TRENDS IN ECONOMIC POLICY OF USSR SINCE 1945

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 180
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 24, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
On file DOC release instructions apply.
BEST COPY
Available
'JGffo:T s OL 01k
State Dept. review completed. On file Dept. of Commerce release instructions apply.
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 S-$-C R-E-T
Approved r ReleacP 90(MIfl4T2d'- T.I71-RfP79T0,104
04 00,14QQQ.17
25X1
25X1
OF T &iwE 3.945
CIA/RR IP-342 (WP)
(O RR Project 0.12)
This document is a working paper and is intended for
the use of the addressee alone, and not for further
dissemination, The data and conclusions contained
herein are provisional and subject to revision. This
document has not been edited or released for pub-
lication. It may not be quoted without permission
of the originating office.
This material contains information affecting the
national defense of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission, or revelation of,
which in any manner to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
24 August 1953
CENTRAL INThILIGZNCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
25X1
State Dept. review completed. On file Dept. of Commerce release instructions apply.
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04
P.,79T01049A000800140001-7
25X1
CCI RR QUEST
Economic Aggregates
A. This question should be rephrased as follows: how can the growth of Soviet
gross national product since 1945 be explained in terms of the principal economic
determinants?
It is not possible to single out a particular determinant and quantativel.y
determine what percentage of economic growth was occasioned bM that particular variable.
The interaction of one variable upon another precludes the possit ility of measuring the
effect of any single determinant in isolation. However, a rough notion of the contribut
of the principal determinants to growth can be gained by analyzing their behavior in the
relevant time period.
Statistics on changes in the composition and size of the USSR labor force are
available in Appendix S to CIA/RR 23 "The Economy, of the Soviet Bloc: Production Trends
aid Potential-t" pages 56, 59-60. Statistics on investments can be found in RAND
RM-7351 f; it,, -1 Investments in the Soviet Union. 19 -1 1" by Norman Kaplan, page 195.
Rudimentary productivity estimates are available in CIA/RR lP-333, "ORR Contribution
Lo
Factor Affecting Bloc Capabilities Through 4d--1955, page 18.
fi.ecussion of the principal factors responsible for postwar Soviet economic
growth may be found in CIA/ER-23, 22.ait. s pages 3-5.. No data is available concerning the
contributions of foreign capital and labor to postwar expansion.
What effect do the following Soviet statistical procedures exert on the
calculation of gross national product?
In the past the use of 1926/27 prices has tended to inflate gross national
product estimates, as the fastest growing industries have been valued at higher price
Approved For Release 20.Qwm#m
E1IA-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
MIMI
 Approved For Release 201 0 QU T0104 000800140001-7
levels than those which have grown more slowl;r.
umably the 1952 price base used
in the rifth Five Year plan should eliminate this source of distortion. If the 1952
prices are used for more than a five year period, distorting elements will appear again.
The inclusion of turnover taxes in the price structure -Noes tend to inflate the absolute
CAP figure. The degree of inflation over t
art with the average rate of taxation.
The omission of services from soviet methodology also contributes to Inflation Of the C;-64P
growth rate, as the slowly growing personal and welfare service activities are excluded.
comprehensive discussions of the deficiencies in Soviet national income
accounting can be found in articles by academic scholars. The beat work has been done by
Abram Bergson in the
1950, pages 10-1-1
journalof Econ_.,, o es for May 1950, Pages 20B-24l and
Another critical discussion of Soviet national income
methodology appears in Gregory 4ro8smafats article in the volume edited by Professor
Berge
; et
comments by Bergson,
h. pages 123.. Grossman's article is followed by info ti
.
x' .rider Oereahenkron, and WWassily Leontief,
is the relationship between the prospective increase in GNP and the growth
of economic potential for war?
^3 nce war supporting economic capabilities are mainly based on industrial potential
the answer to the question hinges upon the relative expansion of GNP and industrial
production. In industrialised nations the expansion of industry tends to exceed that of
gross national product in those years in which there is net growth. In the USSR the
tendency for industrial e=ansion to exceed that of the economy as a whole has been
particularly marked. Therefore, a given expansion in gross national product will lead
to a proportionately greater increase in economic war supporting potential.
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: T01 049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/24:
0494P00800140001-7
No precise estimate can be made as to the increase in economic war potential
ambiguous definition of the term is provided. one such estimate appears in
23, op-4t.., pages 14 and 15. A more so istocated treatment of the problem will
eareh project 13.2, Munitions Pry Ca abilities of the USSR,, now
f preparation.
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: TO11049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release
25X1
D. To that extent will physical and geographic factors limit in the long run the
growth of the Soviet ecanomy? When , if at all, will these factors begin to have a
serious effect?
(MMples of such factors are: disposition of resources, requiring long freight hauls;
location of resources in areas difficult to reach and difficult to live in; availability
of arable land; climate; direction of flow of rivers, etc,)
25X1
Approved For Release 2003
 Approved For R&ease 2003/04/24 ' CIA-RDP79TO1049AO00800140001-7
SECRET
0. Introduction
physical or geographic limitation of the growth of the Soviet economy or any other
large national economy must always be to some extent a matter of conjecture. Growth
limits may only be postulated in terms of some projected rate of growth for the
economy. Extremely rapid rates of economic growth tend to tax resources limits somewhat
more rapidly than slow growth rates, However, extremely rapid growth rates tend to
xpand the resource base
faster rate than do slow rates of growth. Recognition
of the elasticity of a resource base is fundamental to any analysis of economic growth.
Resources are n i,utable, they vary in scope and availability with variation in the
culture and technolo~xy of the society which occupies the land area. ralopment of a
fission process creates an entirely new pattern of resources, one which did not exist
for the society prior to this development. Development of an electrolytic refining
process sets off a hunt for aluminum ores bauxite which previously were so many waste
deposits on the face of the earth, 1/ An economy develops a pattern of wants and at
technological framework within which goods and services are produced. Vs limits of
such production are more a function of the pattern of wants and techniques than they
are a function of the physical resource base of any particular motet,
nts in a Planned Totalitarian Economy
fYf YMnl~YI .I M
The want pattern of a planned totalitarian economy such as the USSR is created by
the planning agency which administers the economy. Certain basic requirements of the
are parameters for the planning group. How these requirements are met may be
determined in major part by the planners, and the people are then conditioned by
advertisement or directive of the planners to consume a particular package of goods and
services. The capital equipment required for producers of consumption goods is
determined by the planning authority in liason with production managers. The basic
industry requirements are fashioned in tots of capital needed to meet some overall
state objective. In general the want patterns are spelled out by the planning agents
for the satisfaction of specified major objectives of the totalitarian state,
The primary objective of the totalitarian state has been the consolidation of the
state's authority. The Soviet union views itself as a worker's state so that one of
overriding objectives has been the creation of a large scale industrial economy
in which the workers would constitute the dominant political force. A second basic
objective of the Soviet Union has been the development of a military force at least
capable of the defense of the Union and possibly strong enough to support a program
of aggression designed to enlist a consecutively increasing portion of the world within
~4T
Approved For Releatt tiiD
P79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved For $elease 2
#.
