SINO-SOVIET BLOC AID AND THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01049A002300150001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 26, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM/SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Bloc Aid and the Belgrade
Conference/CIA/RR EP 61-72/26 September 61/SECRET NOFORN
Copy
Recipient
V`1-10
ODDI
L/11-20
OCI/SIDO
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25X1A
t
22-23
St/CS-R
24-27
25X1A
OCI/IP
" 8-29
John Bullitt, Rm 3013, Treasury Department
Code 182, Ext. 5828
9.4b-32
ORR/D/S
X33-34
ORR/S t/P/C
ORR/St/PR
L-$6-37
ORR/AD
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ORR/Ch/ERA
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
26 September 1961
CIA /RR EP 6Ir72 Copy o. .,
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Bloc Aid and the Belgrade Conference
The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of
Bloc aid, if any, on the positions adopted at Belgrade by
each of the participating countries. An attempt is made to
determine if there is any correlation between the stands
taken at the conference and the nature and magnitude of the
aid being provided by the Bloc. A general discussion of
Bloc aid to the conference countries, as well as a survey
of the main issues and alignments at Belgrade, precedes the
country-by-country analyses.
Conclusions
The Belgrade conference of nonaligned countries, which
took place from 1 to 6 September, brought together heads of
state and other representatives from some 28 countries of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, including most of the
underdeveloped countries which have received Bloc edonomic
aid and all of those which have received Bloc military
assistance. With few, but significant, exceptions, there
is little or no indication in the activities at Belgrade
that Bloc aid had more than an indirect influence on the
positions taken at the conference. Political considerations
peculiar to the individual countries appear to have been
the determining factor behind the positions and alignments
among the conferees. If the Bloc aid program in its en-
tirety had any significant impact on these positions it
probably was in reinforcing the particular form of "neutral-
ism" pursued by the individual countries--the paths usually
having been chosen prior to receiving Bloc aid. In most
cases the impact of aid--whether from the Bloc or the West--
is imperceptible and sometimes a country's position was the
reverse of what might be expected if only aid is considered.
The clear-cut Communist line of Cuba, where the Bloc's
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economic and military support is essential to the mainte-
nance of the regime, can obviously be linked to the impact
of Bloc aid. Negotiations for the supply of advanced Bloc
military equipment, such as those being conducted by Iraq
and which have been completed by Indonesia, may have had an
impact on the extreme positions adopted by these countries.
However, the~:UAR, with similar negotiations under way,
showed no inclinations toward accepting a pro-Soviet po-
sition on East-West issues, and its anti-colonial stance is
not the result of Bloc aid.
For its part, the Soviet Union probably considers what-
ever support for the Communist cause it has aroused through
its aid programs as a desirable but not essential by-product
of the Bloc's efforts in the aid field. While Moscow con-
siders the aid program a vital feature in the advancement
of Communism, it has not demanded specific political quid
pro quo's in its policy of expanding economic relations with
even the most Western-oriented neutrals. For the time being
the cultivation of such neutralism serves Soviet purposes.
At times the USSR has even restrained the enthusiasm for
Communist programs in certain countries in order to calm
the fears of potential aid and trade customers in neighbor-
ing areas.
Thus, while it cannot be categorically stated that
Bloc economic and military aid has promoted either a pro-
Communist or anti-Western atmosphere in the nonaligned
nations, it is apparent that such assistance has tended to
foster the strong sense of "neutralism" already present in
these countries. We feel, therefore, that Bloc aid is a
reflection of Moscow's willingness to ride along with and
to strengthen this wave of neutralism rather than being the
immediate cause of an anti-Western or pro-Soviet attitude
on the part of these countries.
General Discussion
Twenty of the 28 participating countries at Belgrade
have received pledges totaling more than $4 billion in Bloc
economic credits and grants, or more than 96 percent of all
Bloc economic aid extended to the underdeveloped countries
since,:the program began in 1955. Eleven of the countries
have received all of the more than $2 billion in military
aid extended by the Bloc. During the same period (since
1955), the US has extended more than $5 billion in economic
and military aid to the Belgrade countries, and since 1945
US aid to these countries totals more than $9 billion for
economic and $1 billion for the military.
