FOREIGN SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM IN OCTOBER 1965

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01003A002400170001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1965
• Content Type: BRIEF

WARNING NOTICE -.SENSITIVE,
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/05/1-7:
INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
Copy No.
FOREIGN SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM IN OCTOBER 1965
Office of Research and Reports
GROUP. 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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FOREWORD
The data in this publication are preliminary and subject to modifica-
tion as additional information becomes available. Significant changes
may occur in data on ship arrivals and cargoes from Communist China
and, to a lesser extent, in data on cargoes carried by ships of the Free
World. Data on Soviet and Eastern European ship arrivals and cargoes
and on Free World ship arrivals are not likely to be changed significantly.
As required, changes will be reported in subsequent publications.
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FOREIGN SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM IN OCTOBER 1965*
Increasing signs of the effects of the war marked developments in
North Vietnam's foreign shipping in October. No exports of cement
? were observed, probably the result of transport disruption and the need
for cement in reconstruction. Because of the interdiction of the rail lines
from the mines, apatite exports also remained at a standstill. There is
evidence that exports to Hungary may decline sharply in the last quarter.
Finally, import cargo has accumulated in large amounts in and around
the port of Haiphong.
A total of 34 foreign merchant ships -- half of them Communist and
half Free World -- called at North Vietnam's ports in October. A notable
change from September was the increase in Free World ships from 11 to
17, but calls by Free World shipping were still below the monthly average
for 1965, as follows:
September
October
Monthly Average
January-October 1965
Total
30
3
Communist countries
19
17
20
USSR
3
4
6
Eastern Europe
3
4
4
Communist China
1.3
9
10
Free World.
11
17
23
Cyprus
0
1
N
Greece
eg
0
1
3
3
Norway
3
2
3
United. Kingdom
u
13
11
Other
0
0
6
The volume of identified seaborne exports was only 74, 000 metric
tons (mt), the lowest monthly volume of the year. No exports of apatite
or cement were identified. Exports of coal were at nearly the lowest
level of the year because of reduced imports by Japan and because
anticipated imports by Western Europe failed to materialize.
* The estimates and conclusions in this brief represent the best judg-
ment of this Office as of 15 November 1965.
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Identified seaborne imports amounted to 62, 000 mt, 22 percent above
the monthly average for the first ten months of the year. Imports of
petroleum (22, 000 mt) and of bulk foodstuffs (16, 400 mt) reached the
highest monthly volumes of the year. No shipments of arms or ammuni-
tion were identified.
New amendments to US foreign assistance legislation provide, under
certain conditions, for the cutting off of US aid to those countries whose
ships call at North Vietnamese ports. The new legislation can be ex-
pected to have little deterrent effect on Free World shipping to North
Vietnam, because British-flag ships are now the main Free World
carriers. Moreover, a number of the Free World ships trading with
North Vietnam are expected to continue in this trade after changing
their registries to countries not affected by the US legislation.
1. Communist Shipping
The 17 calls made by Communist ships at North Vietnam in October
represent the second lowest monthly total of this year and were 3 less
than the monthly average for the first ten months of 1965. Both Soviet
and Chinese Communist ships made fewer calls than usual. Chinese
ships, with nine calls, accounted for more than half of the Communist
total. Soviet and Polish-flag ships made four calls each.
Despite their relatively low number, Communist ships accounted
for half of the foreign merchant ship arrivals at North Vietnam in
October and continued to increase their share of the carriage of North
Vietnam's seaborne trade as follows:
Percent of Identified Seaborne Trade
Carried by Communist Ships
October 1965 January-September 19?1
25X1C Imports
Exports
59
25
68
18
are receiving bonuses of between 1 0 and 150
Soviet crews
percent o ase pay, compared with the 100 percent bonus that has be-
come the standard for crews of Free World ships.
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II. Free World Shipping
Seventeen Free World ships entered North Vietnamese ports in
October. This was the highest number of calls by Free World ships
since July but was below the monthly average thus far this year.
British-flag ships continued to predominate, accounting for 13 of the
17 port calls. Norwegian ships made two calls, and single visits were
made by ships of Greek and Cypriot registry.
The continued lack of apatite for export was the principal factor
retarding Free World shipping in October. The withdrawal of Free:
World shipping from trade with North Vietnam has been occurring
gradually since last January as US involvement has.increased. This
trend, however, probably has not run its full course.
