ANGLO-NORWEGIAN FISHERIES CASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER NATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01018A000100010001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 29, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION ,,,,,,o .,,,
FQR THE ASSISTA~V'T DIRECTOR
F4R RSSE~IRCH AND REPORTS
GEOGIRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
ANGLO-NfORWEGIAN FISHERIES CASE
AND ITS. IMP]~ICATIONS FOR. OTHER NATIONS
CtA/RR-G-1
29 September 1952
CENTRA-L INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
OQCUMENT NO.
F!C CMANQE W CLASS. ~ ~,ti~,,..--
^ DECLlISSIFIED
CLASS. CFiANGEO TO: TS S
N~X7 REVIEW DATE:
tkCVICVrCn. __
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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AIVGLO-NORWEGIAN FISIiE~RIES CASE
AMID I7'S .IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER NATIONS
CIA~RR-G-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AC=ENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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Pam
Summary ....................................................... 1
I. Introduction ............................................... 1
II. Methods of Determining Territorial Limits...........
...... 2
III. Establishment of Base Lines ............................... ~+
IV.' Norwegian and British Economic Interests in Norwegian
Waters ....................................... 7
..........
A. Vital. Role; of Fishing in Norwegian Economy....... 7
B. British Interest....., 9
. ...............................
V. The Hague Decision ................................ .... 9
VI. Implications for Other Nations. ... 11
........................
A. Iceland .......................................
....... 11
B. Great Britain ......................... ,,,,, 14
C. Denmark-Greenland .................................... 15
D. Yugoslavia ..................................... .... 15
E. The United States .................................... 1~
F. USSR....... .......................................... 19
1. Relations with Sweden and Denmark ............... 20
2. Attitudes of Soviet Satellites.................. 22
G. Norway-Swed.en ........................................ 22
H. Great Britain-France ................................. 22
Appendixes
A. Gaps in Intelligence....... ........... ........... 1
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Bage
B. Sources and Evaluation o~ Sources.....>....??~??????? 1-11
1. Evaluation of Sources ...........................
2. List of Sources ...............??????????????????
Maps
Norway: Territorial Sea (Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case)
(CIA 123+3 )
Norway: Delimitation of Territorial Sea (:~nglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case) ( CIA. 1234+)
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,A,I~LO-NORWEGIAN FISHERIES CASE
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER NATIONS
The settlement of the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries dispute by
the International Court of Justice at The Hague-has world-wide
implications. The Court approved the method. adopted by Norway
for delimiting its territorial sea, that is, the width of sea
bordering the coast over. which Norway could exercise jurisdiction
for the purpose of Excluding .foreign fishing vessels. At stake
were valuable fishitlg grounds along the Norwegian coast in which
fishermen of both Norway and the United Kingdom had vital interests.
Norway defined :its territorial sea as a belt 4 nautical miles
wide extending seaward from a series of straight base lines con-
necting the outermost points along the coast. This method is
advantageous to Norway because the coast is deeply indented and
is fringed by an estimated 120,000 islands, rocks, and reefs,
some of them 30 miles from the mainland. In approving the
Norwegian method, t'he International Court implied that each
nation had the right to determine its territorial sea in accordance
with international law, using such criteria as "geographical
realities," historical precedent, and economic necessity.
The decision ha.s had the effect of encouraging other states to
make more extensive claims to territorial sea. Iceland, having a
coast line somewhat, like that of Norway and being vitally interested
in coastal fisheriees, has already adopted the Norwegian method of
delimiting its terz~itorial sea. The question has arisen as to
whether other nations with comparable geographic conditions might
take similar actioxi. y'ugoslavia, with an island-fringed coast, has
for several years used a system resembling that of Norway. The USSR
claims a 12-mile limit and in many cases has taken action against
vessels and aircraft well beyond this limit. Similar action is
being taken by somE: of its satellites. In the United States,
California advocatE:s the adoption of the Norwegian method in its
claim to littoral ~~il lands. However, in view of the criteria
formulated by the (;ourt, its decision cannot be interpreted as
sanctioning indiscriminate widening of claims without regard to
international law.
I. Introduction
the International Court of Justice
18 December 1951
O
,
n
rendered its decision in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, ruling
by a 10 to 2 vote in favor of Norway.
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The litigation was instituted by the United Kingdom as the
result of a fishing controversy extending over more than 40 years.
The long-standing conflict between the British and the Norwegians
arose over the penetration of British trawlers into the territorial
sea ~~ ~ of Norway.~~ The dispute has been aggravated within
the last few years, not only by the claim of the Norwegians to a
4-mile limit, but also by the conversion of their fjords, irre-
spective of width, into territorial sea. At various points along
the Norwegian coast, the fjords penetrate inland great distances,
the Porsangerfjord ingressing as much as 75 sea miles (;gee map
CIA .12344),
Evidence laid before the Court verified the fact that from
1616-18 until 1905-6 British fishermen refrained from fishing in the
Norwegian coastal waters. Violations then began to occzxr and
'became more frequent. On 12 July 1935 the Government oj' Norway
delimited the Norwegian fisheries zone by Royal Aecree (see map
CIA 12343). Between the seizure in 1911 of the British trawler,
Lard Roberts. and 5 May 1949, 63 British and other fishir.~g vessels
were arrested for fishing in alleged Norwegian waters, their
catches were confiscated, and their skippers were.fined.~~ As a
result of these altercations, the United Kingdom on 24 September
1949 started proceedings before the World Court.
II. Methods of Determining Territorial Limits
Essentially, the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries dispute concerned
the method used by Norway of determining the limits of its
territorial sea at 4 :nautical miles seaward from base lines drawn
between extreme points of the coast. This usage is contrary to the
accepted practice of many countries of measuring limits by parallel
or curved lines 3 miles from the mainland at low-water m~a.rk.~
The coast of northern Norway presents an unusual problem. The
waters in this area abound in commercially valuable fish,, which
have attracted to the region a comparatively large population of
Norwegian fishermen and also exploitation by foreign fishermen from
* Footnote references in arabic numerals refer to sources listed
in Appendix B.
%~ The Second Commission (that on Territorial Waters) at the
Conference for the Cod.ificati~n of International Law (The Hague,
193) recommended the term "territorial sea" in preference to
the more commonly used "territorial waters." It should also
be noted that the terms "marginal sea" and "littoral sea" are used
synonymously with "territorial sea."
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nearby countries. The exclusion of these foreign fishermen from the
area near the coast-was a part of Norway's motive for extending
seaward the limits of its territorial sea,
At tkie.Conference for the Codification of International Law
held at The Hague in 1930, no agreement was reached regarding the
limits of territorial sea. On this question, 20 nations,
including the United States and the United Kingdom, favor+ad a
3-mile limit, 12 other nations, including Rumania, Turkey, and
Yugoslavia, favored a 6-mile limit, and Norway, Sweden, Finland,
and Iceland voted for a ~+-mile limit. The USSR sent observers
to the meeting but did not vote.9~~
One of th.e three generally accepted methods of determining
the limits of territorial sea, the "envelope of the arcs of
circles" {la courbe tangente) method, was recommended by the
United States delegation at the 1930 Hague Conference. This
method applies the principle that the belt of territorial sea
must follow the, line of the coast 10 -- that is, every point of
the line delimiting the territorial sea must be precisely 3 miles
(or arty other stipulated distance) from the nearest point on the
coast. The American amendment stated:
"Except as .otherwise provided in this Convention,
the seaward limit of the territorial. waters is the
envelope of all arcs of circles having a, radius of
three. nautical miles drawn from all points on the
coast (at whatever line of sea level is adopted in the
charts of the coastal State), or from the seaward limit
of those interior waters which are contiguous with the
territorial. waters."~
Tn its deliberations in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,
the International Court of Justice did not find that this
system was obligatory by law, and it was not further considered.
~ The report cited includes a comprehensive study of the
historical background of Soviet claims, the present position of the
USSR and its satellites, and the implications of the problem. No
mention is made of the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case or the
decision of the International Court.
~ The three general methods of delimitation are listed and
explained in Source 12.