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With few exceptions, there is little direct correla-
tion between positions taken at the Belgrade conference
by the participating countries and the degree to which they
have become involved in Bloc economic or military assistance
programs. Political considerations appear to have been the
controlling factor behind these positions; these considera-
tions include concepts--however ill-defined or misguided--
of national interest, personal and national prestige, and
other problems or principles peculiar to individual nations.
Each leader interpreted issues and adopted positions in the
light of these considerations and tailored his own varia-
tion of nonalignment to suit these concepts.
If aid--either Western or Communist--had any impact
on the views expressed and the positions taken, it was in
reinforcing the peculiar forms of political "middle-ism,"
which generally have been chosen by the nonaligned countries
prior to receipt of Bloc aid. The more moderate of them--
such as India and Burma--are accustomed to taking positions
which they feel support neither side in the cold war, hence
should offend neither or both equally. The more rabid among
them--usually those recently freed from some form of European
domination, such as Guinea and Ghana--are accustomed to
taking anti-Western positions and to greeting each East-West
issue with an almost automatic bias, or at least suspicion,
against the Western position. This they would do regardless
of aid programs; even the more moderate Afro-Asians have
only recently overcome their traditional bias against the
West.
In some cases, particularly among the "giants" of the
conference, the impact of aid was negligible or even con-
tradictory. Yugoslavia, with little bitter experience from
Bloc aid and a prime recipient of US aid, adopted an ex-
tremely anti-Western, generally pro-Soviet position. On the
other hand, Nehru and Nasir, the former backed by both
Western and Bloc aid and the latter heavily dependent in
both the economic and. mi;.lit:y spheres on continued large-
scale Bloc aid, adopted moderate stands, urging the US. and
USSR to resolve their differences, but not siding with either.
The West African states receiving significant amounts
of aid from the Bloc tended to be more extreme on colonial-
ism and more pro-Soviet on East-West issues, while older
Asian neutrals like Nepal, Burma, and Ceylon, which have
had mixed experiences with Bloc aid, leaned toward modera-
tion. It is doubtful that Bloc aid was more than one of
many factors in arriving at these positions. Indonesia's
President Sukarno, usually billed as one of the foremost
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spokesmen for the nonaligneds
Belgrade--a course which was ' drifted far to the left at
prompted, by the extensive Bloc oaidlherhasfreceived, pot
artic-
ularly the commitments for modern weapons which are' desired
for the campaign to "recover" West New Guinea from the Dutch.
With regard to the conference itself, there were two
schools of thought on where its attention should be focused.
Those countries like India, Burma, Afghanistan, Nepal, Tun-
isia, Saudi Arabia, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Lebanon,
and Sudan sought to draw the full strength of the confer-
ence to urging the great powers without recourse to war andtoimto r pressingtthem that problems
the
nonaligned countries have a vital interest in the preser-
vation of peace. others, like Indonesia, Iraq, and to a lesser extent the UAR Morocco,, ' Mali Ghana, and the
Guinea,
Algerians, sought to focus the attention of the conference
on the traditional Afro-Asian grievances summed up in the
usual Leninist phraseology of anti-imperialism and colonial-
ism. Nehru's pre-emption of moderate leadership appears
have led Tito to attempt to take over leadership ofrthe
extremists by acting as their spokesman.
Some cduntries among the extreme
their pet anti-colonial arguments included pinothedconferVe
ence documents. The final documents reflect a compromise
in which the general appeal for peace, addressed to Moscow
and Washington, was offset by a longer document carrying
most of the anti-imperialist line, but which acknowledged
that classic colonialism is a dying issue. It took note
of only a few specific anti-colonial issues, such as
Algerian and Angolan wars, and the the
in Tunisia and Cuba. question of foreign k~a~ses
At the same time as this battle raged, another was
under way between those who felt the conference documents
should take strong substantive stands on major East-West
issues-stands which usually reflected _
least anti-Western views--andthose whopbelievvedtthe o e ence would lose its moral force and flavor if it exp essedr-
Judgements on substantive issues such as the German questi
The final conference documents also ref le question.
with a victory indicated for those led b uteh this hplit,
flexibility and not firm y Nehru who sought
All nucleartesting was opositions on East_West questions.
sumption of tests was notpcited -and the great unilateral ere
urged to resume the moratorium and disarmament negotiations.