DP79T0104 000800140001-7
the orbit of the 3oviet eeysteen. Each of these objectives establish a want pattern
which requires the development of a broad base of heavy industry and a complex system
,.chine production. Production of consumer goods, other than those required to
support the population at some mini mm decency standard, is relegated to a time when
the above objectives have been achieved.
Te hnolo,icaal Pattern
A stipulated level of technological competence must be present before production
to satisfy the went pattern can be carried out. The wanted modern industrial and
armaments production required an intensively trained highly skilled labor force back-
stopped by a super-skilled corps of pure scientists and production engineers. Russia
inaugurated its program of modern Industrialization with a relatively small reservoir
industrial and scientific skills. The first claim upon Russia's training facilities
has been the expansion of training in scientific and technical studies. Numborwisee, 'Russia
has turned out a larger volume of technically and scientifically trained personnel in
recent years than any other natin in the world, There has been some dispute abut the
quality of the product of the schools but no dispute of the interest of the Russians
in this training or the quantity of persons being trained. Political training,
inculcation of the national ideology, is carried on concurrently with all training.
There have been several manifestations of the effectiveness of this training in areas
in which it has been possible to observe the product of Soviet technology. Foreign
personnel have been employed wherever available to facilitate the training of personnel.
German science and industrial skill was hired until 1941 and impresses thereafter into
,he U SR program for expansion of industrial and scientific training and capability.
Nowhere has Russian scientific effort been as highly concentrated as in the area
dealing with resource exploration and development. Large teams of scientists are
organised on a continuous basis and are dispatvhed to some highly restricted area to
explore and record in great detail the resurce pattern and resource potential of the
area. N Intensive exploration of the resource base had extended to less than fifty
of the USSR by 1939. It may be assumed that the job Is less than complete at
t although its precise status is not known.
The USSR has devoted and probably will continue to devote a large portion of its
training and research activity to resource development and to the development of new
production functions many of which would Involve substitution of readily available
aommo'iities for oom-a ities -which are not ra;idily available.
Approved For Release 2 RDPhT01049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 20
T01049A000800140001-7
?It.,tin&,-_X!t.ur_al Forces
The USSR includes within its boundaries more than sixteen percent of the ice-
free land mass of the earth, an area about equal to the entire continent of North
rica, touch of this vast area cannot be exploited under current technology. Large
areas of the country yield an insignificant, perhaps even a negative product to
nation as a whole.
Lute, natural vegetation and soils available in the soviet Union run the
of known natural forces outside of the tropical rain forest. Every esub--
tropical, temperate and arctic type of clizatee, vegetation and soil is represented in
the USSR, The varied natural conditions make possible a wide range of growing conditions
and a wide range of agricultural and forest outputs, all. within the confines of a single
Although climatic variations create a wide range of possible outputs, the severity
of the continental climate creates a vast waste land in Soviet Asia. Long, severely
cold winters create an area of permanent ground frost (permafrost) equal to 10,000,000
square kilometers
vigorous
ut 47 percent of the total land area of the USSR. Despite
develop this area, settlement is largely confined to prison camps,
.peer and mining camas and weather stations, In recent years some industrial and
tural activity has been introduced in the far north, but it is thou ht that
production costs are extremely high relative to the value of outputs. Russian conquest
of this vast northland remains one of the fervent dreams of the Soviet Union and receives
:h priority for funds, equipment and personnel in each of the long term plans.
poste continental in magnitude has very limited access to the ocean.
Russia has orJ y two or three ice free ocean ports althoughshee has limited access
oceans via the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and via the Baltic Sea. Russia has an
extensive coastline an the Arctic Ocean: but this waterway is available for call limited
periods of time during the Arctic ewumer.
An extensive system of inland waterways is available to the U . R. The lakes and
of the 'uro.pean north offer connections with Moscow and the southern system of
rivers and inland seas. Asiatic Russia has a number of major rivers but the rivers
courses flow from south to north emptying into the Arctic Ocean except for the Amur
which empties into the Tartareki Proliv. All of these waterway systems are subject to
frozen harbors for varying periods of the year, and to variations in water levels as
Approved For Rele
DP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1046A000800140001-7
SECRET
'usirial u, rca
has one of the largest and most varied industrial resource bases in
the world. tateemonts of reserves of Industrial minerals and energy resources are
of limited value because of their highly tentative nature. significant areas of
the USSR have been subject to only cursory geologic and hydrographie exploration.
United States experience has indicated that estimates of reserves are highly traunsient,
particularly is this proposition accurate in the relatively early stages of resources
exploration..
The vast area of the USSR, almost 1/6 of the ice free earth, renders this resource
base less effective than
would appear at first glance. Hundreds of miles, in some
oases thousands of miles separate principal centers of production of raw materials,
'acturing locations and the major European markets in which the final
Eucts will be consumed. In most instances these great distances must be overcome
by overland transportation. Only in the Donbas do all of the components of the iron
and steel industry lie in adjacent areas ands at the same time, near the major
industrial areas of the country.
The t : R lacks sifficient industrial resources to achieve internal or even 31
Products of the tropical rain forest are not prod.uceed in any quantity.
Production in most of the nonferrous metals and complex machinery items is less than
quirements and these items are imported from the Bloc and the West to meet
ant requirements. Deposits of nonferrous metals are available but the deposits
are limited and the technology required to exploit these products seems incompletely
developed. 'Most of the nonferrous metal production is carried on in Siberia and the
tar east at considerable distance from principal industrial consuming areas,
The energy resources of the USSR at present are small compared to the potential
sources. Again the principal potential energy resources are in the eastern
regions rather than in the west. Transfer of coal and oil to the principal industrial
areas involves expensive rail halls although development of the Volga-Don canal may
have the effect of reducing then transport cost from the Don and Caucasus areas.
The agrioniltural resources o , USSf are probabl:> the most diverse of any
nation in the world. Varied climates and soils make possible the production of all
crops and animals except those indigenous to the humid tropics. Intensive research
and development of major grain, fiber and tree crops has expanded the tolerances of
many of these crops. Substantial efforts are being made to expand acreages in the dry
teppe by tree plantings to reduce the evaporation effect of southeast winds during the
summer.
