LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE TIBETAN CAMPAIGN (43.2492)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01049A001900130001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 17, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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YICSTIOAL PROBLEM OF THE TIBETAN CAMPAIGN
1? :pril 1959
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CONTENTS
Summary and Conclusions ............................................. 1
1. Troop Strength in Tibet ............. ... ......................... 3
2. Supply Requirements for Troops Stationed in Tibet ............... 3
. Supply of Troops Stationed in Tibet by Motor Truck .............. 3
itigway Routes into Tibet .. . .. .. . . . . ... ... . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3
((1) ..are-chow - Lhasa . . ... .. .. .... . .. . .. . .. . . . ... . .. ... . ... .. 3~
(2) Lan-thou - Yuahu ........................................ 4
(3) Ya-an .? Lhasa . ... .. .. .. . . . ... . .. . . .... . . ? .... . .. .. . . . . . . 5
(11) Sinkiang - Tibet ........................................ 5
h. 'utora Affecting Road Movement ............................ 6
(1) G Basic,- Road Capacity ........ ............................ 6
(2,;7 Operational Road Capacity .......... ........ ........ ..... 6
(3) Consimption of Fuel ..................................... 6
K=. Supply of Troops in Tibet ................................... 7
(i) The Present Garrison .................................... T
(2) Increase in Size of Present Garrison .................... 7
d. Impact of Logistical Support on Railroads and on the Motor 9
(1) Railroads ................................................ 9
(2) Motor Truck Park ...........c ............................ 10
Supply of Troops Stationed in Tibet by Air..o..........o.......11
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T.OGISTICAL PROBLEM OF_--THE TIBETAN CAMPAIGN
,gummary and Conclusions
Chinese Communist ground force strength in the Tibet Military District
to currently estimated at about 60,000 men. Present supply requirements
are approximately 64 short tons per day per division of 15,000 men, or a
total of 256 tons per day for the total force. Trucks moving over the
an-chou - Lhasa road via Golmo are able to deliver 385 tons per day in
Lhasa.
If the Chinese Communists should decide to double their present
strength in Tibet to a total of 120,000 men, the Ian-chou - Lhasa road
could not be adequate as a supply route, since it can support only 90,000
troops for a sustained period (3 months or more). Logistic support for the
present force of 60,000 men could be sustained and 30,000 men could be moved
Im over a 30-day period. Following this the road would have to be used
almost exclusively to resupply the 90,000 troops in position.
The Chinese Communists have experienced great difficulty in keeping
open the Ya-an - Lhasa road, the only alternate route between China and the
Lhasa area of Tibet. If the Chinese Communists decide to reopen this road
they could probably do so within a period of 30 to 60 daysa Initially the
cavacity of this road would be about half that of the Lan-chou - Lhasa road,
so it would be able to support logistically only a force of 45,000 men.
n to Tibet over the
Three to four weeks would-be required to move 30,000 me
-road. Thus, establishment and maintenance of a force of 120,000 men in
Tibet would require t-he full capability of the Lan-chou - Lhasa road via
Golmo and the partial use of the Ya-an - Lhasa road and could not be
accomplished in less than 60 days.
It would not be possible for the Chinese Communists to support eaUy a force of 180,000 men (triple the present strength) by surface trans-
portation alone. The Ya-an - Lhasa road after initial reconstruction could
only support an additional 15,000 men for a total of 135,000 by both routes.
However, through extensive improvement and construction extending over a
4z riod of many months with some disruption to the movement of supplies over
the route, it conceivably could be so improved that its capacity would be
approximately equal to that of the Lan-chou - Lhasa road, then 180,000 men
could be supported. During this extended period of time the only possibility
for additional logistic support for forces deployed in Tibet would be through
air transportation.
