POSSIBLE REVISION OF SOVIET GRAIN STATISTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01003A002200180001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1965
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 200 TF W 1003A002200180U01-7
INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
CIA/RR CB 65-18
March 1965
Copy No.
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Research and Reports
CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02200180001-7
 Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02200180001-7
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Alproved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02200180001-7
 Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : Cl P 9 0100 A002200180001-7
C-O-N-F-I-D- - - -A-
POSSIBLE REVISION OF SOVIET GRAIN STATISTICS
Recent articles in the Soviet press and a change in the titles of
tables on production of grain in the 1963 yearbook on the Soviet economy
(published in February 1965) strongly suggest that Soviet officials are
preparing to revise downward their statistics on production of grain and
possibly of some other crops. To date, the extent to which the statistics
may be revised downward is not known. CIA estimates of production of
grain since 1957 have been below Soviet claims by as much as 25 percent
and have averaged 19 percent below official claims for the 1958-63 period,
In contrast, CIA grain estimates for the crop years from 1950 to 1957
were, with the exception of 1956, within 5 percent of Soviet claims. The
differences that have developed in recent years are believed to be due
largely to a change in 1958 in the Soviet method of calculating production.
In addition, there probably also has been some statistical falsification.
1. Evidence of Possible Revision in Official Statistics
A downward revision by the new leaders of statistics on production
of grain would not be unique in the USSR. Malenkov in August 1953
stated that it was "necessary to put an end to the incorrect practice
whereby the results ... in production of grain and other crops were
assessed not by the actual harvest but by the apparent harvest yield
[biological yield]. 11 If for no other reason, it was politically necessary
for the post-Stalin leadership to disassociate itself from the unrealisti-
cally high yields claimed during Stalin's time. Consequently, the sta-
tistics on production of grain published during Khrushchev's regime
were identified as barn harvest.
The pragmatic approach to agriculture displayed to date by ..
Khrushchev's successors strongly suggests that the new leadership
will attempt to correct the statistical distortions in reporting produc-
tion of grain permitted since 1958. It is almost certain that the delay
of some 3 to 4 months in the release of the 1963 yearbook was a reflec-
tion of the intense controversy that this problem must have engendered.
By a footnote indicating as much and by the omission of "barn harvest"
(ambarniiy urozhay) in the titles of the tables, it is made clear in the
1963 yearbook that data on production of grain is on the basis of "bunker
weight" (bunkerniy vyes). Bunker weight is the weight of the grain as
it is unloaded from the bunkers or hoppers on the harvesting combines
or stationary grain thresher and thus includes excess moisture, trash,
weed seeds, dirt, and the like. The barn harvest, on the other hand,
C.-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200180001-7
 Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200180001-7
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
is supposed to be the amount of grain available for utilization after being
cleaned and dried if necessary. The difference between the bunker weight
of the grain harvest and the barn harvest in the USSR is believed to be
about 10 to 15 percent.
A number of articles have been?published in the Soviet press criti-
cizing the use of the concept of bunker weight in determining the level of
grain production. Before the release of the 1963 yearbook, an article
in Red Star of 10 February 1965 calling for "objective and honest statistics"
and speaking out against the "glossing over of shortcomings and the camou-
flaging of one or another negative side" of Soviet life and the "hiding of
truth from the masses" obviously reflected the attitude of the leadership.
On the same day a state farm official caustically commented in Ekono-
micheskaya gazeta on the inability to make "pancakes from grain impuri-
ties. '" This official stated that even though the barn harvest already was
known, the state farm was required by the Central Statistical Administra-
tion to report crop production "on the basis of bunker weight -- that is,
in the overstated condition. " More recently a state farm director from
Tselinograd writing in Selskaya zhizn' on 28 February 1965 pointedly
questioned the use of bunker weight as a measure of the yield and produc-
tion of grain: "The bunker weight contains impurities and moisture which
sometimes exceed 10 to 15 percent of the harvested grain. Nevertheless,
in the annual report our farm includes everything which is taken from the
combine. .. . Whom are we deceiving?"
