MEASURES TO FURTHER THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01049A000900030003-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 23, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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a.
YIWt3 TO URTiF2
'MT OF SOVIET 101J: CULTURE
Cakirtit I1).34,5
IL.c.71.ZI
IN.411
This material conns information affecting the
national defense of the Lri el within the
meaning of the c 3, USC, Secs.
793 and 794, tr.:1,1,sr.ii,sien or revelation of
which in any manner to an unauthorized person is
prohibited hy law,
23 September 1953
TEAL INTIILIOLNCE AGM!
or, ee of liatiaAreh and Reports
SECRET
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SECURITY D1FORMATIOK
Xcasures to Further the Development of Soviet Agriculture
Foreword
On September 7, 1953, the ?antral Comittee of the ;,,PSU made public a series
of measures Cor raising the output of the a?yiculture of the USS4 On the surface
it might appear that the Kremlin has changed its polioi toward producers of
aaltural com-looLties. that a careful reading indicates that there has been no
material ohaa:e in the fundanental policies of .he I;(avurnment to control the
economy 9f the USSR. Certain concessions have been made to obtain the temporary
cooperation of the collective farm workers O!arin the interim required to make
the cadres of the goverment owned and operated Machine-Tractor Statins and not
the collective farmers themeelves, the decisive foroe in aricu1taral production.
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? The keynote of the Decisionson Agriculture passed by the CPSU on September
7, 1953 is found in the following statement.
utihen collective farms beecrie BIG DIVUSLAiW Tib11PRI
MIXHIME-T7- ''1 ST?icNS bece the Da. TIE FORDS 114 AGRICUL4
both must be strengthened with skilled personnel."
The collective farm system serviced by the Machine-Tractor Stations had failed
to come up to the expectations oft)* Kremlin at the outbreak of World War II. The
average standard of living th.roughrnt the Soviet Union was lower than that enjoyed
under the Tzar's regime immediately precedingWorld War I. The position of the
collective farm system as a source of food or the non-farm popelation and materials
for industry worsened during the war. Although the. United States supplied meat
n "the
products equivalent to the ration of
lion men .under axrns, fats and oils
neatly equivalent to the quantity processed by theikood ' try of the USSR,
and although we shipped to Russia 80 percent of our production of lump
millions of town dwellers and factory voxtera
hl to a
even sufficient
bread to meet subsistence requirements. Thus, they were forced to cultivate private
garden plots to get potatoes, cabbage, cucumbers, and other vegetables to eke out
their inadequate food supply. The Soviets were unable to furnish sufficient seed
for these gardens and the United States, under Lend Lease, shipped tons of seed to
salvage the situation
Throughout the period 1945 throug
lost ground and to i
re
agric
1949, the Kremlin made every
regain
I production o the level required to supply
the needs of the increasing population. The problem was not only one of produetion
but, more than that, one of procurement of breadgrainl potatoes, meat, fats and oils,
SEC RE)
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and other products tor dttribition to rxon-producers, and to afford s plis with
-
oh to implement economic devel
The government sue
trus fruit. They actiathj did
down the a
milk butter
or less in the c
itie1. policies abroad.
es 0
ton, ax', tea, and
the acreages at and rye by
of barley, oats corn. They
to bolster up meat,
egg supplies by ?cing peasent households to sell their privately
owned cattle, sheep, hogs, and chickens to the oolleotivized fare econany leaving
some 40 odd percent of the households without cattle.
best, the production
of animal products by the colloqtivi2ed herds was not proportionate to the increase
in nunbers.
Potato production fell off sharply because th collective feem householde were
more interested in prothicing potatoes and vegtab1es on their own private garden
plots for sale on the open market than to work int:entvLy on the co zed
fields, which eompeted with then on these same markets.
Without going further tnto detail as to courses, the prodection and particularly
the procuxemen _situation was unsatisfactory for t.e oar umption year]. July 1949
through 30 June 1950. The controls set up during the war to regulate the collective
farm system had got o
?
The morale of the co ective ouseholders,
who had had hopes that the whole system of
was low and incentive to work on the collet
on was about to be abandoned,
To facilitate the o nt of f product nd to strew its control
over the collective farm households, the K lin in 1950 rescinded the charter
guaraateeing to each collective tari that its boundaries were inviolate and took
drastic stejx toward conso1idting 254,000 farms into aLi big ant rprises
94.000 as of 1953! It went further than
it and
stops toward conceutrting,
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the cone
households of their ancestrial private plota.
? Unrest was created e oeaady dissatisfied over the lose
ot their privately owned livestock. The plan of the agroorod had temporarily to
be abandoned.