S. Whittemore Boggs, technical adviser of the American
delegation to the 1930 Hague Conference, credits the British with
originating the principle of the "envelope of the arcs of circles"
method.
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The other suggested method of delimitation -- lines paral7Lel
to the general trend of the coast and following all the sinuas:lties
of the coast (trace parall~le)12 -- was ruled as impractical,
since the method could not readily be applied to the exceptional
coastal configuration of Norway. The Court assumed its principal
function to be the review of the method of straight lines as decreed
and employed by Norway.
The disputed coastal area of Norway is situated north of
latitude 66?28'48"N, commencing at the Norwegian-Soviet frontier
and extending north west, and south along the coast to Traena.~
(See map CIA 12343. This section of coast is mare than 1,500
kilometers long and is broken by f,jards and bays. The estimated
120,000 islands, islets, rocks, and reefs that fringe the coast
make up the sk~aergaard. (rack rampaxt).14 For mast countries,
the coast constitutes a clear dividing line between land and sea,
but this is not .the ease with Norway. From abreast of Trondheim
northward to Vestf,jord and the Lofotens, the sk,jaergaaxd extends
from 25 to 30 miles beyond the mainland. It was apparent to
the Court that because of the geographies]. realities of nartY-ern
Norway the relevant line was that of the sk~ssrgaard rather f;han
that of the mainland.
In holding that straight base lines could be drawn alone the
outermost extremities of the sk~aergaard, the Court said in ~sffect
that the waters between the base lines of the belt of territorial
sea and the mainland are internal waters. The bodies of water
enclosed by the base lines vary in axes. Although the lim3.t of the
territorial sea is ~+ miles from base paints, in some places it is
18 miles from the mainland. Similaxly, the intervals between fixed
points vary, reaching at one place (the Lopphavet Basin -- t-ase
points 24-21 vn map CIA 12344) a distance of 44 miles .l6
III. Establishment of Base Lines
The mayor part of the controversy between the Governments of
the United Kingdom and Norway concerned the lines prescribed by
the Royal. Decree of 1935 as the "'base lines" for the delimitation
of the Norwegian fisheries zone. Over a period of yeaxs the two
countries had proposed various base lines in an attempt to resolve
their differences in regaxd to the extent of the territorial sta.
The British contended that the line separating the territorial sea
from the high seas should be measured from the line of low water
* The article cited deals with the problem of delimitation and
offers an examination of the contribution of the ,judgment ico
international law.
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along the wholes Norwegian coast, subject to special provisions
for islands an~i historic waters.~l8 Norway contended that base
lines, even when connecting extreme points and headlands up to 40
miles apart, made up the limits from which the territorial sea
should be measured.:
Another pz~oblem involved in the choice of base lines pertained
to whether certain sea areas lying within these lines were
sufficiently linked to the land domain to be regarded as being
internal. waters. The Court found that the unique coast of Norway
made this conception va7-id.~20 In addition, the waters of all
fjords were conceded to be internal waters. The Court ruled,
however, that the "Indrelia" (the interior channel) was not a
strait but a navigational route, established as such by means of
artificial aids to navigation provided by Norway. (See map
CIA 123+3.) Without the use of navigational aids, the interior
channel would be of no practical_ use.
The Norwegan Government, in presenting its case, pointed
out that it recognized only one base line, that established by
the decree of lf' July 193.5, in which some ~+8 base points laetween
the Soviet bordE~r-and Trae:na (12 on the mainland or islands and
36 on racks or z~eefs, computed at low-water mark) were identified
as foci through which the line was drawn (see map CIA 123+3).
Since -this line is usually shown an charts in blue, it is called
the "blue line."22~23~2~+ 25 ~ Although the precise distance
beyond the base. line was not specified in the Royal Decree,
Norway elaizned a,s its fishing limit the area lying 1 geographical.
mile?~-~ -- 7,x.20 meters (4 nautical miles) -- outside the base
line.26 Far customs purposes, the Norwegian territorial sea was
to extend 10 nautical miles beyond the most distant islands or
rocks uncovered 'by the sea at the lowest tide.
At the Anglo-Norwegian discussions that took place in Oslo
in 192+, a "red line" was tentatively drawn by Norwegian experts
in an attempt to clarify the extent of Norway's claims to
territorial sea.~F?*-~? During the negotiations it was stipulated
~ The lines shor~m on all maps or charts used in this case derive
their names from the colors in which they are drawn. The official
charts used by tY:~e British and Norwegians in the fisheries dispute
(22 , ~, 2~+ , axed 25 ) are essential to an understanding of
the problem.
~? This measurement is generally referred to as a "Scandinavian
league."
The differences between the "red line" and the other
lines of territorial-sea claims are shown on map CIA 123~.t~proposed
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that this line should not pre,~udice the position of any of 'the
paxties. The Norwegian Government never recognized this line .27
(See map CIA 123+4 . )
In the meantime, th.e relations between British trawlers and
the Norwegian authorities became more satisfactory, except for a
few minor incidents. The lines drawn at the Oslo Conference-
acquired special significance in 1925, when they came to be known
as the tacit red-line modus vivendi. This operated successfully
until 1931. Amore explicit, but still informal, red-line modus
vivendi-was adopted in 1933.28
The whole situation was radically changed by the promulgation
on 12 July 1935 of the Norwegian Royal Decree defining the
territorial limits. As previously stated,- the British opposed
the ~+-mile limit and the Norwegian system of drawing abase line
from two promontories rather than following the coast line. The
Government of the United Kingdom continued to regard the modus
vivendi of 1933 as being still in force. The British were
apparently under the impression that the Norwegian authorities
would act .leniently toward British ships and would confine them-
selves to enforcing the red line. A few months later, Norwegian
interference with three British trawlers proved this assumi~tion
incorrect. By the end of February 1936, however, a satisfF~ctory
arrangement was reached whereby the Norwegian Government informally
agreed nat to molest British ships outside the red line. This modus
vivendi cantinued until the outbreak of World Wax II.
Alsa indicated on the Norwegian cheats drawn at the tj:me of
the Oslo negotiations in 1924 (see Annex 2 of the Counter-r4emorial,
Source 24) was a 3-mile-limit line plotted according to the; British
thesis. This became known as the "green line." It is esse:ntiel not
to confuse this "firm" green line with the later (1950) Br:Ltish
"pecked" green line shown on the British charts in Annex 3`i of tYie
Reply (.Source 23). The latter line (see map CIA 12344) de:~ignated
the ~--mile outer limit of Norwegian territorial sea according to
the contentions of the United Kingdom in its submissions.~~ All
waters inside the pecked line would be Norwegian waters, either
territorial or internal. Except in special instances, territorial
sea is measured by the British from points on a coast. The
accompanying map (CIA 12344) shows in green the points that the
British maintained were the correct base points for measuring the
Norwegian territorial sea.
In January 1g49, eight months before applying to the ;Inter-
national Court for settlement of the dispute, the United Kingdom
held further negotiations with Norway. At this consultation a new
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comprise "yellow line" was proposed, and the British informed the
Norwegians that they must take either the red or the yellow line
but could not insist on receiving the benefits of the best features
of both. The yellow line, like its predecessor the red line, was
found unacceptable to-the Storting (Norwegian Parliament}.~
IV. Norwegian and British Economic Interests in Norwegian Waters
A. Vital Role of Fishing in Norwegian Economy
The preamble to the Norwegian Royal Decree of 12 July
1935, in setting forth the considerations on which its provisions
were based, referred to "the safeguard of vital interests. of the
inhabitants of the northernmost parts of the country."~ In its
judgment in the case, the Court noted that certain economic
interests peculiar to a region cannot be overlooked even though
they extend beyond purely geographic factors, provided the reality
and importance of such interests are clearly evidenced by long
usage.~~ Ir,~ the opinion of the Court, therefore, Norway's
' -~
case was strengthened by "economic necessity.
The meagerr.~ess of the land resources of Norway is compensated
for in part by the wealth to be found in the adjacent seas. Few
modern nations are as dependent-upon fishing for subsistence as
is Norway.~6~ The importance of fishing in the Norwegian economy
can be attributed not only to the length of the coast line in
relation to total area and population, but also to the presence of
the Gulf Stream, which makes the waters around the coast a very
productive spawning ground.