2. Comparison of CIA Estimates and Official Soviet Statistics on
Production of Grain
Differences between CIA estimates and official Soviet statistics on
production of grain have varied widely over the years (see the table).
Before 1958, CIA estimates of Soviet production of grain made during
the respective crop years were, with the exception of 1956, within 5 per-
cent of the Soviet statistics that were published in 1959. The relatively
large difference in 1956 is attributable to excessive postharvest losses
resulting from the lack of adequate storage facilities. Soviet statistics
on production of grain for the years 1950-55 and 1957 were accepted by
CIA analysts because the divergences from the CIA estimates were
within the range of error of the estimates. Beginning in 1958, however,
CIA estimates have been below Soviet statistics by as much as 25 per-
cent and have averaged 19 percent below official Soviet claims for the
1958-63 period.
Approved For Release 20v1/U4/ Vrk-C'IA-rKD 7*D '01 3' Ot Q00180001-7
 Approved For Releas081/R417C -PDR79f91109,3\002200180001-7
Comparison of Estimated and Official Statistics
on Production of Grain in the USSR
1950-64
Production
(Million Metric Tons
Year
Official
Claims
CIA
Estimates
CIA
Estimates as a Percent
of Official Claims
1950
81
85
105
1951
79
80
101
1952
92
92
100
1953
82
83
101
1954
86
87
101
1955
107
103
96
1956
128
115
90
1957
105
100
95
1958
141
125
89
1959
126
100
79
1960
134
100
75
1961
138
115
83
1962
148
115
78
1963
11l
95
86
1964
N. A.
120 to 125
N.A.
The divergences that began in 1958 between CIA estimates and official
Soviet statistics on production of grain cannot be attributed to a deteriora-
tion in the availability of information used by CIA in making its estimates.
On the contrary, CIA currently uses much more detailed and systematic
information on weather for all of the important agricultural areas in esti-
mating production of grain in the USSR than was available to CIA in the
period 1.950-57. Furthermore, CIA has access to much more information
on crop conditions at various times during the growing season and on
progress in seeding, harvesting, and state procurements. Also of some
use to CIA in making estimates of production of grain is a vast amount
of data on production and yields of grain on a regional basis that has been
published by the USSR since 1958.
3 -
C-O-N-F-I-D-E -N-T-I-A-L
Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200180001-7
 Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200180001-7
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
The large differences between. CIA estimates and Soviet statistics
during the period 1958-64 are believed to be attributable to at least
two factors: (a) to a change in the method of calculating production of
grain, and (b) to an upward "political" bias -- that is, statistical mal-
practices including falsification. Reference has been made in a Soviet
publication (G. Z. Kuparadze, Spravochnik ekonomista, Tbilisi, 1960,
p. 164) to instruction No. 1684 of the Central Statistical Administration
dated 23 April 1958, which apparently gave a new method for calculating
production of grain. This instruction has never been made available to
the West, although a specific request for a copy was submitted to the
USSR.
In the reports submitted by collective and state farms, the grain
crop is reported in terms of the bunker weight. Before 1958 the rayon
components of the Central Statistical. Administration apparently made
the necessary adjustments to the statistics on production of grain re-
ceived from the farms in converting the data to a barn harvest basis.
The new method of calculating production of grain may have been the
use of the bunker weight as equivalent to the barn harvest.
The fact that the difference between CIA estimates and official sta-
tistics is greater than the 10 to 15 percent that has been attributed by
the Soviet authorities to the use of bunker weight rather than the barn
harvest concept strongly suggests that there also is considerable "political"
bias or falsification contained in the Soviet statistics. Following the
plenary session of the Central Committee in January 1961, widespread
statistical malpractices were revealed in all parts of the USSR. Since
1957, Soviet administrators and farm managers have been confronted
with impossible assignments. At times, Khrushchev insisted personally
that officials adopt unrealistic pledges and then made it clear that their
careers depended on meeting these pledges. Many officials reacted by
falsifying records. Opportunists and glory seekers contributed further
to a wave of statistical falsification. Unscrupulous individuals, in hopes
of rapid promotion in the Party or government apparatus, undertook
ridiculously high pledges, some of which subsequently were fulfilled by
padding the statistical reports. The checking of reports during this time
was complicated by the dissolution in 1958 of the machine tractor stations
(MTS's), which had been an effective statistical control mechanism. The
remaining or unexplained difference between CIA estimates and official
statistics suggests that "political" bias may account for as much as 10
percent of Soviet claims since 1957.