The government, indeed, h
these were poorly managed. Only 2,1O0 collective farm chairmen had higher cul-
tural education and 14,200 had inter= eci The 1iscipLthe of
94,000 big collective farm enterprises but
? educat
Collective farm workers vas at low ebb, gVert the operations of the govornnont owned
Machine-Tractor Stations were unsatisfactory, The overwhelming majority of directors,
chief engineers, and chief agronomists of MTS had no higher educat:Lon, mTS ranted
to the collectives its tractor
fficiently by the all too poorly ti'
ned
her machines which were operated
co" ctive farm workers themselves.
There vas little improvement in the general situation during 1951 end 1952.
conditionshat increased the produation of certain
Although favorable
of the field crops, the animal industry situation was bad with the prospect
worse. Against ihis background the decisions effecting azricultuxe that were passed
by the cm on September 7, 1953 were made.
The 940ao "big diversified enterprises" und
farms" have been pronounced to be the Soviet base
the population and rail/materials for
temporary guise of "collective
duction of foodstuffs for
e The operation of these big farming
enterprises is to be under the contra of the Machine4ractor Stations nider t
following mandates from MSS,
a) Increase yields of craps;
b) To secure an increase in the crxuorily owned herds of livestock with a
simultaneous rise in productivity;
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C) Must ompletemechanization of field crop production;
d) To augment the total output and the output for market of farm
and livestock products in the collective fares they serve;
) To extend the mechanization of labor consuming processes in animal
husbandry as well as in the production of potatoes and vegetables;
f) To introduce into collective farm production the achievements of
science and foremost practices;
g) To insure the further organisational and economic conuolidation of
collective farms;
b) To improve the materi4 well being of the collective farmers.
There were 8,950 Machine-Tractor
in 1953 or one station to about 10
of the big farming enterprises which with its present setup is spreading the control
too thinly to do an effective job. If MTS are to be the decisive force in agricultural
productions their numbers and staffs must be increased.
During 1954 and 1955 e
6,500 engineers are to be sent, to MS from industry
and techateal institutions to become directors and other higher personnel. 0 the
spring of 1954 100,000 agrononists and aootschnitiiins are to be attached to the
staff of
tor Stations. Tractor drivers, head
of
tr -tor teams and
their assistants, as well as combine and excavator operators and their assistants,
record keepers and mechanics o be employed as permanent cadres to perform the
actual work of making MTS the decisive force in the Agricultural production of the
USSR. Zn addition to the permanent cadres, assistant combine operators and attendants
of power drawn agricultural and ditch digging machines are to be enployed on a
seasonal basis. The Kremlin itself foresees that ander this plan it will take 1Crom
six months to a year or even longer to teach aman to operate power machinery. After
being taught the mechanics, it requires two or more years of practical experience in
the field to
The present plan
ofictent in the art of farming 4th power machinery.
tal force in Soviet riculture can have
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or no effect on the prodaction of 1954 and probably will have little effect
0111955 and possibly-even of 1956.
As presently organized ?thelachine-Tractor Stations ere big State Enterprises
which do about three-fourths of all agricultural work in th colleotive farms".
Between 1954 through14ay 1, 1957, not less than 500,000 general purpose tractors -
in ter= of 15 HP - and 250,000 tractor cultivatore as well as the necessary euentity
of agricultural machines, motor vehio1s, mobile re air shops& conainzs for oil
products and other equipment are to be sant to MTS. The goveeement can& in all
probability, supply MT$ With thie additional equipment. All of this added power will
not materially aff
duet
hieh t present is lore than 90 percent
mechanised. The tractor cultivators are designed to take aver the altivation of
row crops which at present arc largely hand hoed or worked with horse drawn implements.
Potatoes on collective farms are to be mechanized 40 to 65 puroort in 1957 and BO
to 90
?ent in 1955. Between raw cultivation arevegetables is to be eechanized 70
percent in 1954 and 80 to 90 percent in 1955, Mechanization will not necessarily
increase yields but '411 greatly reduce the dependence of the State on the collective
fare households to perform this work. Jr cutting& now done largely with scythes or
horee drawn mowers, is to be 80 percent mechanized by 1955; eilaging, 75 percent;
lifting root fodder, 90 pat cont; while gathering and stacking straw is to be mechanized
70 per
by 1955* It is probable that the government can put enough tractors etc.