Approved For Release. 20i -RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Rele a 2003104/2SE I
01049AO00800140001-7
Increased efforts to control stream flow in European Russia will yield some by-
product water for irrigation. Additional water supplies will site possible increased
yields in this area but little in the way of additional cultivated land. Control of
stream flow in Central Asia will have the affect of significantly increasing the
acreage of Cultivated land and the acreage which may be devoted to cotton and
subtropical fruit and vegetables.
Animal production in the USSR will continue to be relatively small on any
to basis. Efforts to expand pasture land have met with little success and grain
Production has not sufficiently exceeded cereal demands to permit a larger scale
production of animals.
ricuitural production of the USSR faces the traditional national problem of
vast distances. Principal specialty producing; regions are on the periphery of the
country, Thus products from those areas must move long distances to the central
consuming areas in European Russia, Substantial efforts have been made to develop
regional self-sufficiency in food grains and potatoes. These efforts should lead to
some relief from transport expense but they tend also to reduce the potential agricultural
output of the country,
The principal physical or geographic limit upon the Russian economy seems to be the
very magnitude of its physical extension. The nation is Continental in its land
ion. R'aintenance of present levels of expansion of the Russian economy over a
long period appears to a contingent upon a large scale expamion of the transport
system and an increase in the intensity of development of Western Siberia. If Russia
were able to construct and maintain a highly flexible, low cost transport system and to
maintain Current rates of technological advance, contemplated rates of economic growth
1952-57 could be 'maintained for a period of at least fifty years and positive rates of
economic rowth could be expected for the indefinite future. If technological
developments which would allow economic exploitation of the north Siberian lowlands were
to develop from Current research, it should be possible to maintain Current rates of
economic growth for a period of 100.200 yea
SECRET,
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 A. 1. Mgat 1ni? bas '60' MOMS iasstssss$s is the Rohm teas of the
? ..: Approved. Foy:` e a 3/0 19P7f 040 W90600 1400M-7 off"
1!=SS1 This t?pto is 517!4 is so" detail ii CIA */ft 32,1953- The
folk ins series eviNWIS" WIND U40,41
OeUsrtive Fars
3lssaaade
Yorkers sad 3*1e7e9s
Thesaer-da
1947
32.400
32, 200
1948
52.000
33.400
1949
51,000
35.400
1950
50,000
3?,200
1951
49,000
39,200
1952
48,000
40,800
1953
48.000
41,875
A. 2. What have been the sources of those iacressntst The ea4
source of postwar increaent has been from a popalatioa increase Of "out,
I_,, million per year 1947--?19j2, rising to about 3 million per tear 1952 to
1957. Daring tea war the labor force was augaseated by drawing in large
numbers of womro and g nsiag M. Iaimediatel7 afterward Gerson civilians
were imported. The proportion of vosen emp1e7ed is stable or slitttl7 deelia-
tng and most M and foreign iatisaals have been retnr'*d.
D. 1. Conflict bstsoos sgriasttnr* sat iadustr7t Joe. indicated since
the popv3etien lasrease has bees softicieat to sspply the industrial needs
with oa17 a modest tosses s is srisaftfe. There are still over 6 times
as arm7 esllsetive tumors is the UM sr the amber etplo7ed in 'agriculture
in the Ua etiss ?is aORlwltsrl s^f1gasat has probably been aoMessated
tr sechsnisatiea Ut $Wrs?.t prastisis.
3. 2. 1" the U sWsaetea is ins ttlastrial labor force handicapped
Approved For Release 2q
25X1
!yi? i~ ~t~ )
 actca,7. p"oaita iet!
y V i D a l t + " a l aelyaasIa L o u re hsmidiemmrped lW
preb,b3 ^toh enders.ploymest as form,
C. 1. sifts in fra304-ge Dssi1spments in vocational training may be beet
r 1tamate sad .h riact. Of `MA lead th 1 sbsrtags of labor. There is still.
characterised set as a shift but as extension and intensification of the prewar
trends. Cf CIA RR/PS 16 1952 for detailed discussion.
C 2. Shifts In labor allocation. In addition to the shift from farms
shown Im A 1 t:.wre h.;e brel a continuing es hasie on axi9;zizir em 1-~.Trent I
the pT,sjuc - ~.;o,ts segment= 3ni et amitLa men 't.~ot In the pr3ay drunkenmess, absenteeism. labor turnover, sabotage, eta.
5. Higration. has ; cbntinuing interest in tigration patterns. The
n 1'lced m.igr&tion of population within the Soviet Union appears to coz. In+ e
pr,w$r policies as does the geogr ph.ic migration of Iab r Cf CIA RR/PR I~
.Rurther imfort tion is required to measure the sw,.Qn.:uie Cr a!.
7ton
mart riccurat*iy. an..: to pinpoint focal areas of iazrease.
SECRET .
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 SECRET
-Approved For Reuse 2003/04/24 :CIA7RDP79T01049AD800140001-7
25X1
of
ice of
atis
:946) e d its f to a ed bar the newly
d sat a1 Reeexrr`ea. tae two Miatrie
060 of the
,iatrl of Ft,te
Core: of People's a
is bei
tics a.
equips nt
the Mprem e
defense system
be used only when necessary
of the cc t 7 B defense.
peed "ration f03
Vi below#
plant warehouse. Theo* stocks axe under the sole
nd
VI afireI
V
the aprat of the C
Approved For ReleasI003/01. bR4ZDP79T01049A000800140001-7
SECRET
State JReae r was to AVP27 the o e
of 19
 Approved For Release 2003/04ggIA-RDP79T010494p00800140001-7
25X1
ct .s : h as
k of the =td b s
h ease'!,,
these Item al
lent for Cont
of .teri .
its cmm roses
kit In mifitent
of I to 12 iont)w
of eseh, t "
ice: for
st
and is in effect at, the
sc ers of war re
it 949 d
ub quen
each O-Wr
oso , it is i cnoeivr
'cam in the United Step s .
In
tid aiM a" re-
for a
s where
U1 stools of copper
ave been additious
or p-rtr? or both.