Approved For Release 2001/04/1Y :CIA-RD 9TV1W0iA&i 72'00180001-7
 Approved For Releas@;2MloAtl7i:_CIA .71$TQIOM002200180001-7
The grain situation in the USSR in recent years provides further evi-
dence of a distortion in Soviet statistics on production of grain. That
Soviet grain statistics have been falsified and/or reported in terms that
did not deduct for excess moisture, trash, and the like was convincingly
documented. by the necessity of importing into the USSR almost 12 mil-
lion tons of Wheat and flour between September 1963 and July 1964. Con-
sidering normal consumption requirements in the USSR for food, exports,
and livestock feed, these imports would not have been necessary if offi-
cial statistics had not been greatly inflated.
4. Outlook
The present Soviet leadership appears to be preparing the Soviet
public for the publication of a new series of statistics on production of
grain. The downward adjustment in Soviet statistics may take into
account only the inflation caused by the use of the bunker weight concept
rather than the barn harvest concept. In this event the amount of the up-
ward "political" bias contained in the old statistical series.will remain as
"chaff" in the revised series. It would be in the interest of the new leader-
ship, however, to remove also any "political" bias during the revision of
the statistical series on production of grain. For the Soviet public a lower
series on production of grain will be only official documentation of what
was already well known -- flour is not available in Soviet stores, simply
because grain has not been produced in the amounts claimed for recent
years.
Analyst,
Coord: ORR
25X1A
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200180001-7
 Approved For Release 21MQ1 IF4'M7kiD1003AO02200180001-7
Approved For Release 200'11YWI : P &-T7' T01003AO02200180001-7
 Approved For Relea.e ?~0Y/0A,17I_9I RRP39Tf01l0 A002200180001-7
POSSIBLE REVISION OF SOVIET GRAIN STATISTICS
Recent articles in the Soviet press and a change in the titles of
tables on production of grain in the 1963 yearbook on the Soviet economy
(published in February 1965) strongly suggest that Soviet officials are
preparing to revise downward their statistics on production of grain and
possibly of some other crops. To date, the extent to which the statistics
estimates of production of L!
may be revised downward is not known.
grain since 1957 have been below Soviet claims by as much as 25 percent
and have averpa~~ed 19 percent below official claims for the 1958-63 period.
In contrast, Cpl grain estimates for the crop years from 1950 to 1957
were, with the exception of 1956, within 5 percent of Soviet claims. The
differences that have developed in recent years are believed to be due
largely to a change in 1958 in the Soviet method of calculating production.
In addition, there probably also has been some statistical falsification.
1. Evidence of Possible Revision in Official Statistics
A downward revision by the new leaders of statistics on production
of grain would not be unique in the USSR. Malenkov in August 1953
stated that it was "necessary to put an end to the incorrect practice
whereby the results ... in production of grain and other crops were
assessed not by the actual harvest but by the apparent harvest yield
[biological yield]. " If for no other reason, it was politically necessary
for the post-Stalin leadership to disassociate itself from the unrealisti-
cally high yields claimed during Stalin's time. Consequently, the sta-
tistics on production of grain published during Khrushchev's regime
were identified as barn harvest.
The pragmatic approach to agriculture displayed to date by
Khrushchev's successors strongly suggests that the new leadership
will attempt to correct the statistical distortions in reporting produc-
tion of grain permitted since 1958. It is almost certain that the delay
of some 3 to 4 months in the release of the 1963 yearbook was a reflec-
tion of the intense controversy that this problem must have engendered.