Additional temporary withdrawals of Free World ships under
certain flags may be stimulated by recent amendments of US foreign
assistance legislation which provide, under certain conditions, for
the halting of US aid to countries whose ships call at North Vietnamese
ports. In the long run, however, the effectiveness of the legislation
probably will be diluted as ships change registry to countries unaffected
by the legislation.
Nearly all of the Free World ships trading with North Vietnam in
October were known to be chartered to Communist countries. At least
11 of the 13 UK-flag ships were operating under time charter to Com-
munist China, and two of the 11 were under subcharter to North Vietnam.
The Greek-flag ship also was chartered to Communist China and;?.the
Cypriot-flag ship to North Vietnam. Both Norwegian ships were under
Soviet charters to carry fruit to Soviet Far East ports.
Free World ships carried 60 percent of North Vietnam's identified
seaborne trade in October. Only four Free World ships carried cargoes
to North Vietnam, consisting mainly of bulk foodstuffs and fertilizers,
which amounted to about 41 percent of North Vietnam's identified sea-
borne imports. All 12 Free World ships that departed from North 'Vietnam
in October were fully loaded and carried 75 percent of all identified sea-
borne exports from North Vietnam. Eight of these ships carried coal to
Communist China and Japan, three carried fruit to the Soviet Far East,
and one carried pig iron to Japan. The export of pig iron to Japan was
the first observed export of this commodity since August.
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The smaller Japanese importers of North Vietnamese anthracite
have continued to press the Japanese Shipowners Association to return
their ships to the North Vietnam trade (from which they were withdrawn
last March) because these importers are having difficulty in arranging
transport of coal from North Vietnam. Their difficulties stem more
from a shortage of small carriers than from a general lack of tonnage.
In spite of the pleas of these coal importers and additional pressure
from leftist trade promotion associations, Japanese shipowners re-
mained adamant in refusing to allow their ships to risk voyages to
North Vietnam.
Another demonstration of continuing concern for the risks entailed
by calls at North Vietnamese ports involved a Greek-flag -ship under
Chinese Communist charter to carry flour from Italy. The Chinese
failed to overcome the captain's refusal to land his cargo at Haiphong.
Consequently, the flour will be offloaded at a Chinese port and will
have to be transshipped to North Vietnam.
III. Cargoes
The volume of identified seaborne cargoes moving through North
Vietnam's maritime ports in October was 136, 000 mt, the highest
monthly total since July. Seaborne imports were relatively large, but
seaborne exports were the smallest of any month of this year.
Import cargoes totaled 62, 000 mt, compared with the monthly
average of about 50, 000 mt for the first three quarters of this year.
Imports consisted principally of petroleum (22, 000 mt), bulk food-
stuffs (16, 400 mt), and fertilizers (10, 600 mt). Shipments of both
petroleum and bulk foodstuffs were larger than in any previous month
of 1965. All of the petroleum was carried from Soviet ports by Soviet
ships. None of the seaborne cargoes delivered during October was
identified as arms or ammunition.
Identified seaborne exports from North Vietnam in October
amounted to 74, 000 mt, compared with an average monthly volume
of 138, 300 mt in the first three quarters of this year. Coal accounted
for 73 percent of seaborne exports, and the balance consisted of fruit,
pig iron, and other general cargoes.
The main reason for the low volume of exports was the lack of
apatite. This commodity was exported at the rate of 43, 800 mt a
month in the first half of this year, but none has been shipped since
early in August. The shortage is a result of bomb damage to the rail
line from the apatite mines at Lao Cai.
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Seaborne exports of coal in October totaled only 54, 000 mt, com-
pared with the average monthly volume of 81, 200 mt in the first three
quarters. All of the coal exports went to Communist China (32, OOCI mt)
and Japan (22, 000 mt). The absence of coal shipments to Western
Europe at this time of year may be an indication that some European
coal importers are turning to other markets, following the increased
US involvement in Vietnam.
The decline in coal shipments to Japan accounts for most of the
27, ZOO mt gap between the volume of North Vietnamese exports of coal
in October and the average monthly volume for the first three quarters.
The second quarter was the only period of this year in. which Japanese
importers received their proclaimed quota of 50, 000 mt a month. Their
imports averaged only 37, 300 mt a month in~the third quarter and reached
a new low for the year in October. Some Japanese firms reportedly have
cut back imports of North Vietnamese coal after finding themselves over-
stocked because of a general decline in industrial activity. At the same
time, however, some of the smaller coal importers are claiming that
shipping problems are preventing them from getting North Vietnamese
anthracite in sufficient quantities.