f r pros
td and z i"
d. not bexud
Approved For Release 2003/0412A- 1RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
i'y vies
 Approved For e ease 200 QKeIA-RDP79T01049 900800140001-7
10 to 15 Pon
3.0 15
up oodd be sub t fly x
j a7 1953,
4 for iooressd out pat of cOUMMM" Oft OWWtIng t* over
b Ilion ru
of the onvinged u' pl ' can
3.d Wica
not I
no
axe e$t:1t
year to year and as the stocks
r dipp
i of c ,,
icm to Andice-te ozy witha l from stooks
Approved For Release 2003/04/2 P79T01049A000800140001-7
 SECRET
Approved For Releasf 2003104124: -
0449A000800140001-7
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
25X1
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2003/04/ : ITDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
W
4?1. Nw
. t:~ %i h4..:. ~w SL+ t ?i. f3 Ci'rW] z S.TI. c'...:; d :.'y,.'G::
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
b
u4
...-i. -y?.w
25X1
 Approved For Release 2/4.A-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
0
Union during t.? pmt- mar period
gas were
57
re due
bD that t
daily
5.2
azd fram '
9.i two
nre
last q'
duritle the 70
in tows of d nib an
w bet trn inb~stxt*o and plants and &I"
it is logical to affeum
t point
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/0479T01049A000800140001-7
toh prcdad
 Approved For Release 20$34,,~-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
stockpiled
mviption and am* plants in
had
at acite and e
the e r immtba in the Volga "glen
a zarr
not atom satisfactorily. The r. no are that brom l
t with loss of moist an wuh of the coal easily
are never sufficient to
last more
v*ek or lees a others mould havc
A be szbbect
win, of the owl yr dt d
The e l ion is that stocks fluctuate considerably during the year,
.on oxe dependent a a
dttf icfi r in a short time if there. was interruption in
probable that these songs receive Wority and
is diverted to them frm co
large a
of lower p.o*. A Vol
a deplored there is noth
tool either at, the plants or
latter do not even exist in
as
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003 2 DP79T01049A000800140001-7
piles w
!;; p Aa .ber of
$1
u, ich in =W cams voWnside.rable time la , h:.woven., in the inmplcricn+a.:,
ti.: n of this system in certain c:ountries,, COCOM countries have recently
a greed to make more extensive use oof this system, and are propa.rink to
exchange lists of export licenses issued against import certificates (ICs)a
The ICDV scheme has been extended to certain Far Eastern over. seas t rr:i,,
t >ries and further o tonsir'n of the system is currently under discus Lien
in CCCOM, In Hong Kong a more comprehensive system of eaduse guarantees
ken-.wn as Essential Supplies Certificates was introduced as early as
January
1
-14-
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved Folklease 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T0104,,r000800140001-7
2A Other Controls
a, Fransshi.pncnt Controls
The I JS' and Canada have instituted a system of transshipment licensing
for goods of all kinds destined for Communist C' i.na, North Korea, ?ong
Kong and Macao, The UK has a similar transshipment licensing system but
uses a less comprehensive list which covers in effect arm and munitions,
all goods 6n international List ., a few on it/l_i, all metal. working
machine tools and rubber, as theso are considered by the iii to i?e of
major strategic .inpor tance to Communist C' ina. The 'JKK tr.'nssh _prie nt
control applies to goods on the transshipment list when in transit,
whether or not on a through bill of lading, landed on the quay side or
transferred from one vessel . to another in the UK but not to goods in
transit which remain on beard a vessel even when they -.re reco lsi.r ned
to a new destination,, There arc no tra.nsshipmont controls ap; lied 111_
Hong hang although legal powers to con -,rol. transshipment cargo exist to
be arplied at the discretion of the Kong long Govcrnaacnt,
To date, Belgium and TD .o Netherlands, ::hose ports traditionally have
served as major transit points in Western Enropc,~ have not adopted trans-
shipment li_censin,r. All COCOPi countries., however, have agreed that
transshipment controls are necessary, and they are at present engaged in
working out the details of such controls
Financial and Transaction Cortrols
Under regulations issued 17 ccembor 1950, the UC Gover rurir.nt prohib-
ited all trade and financial. transactions i ivolvinqct the Ch:i,ncse Communist
and North Korean regimes and their nationals by persons subject to this
jurisdiction of the 'J^, excepit with the prior approval of the Treasury
Dep^.rtrient. To ma kke these regulations effective all Chinese Codmu:.rist
and North Korean assets in L ho US were frozen and provisions wire; Trade for
.1.5-
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved FohRelease 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T0104gpt000800140001-7
remittances to those areas only on a licensed basis, This action lies
resulted in an embargo of US imports from Communist China and North Korea,
except for certain purchases of strategic commodities specifically
authorized by the US Government prior to early May 1952,
The US Government also instituted controls during 1952 over the
import from Hong Kong, Macao, Japan, Formosa, and other areas, of Chinese
type merchandise and permitted their import only when they could be proved
to be of non--Chinese Communist origin, The authorities in Hong Kong.,
Japan, Formosa and South Korea have cooperated in these controls by the
issue of special certificates of origin in accordance with procedures
agreed upon with the US Goverzuneat, The US is the only country which
has applied such controls against Communist China,
The UK does not apply transaction controls at present but has
indicated a willingness to adopt such controls in the UK only and that
conditionally upon agroern3nt of all other COGOM countries to institute
simultaneously effective transaction and transshipment controls,
c,, Transport Conols
The security export control programs have also covered certain aspects
of the shipping field, Sales of ships to the Soviet Bloc by C000M
countries have been placed under control as items on the export control
lists, On 27 October 1952; COCOM countries banned the export to
Communist China of all watercraft (ships and boats) and their important
components, Except for the denial of important components, there is no
uniform control. over the repair and servicing of Chinese Communist
vessels in OOCOM countries?
The US prohibits its oil companies from bunkering vessels carrying
strategic cargoes to Far East Communist ports and. Macao; or stratogta
cargoes destined for, these areas even though the vessel itself does not
call at such ports,, Although petroleum products are on IL/I, neither
the US nor the UK prohibits their oil companies from supplying bunkers
to vessels carrying nonstrategic; cargoes to Communist China, In each
case where bunkers are requested of a US company, the burden of proof as
to the strategic character of the cargo rests with the oil company, unless
it seeks prior advice of consular officials.
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
S -E..0 ._R.-E .,T
 Approved FoR'elease 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T010000800140001-7
Until recently' British companies continued to honor bunkering
contracts for vessels of Soviet flag, Since the beginning of 1953,
however, the UK Government has taken steps to tighten up the operation
of its policy to deny bunkers where possible to ships cart Jring strategic
Communist
goods to/China.' and a new set of instructions was brought into use on
30 April 1,053 covering bunkering requests for port, East of and including
Port Saida Under there instructions the British oil companies must
refer to the UK Government ever,- request for the supply of bunkers to
C'c: nunist
ships sailing to/China if they are of Soviet Bloc registry or sailing
from Soviet Bloc ports" In such cases the request will be refused*.
Co. unist
Bunkering requests for other ships sailing to/China and not subject to
voyage: licensing, are referred to the UK Government for guidance where
time permits,, and will be refused' or acceptances cancelled', if V,ere
is available information that they are carrying a significant quantity
of strategic cargo. In any case where a request has been refused, it
is open to the owners or charterers to ;produce evidence that the cargo
is non-strategic, and if this is done to the satisfaction of the
government' bunkers may be su;plieda similar system of control applies
to the supply of marine lubricants and bunker coal..