Fishing haF~ always been among Norway's mast important sources
of income. More: fish are brought ashore in Norway than in any
other European country, and Norwe ion fish and fish products are
sold in all part;s of the world. Recent catches have averaged
approximately a million metric tons per year, 1+0 about one_fourth
of the total annual fishing catch for Europe. 1 In 19l~8, the
country's total catch of fish reached a high of 1,297,2.15 metric
tons.42 ~ Production figures show that the 1950 catch was only
5 percent below that of 191+8, the recoxd year. The estimated value
of the 1950 catch was 323 million kroner (191+5 value, based on
1+.97 kr. to the dollar, approximately $65,000,000; 191+9 value, with
kroner devalued to 7.1>+ to the dollar, approximately $1+5,230,000}.1+3
* An excellent treatment of fish production in Norway, in which
recent statistics are cited, appears in reference 1+2.
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The value of fish exported in the years 1946 and 1947 averaged
approximately 500 million kroner per year and constituted nearly
one-third of the total value of Norwegian exports.44 Offs:vial
statistics show that during the first 8 months of 1950 tott~.l ship-
ments of canned fish alone amounted to 24,674 metric tons, valued at
89.2 million kroner, as compared with 17,210 metric tons, valued at
58.8 million kroner, for the corresponding period of 1949. Exports
for the same 8-month period in 1948 totaled 25,997 metric t;ans,
valued at 86.5 million kroner. The value of the exportti; of the
fishing industry is a positive index of its importance in the
Norwegian economy.46
Among the nations of Europe (excluding Iceland), Norway ranks
first in per capita fish consumption (1947-49, 48 kilograms per
year, landed weight).47 The diet of the Norwegians includes all
types of edible fish that are caught in the coastal waters.
About 65 percent of the total catch of 1950 was exported, either
in fresh or processed form, and the remainder went to meet domestic
needs. I~z.the early postwar years, when food was generally scarce
throughout Europe, cheap, nutritious fish proved a boon tc thousands
of people .~~
According to recent statistics, there are roughly 85,000
fishermen in Norway (as compared with 124,655 in 1939)? Of these,
68,000 are engaged in fishing as their main means of livelihood,
and 17,400 follow the sea as a secondary occupation. A total of
35,000 Norwegians are alternately fishermen and farmers, d~;pending
upon the season.~51 Although the Norwegians fish mainly in
their own coastal waters, Norwegian fishermen are also active
around Iceland, the North Sea banks, Greenland, and Bear Is:Land.~
The two most important fish caught are the cod and herring.
Other principal species i~xe saithe, sprat, ling, mackerel, haddock,
halibut, flounder, and salmon, as well as the crustaceans (c:hiefly
lobster and shrimp) . Cod fishing off the Lofoten Islandia,
normally the most productive fishing grounds in the world, has
shown above-average yields in all postwar seasons. The tott~.t
annual yield of cad is about 200,400 metric tons.~~~
The Norwegian fishing fleet at present consists of approximately
280 steamships, 12,300 covered-in motor boats, 10,700 open motor
boats, and 10 trawlers-over 50 feet long. The task of increasing
the trawler fleet has been undertaken by the Government, whj.ch
recently purchased some trawlers in Canada under the provisions of
a13,000,000 loan. The domestic industry is-also being encouraged
to undertake new shipbuilding.57 ~~~
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B. British. Interest
The loss of Norwegian waters has been a severe blow to
British fishing interests. Shortly after the beginning of the
twentieth century, when the radius of operation of steam trawlers
was greatly extended, the Norwegian coastal fisheries became
increasingly important to certain foreign countries. Supplies
of fish in the North Sea were rapidly being exhausted, and British
fishing vessels were compelled to go farther afield, Trawlers
soon pushed as f'ar as Iceland and shortly afterwards to the Faeroes.
British fishermen then corr~nenced operations in the Bay of Biscay
and along the coasts of Spain and Portugal. By 1905 English
trawlers had begun to fish in the waters off northern Norway.60
For many years this rich coastal area provided British fishing
fleets with extensive and valuable fishing grounds,61 which were
a source of fish. of the better quality, such as .turbot, plaice,
and halibut. As a result of the International Court's ruling,
the United Kingdom is confronted with a problem of major importance.
V. The Hague Decision
In delivering its 18 December 1951 judgment in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case, ?che Hague Court ruled that the Norwegian
straight-line method for delimiting the fishing zone was not
contrary to international law. It further decided, by an 8 to
~+ vote, that the base lines fixed by the 1935 Royal Decree in
applying this method was equally not contrary to international
law.62 63
In its decision, the Court noted that a Norwegian decree of
1812, as well as. subsequent decrees, reports, and diplomatic
correspondEnce, showed that the method of straight lines imposed
by the irregularity of the coast line, had been established in the
"Norwegian system" and consolidated by a constant and sufficiently
long practice. The application of this system (in 1869) had
encountered no opposition from other nations over the years. The
judgment confix~ried that the lines drawn by this mtthod were
justified.6~+ ~~
Fundamentally, the British Government accepted the right of
Norway to a ~+-mi.le limit but disagreed with the method of
delimitation employed. It was the contention of the United Kingdom
that the territorial sea adjacent to .any country should be measured
from the physical coast of the mainland and its offshore islands.
The British also endorsed the rule that the length of straight lines
across bays should not exceed 10 miles. Nevertheless, in its
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submissions to the Court, the United Kingdom approved (on "h:Lstoric
grounds") as Norwegian internal waters "all fjords and sands ~ound~
which fall within the conr_eption of a bay as defined by international
law,"66 ~ regardless of the length of the closing line. At: the
same time, the British recognized as territorial sea "all they waters
of the fjords and sands which have the character of legal st~~aits."68
These concessions with respect to fjards, sands, and other disputed
waters were based on the contention that the Court should em~~loy
the "envelope of the arcs of circles" method. Under that method,
numerous water areas would have been included as high seas tYiat
became Norwegian territorial sea under the straight-line metYiod.
The majority decision of the World Court, in approving T(orway's
method of delimitation as conforming with the requirements of
international law, took abroad view of territorial sea. It
stated that the limits "must follow the general direction of the
coast,"~ but rejected any system that would interpret this strictly.
The Court also pointed out that the 10-mile rule on the closi..ng
line of bays had not acquired the authority of a general rule of
international law.~~ It recognized that a country should. be
allowed the necessary latitude in order to be able to adapt its
delimitation to practical needs and local requirements. This did
not mean that a nation had the right to set the limits of its
territorial sea as it desired. The validity of delimitation with
regard to other states still depended on the rules of international
law .
The intrinsic significance of the decision in the case of
Norway can be ascertained from a statement made by Norwegian
Foreign Minister Halyard M. Lange, who expressed his Government's
"great satisfaction" with the ruling and declared that the award
would be welcomed by people all over Norway, particularly by the
fishing population of Finnmaxk. He mentioned the Svaerholtha~vet
(Svaerholt Sea} at Nord Kapp (North Cape) as the most important
area affected by the judg~nent;~ this region with its abund:~.nce
of fish had been attracting many British and other foreign
trawlermen. The adjudication by the Court had the unquestionable
effect of making much of Norway's rich coastal area off-limits to
vessels of other nations.
The award of damages, as originally demanded by Great Britain
in its submissions, had been left to subsequent settlement by the
parties involved.~5 When asked whether, in view of the deci:lion,
a claim for compensation would now be made by Norway, Mr. Lan~~e
replied that Norway had reserved its position on this question. He
fiax~ther stated that a study of this and other related problems
would be made in the near future.
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Despite the favorable settlement of the fisheries dispute,
Norway is facing new problems as other countries take up the lead
given by the Hague: Court .~ If other nations iii turn apply the
"Norwegian system" af' delimitation-, the trawlers of Norway Drill be
restricted in their fishing activities in foreign waters. The
Norwegian .Labor newspaper, Arbeiderbladet, in a brief comment,
hoped that the decision would provide the basis for further
negotiations with the British and other states to establish rules
far fishing outsii~.e the ~+-mile limit.