Attention was called to the German pr, but powers were
context of an appeal to avoid the use of eforce, and Yinnathe
general statement endorsing "unity", self-determination,
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and independence for all nations. Nearly all members
agreed on the need for reorganization of the UN, but few
could accept--and some specifically condemned--the Soviet
"troika" concept for the Secretary General's office.
Those who pressed for flexibility at the conference were
India, Burma, the UAR, Saudi Arabia, the Algerian Pro-
visional Government, Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Cyprus,
Lebanon, Sudan, Cambodia, Ceylon, Nepal, and Afghanistan.
Those pressing for substantive--and usually pro-Soviet
stands--were Iraq, Cuba, Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea and
Yugoslavia.
In judging the performance of the individual countries
it should be noted that the conference had two-public images.
that conveyed by the unfettered, flamboyant speeches of the
participants as they basked in the limelight of world atten-
tion, and that conveyed by the formal conference documents,
which reflected the results of hard bargaining and the re-
quirement for unanimity. The speeches were much more spe-
cific than the documents and many were anti-Western in a sense
transcending even the usual anti-colonialist theme. In dis-
cussing the positions of the individual countries, comment
is first devoted to the public image and then to the coun-
tryr's-tactics in the bargaining behind the scenes
The following statements on each participant at the
Belgrade conference include summaries of aid received from
the Bloc and from the United States. The figures are some-
what noncomparable for the following reasons:
- Bloc aid is compared only with US aid. In several
cases, particularly for those countries formerly subject to
the United Kingdom, considerable additional Western aid has
been granted.
- US aid includes grants, loans, and credits; Bloc aid
consists almost exclusively of credits.
- US aid for the most part has been delivered or is in
the process of being delivered; the US figures, consequently,
contain relatively little in the way of future obligations.
The Bloc figures, on the other hand in several important
cases represent largely obligations for future assistance
and in most cases future obligations are a significant por-
tion of the total. .
- Bloc figures represent the total of economic develop-
ment resources available to the recipient country from the
Bloc. In several cases, non-governmental assistance from
the US and other Western sources of private capital is (or
has been) of major significance to the recipient country.
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AFGHANISTAN
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from;
Bloc since 1954 US since 1945
Economic
217
Military
110
180
TOTAL
_
3-2-7
3
Afghanistan has accepted aid from both East and
West, but the Bloc's more than $300 million ineconom-
ic and military aid is acknowledged to be of decisive
importance to ,Kabul's development and defense, and
has won a firm foothold for the Communist Bloc' in the
country. Moreover, the Afghans are currently in.pro-
cess of seeking more aid for their Second Five-Year
Plan and probably are to receive additional military
aid, including MIG-l9 aircraft. Bloc aid, along,with
Soviet propaganda support for Afghanistan in the Push-
tunistan dispute with Pakistan, could be used to argue
for Afghanistan's pressing an extremist
able to the USSR, Prime Minister Daud, however,l feallrin
with the moderates of the conference,
advocated Peiping's admission to the UN, hit colonialism,
reorganization and extended recognition tortheed for an
Provisional Government, On Germany, he deploreddlthe ian
division of the country and the use of "policies of
force" but avoided strong stands on East-West issues.
Priva.tely- he generally sided with Nehru agreeing to
forego mention of Pushtunistan in the conference docu-
ments or specific formulas for Germany, The Afghans
did., however, support Cuban insistence on a reference to
the Guantanamo naval base. B loc.aid had no demonstrable
effects on Afghanistan's position at Belgrade,
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ALGERIA
Aid, in millions of US dollars,fromo
Bloc since 1954 US since 1945
Economic Military 12+
TOTAL.