These reports are not necessarily contradictory. The smaller
importers probably are having difficulty in hiring the small coal carriers
that can most economically distribute the relatively low-volume shipments
that their facilities can accommodate. The Japanese ships of about
2, 800 GR.T that were withdrawn from the coal runs to North Vietnam
last March were well suited to their requirements, but most of the Free
World ships currently servicing North Vietnam's coal trade are con-
siderably larger, averaging well over 5, 000 GRT.
The complete absence of exports of cement also contributed to the
low volume of seaborne exports from North Vietnam in October. Al-
though shipments of cement have fluctuated from month to month, the
following data reveal a distinct decline in the volume of cement exports
since the first quarter of this year:
Monthly Average
Thousand, Metric Tons)
1964 11.7
1965
First Quarter
11.6
Second. Quarter
7.3
Third. Quarter
4.4
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One possible explanation for the decline is that exports have been
cut back to meet increased domestic requirements, particularly for
military construction and for the reconstruction of bomb-damaged
structures. Production also may have been hampered by occasional
disruptions to the supply of the 33, 000 mt of gypsum required annually
by North Vietnamese cement plants. Although all other materials are
available locally, the gypsum is supplied by Communist China. If the
Chinese gypsum had been shipped over land routes to North Vietnam,
shipments probably have been disturbed by transportation delays,
thereby reducing both cement production and the surplus available for
export. An alternative explanation for the decline in identified exports
of cement is that Communist China may be taking more North Vietnamese
cement. Cement exports carried by Communist Chinese ships could go
undetected.
North Vietnam's worsening export position makes it unlikely that
the 1964 volume of seaborne exports will be surpassed this year, even
though the volume to date is in excess of the 1964 level. There is
evidence that exports to Hungary, which were on schedule up to Sep-
tember, may fall 20 percent short of plan by the end of the year.
An experienced observer visiting Haiphong in October reported
accumulations of import cargo in and around the port area. Comparisons
of the volume of general cargoes shipped through Haiphong on foreign
flag merchant ships in 1964 and in the first ten months of this year pro-
vide no explanation for the congestion. Furthermore, Haiphong's trans-
port links with Hanoi and other major industrial centers are considered
to have remained capable of carrying without difficulty the normal
volumes of cargoes that pass through the port. If cargo congestion
does exist, it is attributable to disorganization or to increased imports
on Chinese Communist ships, the volume and nature of which are identi-
fied only rarely.
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Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals in North Vietnam
September, October, and Cumulative January-October 1965
,~ Cumulative
September J October January-October a~
Percent Percent Percent
Num- of Num- of Num- of
Flag ber Total b/ ber Total b/ ber Total b~
Total 30 100.0 34 100.0 44.F" 100,0
Communist countries 19 63.3 17 50.0 205 47?2
USSR 3 10.0 4 11.8 62 14,.3
Eastern Europe 3 .10.0 4 11.8 41 9,.4
Albania 1 0.2
Bulgaria. 2 0.5
Czechoslovakia 4 0.9
Poland 3 10.0 4 11.8 34 7.8
Communist China 13 43.3 9 26.5 102 23.5
Free World 11 36.7 17 50.0 229 52.8
Cyprus
France
Greece.
Italy
Japan
Lebanon
Liberia
Malta
Netherlands
Norway
Panama
United Kingdom
1 2.9 2 0.5
1 0.2
1 2.9 26 6.0
1 0.2
37 8..-5
9 2.1
3 0.7
2 0.5
5 1.2
3 10.0 2 5.9 28 6.5
1 0.2
8 26.7 13 38.2 114 26.3
a. Including one additional Chinese Communist ship, not previously re-
ported, which arrived in September.
b. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
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Tonnage of Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals in North Vietnam
September, October, and Cumulative January-October 1965
September
October
Cumulative
January-
October
Thousand
Thousand
Thousand
Gross
Gross
Gross
Register
Register
Register
Flamm.