By a footnote indicating as much and by the omission of "barn harvest"
(ambarniy urozhay) in the titles of the tables, it is made clear in the
1963 yearbook that data on,*production of grain is on the basis of "bunker
weight" (bunkerniy eyes). Bunker weight is the weight of the grain as
it is unloaded from the bunkers or hoppers on the harvesting combines
or stationary grain thresher and thus includes excess moisture, trash,
weed seeds, dirt, and the like. The barn harvest, on the other hand,
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200180001-7
 Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02200180001-7
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
is supposed to be the amount of grain available for utilization after being
cleaned and dried if necessary. The difference between the bunker weight
of the grain harvest and the barn harvest in the USSR is believed to be
about 10 to 15 percent.
A number of articles have been-published in the Soviet press criti-
cizing the use of the concept of bunker weight in determining the level of
grain production. Before the release of the 1963 yearbook, an article
in Red Star of 10 February 1965 calling for "objective and honest statistics"
and speaking out against the "glossing over of shortcomings and the camou-
flaging of one or another negative side" of Soviet life and the "hiding of
truth from the masses" obviously reflected the attitude of the leadership.
On the same day a state farm official caustically commented in Ekono-
micheskaya gazeta on the inability to make "pancakes from grain impuri-
ties. " This official stated that even though the barn harvest already was
known, the state farm was required by the Central Statistical Administra-
tion to report crop production "on the basis of bunker weight -- that is,
in the overstated condition. " More recently a state farm director from
Tselinograd writing in Selskaya zhizn' on 28 February 1965 pointedly
questioned the use of bunker weight as a measure of the yield and produc-
tion of grain: "The bunker weight contains impurities and moisture which
sometimes exceed 10 to 15 percent of the harvested grain. Nevertheless,
in the annual report our farm includes everything which is taken from the
combine. < .. Whom are we deceiving?"
0-
2. Comparison of -GI Estimates and Official Soviet Statistics on
Production of Grain
d
Differences between GIA estimates and official Soviet statistics on
production of rain have varied widely over the years (see the table).
Before 1958, g estimates of Soviet production of grain made during
the respective crop years were, with the exception of 1956, within 5 per-
cent of the Soviet statistics that were published in 1959. The relatively
large difference in 1956 is attributable to excessive postharvest losses
resulting from the lack of adequate storage facilities. Soviet statistics
oneproduction of grain for the years 1950-55 and 1957 were accepted by
(4-analysts because the divergences from fhcstimates were
within the range of error of the estimates. Beginning in 1958, however,
restimates have been below Soviet statistics by as much as 25 per-
cent and have averaged 19 percent below official Soviet claims for the
1958-63 period.
Approved For Release 200 /0 /'1W-EIAZFbP 9-M'IW0'JA@192-k00180001-7
 Approved For Releas 2 0 4 7: 7 T 1 0 002200180001-7
_qfitR
Comparison of Estimated and Official Statistics
on Production of Grain in the USSR
1950-64
Production
(Million Metric Tons)
p,w
0MAI
-
Year
Official
Claims
A`
Estimates
Estimates as a Percent
of Official Claims
1950
81
85
105
1951
79
80
101
1952
92
92
100
1953
82
83
101
1954
86
87
101
1955
107
103
96
1956
128
115
90
1957
105
100
95
1958
141
125
89
1959
126
100
79
1960
134
100
75
1961
138
115
83
1962
148
115
78
1963
111
95
86
1964
N.A.
120 to 125
N.A.
3. Causes of the Difference
The divergences that began in 1958 between -6iA estimates and official
Soviet statistics on production of grain cannot be attributed t o g a deterioa-
tion in the availability of information used b It in making 4s estimates.
On the contrary, e A- 4 ~tfyt e'& much more detailed and systematic
information on weather for all of the importntp,gricultural areas in esti-
mating production of grain in the USSR than was available t"i.n the
period 1.950-57. Furthermore, -te much more information
on crop conditions at various times during the growing season and on
progress in seeding, harvesting, and state procurements. Also of some
use tr -in making estimates of production of grain is a vast amount
of data on production and yields of grain on a regional basis that has been
published by the USSR since 1958.
Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200180001-7
 Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200180001-7
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
The large differences between. 64-estimates and Soviet statistics
during the period 1958-64 are believed to be attributable to at least
two factors: (a) to a change in the method of calculating production of
grain, and (b) to an upward "political" bias -- that is, statistical mal-
practices including falsification. Reference has been made in a Soviet
publication (G. Z. Kuparadze, Spravochnik ekonomista, Tbilisi, 1960,
p. 164) to instruction No. 1684 of the Central Statistical Administration
dated 23 April 1958, which apparently gave a new method for calculating
production of grain. This instruction has never been made available to
the West, although a specific request for a copy was submitted to the
USSR.
In the reports submitted by collective and state farms, the grain crop is reported in terms of the bunker weight. Before 1958 the rayon
components of the Central Statistical Administration apparently made
the necessary adjustments to the statistics on production of grain re-
ceiv,ed from the farms in converting the data to a barn harvest basis.
The new method of calculating production of grain may have been the
use of the bunker weight as equivalent to the barn harvest.
The fact that the difference between efft estimates and official sta-
tistics is greater than the 10 to 15 percent that has been attributed by
the Soviet authorities to the use of bunker weight rather than the barn
harvest concept strongly suggests that there also is considerable "political"
bias or falsification contained in the Soviet statistics. Following the
plenary session of the Central Committee in January 1961, widespread
statistical malpractices were revealed in all parts of the USSR. Since
1957, Soviet administrators and farm managers have been confronted
with impossible assignments. At times, Khrushchev insisted personally
that officials adopt unrealistic pledges and then made it clear that their
careers depended on meeting these pledges. Many officials reacted by
falsifying records. Opportunists and glory seekers contributed further
to a wave of statistical falsification. Unscrupulous individuals, in hopes
of rapid promotion in the Party or government apparatus, undertook
ridiculously high pledges, some of which subsequently were fulfilled by
padding the statistical reports. The checking of reports during this time
was complicated by the dissolution in 1958 of the machine tractor stations
(MTS's), which had been an effective statistical control nechanism. The
remaining or unexplained difference between estimates and official
statistics suggests that "political" bias may account for as much as 10
percent of Soviet claims since 1957.
Approved For Release 200Y/0)l F: I RbPV9" X11 d'03 &2O00180001-7
 Approved For Release 2
t90l4041.IaiLARWP719 1GA3A002200180001-7
The grain situation in the USSR on productionprovides
grainurtThatevi-recent years dence of a distortion in Soviet Soviet grain statistics have been falsified and/or reported in terms that
trash, and the like was convincingly
did not deduct for excess moisture,
documented by the necessity of importing into the USSR almost 12 mil-
lion tons of Wheat and flour between September 1963 and July 1964. Con-
sidering normal consumption requirements
not haveebeUSSR enneocessary i.fxoffits,
and livestock feed, these imports '
cial statistics had not been greatly inflated.
4. Outlook
The present Soviet leadership appears to be preparing the Soviet
public for the publication of a new series of statistics on production of
aain. The downward
inflation caused by the use of the maywtake
account only the n i
rather than the barn harvest concept. In this event the amount of the up-
ward "political" bias contained in the old statistical series.will remain as
"chaff" in the revised series. It would be in the interest of the new leader-the revision of
ship, however, to remove also any political"For the S get public a lower
the statistical series on production of grain.
series on production of grain will be only official documentation of what
amounts Soviet stores,
was already well known -- flooin the available
for recently
because grain has not been produced
years.
25X1A
Analyst'
Coord:
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200180001-7
 Approved For Release t'Q'()/NflAifi003A002200180001-7
March 1965
Copy No,
POSSIBLE REVISION OF SOVIET GRAIN STATISTICS
Recent articles in the Soviet press and a change in the titles of
tables on production of grain in the 1963 yearbook on the Soviet economy
(published in February 1965) strongly suggest that Soviet officials are
preparing to revise downward their statistics on production of grain and
possibly of some other crops. To date, the extent to which the statistics
may be revised downward is not known. Our estimates of production of
grain since 1957 have been below Soviet
fas much as Z or the 1958- 63eperiod.
and have averaged 19 percent below
In. contrast, our grain estimates for the crop years from 1950 to 1957
were, with the exception of 1956, within 5 percent of Soviet claims. The
differences that have developed in recent years are believed to be due cul largely to a change in lbl8 thhe
some statist calf lsif rod ationlon.