into the field to effect these increases in mechanization but the qiiaLity of the work
will leave MMK*1 to be desired. Nevertheless& it is obvioue that Vie extension of
mechanization in farm operations willmake the State Lncxeaaing1y independent or the
collective farm households*
It is interesting that with the e eeption of the rather opt1miia reao1ition of
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CPSU to expand potato acreage by 4,128,500 hectares and vegetables by 1,300,400
hectares in 19514 little is said about acreages. It appears that in increasing
production, great reliance is to be placed on increasing yields through better breeds,
better and mechanized techniques, and the use of more mineral fe
The Soviet Chemical industry is to provide by the end of 1959, plants with a
capacity of 164 to 17.5 million metric tons of fertilizers annually. By the end
at 1964 this capacity is tooe increased to between 28 to 30 million tons. It is
the opinion of the Chemicals Branch of Xateriela Division that some expansion in
fertilizer facilities will take place, but that it is highly unlikely that it will
approach the magnitude of the expansion envisioned by PU. In 1952, MA estimated
the fertilizer production of the USSR at 4,070,000 metric tons of which about 30
percent was applied to cotton; 25 percent to eugarbeets; 11 percent to flax; 4 percent
to potatoes and we
et es. and 30 percent to a' variety of industrial crops or
specialized cultures. No significant quantity
f'cummercial fertilizer was applied
to grain. It is possible in the futere, if a considerable expansion in the production
of caumarcial-fertillzers takes place, that grain may be fertilised. There is at
present, however, no basis for appraising the extent to Ihien the USSR can realize
its expectations in the production of fertilizer or the direction its utilization will
take.
Under Stalin the collective farm household with its private garden plot and its
privately owned livestock was at variance with a gover
K:Lici. econmy.
The use of pressure to weaken the position of the household economy had not produced
the desired results of forcing the peasants to work harder in the coiectivized
econogr. The government requires time to build up its on productive force and cannot
disregard the present work potential of the households.,
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Until the time CMOS when collective farms are,in fact, SIG DIURSIFIO
VA FOR(S IN AORICULe
ON, the State will need the productive labor force of the collective
arm household not only on the socialized fields and with
ts and herds of
the collective economy, but also on his private garden plot and with his own privately
owuad live
The plenum of the Central Conitteo of he CPSU, therefore, reiterates the
right of the collective farm household to retain "its srnll peraon4 plot to satisfy
its "nsumer needs ehioh cannot be satisfied completely by the communal economy'.
They forbade "the practice of infringing the interests of collective taniers with
regard to liveatocic in hair private possession". They reduced the norms of required
deliverisa by both the co
In some i.netances, deliveries of Livestock
writte
d the collective tarm households.
relinquished and arrears
? They increased prices paid for requ4red deliver
,..r1 surpluses.
They otter bonuses, make advance payments, and have reduced taxes.have
increased the avail abili
of consumer goods.
All these measures are designed as incentives to stimulate the collective farm
household to perform more and better werk to create an ups
in production, not only
on the socialised fields of the communal econcrty but on the private household garden
plot as well. They further,offer
ance in t
facilitate the profitable disposal of any surpl
and the collective farm households may produce.
The collective farmworker will probably be stimulated, He responded to the
applied to induce hire to grew cotton., sugar beets, tea, and citrus fruit.
organization of markets to
that the collscttve farm economy
The degree to which he responds to etirailetion c
W
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predicted at this time.
StOL
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It is probable, however, that whatever increase in production raw take place during
the.nezt year or two, more to the activities of the collective farm
household than to the vitalization of the peeeanent rewires of the MTS. But in the
I.
merit pressure, the permenent cadres will become more and more of a
4cisie force in agriculturepleaving to the collective farm household the is?
important tskain field crop production and a
This apparently sudden concern of the Kremlin over lagging agricultural Prodection
la not an indication of weakness within the present ruling circles of the Soviet Union.
Tbe agricultural problem
rious since 1928 and has recently b come worse.
There could be no better time to inaugurate what appear to be new measures" then at
the begiuning of the new administration, The leading personalities in the new
/Administration are much t1, e as those who formulated the policies in the old
adeinistret on and we believe there has been no funaenental change in these policies.
ie'
If the vazpu ie
abo
the basic Countst policy that ba3 been in
lain greatly strengthen
tor the past 35 6D6 and
result in the...CROY achieving complete control of the USSR seemly.
The government will gradually through
r control of psast uarketa
and eliminate them as a source of income. Houeehold economy will be weakened and
the peasanta themselves will become more and more dependent upon the collectivized
economy which will aooner or later pay wages in cash.. The collective farms themselves
will becomes in fact, BIG AGRI
=MP' .ES whoUy operated by the State. The
agrogorod inhabited by a rural. proletariate will beoome a re 'ty. The achievement of
this goal will unincumber the Kremlin from the cert ties
resent e
S.
nee
of a rural capitalistic class and leave the Soviet rulers free to more vig?1thn
ever to prosecute their struggle with the non-Commenist world,
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production to meat the rettairements of the increasing population cannot
4rummrett at this time, Some of the measur
lathe right direction. T
re
to and steps
however, will depend to a large extent
: ,upon the ability of the local party units and others in control to understand the
. multitude of problems that continuously arise. Heretofore, party organizatio , as
as NT$, have tbrongh lack of derstanding, frequently interfered with the efforts
of agronomists, veterinarians, and engineers to solve agricultural problems.
The solution of the food and raw material production problems or the Soviet
Union would increase its war potenti
ofier a real danger for the free World.
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