Although strongly supported by Soviet propaganda and
with limited amounts of Bloc military and financial assis-
tance, the Algerians have no particular cause for champion-
ing a pro-Soviet line on East-West matters. Prime Minister
Ben Khedda concentrated on his own struggle for Algerian in-
dependence, reaping support for his fight from all, including
specific reference to the issue in the conference documents.
He laid strong emphasis on colonialism, banning of nuclear
tests, and condemned military pacts. Privately, not much
is known, although the extent of support for Algeria in the
documents suggests strong politicking on the colonialism
issue. The limited assistance received from the Bloc does
not appear to have significantly affected the Algerian posi-
tion.
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954
US since 1945
Economic
96
95
Military
--
--
TOTAL
-96-
95
Burma has received little Soviet aid so far, but this year
accepted an $84 million credit from Communist China which
boosted it into one of the more important recipients of
Bloc aid; Rangoon has also been flirting with Bloc over-
tures for military assistance. So far, though, Bloc aid
has played a relatively minor role in the country and pro-
bably exerts little or no influence on the government's in-
ternational posture. U Nu delivered the most statesmanlike
address of the whole Belgrade conference, out-doing even
Nehru,,. on the importance of the peace issue and criticizing
anticolonialism based on. revenge ap.d racialism. Behind the
scenes, U Nu appears to have been Nehru's strongest aid in
pressing for flexibility and moderation. Bloc aid had no
apparent effect on the Burmese stand.
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CAMBODIA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954 US
Economic 56
since 1945
Military 220
TOTAL 56 78
29
An important recipient of US aid Cambodia
economic assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. also accepts
of Bloc aid at this stage The
mag`hitude
than a ge should preclude it from being more
minor factor in influencing Cambodian foreign
in fact its function at times has been to
to new aid commitments. Policy;
in-
Sihanouk stressed pthescolonialUissue,
but also hit hard on the division of Germany, Vietna
and Laos. He critiai:Zed the two "blocs f, e, Korea,
Laos and pressed for plebisites for their roles in
also argued for disarmamentcunderitheisupervision tries, neutral
governments. Privately, he appears to have beeninfthe Nehru
p, favoring flexibility in positions on East-West issues
CEYLON
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954
US since 1945
Economic
Military 58 75
-w
Ceylon has accepted aid from both East and West but
no time has been SO deeply involved With the Bloc ec"ono
cally as to at
trade are OJerpor ize its neutral Position, and ant o Mrs. tanaike called forlonanbcn dct~tthelY not Bloc aid and
in
her rs speech at Belgrade suggesting the demilitarization of
Germany and the need for negotiations between the major,
Powers. She specifically criticized the Soviet decision. to
resume nuclear testing and IVloscowls 41 ? the UN. She called for increased aid to ith up ndeodee ope
world--from both East and West--and for Chinese Communist
dmissio to the UN, the underdeveloped
admiss wni to privately she appears to have carried
littlght , but was definitely in the moderate cam
aid probably had little or no influence on this position.
c
on,
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CONGO
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954 US since 1945
Economic some 78
Military
TOTAL 78
Late arrivals at the conference, Congo leaders Adoula
and Gizenga created mixed impressions, as would be expected
from their well-known positions prior to the gathering in
Belgrade. Adoula's well-balanced, moderate speech and
his support for the UN earned kudos from the moderate camp,
while Gizenga's pre-occupation with Lumumba's ghost brought
forth some short-lived emotion.. Although Gizenga has re-
ceived some financial assistance from the Bloc, as well as
massive propaganda support, he focused on Congolese problems
and avoided pronouncements on other issues. Both..Congo
leaders arrived too late for most of the backstage activity,
but Adoula earned special praise from Nehru for his balanced
performance, while presumably Gizenga lined up with the ex-
tremists.