Currently there are 20 Tu-4 and 40 I1-14 aircraft available to the
Chinese Communist Air Force. In addition, there are about 50 Il-14?s in the
Civil Air Fleet of Communist China. From the air base at Lan-chou, these
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aircraft could supplement the logistic support provided by road transport
to a moderate extent, possibly by as much as 128 tons per day, the require-
men.t for two divisions of 15,000 men each. If the Chinese are willing to
commit half of their combined military and civil air transport capability
to this operation, allowing for a 25-percent operational reserve, they
could probably supply a force of 35,000 men (150 tons per day) by airlift.
The tonnage required to sustain 180,0`30 troops in Tibet would not place
an undue burden on the railroad system of Communist China, since no more than
2 to 3 trains per day would be required to deliver supplies to the staging
areas. The impact on the combined civilian and military truck park of the
country would also be negligible. Sufficient trucks exist in the Tibet -
Tsinghai-Sinkiang area to handle traffic on the Lan-chou - Lhasa route,
and. enough trucks are available for use on the Ya-an - Lhasa route. The
limitation is not the number of trucks, but the capacity of the supply
roads.
The most serious vulnerability identified in this study is the limited
capacity of the supply routes. The southern route from Ya-an to Lhasa is
closed at present and would require a military campaign plus a period of
reconstruction before it could be used. The northern route from Lan-chou
Is of limited capacity at best, and is subject to interdiction at several
points between Golmo and Lhasa. Only a concentrated effort by the Chinese
at keeping the road open will permit a sustained flow of supplies to Tibet.
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1. Troop Strength in Tibet.
Chinese Communist ground force strength in the Tibet Military
District is now estimated at approximately 60,000 troops. Thus, logistic
support has to be provided for the equivalent of 4 divisions at 85 percent
strength. Consideration will also be given in this report to the logisti-
cal situation if this number of troops were to be doubled or tripled.
20 Supply Re cements for Troops Stationed in Tibet.
It has been estimated that it would take 38.55 short tons* per day
to supply a Chinese infantry division of 15,000 troops on garrison duty in
Tibet. This would be increased to 147 tons per day for a full combat opera-
tion. For a situation sut?h as exists at present (garrison duty plus limited
?combat or "mopping up" type operations) an additional 25 tons per day of POL
would be required over and above the supplies necessary for a garrison type
of operation. Thus, present requirements are approximately 64 tons per day
per division of 15,000 troops, or a total of 256 tons per day for the
60,000 troops estimated to be in Tibet at the present time. If the number
of troops were increased to 120,000 or to 180.,000, the supply requirement
would increase correspondingly to 512 or 768 tons per day.
30 Supply of T_?oopc Stationed in Tibet by Motor Truck,
a.. Highway Routes into Tibet.
For purposes of logistical support, three alternate highways
lead into Tibet. One of these is operational at present, one could be
wAde operational in approximately 30-60 days, and the other is of no
practical use in the present situation. An additional route extends to the
Tibet border but is of no value in providing support for troops operating
in the Lhasa area. The four highways are listed below in order of their
present importance:
(1) Lan-thou - Lhasa.
The, only land supply route of logistical importance leading
into Lhasa at present is the Lan-chou - Lhasa highway. This route is about
1,400 miles from the railhead at Lan-chou in Kansu province to Lhasa. The
Chinese Communists give the eastern terminal of the road as Hsi-Wing, about
100 miles vest of Lan-chou, thus reducing the total length to about 1,300
miles from Hsi-ring to Lhasa. From Hsi-wing the route passes through
Huang-yuan, Ch?a-k'a and Pa-lung to Golmo (Ka-erh-mu). This portion of
the route is limited all-weather, approximately 26 feet in width. An
alternate route from Golmo leads north to a railhead on the Trans-Sinkiang
Railroad at Hsia-tung in western Kansu province. The distance from the
railhead and characteristics of this road make it very comparable to the
Tonnages are given in short tons throughout this report except where
otherwise indicated.
