
by Category, Selected Years, 1963-76
. Millen rubles
Force ;;
Total
mum*
W.J.
4.2
23.3,
7.0
32.0
9.9
28.1
3-1.1
Invectment
(aluirment and facill.
a` 7.)
9.5
12.T
7.4
Operating
(Personnel, operations,
and maintenance)
88
9.4
Average Annual Rate of Growt
.rcent)
T4 6
5.5
104 T.2 3.9
5.1
2.4 1.3 1.4
E2,1:912.
Total 16,1 16 0 14.9 14,5 r0.1
RDTE&S 2.7 3.2 3,9
Investment
(Equipment and faeilitieS)611 6.3 4.6 ? 4.0 -1.2 -5.3 5.9
Operating
Uersonnel, operatiOn,
and maintenance) 6.7 64, 6 6.1 -0.6 4.0.9
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As shown in the table, expenditure for Force IX iuease rapidly during
1964-73 6.nd do not begin to decline until 1974. Egpenclitures for Force IV,
hcwevert reach a peak in 1966 (a year-not shown in the, table) and declaim
quUta steadily during the following 10-year period In 1973, the expenditures
for Force II are more than two times the expenditures for Force IV.
A comparison of the structure ef expenditures for each of the forces, also
shown in Table 2, illustrates the importance to the civilian economy or inecirio
elcmcnta in the two military programs. Expenditures on RZWESIS increase in both
forces through 1976. Uowever, they ;Aut trona higher base and increase V4WO
rapid4 in Force XI, and during 1973-76 they are two and one.half times higher
than &talar expenditures in Force IV. .The large and increasing allocations
to S under Force IX would pro-ompt highly skilled manpowor and scarce
materials for the military and -would seriously impede the flaw of now technology
to the civilian sector of the economy. In addition, the jnrauent i4
equipment and facilitiee under Force I% increases by more than 5 percent annually
through 1973, whereas under Force IV it actually decline?, implying a smaller
share of investment to the civilian sector under Force IX than under Force IV
The UtrAia that Force. XI would impose on ecarce manpower and material
resources are net apparent from the expenditure figures alone,' Eirrently
the Soviet azzig forces nuMber between 3.0 and 35 million men. The aime o
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the Soviet armed forces in 1976 would range frau a low of 2,4 million mon
under Force /V to a high of k.6 million under Force II. Thus Force IV would
generate a reduction in the armed forces of perhaps one million men, whereas
Force II would generate an increase of about that magnitude. This difference.
of two million men by 19T6 would represent a difference in the rate of growth
in the labor force of 1.6 percent under Force II and 1.8 percent Under Force IV.
Although this difference in the rates of growth appears email, these men are in
their prime working ages while in military service, and their educational attainment
generally is higher then the average for the labor forge as a whole.
Perhaps more important tban the relative size of the armed forces, however,
would be the relative demand ter scientific and technical manpower for military .
research and development purposes, Under Force It, expenditures for military
RDTEW would increase at au average annual rate of 8 poreent through 1976.
During 1956-63, the number of advanced degree holdera in the pasR increased
at an average rete of only 5 percent annually, considerably below the annual
iecrease in military RDTESQS, suggesting that a disproportionate share of such
persons had to be directed into military rather than eivilian uses during this
period. Although recent changes in the Soviet educational system should
accelerate the growth of advanced-degree holders., under Force II the eiviliala
sector probably would continua to be short-changed in favor of the military.