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CUBA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954
US since 1945
Military 1004 41
TOTAL 40 11
_3Z
Dependent on the Sino-Soviet Bloc for both its
and future development plans, for the economic well-being
of the county as present
y measured in -terms of sugar sales, and for
large-scale military assistance necessary for its s
the Castro o regime has ample survival,
the Castro regime reasons for adopting ,a strong
Bloc ova aid hSince early 1960, as the magnitude of tee
Bchoing of effort
Blas grown, so has grown Cuba"s sycophantic
Dohoins propaganda line on every world issue.
gave a straight Communist-line speech on all major
issues, urging special treatment, not of general
but of specific issues such as colonialism,
~.x.mament principles
' testing. foreign bases. "troika", dis_ '
pre.ssdd the, same anti-WesternantiPrivately,the Cubans
tained a staunchly -US sentiments , and main
tainnde? pro-Soviet posture throughout the ,con-
fee. appears to have alienated most of the
other conferees, but
other dofere s a gained mention of Guantanamo in the
.American issue rated asomelspeon the cific mention. that a Latin
,not possible to demonstrate that Cubafs o While it is
direct result of Bloc aid, aposition is the
such aid the Castro regimwit be ouldnnot begable ttotassume the
stance taken at Belgrade by Dorticos.
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Economic
Military
TOTAL
CYPRUS
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954
US since 1945
10
Cyprus was one of the five partct- enc.e that has not received Bloc aid_ialthoug at the caver-
been made-and has no reason for feeling beholden offero have
Makarios publicly condemned colonialism, ovolden to the
the erection of barriers in Berlin. Soviet tests USSR.
termination to be applied and
to He called for self-de-
many
Makarios appears to have been Gamoany as elsewhere, Privately, those moder-
ation, although he probably carried little weight.
ht.
ETHIOPIA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954
US since 1945
""y"
Mili " tary
114
124
TOTAL
4
57
1$1
Ethiopia has accepted about
aid but relatively little has beenl accomplished nundeC the
agreements and the degree of Bloc influence is rather slight.
Haile Selassie expressed strong nnaignmen for a support for the slight.
Berlin. unified Germany and for
He said classic colonialism isdafddeadrissuecinsAsi
and Africa, but touched on such issues as West Irian and
a
Bizerte. Privately,
With the Nehru he appears to have thrown his weight
withtthioeh group in favor of flexibility in East-West
and of the conference focusing on peace issues.
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GHANA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Economic
Bloc since 1954
108
US since 1945
7
Military
some
TOTAL
1084
7 ----
If there is a direct correlation between foreign aid
.and the positions taken by a country in international affairs,
it would.seem prudent for Ghana to have followed a moderate
course at the conference, as it has negotiations under way
for additional aid from both Bloc and Western sources, Ghana
has been a primary target of the Bloc's economic offensive
in Africa, While currently cultivating its existing ties
with Accra, Moscow stands ready to extend further aid if re-
quested. Although no military aid agreements are known to
have been concluded as yet, recent developments strongly
suggest the Bloc may soon be active in that field also. It
is doubtful, however, that this aid has been decisive in
determining Ghana's position in world affairs, although it
probably has had some influence. Nkrumah at Belgrade gave
a strongly anti-colonial speech, and on East-West issues
generally favored the ,Soviet line, especially on Berlin.
He stressed the need for a demilitarized Germany, for general
disarmament, and for a summit meeting between the US and
USSR. He supported a "troika" system for officials immediately
under the-UN Secretary General. Privately, he pushed for
substantive--and pro-Soviet--stands on Germany, heavy emphasis on the colonialism issue, but.splitdwith
.Nasir on criticism of Israel. Bloc aid seems to be only
one of many factors in Nkrumah's anti-Western position.
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GUINEA
Aid, in millions of US-dollars, from:
Bloc since 1.954 US since 1945
-Economic .113
Military some
I TAL 1131
Guinea, strongly bound up with the Bloc through economic
and military.aid programs, was cast with Ghana, Indonesia,
Yugoslavia, and a few.others as one of the extremist, gener-
ally pro-Soviet participants at Belgrade. Foreign-Minister
Bevogui spoke most vigorously on colonialism, and on other
questions fell in with the.Nkrumah line, both publicly and
privately. Guinea's support for the Soviet Bloc has been
evident for sometime and may well be derived in part from
its growing dependence on Bloc aid and trade. It would be
difficult to argue, however, that the aid program is the
reason for Guineas present stance in.East-West relations?