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Lan-chou - Golmo portion of the route. It is believed at this time that the
Hsia-tung to Golmo route is being used primarily for traffic to and from the
Tsaidam oil basin and that the Lan-chou - Golmo highway is the principal
logistical. route. Because of these alternate routes leading into Golmo,
the critical section of the road is that portion from Golmo to Lhasa.
From Golmo to the Tang Pass (on the Tsinghai-Tibet border)
the road is limited all-weather, approximately 15-30 feet in width. A
section of the road from this point to the Tang-hstung airfield is fair
weather, about 12-15 feet wide, with the remainder of the route limited
all-weather from the airfield to Lhasa.
The surface of the route from Lan-chou to Lhasa is assumed
to be in fair to good condition with surfacing of gravel, crushed rock, or
improved earth. This route was hastily constructed and opened to traffic
in 1954. Since that time constant improvements have been made with the
Chinese claiming that the entire route has been widened to 32.8 feet. It
is doubtful that this standard has been reached. Most bridges along the
route are less than 100 feet in length, characteristically of timber con-
struction, and load capacity of 8 tons although some small streams are
probably still forded. There are no known tunnels on the route. The
sections of this route most susceptible to interdiction appear to be the
bridges (those crossing dry streams could probably be easily forded), passes,
and the section from Nagchhu Dzong (Hsi-ho) to Yang-pa-Being.
Central and southern Tsinghai is an extremely barren, high,
desolate plateau. Although this area is generally free of difficult passes
and mountains, ravines, and deeply entrenched streams, the high elevations
(the plateau at about 15,000 feet and mountains rising to 20,000 feet)
coupled with intense cold, frozen soil, and severe gales have greatly handi-
capped motor truck operation. Operating efficiency is cut down by altitude,
radiators boil at low temperature, and fuel consumption is very high.
(2) Lan-chou - Yuehu.
This route begins at Lan-chou, follows the Lan-chou - Lhasa
route west through Hsi-ning to Huang-yuaa, and then travels southwest to
Yushu. The portion of this route from Huang-yuan to Yushu is fair-weather
of unknown width. A caravan route of questionable motorability leads west
from Yushu to meet the Lan-chou - Lhasa route between Tang Pass and
Nagchhu Bzong. The Yushu road could be used to transport supplies to the
garrison at Chamdo. However, it is of no significance in supporting general
operations in Tibet proper.
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(3) Ya-an - Lhasa.
This highway is approximately 1,400 miles long extending
from Ya-an to Lhasa. Ya-an is connected by road to the railhead at Ch"-eng-tu,
100 miles to the northeast. The route to the west passes through Tatsienlu
(yang-.tie g), Kan'tzu, T1e'ko, Chamdo (Ch?ang-tu) and TVai-chao on its way
to Lhasa. From Ya-an to Chamdo (a distance of about 620 miles) this route is
limited all-weather, about 15-30 feet in width. From Chamdo to Lhasa the
road is fair-weather and about 15 feet in width.
Construction of this difficult route began in 1950 and was
completed in December of 1954. Three major mountain ranges and four large
rivers had to be crossed. The Chinese Communists have experienced great
difficulty in keeping this route open, especially the section west of Chamdo
where extensive repairs were necessary after the road was opened in 1954.
In addition to natural causes, this portion of the road has been frequently
damaged or blocked by dissident groups. It is probable that the Chamdo to
Mass, section of the road has been inoperable for some time and that exten-
sive repairs would be necessary to reopen this portion of the road as a
logistical supply route.
in alternate route (243 miles long) extending vest from
Tungolo (a short distance west of Tatsienlu).via Batang to Patang (south of
Chamdo) may have been completed. This route is fair-weather of unknown
'width. It is possible that a small section of the road between Batang and
Ningching is still in very poor condition and that additional work would
be necessary if this section were to be used as a major supply route. In
any event, operation of this route for a supply route into Tibet is dependent
upon the opening of the section of the road from Chamdo to Lhasa.