Under Force IV, however, military'RDTMS would increase at an annuel
mt at only about 4 percent. When related 'Gotha expected growth of better
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than 5 voreezt anuAU in the umber of aavanced-dearoe holders, nkse
Covele,ment Lrt t1 iyi1ttn.vector would increase oubstantially (sinca
civilian o2r dttre IMTE311 have be roushly of the military
expenaituree on 11171V4
In adilition to high manpower requirements, also pre-orapt
13041 a the Aysical recources that are crucial to the continuira modernization
a the Coyle% econy* The concentration ot spool:lilted resources on razesimh,
derelorcoats production: space ectivitiess luxd doplopout or advanced %MVO=
)OUUInterfere stalowily 14th the introdugtton of techtioloa in indvstry*
Ito impact, woad be particularly critical to ouch areas as autouation and new
obcnical processees wh'ere t120 utremento a modern, cophiaticated cot/wont
?=Tete directly with tho requirmenta of a nedorn, opeoe-nzo artammto inCkuttry
The relative costa of, 'ore n and 2?oroo IV owr the next decade would be
n:oot clearly felt, in the growth of eto ivitj, tbe mtioGZc.,72 to
invite of both labor arid capital confeined. Riatorically, factor produ.ativity
in the tICSA durius the lona period 1,92843 increased at a rat* or 1.5 porleat
amuellyi houeveri the rate or rot i increase-a to a little more then 3.0 pare=
=wally during 300-58 %ban defense eavenditures arev slowly, and then Zell to a.
rate of itboat ItO percent soursaliy during 12.S8-63 %ea= detelase evenditurw snore
accelerated.* Xt le swanned that under Three 11; the gt,routh of factor productivity
would 111,11 below the locg-tora trend and would avoraso abomt 1.0 pewee:Al as it
durivz the period of rapid milltary **mei= 195a-63.. On tfrbil Ot1107 hate, it
az-mum:4 that the additional techrsolosical revoureen left over for tbe civilian
econow miler tore* IV would raise the growth Of factor pxoductivity to perhavo
2.0 percent
.s :'.i that the grovth of factor productivity votazt
return to 3.0 percent annually under any of the prctjected tome levels* l'ecluisc
tfts r8M111131 RWAVV0154/6S1/15u.nE%-itt ilsar
recoom during 2,950-58?
$3.-R:411.0ior
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IV. Proaections of GNP, 1263-76
Alternative annual rates of-growth of Soviet GNP have been projeeted to "
1976 and are shown in Table 3
Table 3
othetical Average Annual Pates of increase in
1964-76
Ni Investment
High ? Low iI1gh
d ct i. oduc lvi duct
tot GNP*
Lov Inv atm nt
vit
Force II
Force IV
58
4.8
5 .0
if .0
Appendix*
* The et used or projjootir Grfigures to describe
For any military expenditure there is still =economic, policy choice betveen
investment and consumption, Growth of GNP can be increased by increasing the
grovtla of investment and hence of capital stock, but at tae expense, ofeonsUmption.
The projections in Table 3 contatn mob, and low investment alternattvea. In a
later section, the impact of these alternatives on consumption be examined,
In All four cases, the labor force is assumed to grow by 1.7 percent
annually, villch le the expected rate of growth for the _adult population during ,
1964-76.
'rhe. high investment assumption corresponde to 412 annual growth in the
capital atodk of 10 percent, similar to that experienced during 19501s. The low
investment assumption corresponds to an average growth or 7' percent in capital
stock, comparable to that experienced during the, much longer period 1929-58.
Produettvity, the ratio of GNP to inputs of both labor and capital coMbined,
is assumed to grow at 1.0 percent annually (low productivity) under Peree,IZ
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wad at 2.0 Imrcent examslly (high pzioduetivity) under Ponta iv, as explained
in Section In above.
It is conceivable that during the next decade factor productivity could
grov at a higher rate such as 3.0 percent annually, whieh. Nrotaa. cause ONP to
grow more rapidly under either Force 11 or Force IV. However, it is unlilcely
that such a high growth rate in fector productivit3r could be achieved unless
the entire Soviet totem of econceac administration were xbadically reformed,
to achieve greater efficiency. On the other hand) it it; also ?conceivable
that the decline experienced in productivity growth from 2.0 )?ercent in the
1950's to 1.0 percent in the early 1960'a is not a temporary drop bu,t io a
new trend that will continue into the future. In this event, the myth
rates in GNP in Table 3 would, to lower under either force level.