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INDIA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954
US since 1945
Economic
Military 1,000
TOTAL -- 3,072
Although India is the
aid, and the largest third largest recipie
billion is committed-- recipient of economic aid _nt of Bloc
from the it has received eve nearly is 1
West, primarily the rUS. eceived n lar er a
and accept Bloc While continuin mouses
underscores his aid offers, Nehru's gBe seek
polic performance at Belgrade
ticipant almost to y of nonalignment.
the peace issue the end, Nehru addressedr his remarks par_
states to , stressing the need his remarks to
but urge the great for the nonaligned
without cmthet powers to negotiate
the German g the conference their differences
question. to specific said the crisis stands on
West relations overshadows present crisis
felt sat to the issue of in Eastt
f man temper the violently colonialism and y others. He expressed regrtaatihe S vi he favored
to resume nuclear testing. On German to asked decision
tion of the "fact' of two he asked for recogni-
need for free aGerman states,
moeand was access
the to Berlin. but stredseh the
moderates oderns . principal architectyofhthee the
Foreign aid appears conference
indirect effect on Nhru-s to have
both East and West cen attitude, his ' at desire fret, hav an
tribute to his have
s to be sharply India may tribe , shar c
ply critical l o
of
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.INDONESIA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954 US since 1945
Economic 6004- 583
Military 830 ?
TOTAL 1, 43 0 583+
The second largest recipient of Bloc economic and mil-
itary aid, Indonesia in all probability has been influenced
by this support in adopting more favorable positions to the
USSR, not only at Belgrade, but.at other times as well. With
more than $60.0 million in economic aid extended by the Bloc,
for use in key areas of the country's Eight-Year development
plan, and with the three military services in process of
receiving some $600 million in military equipment and train-
ing from the Bloc, the Indonesians are in a poor position
to incur the wrath of Moscow. They may feel a need to
balance Soviet largess with pro-Soviet gestures, but often
these appear to be little more than manifestations of
President Sukarno's peculiar brand of neutralism. Moscow
has shown an ususual willingness to meet Indonesian requests
for military equipment on favorable terms--including guided
missiles and military aircraft, such as MIG-19s, MI.G-21s
and TU-16 bombers, all of which are still of prime im-
portance in the Soviet arsenal. The Indonesians are also
grateful for the Bloc's all-out support for their claims to
Dutch New Guinea. A conference sponsor at Belgrade,, Sukarno
naively declared in his major speech that the most important
source of world tensions is not the ideological clash between
two great power groups, but rather the continuation of colonial.-
ism; thereafter he hammerdd away on a similar theme. On
Germany, he urged a solution on the basis of "realities,"'
and said that if a "temporary" division of Germany is
necessary, then so be it. On the UN, he stressed the need
for reorganization to take account of the increasing in-
fluence of the neutrals. He omitted all reference to the
Soviet test resumption, and merely voiced support for general
disarmament. Privately, he appears to have been with.the
violent anticolonialists, especially the Africans, but was
persuaded. to omit mention of West New Guinea from the documents.
While the cause-and-effect relationship is more subtle than
.elaborated here, Bloc aid and the Communist support of
Indonesian national goals probably have had significant
effects on Indonesia's position between East and West.
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IRAQ
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954
US since 1945
Economic
Mi
216
21
litary
240+
46
TOTAL
.
6,~-
Iraq has received more than $45.0 million in Bloc econom-
ic and military aid since the revolution in the summer of
1958 brought Qasim to power. Prior to the revolt, Iraq re.-
ceived aid exclusively from the West, but the Bloc has taken
over almost completely and is carrying out a wide range of
projects in all key sectors of the economy. Moreover, the
Iraqis are currently engaged in seeking additional military
aid from the Bloc, probably including guided missiles, more
aircraft, and probably more land armaments. These delicate
negotiations may have exerted some influence onIraq's position
at the conference, although Baghdad's leftist approach was
manifest long before Belgrade. Iragi.Foriegn.Minister Jawad,
however, appears to have outdone himself, turning in what
Ambassador Kennan termed an "amazing performance," Both
publicly and privately he followed the Communist line,
heavily on anti-colonialism, and repeatedly denounced, played
Western positions while apologizing for those of the
Communist Bloc, He called for the recognition of two German-
ies and for general and complete disarmament, without
mentioning the Soviet resumption of testing. He denounced
Western economic assistance as a cover for "neo-coloni.alism
and generally favored a strong acceptance of Soviet positions
on East-West issues. Although not one of the leading
lights, Iraq strongly supported the extremist
.publicly and privately. Bloc.aid has gexup, both
significant influence on Iraqi probably exerted a
policies.