The judgment rendered by the World Court was the first
delivered by an authority of such eminence on the general question
of territorial. sea.* Of fundamental importance was the tribunal's
ruling that the principle of the 3-mile limit and the British
method of establishing base points were not necessarily applicable
in delimiting the territorial sea. At the same time, the decision
sets a precedent ~to be followed by other countries.
Various foreign newspapers have painted out that the ruling
should help to dispel doubts regarding the impartiality and
integrity of the :Lnternational Court, as well as fears that it is
influenced by great-power politics . Mar~.y Norwegian newspapers
commented on the fact that the decision demonstrated to the world
that two nations, one small and the other a great power, could
settle an issue of major economic importance by recourse to an
International Court, and had done so at a time when international
relations were characterized by abusive language and the rattling
of sabers.
VI. Implications for Other Nations
A. Iceland
Although it may be some time before the aggregate effects
of the International Court's ruling regarding fishing rights become
fully apparent, results of the decision are already being felt in
all parts of the ?world. The most immediate effect of the judgment
concerns Iceland. Before the ruling, the Icelandic Government had
issued a decree m;axking off an exclusive fishing zone using the
"Norwegian system," but had deferred enforcement pending the
outcome of the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case. The fallowing
background information is pertinent in connection with Iceland's
claim to control over adjacent waters:~80
~ The Conference for the Codification of International Law held
at The Hague in 1!30 did not result in any treaty or convention.
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(1) Icelandic Law No. ~; 5 April 19+8, authorized the
M~.nistry of Fisheries to establish conservation zones within
the limits of the Icelandic .continental shelf.
(2) Ministry of Fisheries regulations of 22 April 1950
extended control over fisheries to a ~+-mile limit off the
north coast of Iceland, using arbitrary base lines fa;r the
closure of bays and fjords.
(3) Iceland denounced the 1901 treaty between Denmaxk
and Great. Britain that had assured British vessels of fishing
rights within the customary 3-mile zone during the last 50 years
(the treaty lapsed ~n 3 October 1951).
In the spring of T951, the United Kingdom asked the Icelandic
Foreign Office not to apply its new regulations to British vessels
until the two Governments had the opportunity to discuss the
question in the light of the judgment of the International Court.
Iceland complied with the British request by stating that 1~he
status quo would be maintained.81 NevertheJ.ess, the Ministry fir
Foreign Affairs issued a press release on 23 August 1951 proclaiming
Iceland's right to adopt measures concerning its own fishing
grounds on a unilateral basis.82 ~$~-
The ruling of the World Coui-E in favor of Norway conf~:rmed
the belief of IcElanders that they possessed the right to extend
control over their territorial sea. The Icelandic Gaverrme:nt felt
that the judgment justified the steps it had taken in the past two
years.
The following basic principles, which were also involved in the
Anglo-Norwegian dispute, were taken to be valid in the cases of
Iceland: (1) the ~-mile limit; (2) the straight-base-13.ne method
of determining the limits of. territorial sea; (3) closing cuff of
bays regardless of width; and (~+) importance of the essential
economic interests of the coastal state.
The Court's decision prompted the United Kingdom to request
Iceland to discuss the status of the territorial-sea problem in a
series of informal talks, which we.:e held in London in January
1952.86 ~ Meanwhile, Iceland continued to study the legal
aspects of the Hague judgment before taking any action.
Finally, on 19 March 1952, the Icelandic Government issued
regulations, to became effective 15 May 1952, establishing a 4-mile
zone for fishing around the entire country, with straight base
lines drawn from outermost points of coasts, islands, and rocks and
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across the openings of bays, regardless of outer width. All
trawling and Danish ;seine netting, as well as all other foreign
fishing activities, were prohibited within this zone.88
A short press release was also issued by the Icelandic
Government on 19 March surr~narizing the regulations made public
on that date and emphasizing the economic importance to Iceland
of the action taken. In a radio address, Olafur Thors, the
Minister of Industries, claimed that the movement by various states
to claim ,jurisdiction over fishing on the "continental shelf"**
was given impetus by the proclamation issued by the President
of tYie United States on 28 September 1945? The Minister stated
that the Icelandic Law of 1948, which authorized the Government to
control-fisheries over the continental shelf of Iceland, eras
passed after a study of actions by the United States and other
nations. FIe mentioned that the decision of the International
Court of Justice of 18 December 1951 in the case involving Norway
and Great Britain 'read been carefully studied by Iceland before
the new regulations were announced.90
The Icelandic press unanj,mously approved the announcement of
the extension of Ice:land's territorial sea in protection of it.s
fishing grounds. Co~nenting on the new regulation, the chairman.
of the Norwegian-Iceland Herring Fishermen's Association told the
Norwegian newspaper, Dagbladet, that for all practical purposes
the new decree woulii have no effect on Norwegian fishermen as long
as the herring are :E'ar out at sea. He warned, however, that
should the herring go nearer the land, the new regulation might
have serious effects on Norwegian fishing off Iceland.
In May, the F'o:reign Office in London published the text of a
note from the British Government to the Government of Iceland
requesting that Ice:Land modify her new fishing regulations. The
note expressed deep regret that Iceland should-have published the
regulations without further consultations between the two countries,
as the United Kingdom had proposed.~~~5 Iceland re~3ected
Great Britain's plea and the British have been warned that vessels
~ One of the most efficient forms of seine net is the instrument
chiefly used by Danish fishermen and adopted to some extent in
recent years by the British fishing industry.
~ The "continental shelf" is the zone around a continent extending
frcmi the low-tide line to a depth at which there is a marked
increase cf slope to greater depths. Conventionally, its outer
edge is taken. as 100 fathoms or 600 feet.
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entering the newly restricted areas run the risk of d.e:tention.~
In a note dated 18 June 1952, ?the United Kingdom expressed the view
that the Icelandic regulations in question were not in accordance
with international law and stated that the British rE~served their
right to claim compensation for any interference with British
fishing vessels in waters that, in the opinion of the Bri'cish
Government, are high seas.~~
Both Belgium and the Netherlands have recently protested
the extension of the Icelandic fishing lim.its.~100 Although
the United States has not officially delivered a note ~of protest
to the Icelandic Government, it can be assumed from previous re-
actions 101 102 10 that the Government of the United States
would: object to certain basic principles involved in the extension
of Iceland's territorial sea.
B. Great Britain
It has been unofficially suggested that Greai; Britain
now take the opportunity of widening her fishing zone aff the
Scottish coast. It was pointed out that the United Kir-gdom might
secure for the exclusive use of British vessels a laxge~r area of
coastal waters by adopting the Norwegian base-line system and
drawing lines across the mouths of large estuaries, for' example,
the Moray Firth.l0~+ 10 Such action would close to Norwegian
fishing vessels a large expanse of sea off the northwest coast of
Scotland, where they at present have fishing privileges.106 At
the sauce time., other retaliatory measures could be imposed, such.
as the limitation of landings from foreign ships of fish for the
British market. Actually, officials of the United Kingdom have
been at pains to accept the Court's decision with good ;race, and
there has been no move on the part of the Government to take any
precipitate action, British newspaper comment, however,, reflected
great disappointment with the ruling.
In a press conference after the ruling of the Inter?national
Court was announced, Sir Eric Beckett, the British Fore9:gn Office
Legal Adviser, said that ".for the future the United Kingdom Govern-
ment will naturally consider the effect of this decisior.~ of the
Court as a precedent of general application." In any event, the
British Government has accepted the adverse judgment as binding .l0
Sir Eric told the reporters that his Government was still of the
opinion that legal disputes between states should be sattled by
judicial decision. The majority decision, he continued, "contains
rulings on certain questions of general principles applicable to
territorial waters, which are contrary to the views which the
United Kingdom Goverrnnent has hitherto entertained regarding the
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rules of international law, and which in consequence it has
hitherto folla~red."108
It has been unofficially noted in British legal quarters that the
judgment upset the previously employed. "envelope of the arcs of
circles" method, and that it meant that any nation with a coast
line dotted with islands now possessed all the waters between the
islands and they coast line.