V. X et of Milita ntiturer on Economic G'owt
Although the militanr force levels in this paper are projected through 19760
the most significant economic impact occurs through 7073 because defense
expenditures decline, after that date for both Force XX and Force Itr.
A. nd ture e Chaz of ro Nationa Product
A rough measure of the burden imisoeed on the economy by alternative
military expenditurea le the share of GNP going to defense. The relative
domande on G122 of Force Ix and Force XV are ohcrwn in Table 4. Under Force XX,.
the military share of GNP remains 4ove 10 percent through 1973 vith both the
high and the low investment alternatives. By contrast, the military share
of ata) under Force XV declines in every year end by 1973 b less then hoar
tto share under Faroe rt
11 -
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Table 4
Mi tary Expenditures as 4a Share of Gross Ea oral Product, 91
Selected Years, 1963-16
Fercen
High investment
Low inveatment
Hi h Investment ,
tow investment
6 68 1
1 6
Force 17,(low productivity)
3.0.6 94,.9 3.0.9
10.6 134
1D.....slat (hush productivity)
8.9 6.7 4.7 3.9
8.9 7.0 5.3.
fio ee: The Appea x,particularly Table
b., The military share of OF under Force it would decline through 2.973 only
if the high Investment alternative (10, increase in capital stock) were
cothined with the high productivity assumption (4 sznual growth), an
unlikely coMbinetion.
o. The military ebare of OP under FOXV-0 IV would decline' more gradually . \
if the by investment alternattre were combined with the lov productivity
assumption* -
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Tranact of urea on Conan tion
During the past decade,. the Soviet consumer has become accustsmed to
gradual but steady rise in hie living standards? Consumption has been
increasing on the average of about 5 pereent annually, and per capita Consuo ion
by about 3.5 x)ercent aralually* In order to raise iforker productivity and
conserve scarce materials and manperwer, the USSR in recent yea= lass steadily
increaced worker incentives while relying Leas and less on eompalsion and
coercion. A reversal ot these trends might have aseriously adverse effect
on the morale of the population ae a *hole and of the labor force in partieular.
As ahem in Table 5, hnothetical trendta in consumption during 1964-76
would be determined by investment policies and by the growth in i"actor productivity,
which in turn would be greatly influenced by the choice of Fore* I or Porce
Under Force XI, a high investment effort would Maintain a respectable growth. in
GNP (4.8 /Jercent ainaually),* but 14.6%04 result in an absolute deerease in
conswaption apd declIne in per capita conamption ab about 2 percent arxnually
for the decade through 1976. This reault would be =acceptable to the Soviet
consumer and almost* certainly would force a. modification in either investment
or rail-IA[147 policies,* Force IX in combil.mtion with a low investment pros=
would reoult in GNP growth of only 4.0 percent annually, but would permit
increases in or capita conouswtion ranging from about one to two percent
annuelly throughout the decade. In order to deploy Force IL therefore, the
Soviet leaderehip probably would be %Vecied to aecept a, Lower growth in GNI in
Order to maintain a small annual increaser in per eapita eonsuription.*
* In the unlikely event that the Soviets should experience a high growth in factor
productivity with Force XL they could, maintain GNP growth at 4.8 percent annually
and a small. increase (rather then a decrease) in ;:ier capita consumption through 19T6,,
1,3*
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Table 5
Ave e Annual Batas of Growth in GNP and Consupption
Under Alternative Investment Policies .
end Productivity Trend?, 1964-76 tit
Force 1;
High ? Low High
Productivity Productivity Pouct1vity Productivity
rcen
GNP, 1964-7
4.8
4.0
Conzumption, 1964.76
2.7
1964-68
.4).6
2.5
1969-73
2.2
1974.76
-0.2
3.9
GNP, 1964-76
5.0
Consumption, 1964-.76
,5?8
1964-68
ea.