In addition, their probably
1, Evidence of Possible Revision in Official Statistics
A downward revision by the new leaders of statistics ;on production
of grain would not be unique in the USSR. Malenkov in August 1953
stated that it was "necessary to put an end to the incorrect practice
whereby the results ... in production of grain and other crops were
assessed not by the actual harvest but by the apparent harvest yield
/ biological yield /. " If for no other reason, it was politically necessary
for the post-Stalin leadership to disassociate itself from the unrealisti-
cally high yields claimed during Stalin's time. Consequently, the sta-
tistics on production of grain published during Khrushchev's regime
were identified as barn harvest.
The pragmatic approach to agriculture displayed to date by
Khrushchev's successors strongly suggests that the new leadership
will attempt to correct the statistical distortions in reporting produc-
tion of grain permitted since 1958. It is almost certain that the delay
of some 3 to 4 months in the release of the 1963 yearbook was a reflec-
tion of the intense controversy that this problem must have engendered.
By a footnote indicating as much and by the omission of "barn harvest"
(ambarniy urozhay) in the titles of the tables, it is made clear in the
1963 yearbook that data on production of grain is on the basis of "bunker
weight" (bunkerniy vyes). Bunker weight is the weight of the grain as
it is unloaded from the bunkers or hoppers on the harvesting combines
or stationary grain thresher and thus includes excess moisture, trash,
Approved For Release 200COM IBWIVTT,IA(LA002200180001-7
 Approved For Release Cll.[DEAI-'if.&003AO02200180001-7
weed seeds, dirt, and the like. The barn harvest, on the other hand,
is supposed to be the amount of grain available for utilization after being
cleaned and dried if necessary. harvest in the USSR is believed to belght
of the grain harvest and the barn
about 10 to 15 percent.
A number of articles have been published in the Soviet press criti-
cizing the use of the concept of bunker weight in determining the level of
grain production. Before the release of the 1963 yearbook, an article
in Red Star of 10 February 1965 calling for "objective and honest statistics"
and speaking out against the ".glossing over of shortcomings and the camou-
flaging of one or another negative side" of Soviet life and the "hiding of
truth from the masses" obviously reflected the attitude of the leadership.
On the same day a state farm official caustically commented in Ekono-
micheskaya gazeta on the inability to make "pancakes from grain impuri-
Statistical already was
ties. " This official stated that even though the barn
a-
known, the state farm was required by the
tion to report crop production "on the basis of bunker weight -- that is,
in the overstated condition." More recently a state farm director from
Tselinograd writing in Selskaya zhizn' on 28 February 1965 pointedly
questioned the use of bunker weight as a measure of the yield and produc-
tion of grain: "The bunker weight contains impurities and moisture which
ss,
sometimes exceed 10 to 15 me includes the
everything which is takenefrom the
farm
in the annual report our
combine ... Whome are we deceiving?"
2. Comparison of Our Estimates and Official Soviet Statistics on
Production of Grain
Differences between our estimates and official Soviet statistics on
production of grain have varied widely over the years (see the table).
Before 1958, our estimates of Soviet production of grain made during
the respective crop years were, with the exception of 1956, within 5 per-
cent of the Soviet statistics that were published in 1959. The relatively
large difference in 1956 is attributable to excessive postharvest losses
resulting from the lack of adequate storage facilities. Soviet statistics
on production of grain for the years 1950-55 and 1957 were accepted by
our analysts because the divergences from our estimates were within
however,
the range of error of the estimates. Beginning in 1958,
our estimates have been below Soviet statistics by as much as 25 per-
cent and have averaged 19 percent below official Soviet claims for the
1958-63 period.