Where ships believed to be carrying strategic cargo ask or are
expected to ask British oil companies for bunkers in ports not under
British control, the local government will be asked not to countermand
any instructions given by the UK Government to the company' but in the
last resort the final decision rests with the local govcr. rnientQ
In Hong Kong a system of bunkering controls has been in operation
since mid-1951 whereby the three major oil companies refuse bunker oil
and lubricants to any vessel' whether ocean-going or junk, unless
specifically exempted or in possession of a government permit or
other authorization stipulating the exact amount of petroleum products
that may be purchased,
S-E--C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 Approved Forease 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T010454,pfb0800140001-7
C-E-C- F-E-T
The French Government refused in December 1952, to renew the
contract held by T?!ory Bros e to bunker Polish vessels at Djibouti., on
26 March 1953 the French Government announced that it would institute
controls to deny bunkers to vessels carrying strategic cargo to Communist
China,
On 15 April 1953, the U3 instructed its oil companies and their
foreign branches and subsidiaries to refuse bunkers to any vessel
returning from Far East Communist ports and Macao unless it can be
proved that the vessel carried solely non-stragic cargo to these
areas on its outbound voyage. They were further instructed to.deny
bunkers to any vessel returning; from any Far East ports, ;rhere there
is cause to believe that the vessel was refused bunkers on its outbound
voyage, In the case of the UK, however, :briti.sh oil companies are free
to bunker on the re turn voyage ships that have carried strategic cargo
to Communist China.
US and Costa i.ca formally control (and in practice prohibit)
chartering of their flag vessels for trade with the Soviet Bloc, In
addition the US prohibits i_ts flag vessels from calling at ports under
the control of Corm uni;st Cld.na* Liberia exercises controls over
cargoes that can be carried by its flag vessels to the Blocs The
Mutual Security Agency now inserts a clause in its chart orp4rtics for
movement of cargoes to Formosa which stipulates that vessels will not
engage in trade with Communist China or any other Soviet Ploc de,sti-
nation for a period of 60 days after discharge of cargo in Forrosar
The MS4% now also inserts a restrictive clause in its chdu t
d greatly in the postwar period and in doing so it
new workers, fre !iently peasants. Furtherp technology- h
much improved thus making possible an increase in labor productivity and creating
problems, The entire period since the war can be considered a pe
great effort to increase norms of work. The So
haet given much publicity
Two plants Moscow - ZIS and Moskvich.
k, Novosibirsk, Kutaisi, neperpetrovaks Ulyanovsk,
Lvov, Irkutsk, Odessa,
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04 ff 2r 79T010494,00800140001-7
achieved by faster machining,, improved methods, mods
orte of the individual workers and their
increase norms, especially by I
nt
trend to
%ical i7rovenente and workers innovates
tiona may be expected to continue indefinitely in the motor vehicle industry
recognizes the
ance of proper ,y setting both
A wages and recognizes that these two factors together are the most
important lever for raising labor efficiency.
c. in march 1948, Minister Akopov called for an increase
efficiency of at least 17.5 percent during 1948. This may be considered an
indication of the desired increase in labor norms
is not an unreal aspiration in view of the quantities of inex erienced labor
ion of the industry depended,
ex of the Annual Vol of Production c the Principal Produota
"use estimates are quoted from RIE>90
contribution), 25X1
Approved For Release 2003ION2Ael
 SbCRET
It. coy
Trucks
Passenger
Tractors
Approved For Release 2003/ /24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
need)
Thousands of Vehiel
1915 1946 1917 1948 1949 1 1951 1952
118 1136 209 2 72 353 390 410
1.1 1.14
4 8.4 20 29 36 40
7.6 13 27 56 86 146 116 121
rgence from plan goals for 1950 are shown below:
Plan Actual (estimated)
Trucks 435sODO 353.000
Passenger cars 65,000 21,000
Tractors 112,,000 106,000
The MaJor Causes of Annual Increases in Production.
The annual increases in production since 1915 have not been :vainly due
to new plant construction. Actaally the major production at this time
(65% of tract~ora and 75% of the motor vehicles) is carried. out in the )rewar
plants.
the largest single cause of annual increases has been the
technological imp:
in the manufacturing process,, e.g., the installation
of more highly productive ec ,cipmerit in existing plants. The increasing
skill of labor reflected in a reduction of zoduction rejects has been another
large factor. The older prewar plants have been expanded soy what and this ex-
of
passion plus the construction/new postwar plants accounts for some of the annual
production increases.
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 SERE
Approved For Release 2003/4/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
creases in Prodstctivi M and Labor force in the
Yes in Mlw L1
945
These estimates of the size of the labor force have not been
attempted and the analyst cannot devote sufficient time to such a large
project at this time,
that productivity has greatly increased and that the
oa the training of labor and the instaUation
saving.
d thee Cause7
countered in F .1fi:l
The fourth five ye.aar plan for the production of
d, At least one plant, Novosibirsk,
not been mentioned in the Soviet press since
This
.
d to produce 350,000 diesel powered trucks, per year by 1950.
vehicle plants at Ulyanovsk, Kutaisi, Dniepropetrovsk and Minsk have
slow in coming into production. In fact there is not yet a
to prove that 1 utaisi and Ihiepropetrovsk are producing complete
shout the help o
The new tractor plantS at L.ipetak and Mi
were slow in putting t',ieir
xroduction. The existing plants at Rubtsovsk, Vladimir and
Chelyabinsk were slow in increasing their output the postwar period and
h criticized in the press,.
plants have come closer to fulfilling, the five year plan goals than have the
or vehicle plants.
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: (jI P79T01049A000800140001-7
 11
Approved For Release 2003/04i- P79T01049A000800140001-7
In March 19148., a conference of the executives of the 11istry of the
?ehicle a rd Tractor industry took place in I oscow. The conference
mod up the results of the first two years of the fourth
be unsatisfactory. A.A. Akopov3 minis
plan in spite of the
(a) Short
two years of the fiv
4d begnnino
in output and loss incurred in the co
(b) The output o
plan and
n 19148
products in 1949 must be increased by at
o 70% in comparison to 1948. This means that in 1949 at least 80-85%
ned the following steps which must be taken in order to fulfill the five year
be in operation if the five year plan is to
fulfilled.
cued. to completing plants which are
already in the process of construction.
ar models must pre?omi.nate in production.
) A vital problem is to accarate housing construction to correspond
noreasing plant capacity. This is c
fulfillment of the 1949 plan and the five year plan.
(e) Orders for new equipment must be fully juetifiedj equipment on
hand must be strictly controlled and r equipment must be placed in operation
Moreover, the motor vehicle factories must build more of th
own equipment particularly the specialized types of forging, castings s hin4
an :d materials handling -machinery.
(f) Labor productivity and quality o
hip must be sharply
d. Waste and scrap reductions, especially in the foundry? can go far toward
increasing revenues.