4.9
3?969-73
3.3
4.8
197446
2.1
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Under Force /V the low investmmt alternative would provide on avernge
onnuaI inerenso of 5 poment in onsumption 6uring 1964-76 ,:ompormble t.the
im-!rcolse ot the post de,_ade. The annual 'in reose in GNP, in this nee would.:he
5.Dpereent. Xf under Force IV the Soviets seek a higher rate ofincrease in
W(5.9 Portent), the increase in consumption would average'Z-.6-pereent annually,
about half tha increase of the past decade.*
C. Zfi....entitexc.A.atex.......9211011ne_g_Industries
The modern, space-age armaments industry introduces serious problems of
resource allocation, Oven when resources are graving rapidly and are under strong
political control* The inverse relationship between expenditures for military
equipment and for new fixed investment in the USSB during 1956.63 vas noted ,
/above in Table 1. A, rapid rise during 1959.63 in expenditures for military
equipment and facilities vas accompanied by a sharp decline in new fixed investment
the primary element of economic growth. This represented a reversal of trends
observed during 1956-58.
The expanded weapons Systeme required under Force XX would involve heavy-:
investment in military equipment And tcilitieu, especially in the period of rapid
buildup thrOugh 1973* EXpanditures for military investment would Increase
at an Annual rate Of Sporeent during 1964-68 and 6 percent durimg 1969.73*
TM-771--acx ac* in both CINP and consuwtton you
does not increase by 2 Pore
annually
15
r if fact pro uettvi y
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Under Force IVA on the other hand, expenditures for military equipment and
facilities would, remain almost unchanged over the entire perioe and would decline
as a proportion of ORP? The requirements of Force 17, therefore, probablt.
would make it difficult for tho USSR to maintain a high rate of investment
in nye fixed equipment for the civilian eector* Thie possibility reinforces
the conelusion made above in 41scuseine consumption (Section V*B) that a high
investment effort under Fermi II would be too etrenuous for the Soviet economy.
The fame restraint on high investment would apply, though with leee eeverity,
totem? levels intermediate between Foresee II and IVs
VI* Conclunions*
Force II would impooe Otin s on scarce material reeourcee that would
require sharp adjustmente in the civilian economy. In particular, Forte II IA
not compatible with a high investment poliey (growth In capital stock of ID
percent per year) because ()) it would result in a eecline in per capita
consurotion every year through 1976a and () the heavY exPenditure0 alitarY
equipment would reduce the reeource0 available for civilian investment. Force
II woul4 be possible with a lower investment policy, although this in turn
would hold the growth in Off? to only 4 percent =manor and would permit increases
in per capita consumption only about half those Of the reeont past* Revel:thaw:et
the economy would b* able to bear the burden imposed by Force II*
7.-Earairclaions aro based en the essueption? that Imre boon made about
inventment, productivity' and increeee in tho labor force.: See the Appendix for
a, discussion of these aseumptione*
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Vorce IV would give the Soviet leadership more roOm for Choice. A high
investment policy would result in a growth in =Poi' about 6 percent annually
and still provide moderate increases in per eapita consumption, although lower
than consumption increases Of the recent past. If the leadership preferred
to maintain their. present trends-in consumption, they could reduce investment
and let GUT, growth drop to about 5 percent annually while growth in per capita
consumption remained: at 349 roroont annuai1y.
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IV. 119tts.a.,DAL.21zIodol
The estimates appearing in tables 2, 41 and 5 are based on data that
appear in table 6* The separate growth models in table, 6 were derived as
follows: -
A. Data on military matures for all years are those tabn.lated. for
JAG by MRA.