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LEBANON
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from;
Bl
Economic
Military
oc since 1954
US since 1945
81
TOTAL
9
Lebanon has received no aid
Prime Minister Salam took a from the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
stressing
stressing the sof moderate position at Belgrade,
Israel survival u a the remnants of colonialism and
Citing "center of imperialist infection"
reorgaing tionthroughout take Asia and account i.ca. the East-West issues, new called for On
he expressed dismay at members. to
announcement on the eve of the conferencethe Soviet teat
to have been in the Nehru camp Salam appears
behind for Nasir's views as well.
the scenes with some
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MALI
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954
US since 1945
Economic 57
Military 3
TOTAL.
Mali has accepted substantial Bloc aid this year and
at the time of the conference was engaged inworkin ou
aid agreement with Communist China, g t an
ment has begun to a Bloc military equip-
i ities as that the Communist foothold in West Africa will
include a substantial program for
Mali
the
country welcomes Western assistance as,well. tAt Bel
however, president I{eita played e role his two African neighbors -_ a more moderate role than grade)
fication
and neutra.izationGforaallddivided `countries He urged uni-
Germany, but said the conference should not side
with either in_
UN and a sraEas
t or West. He urged reorganization of the
for
carried little weightplalthaur1vat~lyA he appears to have
relative mildness in although there are indications his
the scenes. Bloc aidpmayihavelhal o in his
ddsomerinfluenceoon behind
Malirs
Position, but less than might have been expected. on ita'
Position at Belgrade., however) th ., s
the Mali delegation's more exremistas a sharply-with wath
preparatory sessions in Cairo.
performance at the
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Aid,. in millions of US dollars, .,from:
Bloc since 1954
US since 1945
Economic
308
Military
5
TOTAL
308
A recipient of some Soviet military aid, Morocco's
position at the conference reflected no significant pro-
Soviet leanings. King Hassan hit hard at colonialism,
especially on Mauritania, but was more moderate on East-West
issues: He vigorously condemned French nuclear tests in the
Sahara, and noted that the Soviet test announcement "un-
fortunately" occured just at the time when first steps to-
ward disarmament were expected. On Germany, he spoke of the
need for the nonaligned nations to mediate between the two
great powers. Privately, Hassan's activity is subject to
conflicting reporting, but he appears to have vacillated be-
tween supporting the extremists on colonialism and the
moderates on East-West issues. No perceptible influence of
Bloc aid is indicated by the Moroccan stand at Belgrade.
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Bloc since 1954 US since 1945
Economic 41 44
Military
TOTAL
A recipient of roughly equal amounts of aid from the
US and the Bloc--chiefly Communist China--Nepal's King
Mahendra both privately and publicly supported flexibility
in stands on East-West relations and moderation.on other
issues. He decried attempts to change the status quo ex-
cept through negotiation, and urged the conference to work
for a relaxation of tensions rather than substantive stands
on cold war issues. While deploring the remnants of colo-
nialism, he pointed out the British example of accommodating
to new situations and regretted France's inability to learn
from the British. On the UN, Mahendra denounced the Soviet
"troika" principle, but suggested strengthening the body by
fairer representation and by the admission of Communist China.
The influence of Bloc aid on Nepal's stand apparently was
negligible.
SAUDI ARABIA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954
US since 1945
Economic
--
47
Military
--
some
TOTAL
Saudi Arabia has accepted no economic or military assis-
tance from the Bloc. Foreign Minister Suwaijil denounced
colonialism in general terms, except for strong attacks on
the French and Israelis, and on East-West issues urged the
conference to contribute something helpful to easing tensions,
warning against a bias toward either bloc. Privately he
voted with the moderates, except on the reference to Israel.