One defin3.te outcome of the fisheries case has been active
consideration on the part of the British Government and British
trawler skippers of the development of fishing off the coast of
Greenland. There have been reports of trawlers operating in
Davis Strait below Baffin Bay and of the discovery of "prolific"
fishing grounds.~110
A direct aftermath of the fisheries dispute (as reported by
the British press of 13 January 1952) was the arrest of the British
trawler, Painter; off the mouth of the Tanaf,jord by a Norwegian
patrol vessel that escorted it to Hammerfest. The skipper of the
trawler stated in his own defense that he did not know of the
Hague decision or that he was fishing within the "red line."
Nevertheless, he was fined 35,000 kroner.lll 112 As a result of
the verdict, the sentence was to be appealed as of 15 January 1952.
C. Denmark-Greenland
It is interesting to observe that if the "Norwegian
system" is applied to the cod fisheries of Greenland extensive
areas would be closed to foreign fishermen. Greenland's coast
line, with numerous small islands lying off its shores, is indented
"by deep, long fords, which like the Norwegian fords probably
have a threshold with shallow water near their mouths.
There has been some speculation in British circles as to what
action Denmark may take in regard to Greenland.ll Although
Greenland is Danish territory, its own national council has recently
been demanding, in the interests of the local inhabitants, that not
only foreigners but also Danish and Faeroese fishermen should be
forbidden to fish off its coast.
D. Yugoslavia
The coast line of Yugoslavia on the Adriatic Sea, with its
great number of indentations and its matey islands, poses a similar
problem as to f'Lshing rights. Three years before the Anglo-
Norwegian decision, the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia had
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established basic laws and regulations delimiting the territorial
sea.114 Using a method resembling the system employed by t;he
Norwegians and upheld bjr the World Court, the Yugoslav Government
.drew a series of base lines connecting capes, islands, and x?ocks
along their coast.ll ~ Article V of Law 876, published in the
Official Gazette (No. 106) on 8 December 1948, states that the
territorial sea of Yugoslavia extends.6 nautical miles into the
open sea and is measured from the limits of domestic sea wa.t,ers,
or from the coast at lowest ebb tide, or from the coasts of islands
lying outside the domestic waters of Yagoslavia.116~ The base lines
form the outer limit of the domestic waters. Furthermore, the
regulations provide for search of foreign vessels within an area
4 nautical miles beyond the 6-mile limit when Yugoslavia suspects
activities contrary to its interests. Yugoslavia also exter,.ds
jurisdiction into this zone for the purpose of protecting marine
resources.117 The Yugoslav method of drawing base lines between
designated areas following the coast line encloses less open. sea
than the Norwegian system, however.
The actions. taken by Yugoslavia in .the Adrstic during the past
year have heightened existing tensions between the Yugoslav and
Italian Governments. According to recent reports, Italian fishing
vessels are being seized 14 to 20 miles from the Dalmatian coast.
118 11 120
It is possible that Italian fishermen have been disregarding
the seaward limits of the territorial sea established by Yugoslav
law in 1948 and have been encroaching upon waters regarded as
inter~zal by Yugoslavia. It is also possible .that in the light of
the Hague decision there has been a shift in Yugoslavia's course
of action regarding its territorial limits. To date, no official
announcement of such a, change in Yugoslav policy has been made.
E. The United States
The decision of the International Court in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries-Case has had repercussions. affecting the
United States in both the international and national fields.
Immediately after the ruling, Peruvian fishing interests launched
a series of complaints against the activity of American tuna,
fishermen off the coast of Peru. (Peru claims jurisdiction ~cver
waters extending 200 miles from its coast.)
The decision has also played an important part in the Supreme
Court case between the United States Government and the State=_ of
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California over littoral. oil deposits, in which the issue of a
base line masking the territorial. sea is invalved.l21 ~- The suit,
filed by the United States involved the right. of the State of
Califfarnia to grant leases and receive revenue for the extraction
of oil and other products from the 3-mile marginal belt off the
coast of California.122 Federal officials have contended that
coastal states have no more right to oil reserves under the
marginal sea th~~,n inland states have to Federal forests and
minerals.
On 23 June 19+7, the Supreme Court of the United States
declared by a 6 to 2 vote (United States vs. California, 332 US l9)
that the Federal. Government, and not the State of California,
possessed owner~~hip of the submerged lands lying 3 nautical miles
seaward of the ordinary low-water mark and outside the inland
waters of the state. It further stated that "paramount rights" in
and full dominion aver this area are attributes of national
sovereignty.l2 ~ On 28 September 19-5 President Truman had issued
a proclamation that reserved to,the United States all mineral
rights on the submerged "continental shelf" off its shores.
12~+ 125 126
The decision was not a departure from previous Supreme Court
pronouncements. In the cases of Texas (United States vs. Texas,
339 US 707) and Louisiana (United States vs. Louisiana, 339 US 699),
the Supreme Court had ruled that the U.S. Government, and not the
states, had control of the mineral-rich underwater lands off their
coasts.l2 128 The decision, however, does not affect the
established rule of law that the states, and not the Federal Govern-
ment, awn the "tidelands,"12 ~1 0 l~~ as well as the submerged
lands under inland navigable waters.
The case of the United States vs. California (332 US 19) is
still before the Supreme Court for the determination of the base
line of the marginal sea along sections of the California coast.
Continuation of the hearings on the matter have been held before
the Special Master since the first of the year.
The State of California has placed great reliance on the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case as a precedent, proposing the
~ A comprehensive treatment of the whole problem can be found
in Submerged Lancls~ Source 121.
~' "Tidelands" refers to the land that is covered and uncovered
by the ebb and flow of the tide; it is commonly known as the shore.
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the lacation of base lines outside the outlying rocks and is~_ands
off its shores. In the channel axeas off the coast of-California,
such islands as San Miguel, Santa Rosa, Santa Cruz, San Nico_Las,
Santa Barbara, Santa Catalina, and San Clemente are separated from
the mainland by as much as 10 to 60 nautical miles. The United
States has held that in the absence of historical exceptions the
boundary line should follow the sinuosities of the coast and should
not jump from point to point, rock to rock, or island to isl;~,nd.l 2
Whereas California's claims to water areas such as bays axe '.not
limited to deep indentations of 10 miles or less between hea,ilands,
the United States considers indentations in the coast as inland
waters only if they are deep, and then only the part where the mouth
is 10 miles or less in width.~~l ~ ~
The Solicitor General of the United States, Philip B. Perlman,
in a letter of 21 January 1952 to Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney,
Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, stated that "nothing in the International Court's opinion
seems to require any modification of the legal position of the
United States ~~rith respect to the determination of the location of
the marginal sea."l~ Similarly, on 12 February 1952, Secretary
of State Dean Acheson, in a letter to the Attorney General, J.
Howaxd McGrath, asserted:
"... The decision of the ~nternationalJ Court, however,
does not indicate, nor does it suggest, that other
methods of delimitation of territorial waters such as
that adopted by the United States are not equally valid.
in international law. The selection of base lines, tYie
Court pointed out, is determined on the one .hand by they
will of the coastal state which is in the best position
to appraise the local conditions dictating such selection,
and on the other hand by international law which provides
certain criteria to be taken into account such as the
criteria that the drawing of 'base lines must not depart;
to any appreciable extent from th.e general direction of
the coast, that the inclusion within those lines of se~~
areas surrounded or divided by land formations depends
on whether such sea areas are sufficiently closely
linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime
of internal waters, and that economic interests should
not be overlooked the reality and importance of which
are clearly evidenced by long usage..."1 6
~ A statement of U.S. policy on the question of the territorial
sea, appears in Saurce 13~-.