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2003/0 ) I DP79T01049A000800140001-7
it therefore appears that in the beginning of 1948 a crisis was recognized
regard to the fulfillment of the fourth
vehicle industry.. This crisis was caused by f4 l
,1nd old plant extensions on so
use existing equipment of fi ciently# failure to raise labor
workers brought into new industrial aareas* fdlure. to equip the existing
productivity and workmanship qualit a ft lure to introduce the new models into
ion, and failure to achieve steady rhythmic production at the planned
The importance of stead rhythmical output should be emphasized. The
major plants de end on specialty subcontractors for co,
Noginak Fuel Apparatus Plant supplies Diesel fuel apparatus to the Lipetsk
Tractor Plant and in accord
each month. The
and ship,
This prac
apparatus, thu
Pting steady rhythmic production in that plant.
Moginak was s victim of the name problem* receiving evaential materials
in the last ten days of each month. In fact, there Is a vicious circle of last
minute fulfillment throughout all, soviet Induatrr from the extraction of ore
to the delivery of the finished major product to the constr.
gine
the place is to ship
plant owing
d most of it
output in the last
d quantity
ducti?on,
of the month.
caused tractors to pile up in the yard at Ligetsk away, ting fuel
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
-,'It E
 "It
Approved For Release 2003/:1 lDP79T01042J 000800140001-7
Since plays do not provide for reserves, i'
goals of the fifth five 9
bly lines to shut dorn for lack of some component or other. The success-
-ritica3
ht director is the one who is able to acgaire an illegal reserve of
nts in order to absorb the fluctuation of his suppli..ers' ship ing
Jule and thus achieve a steady rhythm of production in his own plant*
h F ve3_ o
lan-!?eali
The fifth five year plan require that 19% more tractors
vehicles be produced in 9955 than were produced in 1950, These modest increases
are realizable and can be accomplished. without any extension to the Postwar
expansion program which was to
been completed during the fourth five year plan.
ompletion and equipping of the presently unfinished plants together with
nt of the 19% goals.
iris yactors which will Slow the Growth of Indust .
It appears from a study o
plan that the
ecelerating at the present time. The nei.niae satisfactory
ae that sire which
vehicles and tractors to
allow annual production of e
see the national parka* at the sar rate as
increase in national requirements for these parks (taking into account both the
incre.nta to the par's and the replacement of worn out ve
Me' tern 5ark? refers to the number of vehicles and tractors in we.
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
SEX RET
 Approved For Release 2003/04/2 4 cIIg--RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
asee in production in the postwar period
have been necessary because the industry
negligible rate of
deficit In the natiorwl park. Now (3253)
that a high rate of production has been eatabliaheda compared-to 19b5,
;ual increases in production should be sufficient.
Approved For Release 200,, WIC,-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 Approved For R. ease +' - T010498000800140001-7
:O3
jv-
O o x3
but i=ftetjon target for
4,000 I
Al prWwtion of muhine n o1 d
eblwi o.
,k btt1d n :i "' S i h ' t iy converted
t 4 3OL-Cs plan
74. ,ow
of
d op
Ci i 11
25X1
Approved For Release 2003v'RE1T-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Relea
aivival of dim
on of 18 -.w!iLr4 tool 8j,
A possib
n of mom typos*
Approved For Release Wwrr CIA-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Felea m 14/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049000800140001-7
.1410
F tiame that of
117,5104
15,
o that
Approved For Release 200CIRE1~-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved For
79T01049"00800140001-7
aca4raoUm. a A.
L&I
ab
a Ch tool imhurtry,
ionic last ,
p *ton .
"i# of p
oroudzatLm
Approved For Releass i/ 4 : CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 Approved Fo
mdels M *xWommit a. 3
9T0104SL000800140001-7
of output,
on the lzftr form
A t mg it *an be aammd that Isker g '- vi Increased
t 1 d,
1 i t
vri*.iciw P.111.1
uaLtae
I'l
1952 at least Zve O vmore
Approved For Release 2 / 'f E: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 Approved
prise
tM axv
o r t 3 * n e x t # o .Ky
1952, ~Mth e ourmut
t ews It I
7,
e '
Approved For Release 200 -RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
SE- C E
25X1
L Pt0
A' X A
1,,i
, 1#400
96
1947
la7, 8
50
10
103.5
1948
5902M
24
19
70,500
19
20
78,E
23
102
3zi
81,bOO
16
03.5
19.52
83,82
II
100.5
, heavy and p La1 +pux rose machine tool
Approved For Release 200 ` gf lEI -RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 20 MUST. CIA-RDP79T0104"000800140001-7
plants rota nsd the
machinery before the end of t? war
45 and 1946- In 1948
roduction of the 3c agKc 1tura1 machines
version back to =rations some plants. This conversion by no .means
just befo
aced producing manitiO'
entire -productive facilities are not so engaged, Numerous p
a complete c on ersri:on.
effort in the firs
aces,
I LTR MLKE
a .culttral h a
ms. There was as
,anversi
at part,
a ix
mobiUsed
ion did
elati ly
a.3..ne tools iraw
mechanization
ca in 1952. Co bd.
Ion decreased for the first t
out 23 percent from 1951. `. s 4
of a change
plans, since plan products o;
only 1,,0, a than the 1950 plan of 60*000
192
94000 units or 9
of plan.
,he oostwar
to have been the re :lt
;2 at Soo? Flo units was
probl of the agricultural. nex't' industry since 19
a) won
LaLed plus wile erecting a
of r plants;
Approved For Release 2003/04/ EGk ,c'79T01049A000800140001-7
dri, a cultivaUrs.
production
 25X1
1950
1951
1952
SECTIET
Approved For Release
2.4 CIA P79T01049$000800140001-7
lost or da
sufficiently to rep1e
durinC thevar : arsdiu
ee more of the non-field t
d) to
There is in
agricultural
.f' farce tam;
olor of the i ri and a) to
a cent on charges in 0
n figures for the four man t,
300
0
10350
2_,
0
',,Q00
280
25,000 3000
30,E 32#000
60,000 23,
29,E
6,
.1,9W
700 23,8
53,300
4,j 82,E
121,1400
139,E
139,*
1953 published fires only for canibineti.
n below (incl
15,30
32,?0 19A W 3? x +0 32,1 37000
80,000 41,700 7,00 142,IM 55,E
65,100 59,x'00
110,E ]2O, 3 0 83,300 99,800 82,300
138 11,8
IAN w,80o
the. absence of other info
oducti.on of p:# s;, seed dri11a, and cultivators r
Approved For Release 2003/q KC- hl~-PDP79T01049A000800140001-7
e agmmu ra :
nor st of production..
of a v 1tura1 - ine s
Ing plan fig=asre
4700 900
7,10D
 Approved For
Kh
19 46
pia
19b
194 9
'por x t factors in i asin z production in the
period 1915^-i.9
pj-
Fl. That a lot of r
in spite of
on of war damaged pianl;s and thO construction
ion-" period is re=ed
done in the a cult Ll n
reconstruction, mV be seen fro-vt the
1947 production with 1951 production. Cbiu~s
ee, tractor moo.
sad drills, 7 ti cs; and t
E, 3.?4 times.