A route west from Chamdo to intersect the Lan-chou - Lhasa
route near Nagehhu Dzong is currently under construction. The route may
have been completed as a fair-weather route as far as Dinching. The uncom-
pleted section from Dinching to Nagchhu Dzong eliminates this as a supply
route at pre sent.
(4) Sinkiang - Tibet .
A fourth route, of no practical logistical importance, is
the Sinkiang-Tibet highway route. The route extends from Kashgar (Klo-ship)
in Sinkiang to Gartok in extreme viestern Tibet. This portion of the road
is considered to be fair-weather with the exact width unknown. From Gartok
two routes of limited motorability extend to 7hikatse and Nagchhu Dzong.
The route from Gartok to Nagchhu Dzong, a point on the Lan-chou - Lhasa
route, is thought to be little more than a course marked across the plateau
and of no logistical value. Although motor vehicles may have been operated
between Gartok and 7..hi.katse, this route is of limited motorability and of no
logistical value. A section of road from Gartok running southeast to
Taklakhar ban been completed.
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b. Rectors Affecting Road Movement.
(1) Basic Road Capacity.
The basic capacity of a road is expressed as the number
of vehicles per hour each way that the road is physically capable of sup-
porting over a period of 3 months. In arriving at a capacity figure the
following factors are considered: road construction; width; condition;
grades, curves and bottlenecks; and effects of weather. The basic capa-
city is applicable during daylight hours and under fair weather conditions.
It has to be reduced if operations take place at night or during bad
weather. If essential road maintenance is neglected, the basic road
capacity may be increased by 50 to 100 percent for a short period not
exceeding 7 days.
(2) O~eratonaLVRoad C~paci~t.
The standard vehicle for purposes of assessing convoy
performance and densities in Communist China is the 3-ton truck. The
average load carried by a vehicle is assumed to be 3 tons. This allows
for use of 3/4-ton, 1 1/2-ton, 6-ton, and 10-ton trucks, as well as for
local overloading. If it is necessary to use a road at its basic capacity
over a period of time, allowance must be made for road maintenance, admin-
istrative traffic, and other operating factors. For planning purposes, it
is estimated that 10 hours per day is the maximum time that a road can be
used for supply operations. This allows 9 to 1.2 hours a day for road
maintenance which is normal for China and Southeast Asia, 2 to 4 hours
for administrative traffic, including supply of personnel permanently
stationed along the road, and several hours for such operating factors
as realignment of convoy spacing and vehicle breakdowns. Additional
allowance would have to be made if civilian or operational military
traffic were also using the'supply route.
(3) Consuiaion of Fuel.
In assessing the amount of tonnage which can be delivered
to a point, an allowance has to be made for consumption of fuel along the
route. For this purpose the route should be divided into stages the length
of which will vary with the type of road and the terrain. Normally, a
distance of about 100 miles per stage should be assumed. The consumption
of fuel per stage is estimated to be about 5 percent of the total tonnage
available at the beginning of each stage, starting with the second stage.
Fuel for the first stage would be available from base supplies and would
not be part of the basic load.
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ipp of 2'roos in Tibet.
(i) The Present Garrison.
it is assumed that the base used by the Chinese
Communists to supply their troops in Tibet is located at Lan-thou in
nsu Province. Supplies presumably arrive at Lan-thou primarily by
railroad over the Lung-Hai or Pao-t-ou - Lan-chou lines. From Lan-thou
they move by truck via Hsi-ning and Golmo to Lhasa from which they Lre
distributed to individual units by locE,2_ means of transportation. It is
estimated that the basic capacity of the Lan-thou to Lhasa road is 25
trucks per hour in each direction. This estimate takes into consider-
ation such factors as the moisture content of the soil, conditions of
the road surface, the terrain, and the width of the road. If the road
is used for a maximum of 10 hours per day, the daily capacity is 250
trucks moving in each direction.