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Congressman Yorty of California on 11 February 1952 introduced
in the House of Representatives Joint Resolution 373, which would
fix the boundaries of the internal waters of the United States in a
manner consistent with the decision in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case.l 7 It wt~,s his opinion that the ruling of the International
Court had a very great bearing on the case of the United States
against California. Mr. Yorty emphasized that immediate Congres-
sional action was needed, not only because the rules of interns-
tional law had been clarified, but also because it was imperative
not to leave our coast defenses unnecessarily exposed.l 8 The
preamble of Joirit Resolution 373 reads as follows:
"Joint resolution declaring the boundaries of the
inland or internal waters of the United States to
be as far seaward as is permissible under inter-
national la,w, and providing for a survey of such
boundaries to be made by the United States Coast
and Geodetic Survey in the light of the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case."l~
The State of California has consistently maintained throughout
the proceedings that the determination of the boundary of the
internal waters of the United States is a question for the political
`branch of the Government and not the judicial branch to decide. In
its brief,. the Federal Government recognizes that the Anglo-Norwegian
decision confirms that the delimitation of the marginal sea is a
political act.14~
On 15 May 1952, the House of Representatives by a 2~+7 to 289
vote approved a compromise bill for state control of oil-rich lands
beneath the marginal sea.l~+l~ The next day, without debate and by
a voice vote, thE~ Senate approved and sent to the White House a
campromise Senates-House bill giving the states clear title to the
submerged coastaa lands.l~+2 On 29 May President Truman vetoed the.
bill, stating in his message that he saw no reason for the Federal
Government to ma~;e an outright gift '?for the benefit of a few
coastal states" of property worth billions of dollars. It was his
opinion that the property belonged to the 155 million people of the
nation.l~+ A pz?oposed Senate vote to override the President's veto,
which requires a two-thirds majority, was not taken before Congress
ad ~ ourned .
F. USSR
The outcome of the dispute between Great Britain and
Norway has had no noticeable effect on the basic policy of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the littoral sea.
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Indirectly, the Soviet Union may find the Court's decision beneficial.
The Soviets have claimed a 12-mile limit for their own territ;oriel
sea while insisting on the ri t to approach within 3 miles of the
shores of other countries.l44 The USSR has maintained in tYie past
that no general rules exist governing the extent of a nation's
territorial sea and that it is a matter for each nation to decide
for itself.145 It is the opinion of some observers that the:
ruling-handed down by the Hague Court strengthens the Soviet case.
Since the end of World War II, the USSR has been involvE~d in
a series of incidents concerning her claim to a 12-mile territorial
sea.l46/ Seizures of fishing vessels by the Soviets have become
more frequent in an effort to discourage nationals of non-Cot~unist
countries from fishing in waters adjacent to the USSR. British,
Nor~segian, Danish, Swedish, Finnish, West German, and Japane,~e
vessels have been detained. In many instances, the evidence
reveals that the incidents occurred well beyond the 12-mile :Limit.
147 14~1~,/150 151/152
In 1951, in an exchange of notes with Sweden and Denmark over
jurisdiction in the Baltic Sea, the USSR referred to a 1909 'Psarist
decree claiming 12 nautical miles as the territorial limit f~~r
customs purposes.l5 Another law cited extended Soviet jurisdiction
over fisheries throughout the 4Thite Sea and 12 miles off the coast
of the Barents Sea. This claim to a 12-mile limit is based on the
existence of three statutes promulgated in 1921, 1927, and 1935?
154/155/ By adoption of these decrees, the USSR reaffirmed its
stand that the 12-mile limit applied to all coasts of the country,
with the exception of areas where such a limit would overlap with
foreign claims.
The motives of the USSR for claiming and enforcing a 12-mile
limit are. not clear-cut. Several plausible reasons have been
advanced for the present Soviet policy,l56/ including (1) a desire
on the part of the USSR and its satellites to prevent the entry of
unauthorized persons behind the "Iron Curtain and to prohibit
Soviet emigration, and (2) an attempt to prevent the observation
and photographing of the coast and coastal activities. On the
over-all question of the littoral. sea, it appears that the primary
aim of the USSR is the effective control of the seas crashing its
shores, particularly the Baltic and Black Seas. At the same time
it is evident that the Soviet Union is unwilling to settle rr.atters
through established international organizations.
1. Relations with Sweden and Denmark
Before ~r7orld .?1ar II, Swedish and Danish fisYiermen
regularly caught salmon off the coasts of Latvia, Lithuania, and
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East Prussia. Fishing was carried on outside the 3- and ~+-mile
limits claimed by the Governments of the Baltic States and of
Germany.157/ At the end of the war, both the Swedes and the
Danes returned to their former fishing grounds in this area, but
in 1~~+8 the Russians began to arrest and detain foreign fishing
vessels operating, in the Baltic Sea.158/ Notes were exchanged
between Sweden and the USSR regarding the series of incidents, the
Russians justifyir~ their actions by citing the decree of 127,
which applied a 1.2-mile limit to all Soviet territorial sea. A
Swedish note to the USSR pointed out that in 127 the southeastern
shore of the Baltic was not Soviet territory and that therefore the
12-mile limit did not apply to the Baltic States.l5~ The reply
stated that Soviet legislation automatically included the Baltic
States upon their joining the USSR .160/
In July 157_, Sweden and_ Denmark jointly suggested that the
matter be referrEsd to the International Court of Justice, but the
Soviets re:E`used the request, declaring that they were free to define
their z-raters as they chose .16~
It ilas then rumored that the Sfredish and Danish Governments
were contemplating discussions with the, USSR regarding a possible
agreement by which fishing boats of all-three countries could fish
anywhere outside the 4-mile limit despite the Russian claim of a.
12-mile limit. ~Che rumored agreement ~~rould be similar to a treaty
concluded by the Russians with Great Britain in 1930 concerning
fishing in the Axctic Ocean and-the White Sea.l62/
Later, P,'Ir. Sven Dahlman., Director of the Political Affairs
Division of the Swedish Foreign Office, stated that the Danes-and
the Swedes had decided-that it would be better to-await the
decision in the .Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case before determining
what to do next.163/164/ Although it appeaxs that the ruling
handed down by the World Court did not help the S~:redish-Danish
cause, both countries are anxious to settle the problem of fishing
limits with the USSR. It has been estimated that Denmark alone is
losing a million kroner a year because of the Soviet restrictions.
The Danish ne~rspaper9 Ekstrabladet9 in March 1952 reported that
S:~reden and Denmark intended to dispatch a joint note to the Soviet
Union in reply to its rejection of the idea of submitting the
question of territorial-sea limits to the International Court.
l~ 166 167. Three months later, similar notes addressed by the
Swedish and Danish Governments to the USSR were delivered by the
Scandinavian Ministers in Moscow. The notes stress the point made
in the findings of the Hague Court in the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries
dispute to the effect that the Court has proper jurisdiction over
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such matters.168/16 170/ No change in the attitude of the Soviets
was expected, but the Governments o.i bath countries believfw that the
notes will place on record their official views and keep tl~.e issue
open.
2. Attitudes of Soviet Satellites
Among the USSR satellites, only Rumania and Bulgaria
mil/ have made postwar revisions of claims to territorial :yea. Each
of these countries noti~r maintains a 12-mile limit, and it i;; likely
that this precedent may be followed by Poland, Albania, and
Communist China.l72/ Recently Poland warned both Sweden ar~d Denmark
that "illegal." fishing in Polish waters would be severely I~unished.
Poland has not yet defined its claims, but Swedish fishermen fear
that the Poles, like the Russians, may insist on a 12-mile limit.
173/17+/
G. Norway-Sweden
The decision of the Hague Tribunal has created other
problems in respect to fishing rights. Fishermen from parts on the
west coast of Sweden have long frequented the Oslofjord, which is
especially rich in shrimp.l75/ The Norwegians also fish in these
waters, and after World War II they discovered that the Swedes,
whose ships and equipment had been modernized while Norway ;stagnated
under German occupation, were getting the bulk of the catchy=s.
Norwegian fishermen have protested that mutual concessions made
during the war should no-t continue in time of peace. They Neel that
under present conditions it is not necessary for the Swedes to fish
in the limited Norwegian shrimp grounds .176/ As a result o:? this
controversy, Norwegian authorities have declared that fishing by
Swedish trawlers inside an area 4 miles from the base line ~.s illegal.