,dboard p1s,t 5* 9 ties, tractor
d more to :L% rov nts in tech 1o, ,
do in this pct ( question 7 below
been Laproved
apacity to
6. There is in
industr.y to nake a
19451
68
40
40
4
66
87
58
67
62
77
97
77
no
3.44
94
materials and finish MWi
plants de 'oted
c ultu ;rs. mad3, inary.
ity and labor force
Approved For Release 200 40R: fi-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
e
 Approved For R41ease 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO10494000800140001-7
raj
n the Jazzary 1953 i
period, but Brous p
the period to
b) failure to institute shot 1a
tion costs because of
'acture of phi pa
plants as pfd
ng
ations
It, pticular:t fo
a lowers
put
of a =Wber of plants;
spare parts throughout -
zatior
and g) failure to
,ctory
ection r
ins;; g) o-co tiou
article,
;tae p.
e or in the proper
sh
roduction of
ounts and quality the
dif:
As mentioned in quest? on 5 above,
new types o.
Approved For Release 200 1 F1f-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release
ling
nC pla
4 : CIA-RDP79T0104"000800140001-7
goals for agricultural macix;.nery
n of their facilities to producing munitions.
the agrioul to ra
pubsh in the fifth Five Year Plan,
9. There are two factors which probably will. operate most effec
,c be adopted in agricultural macidnery plants
in 7 above, and the second is the production of nttiions
.dh p1
tors are operating at the prese
with each year
us i
pr
one is more likely to increase each
probably take
2 to improve tech polo , will
1938 was immediate
drop in. the production of agricultural machi ry.
Approved For Release 2003i4 4 -RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
e" SECRET
25X1
OW12
OF WO= WAR II TO DATE.
1953
25X1
Approved For Release 2003 IZ#J A-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
SECRET
To Office Project 0,,12
The End O World War To D a
t, the River fleet,, the
repair it diwtx is so cle e
on of the h pbufl ? industry .a iri
d "War 11 Russia has large
trade
"g Olish-
.or should also
onf:d the use of her
entire
t 1w.6 M e
k ling, effort devoted. to the native rterahant
'?ho-3o lar4e c? tal std ryar4N which are capable of bull in ocean
?s3els h a v e e been, since eir rehabilitatA4n during
Five-.Tear fin :riod* engaged
exclusively in the build at
Vai
itesa 4c and repair or naval vessels.
bui-ldi.ng of small coax
lnr r .:.ased activity in sh pbuilding ar ship repair for ^e river
a
;sired the o rt+i rive-7 , Plan* a r e continuing r :
etp~
1*1
and trade a
auxiliary naval
I1a:ati, r-p r
ay have t planned goal; for t
lI ,,O Ils
goals in sip repair for the river fleet:.
that native ?...lain:', aided by
;-ar :
Approved For Release 200 /04724: CIA-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
TCRET
xgo and s,
ele ad re par.
by Vais Branch
d of the present.
3
m,buJIrUnr,,,I- industry
ed on. zdividua.1, x t"teddr
ned from many repor , ratter than on detailed
subject to revision as detailed sttdles a
flo production
Approved For Release 2003 k1 P PA-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/24 ; C
79T01049AA000800140001-7
Ma qw
of the Fourth Five,-Tear
of the mine
of the dad and
lding may be considered to
previously evacuated yam. In general
have been accomplished by Igo( or lqaO
although eordinz to our most recent I
in process,
had p'4
n, some rebuiIding
plan w to rebui.c th.e faci.tiez as they
:sated, in many oars
ild-j'.ng on the old f tioi
planned. Those k= own to have beenn, constructed were
Cottrtzotion of giant use
ady rate and there is no indication
or unexpected changes in ^oduc
avyr lost Its independen
placed on certain types of building arxt conversion work fort ht,
Voliga Don Cana
in 1946 ,
~ly tr to of the larger
This oonst ction
became a part
of Armed ro,
U. hev, who advocated the
of only small
SharU alter t his unification
d rn1zation of existing, large var ships
enei uixits, was appointed head of the
gely followed until 1949 when the first of
Asera vas laid down. During the period o
was undertaken the large a mar ne build:
Approved For Release 2Q w: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
of vessels for the
 Approved For Release 2003/04~~ Q-2DP79T01044A000800140001-7
0 Viachealorv A* Xa yshev a appointied had of the
a nev policy in the building of larger corMtsnt
'There are other evvnte appear . co.afir an of
Policy at
Februa r 1950 an indbper nt Nw
:ls care i bildtng
not coinc idwlt*
Although.
he had been the gu
Shipbuilding
czv is '; ovn a an advocate of braildin a : ,
sbeys. ia March
s 1phuildi ar transport machine building
uction and. road r
d capabilities as furl
a definite changs of plan for naval const
have been engaged 41:wat
si vessels, making it necessary
or problems encountered by
in the building of naval vessels. The way tine of 13-14 on
ECRE
n vas put into effect
sa to ti over age sea-go
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/22EOI. tP79T010494900800140001-7
ers ; considered good and indicates that there have been no maj ,
probl in connection with this major construction program. For the past
several Years
to develop a, sub r ne utilizing th
The employnt of many aeon s
a'Loped by the r n.,3.
on this prograr. m i or r axot
e a lack of Rmasian technological ability
1948, the river shapbui :dt:ng -industry as fad with
design program under way
certain very definite Problems. Listing of
Completion of restoration work
of ri W 'll,
Of these Problems inc 1ude x
at the Sam time car
n of sa capaoit,
(a
First Five-year p.