If, as is estimated the Chinese Communists are capable
of doing, 250 trucks are loaded each day in Lan-thou with an average
load of 3 tons, it is possible for the Chinese to dispatch 750 tons
daily from their supply base. The distance from Ian-chru to Lhasa is
approximately 1,400 miles. Although the Chinese have reportedly been
able to drive this distance in about 11 days, for purposes of a sus-
tained military movement of the kind under discussion here, it is
assumed that the trip would take 14 days. Thus the total distance
would be broken into 14+ stages of 100 miles per stage. Assuming fuel
consumption of 5 percent of the total tonnage available at the beginning
of each stage (except the first stage), the original 750 tons would
dwindle to 385 tons by the time the trucks reached Lhasa. The 5 percent
figure contains an allowance for fuel consumption on the return trip,
so the maximum effective load delivered in the Lhasa area would be
approximately 380 to 390 tons each day. This amount of tonnage would
be about 50 percent above the 256 ton daily requirement of the estimated
60,000 troops currently stationed in Tibet. Thus, under present con-
ditions, the Chinese should have no trouble supplying their troop
strength in the area entirely by road.
(2) Increase in Size of Present Garrison.
if the Chinese Communists should double their present
estimated troop strength in Tibet to 120 .000,their estimated daily sup-
ply requirement would be 512 tons. This is about 33 percent above the
daily capability of the Lan-thou - Lhasa road of 385 tons. The tonnage
requirement for 120,000 troops could be delivered for a short period of
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time, perhaps a week or two, but could not be sustained indefinitely.
Therefore, without use of the southern route from Y&-an to Lhasa, it
is estimated that no more than 90,000 troops could be supported in
the Lhasa area by road under present conditions. If the present Tibet
garrison were tripled (180,000 troops), it would be necessary to open
the southern route or place reliance excessively on an air lift. The
problems associated with an air lift are discussed below.
if the Chinese move additional troops from Lan-chou
or Golmo to Lhasa, there will be some interference with the supply
operation currently underway while the operational traffic is on the
road. However, there appears to be enough of a cushion between the
256 tons per day required by the troops currently in Tibet, and the
basic capability of the road of 385 tons per day delivered at Lhasa,
to allow for the simultaneous movement of supply traffic and operational
traffic. Once the new troops reach a total of about 90,000 the entire
capacity of the road would have to be used for resupply. Under those
circumstances there would be little or no capacity available for
civilian or operational military traffic.
The movement of 30,000 additional troops to Lhasa
under sent__conditions would take about a month if the staging area
were in L n--chou. Ah~iut two-thirds of the daily capacity of the road
(165 trucks) is used to supply the 60,000 troops presently in position
in Tibet. This would leave a capacity of 85 trucks per day to be used
by the new units moving into position. If each infantry division of
15,000 men moved on its organic transportation it would take about 5.3
days to get all elements of the division on the road. Leading elements
of the division would begin to arrive in Lhasa in 14 days. By the
middle of the 19th day the entire division would be in the area. The
next division would begin to arrive on the 19th day and would complete
its movement on the 24th day. These calculations do not take into
consideration the resupply problems of the first elements to arrive
which would complicate the movement of the last division. Thus, it is
estimated that it would take at least a month and possibly somewhat
longer to move 30,000 men to Tibet by truck under present conditions.
Once these troops were in position the entire capacity of the highway
would have to be used for resupply. If the Chinese should decide to
move 30,000 troops to Lhasa in excess of the 90,000 troops which can
realistically be supplied by the Lein-chou - Lhasa road, they may be
able to do so on a crash basis. Such action, however, would probably
result in such severe damage to the road that it would not be able to
support logistically the troops in Tibet.
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L, o,`vder to move realistically the remaining 30fi0O0
troops into Tibet, and supply a total of 120,,0O0 troops by road, the
a uther