A temporary agreement on Swedish rights in the fjord was finally
reached between the two Governments, but it will expire at t;he end.
of 1955? Stti~eden fears that Norway may then cite the Intern~~tional
Court's ruling as justification for excluding the Sz-cedes altogether.
H. Great Britain-France
For some 300 years, England and France have been contending
for ownership of English Channel islets, Minquiers and Ecrehos.l77
The Minquiers group lies approximately 17 miles and Ecrehos about
7 miles from the French coast. Fishing rights are involved, for the
waters surrounding the islets are valuable fishing grounds, with
lobster and mollusks the main catch. An interesting sidelight on
the general fisheries problem was the decision by the Goverrvnents
of Great Britain and France to submit the dispute on sovereignty
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rights over the t~~ro islets to the International Court of eTustice
for settlement.178 17 The British and French have reached an
advance agreement concerning the right to fish in the area o.f these
islets pending the decision of the Court.1~30
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GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
Aimast all the; source material. on the Anglo-Nort-regian Fisheries
Case was available or readily obtainable. The only serious gap in
information concerns the "yellow line,"-the compromise base line
proposed by the British to the Norwegians in ly4g. It is believed
that official charts ar reports bearing on this line are in existence,
but they are not available. However, an inset map showing the
"yellow line," clipped from a Norwegian newspaper and enclosed with
a Department of State despatch, was obtained.
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SOURCES AND EVALUATION OF .SOURCES
25X1A
25X1A
1. Evaluation of Sources
The sources c;overing the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case were
voluminous and diverse. The primary official sources were
excellent in both coverage and quality. Department of State
despatches were oi' great value in providing information on recent
developments. The; secondary sources used for background material
were bath accurate: and comprehensive.
2. List of Sourcea
1. S. Whittemore Boggs, "Delimitation of the Territorial
Sea," American Journal of Internatianal Law, Vol. 2~+, No. 3,
Ju1-Y 1930, p ? 5~+1, ftn. 1.
2. The Times (London), 19 December 1951?
4. Department of State Despatch 98, Reykjavik, 19 September
1951, enclosure ~+ (Confidential).
5. International Court of Justice, The Hague, Fisheries
Case -- United Ki;n.~dom vs . Norway _ Jud~xnent, 18 December 1951,
p. 173.-
6. Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, Memorial submitted in the Ang_l.o-Norwegian
Fisheries Case, n.d., pp. 2-27.
7. International Court of Justice, The Iiague, An~lo_
Norwegian Fisheries Case. Order, 9 November 19+9, p? 233?
8. Department of State Despatch 2803, Landon, 21 December 1951.
].0. International Court of Justice, Jud~,cnent, p. 129.
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11. S. Whittemore Boggs, "Delimitation of Seaward Areas Under
National Jurisdiction," American Journal of International Law, Val.
45, April 1951, p. 248.
12. S. Whittemore Boggs, Delimitation of the Territorial Sea,
pp? 543-548. _
13, Department of .State Despatch 268, Oslo, 11 August 149
(Restricted).
14. International Court of Justice, Jud~nent, p. 127.
15? Norway Pilot, Part II (5th Edition), published for the
Iiydrographic Department, British Admiralty, London, 1931, ;p. 20.
16. Denys P. N~yers, Observations on the_Fisheries Case., 17
January 1952, pp. 3-~.. -
17. Government of the United Kingdom, Memorial, p. 27 ff.
18. Manchester Guardian, 19 December 1951.
lg. Philip C. Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters aazd Maritime
Jurisdiction, New York, 1927, p. 31.
20. International Court of Justice, Ju ent, p. 133?
21. Ibid., p. 132.
22. Government of the United Kingdom, Memorial, Annex 2
(Charts), n.d.
23, Government of-the United Kingdom, Reply in the A~n;lo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case, Annex 35 (Charts), n.d.
24. Norwegian Government, Au Contre-Memoire du Gouverr.~ement
Norve ien Affaire o-Norve ienne des Pecheries, July 1c, 50, Annexe
2 Charts .
25. Norwegian Government, A la Duplique du Gouvernement
Norve ien Affaire o-Norve fenne des Pecheries, Annexe 75 (Charts
Charts), n.d.
26. Department of State Despatch 273, Oslo, 15 August 1949
(Confidential)..
27. Department of State Despatch 306, Oslo,'12 September 1948.
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28. Goverxunen~t of the United Kingdom, Memorial, pp. 10,
15, 21-22. .
2g. Ibid., pp. 25-26.
30. Government of the United Kixagdom, Re 1 in the A lo-
Norwe~ian Fisheries Case, Vol. I (text), 8 June 1951, p. 2 7.
31. Department of State Despatch 273, Oslo, 15 August 19+9
(Confidential).
32. International Court of Justice, Jud~nent, p. 125.
33? Ibid., p. 133.
31+. William E. Masterson, Jurisdiction in Marginal Seas,
New York, lg2q, p. 388.
35? Department of State Despatch 3757, London, 26 February
1952.
36. W.O. Blanchard and S.S. Visher, Economic Geography of
Europe, New York, 1931, pp. 317-318
37. U.S..Boax?d of Economic Warfare, The Norwe ion Fishi
Industr~r, BEW, Enemy Branch (32-2213), 27 April 193?
38. Facts About Norwav, Oslo, 198, p. 36.
39 ? Sverre Mortenson and A. Sktrlien, editors, The 1Vorway
Yearbook, 1950, Oslo, p. 305.
40. Norwegian Export Council, Norwayy (Survey of Ex_ports_ and
Economic DevelopxnE;nts , 19+8, p. 26.
~+1. Arne Datum and Carl Just, Look a;t Norway, London, 1951,
P? 7?
~+2. National Intelligence Survey, Norwa , Chapter VIA Section
61, "Agriculture and Food," February 1951, p. 61-29 (Restricted).
~+3. Department of State Despatch 63, Bergen, 13 February 1951.
~+~+. The Norway Yearbook, 1950, p. 305.
~+5. Department of State Despatch 38, Bergen, 16 November 1950.
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25X1A2g
25X1A2g
25X1X7
~+7. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Production and
Food Cans tion in Western Euro e, Agriculture MonograpYi 10, July
1951 p - 1
~+8. Department of State Despatch 22, Bergen, 21 March 1950.
~+9. Odd Holaas, The World of the Norseman, London, 1.950, p. 60.
50. Department of State Despatch ~0, Bergen, 27 November 1950.
51. The Norway Yearbook, 1950, p. 305.
52. Ibid., p. 307.
53? Norwegian Export Council, op. cit., p. 26.
5~+
55? Odd Holaas, ou. cit... p. 60.
56. Harry Hansen, editor, The World Almanac and Book of Facts,
New York, 1952, p? 338?
57? Charles P. Barry, Editor-in-Chief, Collier's Encyclopedia,
Vol. 15, New York, 1950, p. 26.
58. The Norway Yearbook, 1950, p. 306.
59?
60. International Court of Justice, Memorial, p. ~+.
61. Fish Trades Gazette, No, 3583, London, g Februar;~ 1952, p. 6 .
62. International Court of Justice, Ju ent, p. 1~+3.
63. Fishing News, No. 2018, London, 22 December 1951,, p. 3.
6~+. International Court of Justice, Jud~nent, pp. 13f3-139
65. Denys P. N.~yers, op. cit., p. 3.
66. International Court of Justice, Ju ent, pp. 120-121.
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67. Government of the United Kingdom, Amended Conclusions
(filed by the Agent of the United Kingdom Government at the end of
the pleadings in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case).
68. Ibid.
69. Government of the United Kingdom, Reply in the Anglo-
Nox~de~ian Fisheries Case, Vol. II, Annexes, n.d., p. 32.
70, Robert Nf. Vaughn, "Delimitation of Norwegian Fisheries
Zone,`? Geographical Review, Val. XLII, No. 2, April 1952, pp. 302-304.
71. International Court of Justice, Ju ent, p. 129.
72. Ibid., p. 131.
73. .United ATations General Assembly, International Law
Commission, Fourth Session, Report on the Re?zime of the Territorial
Sea, 4 April 1952, p. 26.
74. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 19 December 1951,
p . YY 1.