.hp
16 barges with it oar- % c"ei
tf 57*000 metric tons; during the second F t *-year Plan period
10 v'es
of 20.#00-hp and a comparable number of barges..
c. The deloprent of VUM for
me required in th
n of new vessel:
Volga-Don canals the Main Turn Ca
The rebuilding of es
The obtain
of .rer is rrom plants previously geared
production and in process o. ` con ursion to
of peactine use.
rice
it
Approved For Release 2003/0+ RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
SECRET
by t 'ieeoory of the USSR is
the obtaining of bottoms in which tohau1 V is traffic is of prim pace.
every vaster basin in the nation as been faced vita the task of
`idual haulaa qe a At h increasos r
in the
and the repair of those
L 57),v
ox a
on certain of the small rive, to as ch
o and Wsenge
industry.
of
obviously thar-: was created
river sr;r To enga
the probleris of obtaining
added to the river fleet
i3W3
transport services
of the United States
aaa k of such aaervi
f'j the build
ualy
of designates certain
k. In ad itio
ch work as more vessels >a
continuing ref'erence's to Vie work of repair "
a of the work of Wild
he Soviet press and periodicals dealing
the subject of ship-repairing. When the Soviet practise
concerning vhich
eesult of such circumspection has been an increasing
'capital overhaau
stud it is found to mean the LVUg of vessels so assigned for periods
Approved For Release 20031,0 / A-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
REGRET
rwv,inp
p try
.yarn and ? a . Th ISe 11ities tied u p by such
ble, for rev construction and obviously,
one cannot help but wonder !,ova ra-eb additiona work
o deterioration as the vessel val.tAv f+ rnpai
only limited information as to norms, and no specific
information as to cha ge in norm, it in doubtful that .actual norms can
established for the over-all shipbuilding and ship repair industry since
in Per worker i ust vaz eansjderab :e depenf jn * upon the type of
1 under cwion or the Vy?'. a of re .pair being perPormed and the t7pe
rid facilities of
(A) Estimated
o
es a
2945
307
9V
326
1947
337
1948
357
2949
356
1950
362
1951
370
1952
379
1953
388
(3) Estimated
1947
1948
X949
ant vessels iz 1uding
False:
41A
HA *
iA +
NA at
NA *
PEA
203,000
2031,
isplrnt Tons
Approved For Release 200!CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/042/IETDP79T01049U00800140001-7
f ocean gaming r.rckant sssle c
tab?.
o the trai rei ns of p4-rson aol for =._
riin the Sov-lzt econoi&y have reflected upon
l: Nay ,9 3) . .
the activities of the shipbuilders for the ri ra. Ae r such t
an increase in the exPRMO of naVUable water vet's,, inorea d n, of
he cropletion of such :ejects as the Vo
and deepening of other e-4n
such develop nts took place additional fields of grain or stands of t I*r,
'or eae
available for market
a need for vessels. Coupled with this need tar s
For example,
289
River TechT jcum
kiy Institute of l n mneers for water Transport a tici tee:
approximately 2,0000 S
y negligible,# the mat preponderance being
953. (RT 1 Jan 1953)
n the twenty-one
en there has evolved
shipb-.Ulding. Indus
of its existence graduated
This year the T4e
the indu.str, is augrex'ttd by a steady influx of tis
Mich an i vitable increase productivity: smile
3:in ft 4r?ee are as of 19 :x4 and hence -y not be valid t . ay#: they
y an annual quota, 98 s;
all these
-ged in that year. In
hen the People's c ar t of th River flefi t and hence the
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/ ~~11 DP79TO104 00800140001-7
U
tiva control. of vi "Ily an shipyards buil- :ing for the river fleets
of #000 persons were engaged in formal training cc ses
hraica schoolsj, uxader;o tatd nc-,
in camas
291) . In that
of Socialist Labor. (0194
arj l9trl,
anticipated that an
Quid, amount to 9,, p rson t imid.) 4
The repair and rehabilitation of the larger s ipyards
fpled with the
is on the irnportanoe
rats for the increases in naval shipbuilding although
aces which have entered into Increased
pmaction. Long these eecuna yr causes rAf be included J,rre M
of er-gineers, t echnic3 z s and skilled i orkers# improved rii.ne
The estimated labor force
repair industry for 1952 is 312,
an increasing amount of shipbuilding facilities
hipb .Liding and ship
uctivity of that labor is concerfaed it is esthted
shipbuilding industry has kept pace
that of industry as a whole, Accordingly; in the period between 1946-1950j,
been calculated as:
Annual
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
19S2
1-5,
13.0
15.0
13r0
1200
10.0
10.0
8*0
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049AO00800140001-7
EGRUU
to acquisitions fro,,n abroad. it is
workers. Too, improva4 3 `
such as the
In the building of lhr
production*
Neither the 1%6.1950 Plan nor
ch nanutsition as a part of the Plano
The folxrth Five-"/'ear Plan reouired that yin 1950 the tonnage
hips built ahaU double the 1940 fi re..
only, this PI
that floe total ;_
construction goals. The 19461950 goal for
T^tivit)r is due to a rising
degree of
55P lan a
not met. I ft however
posed on the original P3Anj it appears
x* chant t onn g e to production of naval tonnage #
production of
at the expense of the
rting production
duced merchant
n going, vessels,,
estimated at only between 0 and 20,000 CRT by 1952*
the bit t.idin of large, merchant vessels
id is primarily laok of shipbuilding
specific difficult
n apparent in the a tinnt of P3An goals.
verj, Is another matter. Wit out attempting to t
rted in the Soviet press, mention our, be
Ina tmeth-ods of production
Approved For Release 2003/0412-t.TDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
A
sECRET
Tard in j
p Repair Yard
as 6.
of the self-propelled vessels assigned to the yard was
;ed to complete its 1952
ou Ship Repair !
d to its as well as its 19552 plan for eap: to and restoration
repair and shipbuild
Jan 1953)? T hi
drain the pact winter a
unsatisfactory organiza
only
.neluding certain of the main, Adrinia ratio
P`olotov the lag
1953,
sets
of ti-w, Minietry
plage the shipbuilder and ship repairers. (R.T, 24 Feb 1953)
only s;
and does not i an over-all -.,cal. onstructton
for 191955 givai; production ,oar:
h in 1950 accounted for great majority, o
nt shipbu.ildingr, .is .$ ntic d only as fo
n a of river passenger
2.6 tiros as cold with 1950.
insure the building of river pas
of the fragmentary nature of this P
bui; i.n , per se, do not
nother part of the Phan., that per nto t'
of new ship
published
Approved For Release 2003/ AgHT A-RDP79T01049A000800140001-7
 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7
SECRET
Wit' .%d eappci~4y of hip repair rdn for sea-going vessals by 100%
probable ful illrmnt This mot be evaiu&t ,
ut aw:I,~,jvy; r'..et r the Plan base includes those,
engw-,ed in naval Y rk or only those minor yards or portions of r jorr .:yards
available fur
9,. in go ral the pyth of shipbuilding snd of the s iipbu.ild.ing
continued at a agate? : cdical pace since the and of
'Mc. re are a faw exc p ion;am, viz
of the River fleet
observation7 ;,so'd'
Vo as-Doti. As far as can be
speed-up of
mijor s';ipyards are gtil workcinj on a
Research,, the trainin of :snipauilders and the expansion of faci ,.ties
be processing at such a rate that the
known #aertova a,:jch will limit
SECRET
ion a0=1
of the industry =ti.l .
Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79TO1049A000800140001-7