B. CiliP clata by on use for 1963, except military, are ORR estimates.
C. A basic Cobb-Douglas production, function, with constant return? to
scale, was used for the projections. The formula, in terms of rates of
ch.enge, ia aa fo/lows:
AO IP AA +
."X K
where 0 10 GNP, A. is factor productivity, X La the capital stocit, and L is
the labor force. The weights used to aggregate X and L represent arbitrary
roximationa
D. The a zptions regLti Aituie growth of A Kit and already noted
in the text, are:
(1) A
(2) Ic
(3) L
ft**
? I.,
1 and 2 percent
and 2.0 percent
1.7 percent
B. GliP was? derived for eac variant oho= in table
rates to 1965 level._
?
al41371411 grovrth
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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A003100010001-5
Y. Growth in inveatment represents the increase needed to raipe capital
stock, by 7 and 10 percent respeotively. It was assumed that depreciation
would inereaee at the same rate, ea capital etodk.
0.. "Other" GNP' wee aseumed to remain a constant oire of M.
H. Consumption was obtained ae a residual.,
Many pitfalls are eneountered in attempting to pro ect the components of
wlsee national prodaet, over the period of a decade, tuld there is no synthesized
theory of eeonomic growth-which can cake allowance for all of them. In making
?commie comparieone of alternatives Over time, adjustments should be made
for future ohanges in production costs, installation costs, and operating
and maintenance costs, chenges. which may occur at different times and
different rates threashout the course or 4 decade& No attempt has been made
in this paper to compare and adjust for the coats and gains that may occur at
different points becaued of changes in technology, change; in demand and
change* in time preferences. The GNP figures in this paper are hypothetical '
projections only, based on assumptions about feasible economic alternatives
in the UZSR. The projections are not Intelligence e timates; they were
developed solel,y tO aecompeAr the hypOthetiesI projections of military forces.
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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A003100010001-5
Table 6
Rypothotical Evojections of GNP by d Voss USSR,
Soloctod room, 1963-T6
Egri2t,M) (low invortmorkti by productivity)
ONP 1, 183.4
Corkomption 109.3
2234
i235
271.4
137.9
3o5,3
154,5
4.0
2.5
4.o
2.2
3'9
New fixori ivoi tIT
59.1
83.7
102.5
6.9
7.o
TO
Military i&ttteA 19.4
2.r?i #3
324
23.3
4.0
Other sto 12.o
344.6
17.8
20.0
4.0
4,o
Filyee 12*, (1ig13. invootineut, lo producti
ClUP,total
183.4
231.9
Conoumption
109.3
105.8
Vow rixed itorootzeut
42.7
65.6
Military oarvenditureo 19.4
25.3
or
12.0
)93.2
337e5
4.8
18
4.3
3.o
1384
163.6
1,4.9
3.opo
32.0 28.3
194 L34.6 4.6
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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP79T01049A003100010001-5
Table 6 continued
race Annual Rate of Growth
remit
itnrostaaon
2384 316.4
121.2 142.4
65.6 138.0
16.0 14.9
biah
3744
151.6
3.83.6
.5
2.1
14.9
-oa.
8
3.3
10.0
4.4
=Po total 180.1
consumtice lo9.3
lklyr fixod investrant 424
Military expenditures 164
other a 12.0
i,9
214
25.0
5.8
atrnt
bisA pro
ISO ?
293,4
339.6
o
5.o
5,o
Cpti 109 .3
138.9
45.3
200.0
k 0
4,5
? rimr fixed vestment 424
'524
83.T
102.5
7.0
7,o
Military expenditures 16.1
164
14.9
1.4 *5
Other ILO
195
,6

.0
.Q.
Approved
$41.4-11-242
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ita
Approved For Release 2000/05115 : CIA-RDP79TO1049A003100010001-5
Corrections to ERA contribution to JAG, "Economic impact of Alternative
Military Forces, USSR, 1963-76"
Page 13, second paragraph:
line 10: change "4.1 percent to "4.o percent"
Page 15, first paragraph:
line 4: change "5.1 percent" to "5.0 percent"
line 5: change "5.9 percent" to "5.8 percent"
line 5: change "2.8 percent" to "2.5 percent"
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