75. International Court of Justice, Ju ent, pp. 123, 126.
76. Department of State Despatch 3402, London, 4 Februaxy 1952,
with enclosure from The Economist, 26 January 1952, entitled
"Northern Waters in Dispute."
77. Department of State Despatch 618, Oslo, 21 December 1951.
78. Department of-State Despatch 3244, London, 24 January 1952.
79. Department of State Despatch 74, Reykjavik, 31 August 1951.
80. Department of State Despatch 120, Reykjavik, 7 June 1949?
81. Department of State Despatch 98, Reykjavik, 19 September
1951, enclosure !F (Confidential).
82. Department of State Despatch 74, Reykjavik, 31 August 1951.
83. Department of State Despatch 151, Reykjavik, 28 April 1950
(Confidential).
84. Depaxtme:nt of State Despatch 167, Reykjavik, 4 May 1950 .
(Confidential).
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85. Department of State Despatch 253, Reykjavik, 11 January
1952 (Secret).
86. Department of State Despatch 251, Reykjavik, 11 January
1952 (Confidential).
87. Department of State Despatch 297, Reykjavik, 7 February
1952 (Secret).
88. Department of State Incoming Telegram No. 140, Reykjm~.vik,
19 March 1952.
8g. Department of State Despatch 354, Reykjavik, 20 March 1952.
90. Department of State Despatch 367, Reykjavik, 25 March 1952.
91. Department of State Despatch 373, Reykjavik, 28 March 1952
(Confidential).
g2. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 21 March 1952,
p.YY3.
93. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 5 May 1952, pp, YY 2-3.
g4. Department of State Despatch 5246, London, 6 May 1952.
95? Department of State Despatch 424, Reykjavik, 2 May 19~~2,
enclosure 2 (Confidential).
96. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 16 May 1952, p. YY 4.
97. Department of State Despatch 6136, London, 25 June 1952
(Confidential).
98. Department of State Despatch 6176, London, 27 June 1952.
99. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 19 May 1952, p. W 1.
100. Department of State Despatch 468, Reykjavik, 28 May 1952
(Confidential).
101. Department of State Incoming Telegram No. 56, Reykjavik,
17 August 1950 (Confidential).
102. Department of State Despatch 5178, London, 27 April 1951,
enclosure (Confidential).
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103. Department of State Despatch 5583, London, 18 May 1851,
enclosure (Goni'idential).
101+. The Times (London), 20 December 1951.
105. Fishir~ News,, No. 2021, London, 12 January 1952, p. 3.
106. Manchester Guardian, lg December 1851.
107. Department of State Despatch 1109, The Hague, lg
December 1951 (Restricted).
108. Ibid.
lOg. Department of. State Despatch 3757, London, 26 February
1852.
110. Fish Trades Gazette, Na. 3581, London, 26 January 1952, p.
25X1A p. 5.
112. Depart:~.ent cf State Despatch 321+1+, London, 21+ January
1952.
25X1A
113. Department of State Despatch 41+08, Londan, 26 March 1852,
115. Department of State Despatch g07, Belgrade, 20 December
181+8, enclosure .
116. Department of State Despatch gg, Belgrade, 20 December
19~, enclosure ..
11.7. Ib id .
118. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 26 May 1952, p. WW 6.
119. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 27 June 1952,
p.ww3.
120. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 3 July 1852, p. WW 3.
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121. United States Senate, 82nd Congr:~ss, First Session,
Submerged Lands, Hearings before the Committee on Interior acid
Insular Affairs on S.J. Res. 20, Washington, D.C.,19-22 February
1951 (including Conferences with Executive Departments on S. 940,
28 March and 10 April 1951}.
122. A.L. Shalo:,ritz, "Cartography in the Submerged Lands Oil
Cases," Surveying and Mapping, July-September-1951, p. 225.
123. Ibid., pp. 225, 236.
124. S. Whittemore Boggs, "National Claims in Adjacent SE~as,"
Geographical Review, VVol. XLI, No.22, April 1951, pp. 206-20#3.
125. United Nations General Assembly, International Law
Commission (Fourth Session), Regime of the High Seas, 16 May 1;52,
p. 6.
126. Department of State Despatch 339, Copenhagen, 1 Apr:tl 1950,
enclosure.
127. United States of America, Plaintiff vs. State of Ca:Lifornia,
Brief for the United States Before the Special,2daster, Supreme Court
of the United States, October Term, 1951 (No. 6 Original), p~?.
123-124.
128. The Washington Post, 29 April 1952, editoria7_.
129. A.L. Shalowitz, ap. cit., p. 236.
130. The Washington Post, 10 May 1952, editorial..
131. Tlie Washington Post, 13 June 1952, editorisl.
132. United States of America, Plaintiff vs. State of
California, Brief for-the United States, p. 93.
133. Ibid., pP? 93-94?
134. "U.S. Policy on Fisheries and Territorial Waters,"
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXVI, No. 679, 30 June 1912, pp.
1021-1023.
135. Proceedings and Debates of the 82nd Congress, Secon+~
Session, Congressional Record, Vol. 98, No. 21, Washington, :L1
February 1952, p. 982.
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135. United States of America, Plaintiff vs. State of
California, Brief for the United States, p. 173.
137 . Con.~re s s ioiza_l. Record, Vol . g3 . No . 21, p . 981.
138 . Ibid . , :pp ? g~'>1, g83 .
1J9. Ibid., ;p. g83.
1~+0. United States of America, Plaintiff vs. State of
California, Brief for the United States, p. 28.
141. The Washington Post, 15 May 1952.
142. The ~~7s,shi .gton Post, 17 May 1952.
143. The Washington Post, 30 May 1952.
1-~4. Department of State Incoming Airgram 2785, Moscow,
1 August 19~~9 (Restricted).
145. Department of State Despatch 90, Stockholm, 31 July 1951
(Confidential).
11i~6. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Research Department, Note
on the Soviet Claim of a 12 R4i1e Limit of Territorial Waters
USSR 68 50), December 1950, pp. 1E-5.
147. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 24 March 1952:
p . SS 7 .
148. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 14 May 1952, p. YY 4.
25X1A
150. Department of State Despatch 560, Helsinki, 11 January 1952.
151. The ';Tashin~?;ton,Post, 4 May 1852.
25X1A
153? Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest o:F International Law, Vol.
I, Washington, 1940, p. 632.
25X1A
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25X1A
155. Department of State Incoming Airgram 2785, Mascow,
enclosures (Restricted).
158. Department of State Despatch 59, Copenhagen, 21 July 1950
(Restricted).
159, Department of State Despatch 90, Stockholm, 31 July 1951,
enclosure (C-onfidential).
160. Department of State Despatch 18~+, Stockholm, 31 August
1951 (Restricted).
161. Department of State Despatch 819, Stockholm, 17 April
1952 (Confidential).
162. Department of State Despatch x+32, Stockholm, 28 November
1951 (Secret).
163. Ibid.
16~+. Department of State Despatch 825, Copenhagen, 3 April 1952.
165. Ibid.
166. Fareign Broadcast Information Service, 31 March 19.52,
p . YY 1.
167. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 29 May 1952, p. YY 1.
168. Department of State Despatch 95~+_, Stockholm, 23 ~;Y 1952
(Confidential).
169. Department of State Despatch 1106, Copenhagen, 12 ,June
1952 (Confidential).
170. Department of State Despatch 1112, Copenhagen, 13-June
1952 (Confidential).
171. "Ukase for the Territorial and Internal. Waters of -the
P-eople's Republic of Bulgaria," Izvestia of the Presiaium a:f the
National Assembly, No. 85, 23 October 1951.
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25X1A
25X1A
173. Department of State Despatch 3+02, London, ~+ February
25~~~' enclosure .
175. Department of State Despatch 57q, Oslo, 2 October 1950.
176. Ibid.
177. The New York Times, 16 December 1951..
179. International Court of Justice, The Minauiers and. Ecrehos
Case (United Kingdom/ ante}~ Reports of JudSraents, Advisory
Opinions and Orders, Order of 15 January 1852.
180. Department of State Despatch 3302, Landon, 28 January 1952.
SECRET
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