Number
Tons
Number
Tons
Number
Tons
Total
145.6
3344
178.6
4i
2,120.0
Communist countries
19
81.7
17
85.6
205
1,028.0
USSR
3
23.9
4
28.7
62
398.4
Eastern Europe
3
19.1
4
27.7
41
282.5
Communist China
13
44.1
9
29.3
102
347.1
Free World
11
58.5
17
93.0
229
1,092.1
a. Many Soviet and Eastern European ships calling at North Vietnamese
ports pick up or discharge only small parts of their total cargoes in
North Vietnam, and many of the Free World ships only pick up export car-
goes. For this reason, with the possible exception of Chinese Communist
ships, aggregate tonnage of ships calling is not closely correlative to
actual volume of cargoes moving into and out of North Vietnam, but these
data are of value as indications of relative changes in the volume of
shipping. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals
shown.
b. Including an additional Chinese Communist ship of 5,614 GRT, not
previously reported, which arrived in September.
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Identified North Vietnamese Imports Carried by Foreign-Flag Ships a
October 1965
Ammonium
Sulf ate Grain
and Other and Other
Flag Fertilizers Petroleum Foodstuffs Pyrites Timber Miscellaneous Total
Total
Communist countries
USSR
Eastern Europe
Communist China
Free World
10.6 22.0 16.4 2.7 1.9 8.4 62.0
2.6 22.0 1.1 227 1.9 600 36.3
2.6 22.0 2.7 1.9 1.5 30.7
4.2 4.2
8.0 0 15.3 0
2.4 25.7 H
a. Identified imports include some estimates of bulk cargoes using methods which have proved to
be highly reliable.
b. An additional unknown quantity of imports was carried by Chinese Communist ships.
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Identified North Vietnamese Exports
Carried by Foreign-Flag Ships a/
October 1965
Commodity
Flag Coal
Apatite
Cement
Pik; Iron
Miscel-
laneous
Total
Total 51+.0
0
0
3.3
16.8
74.o
Communist countries
5.0
0
0
13.6
18.6
USSR
8.7
8.7
Eastern Europe
2.6
2.6
Communist China b/
5.0
2.3
7.3
Free World
1+9.0
0
0
3-3
3+1
55.4
a. Identified exports include some estimates of bulk cargoes using
methods which have proved to be highly reliable. Because of rounding,
components may not add to the totals shown.
b. An additional unknown quantity of exports was carried by Chinese
Communist ships.
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Analysts:
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CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION 25X1A
SERIES NUMBER
CIA/RR CB 65-67
CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
SECRET/NFD
DISTRIBUTION TO RC 25X1 A
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143
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19 Nov 65
144
St/P
if
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OCR 25X1 A
II
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152
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153
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i~
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25X1 C
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1
159
7
160
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167
168
~i
169
170
171
172-17
Filed in St P C
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St/A/DS Distribution of Current Support Brief No.
~ wetnamj ShLoginge t w6~ U October 1965 --? November 19 i
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30 November 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Dissemination Control Branch, DD/CR
Chief, Publications Staff, ORR
It is requested that the attached copies of CIA/RR CB
rig tai North Vietnam in October 1965 November 1965,
State, INR Communications Center,
Room 6527, State Dept. Bldg.
Suggested distribution for
Embassies in Wellington Camberral
Melbourne, Bangkok, gong .Kngt
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and Vientiare
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Copy No. 7 of report)
ACTION COMPLETED
Yho disseminatron requested by
this memorandum has beorr completed,
55-67, Fore
ecret/NO'
f~ti
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Project No.
Report Series CIA/RR CB 65-67
Title: Foreign Shipping to North Vietnam in October 1965 (SECRET/NO
FOREIGN DISSEM)
Responsible Analyst and Branch T /IS 25X1 A
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SA/VA (hand carried by St/P/C on 19 Nov 65)
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Attn: Warren Phelps
Defense Intelligence Agency, DIASA-2C, Room 2D233, Pentagon
I - DIAAP-2,
Room ,
Chief, Yankee Team Task Force, DIAXX
- liffillijiJiM Intelligence Support
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i (for Lt. Col. Fred Lang,
COMUS MAC V)
(for Col. Patterson 25X1A
~-
141 25X1A
Chief, CIA/PIC (NPIC), Room 3NI21, Attn:
142
Mr. Cheater Cooper, Room 380, Executive Office Buildi,r
143 - 199
St/P/C/RR, Room 4F41, Hq.
(held in St/P/C, 19 Nov 65
200 - 247
Defense Intelligence Agency,
Arlington Hall Station
DT.AAO-3, A Building,
- 300
Records Center
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79f01003AO02400170001-6
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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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