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SOMALI REPUBLIC
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954
US since 1945
Economic
58
13
Military
--
--
TOTAL
58
The Bloc has made considerable progress in developing
its economic relations with the Somali Republic, having ex-
tended nearly $60,000,000 in long-term credits this year;
additional aid probably will be forthcoming. President
Aden, however, generally sided with the conference moderates
and rejected taking substantive stands for one side or.' the
other. He spoke in general terms on the German question,
urging a peaceful settlement. He supported a strong UN ex-
ecutive, praised the UN operations in the Congo, and asked
those who wish to alter the present structure of the UN or-
ganization to reconsider. He attacked Portugese and French
colonialism and declared the principle of self-d6terriination
should be applied to all colonial territories, as well as
to Germany. Privately, he appears to have been with the
moderates on most issues and showed no inclinations toward
favoring Soviet positions in East-West issues. Bloc aid
probably played no appreciable role in deciding the Somali
Republic's positions at Belgrade.
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SUDAN
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954
US since 1945
Economic
22
54
Military
__
TOTAL
22
---
Sudan, which recently accepted a $22 million Soviet
credit, avoided Positions either pro-Soviet or violently
anti-Western and generally held to the views of the
moderates. Abboud's speech was temporate and reasonable,
stressed the need for UN reorganization, for a test ban,
and for Peiping'.s admission to the UN; he omitted all
reference to Berlin or the German question. appears to have worked well with the moderatesyon
both the "flexibility" and peace issues.
tion probably was not affected by foreign aSudan?s
id.. posi-
TUNISIA
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954
US since 1945
Economic
35
Military
--
TOTAL
--3-9-
2 5
Tunisia only recently entered into its first important
aid agreement with the Bloc--a $27 million offer from the
USSR,in August--but has received well over a quarter of a
billion dollars in US economic aid.. ed,
hit French colonial policies hardest,Aandxomitted mentiionba
of Germany or Berlin. Privately, Bourguiba appears to have
been with the conference moderates on most questions, but
was said to be out of his element among the nonaligneds.
He successfully pressed for mention of Bizerte in the confer-
ence documents, While Bourgiba publicly stated his willing-
ness to accept Bloc aid during the Bizerte crisis, he is
not involved in any significant economic or military com-
mitments with the Bloc and showed no sign of favoring pro-
Soviet positions. The limited aid extended to the Bloc does
not appear to have affected the Tunisian position.
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UAR
Aid, in millions of US dollars, from:
Bloc since 1954 US since 1945
Economic Rnn
Military 700.L
TOTAL 1 W? _iiv
A sponsor of the gathering and one of its "big five"
personalities, Nasir generally focused on the anti-colonial
issue; he was anti-French, anti-Portuguese, of course anti-
Israeli, and to a degree anti-.American
in general, as well as the artificial divi~sionpofrGermany,
and he specifically condemned the Soviet resumption of
nuclear testing. Behind the scenes,
on the need for the conference to avoiVdssubstantiveastands
on East-West issues. He worked for a strong anti-colonial
statement, while giving way to only a mild reference to
Palestine. While the.UAR is the largest single recipient
of Bloc aid--more than $1.5 billion--and is currently in
process of acquiring such advanced military items as guided
missiles and high-performance aircraft from the USSR under
new military aid pacts, its positions at Belgrade, while
strongly anti-Western on colonial issues, were not pro-
Soviet in the manner of several other participants. While
Bloc aid may cause Cairo to be circumspect on East-West
issues, particularly the Berlin problem, con-
sistently disavowed those who argue he musts temper his
anti-Communism because of the economic and military support
he receives from the Bloc. His stature among the neutrals
appears to have been enhanced by his conduct at the con-
ference. Nasir, along with Nehru, is a prime example of a
nonaligned leader who continues to receive entensive aid
from the Bloc, but who continues to steer his own course
between East and West. His support significantly less than his dependence oneBloccmilitary
supplies, including modern weapons systems. His position
appears, at most, to be but indirectly affected by Bloc
aid.
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