Approved For Release 200MIVIUNWir1 A002200180001-7
 Approved For Release 2 PIDIE hO3A002200180001-7
Comparison of Estimated and Official Statistics
on Production of Grain in the USSR
1950-64
Production
(Million Metric Tons)
Year
Official Our
Claims Estimates
Our
Estimates as a Percent
of Official Claims
1950
81
85
105
1951
79
80
101
1952
92
92
100
1953
82
83
101
1954
86
87
101
1955
107
103
96
1956
128
115
90
1957
105
100
95
1958
141
125
89
1959
126
100
79
1960
134
100
75
1961
138
115
83
1962
148
115
78
1963
111
95
86
1964
N. A.
120 to
125
N. A.
3.
Causes of the Difference
The divergences that began in 1958 between our estimates and official
Soviet statistics on production of grain cannot be attributed to a deteriora-
tion in the availability of information used in making the estimates. On the
contrary, much more detailed and systematic information on weather for
all of the important agricultural areas in estimating production of grain. in
the USSR were used than was available in the period 1950-57. Further-
more, much more information was available on crop conditions at various
times during the growing season and on progress in seeding, harvesting,
and state procurements. Also of some use in making estimates of produc-
tion of grain is a vast amount of data on production and yields of grain
on a regional basis that has been published by the USSR since 1958.
Approved For Release 2ab," MFj , .&3A002200180001-7
 Approved For Release 2I9ID1.MIM1003A002200180001-7
The large differences between our estimates and Soviet statistics
during the period 1958-64 are believed to be attributable to at least
two factors: (a) to a change in the method of calculating production of
grain, and (b) to an upward "political" bias -- that is, statistical mal-
practices including falsification. Reference has been made in a Soviet
publication (G. Z. Kuparadze, Spravochnik ekonomista, Tbilisi, 1960,
p. 164) to instruction No. 1684 of the Central Statistical Administration
dated 23 April 1958, which apparently gave a new method for calculating
production of grain. This instruction has never been made available to
the West, although a specific request for a copy was submitted to the
USSR.
In the reports submitted by collective and state farms, the grain
crop is reported in terms of the bunker weight. Before 1958 the rayon
components of the Central Statistical Administration apparently made
the necessary adjustments to the statistics on production of grain re-
ceived from the farms in coverting the data to a barn harvest basis.
The new method of calculating production of grain may have been the
use of the bunker weight as equivalent to the barn harvest.
The fact that the difference between our estimates and official sta-
tistics is greater than the 10 to 15 percent that has been attributed by
the Soviet aurhorities to the use of bunker weight rather than the barn
harvest concept strongly suggests that there also is considerable "political"
bias or falsification contained in the Soviet statistics. Following the
plenary session of the Central Committee in January 1961, widespread
statistical malpractices were revealed in all parts of the USSR. Since
1957, Soviet administrators and farm managers have been confronted
with impossible assignments. At times, Khrushchev insisted personally
that officials adopt unrealistic pledges and then made it clear that their
careers depended on meeting these pledges. Many officials reacted by
falsifying records. Opportunists and glory seekers contributed further
to a wave of statistical falsification. Unscrupulous individuals, in hopes
of rapid promotion in the Party or government apparatus, undertook
ridiculously high pledges, some of which subsequently were fulfilled by
padding the statistical reports. The checking of reports during this time
was complicated by the dissolution in 1958 of the machine tractor stations
(MTS's), which had been an effective statistical control mechanism. The
remaining or unexplained difference between our estimates and official
statistics suggests that "political" bias may account for as much as 10
percent of Soviet claims since 1957.
Approved For Release 2WN/} I-DEiV '1 h03A002200180001-7
 Approved For Release 21g(/ ,jDENITiFA1&3AO02200180001-7
The grain situation in the USSR in recent years provides further evi-
dence of a distortion in Soviet statistics on production of grain. That
Soviet grain statistics have been falsified and/or reported in terms that
did not deduct for excess moisture, trash, and the like was convincingly
documented by the necessity of importing into the USSR almost 12 mil-
lion tons of wheat and flour between September 1963 and July 1964. Con-
sidering normal consumption requirements in the USSR for food, exports,
and livestock feed, these imports would not have been necessary if offi-
cial statistics had not been greatly inflated.
The present Soviet leadership appears to be preparing the Soviet
public for the publication of a new series of statistics on production of
grain. The downward adjustment in Soviet statistics may take into
account only the inflation caused by the use of the bunker weight concept
rather than the barn harvest concept. In this event the amount of the up-
ward "political" bias contained in the old statistical series will remain as
"chaff" in the revised series. It would be in the interest of the new leader-
ship, however, to remove also any "political" bias during the revision of
the statistical series on production of grain. For the Soviet public a lower
series on production of grain will be only official documentation of what
was already well known -- flour is not available in Soviet stores, simply
because grain has not been produced in the amounts claimed for recent
years.
Approved For Release 20iPiD,Er Ng?IJ fg03AO02200180001-7
 Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02200180001-7
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 RECORD OF REVIEW
OF ORR PUBLICATIONS FOR SECURITY SANITIZATION APPROVAL
SUBJECT
ANAL
/ I 3 - ~~
BRANCH
SECURITY REVIEW
9L?ij SANITIZING INSTRUCTIONS
ITEM DATE
INITIALS
REMOVE
UNEDITED DRAFT
EDITED DRAFT
25X1A
DELETE
SUBSTITUTE
25X1C
25X1 C
REMARK//S~A
C (p
w --~
25X1 C
T go 6u^~ s~v~ t s Z~c ClZ
(AA 6
25X1 Cc
G
~1^^r CJ
25X1 C
25X1 C
IOU -
FORM
12.64
GR f 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
 Analyst: R / AG
CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION 25X1A
SERIES NUMBER
CIA/RR CB 65-18
CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
Confidential
DISTRIBUTION TO RC
50
DATE OF DOCUMENT
March 1965
NUMBER OF COPIES
280
NUMBER IN RC
COPY
RECIPIENT
DATE
NO. (S)
SENT
RETURNED
32
AD RR
26 Mar 65
~-S
33
DAD/RR 25X1A
'I
97
St/P
II
175
OCR
"
S'~~?2c~? is
176
-r
177-180
.?_'
181
182
183-185
186
187
>i
25X1 C
188
189
190
1
,4 v
192-194
195
CGS HR O s 1G81 H q.
26 Mar 65
196-230
Filed in St/P/C
11
45
33, _?.
d .- -~ it C
1
~' S
-
5
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jqq
36-
25X1 A
n
t7
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AO02200180001-7
FORM 2353 (13)
2.65
 COPY
NO. (S)
Approved For Release i20OWid04/17 : CIA-RDP79T0100
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 ~tL6r 1 I AL
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SUBJECT: Distribution of Current Support Brief No.
`"" _et Grain S Stc ,. b x. Match 1965 CQ
Copy No. Recipient
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Excludtd tram aatamatlct
d,,,,gading and
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aibl*
St/A/DS Distribution of Current Support Brief No..
Copy No.
34
35
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k7?1 ~R
ru i
 Approved For Release 2001/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002200180001-7
1 April 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR. Chief, Dissemination Control. Branch, DD/CR
FROM Chief, Publications Staff, ORR
SUBJECT Transmittal of Material
It is requested that the attached copies of CIA/RR CS 65`16:
Possible Revision of Soviet Grain Statistics. March 1965, Confidential$
be forwarded as follows:
State, INR Communications Center,
Room 6527, State Dept. Bldg.
Suggested distribute"on? for
Embassies in Moscow, and London
25X1A
Attachments:
Copies #197 - #198 Of CB 65-18
CGS/
is rrc a i_'uc `,a> teen completed;
by:
Date: mot' ~S"
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 Approved For Release 2001''
Project No. 21. 5230
T01 003A002200180001-7
Report Series CLA./RR CB 65-18
Possible Revision of Soviet Grain Statistics (CONFIDENTIAL)
Responsible Analyst and Branch
R/AG 25X1A
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