SOVIET POSITION IN AFGHANISTAN ENCHANCED BY THE ARRIVAL OF ADVANCED WEAPONS SYSTEMS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T01003A002100050001-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
November 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 13, 2000
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 1, 1964
Content Type:
BRIEF
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FOREIGN DISSEM
Current Support Brief
SOVIET POSITION IN AFGHANISTAN
ENHANCED BY THE ARRIVAL
OF ADVANCED WEAPONS SYSTEMS
CIA/RR CB 64-59
September 1964
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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SOVIET POSITION IN AFGHANISTAN
ENHANCED BY THE. ARRIVAL
OF ADVANCED WEAPONS SYSTEMS
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Recent evidence suggests that a new arms agreement -- the first
since 1959 - - may have
been signed by Afghanistan and the USSR (see the chart). Two types
of Soviet missiles were observed in Kabul's Independence Day mili-
tary parade on 23 August: the SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) and
what is described as an antitank missile (probably the Snapper or
Swatter. surface-to-surface missile, a wire-guided tactical system).
Moreover, the purchase of a squadron of MIG-21 supersonic jet fighters
and several An-12 turboprop assault transports may follow. Although
Afghanistan is now striving to adhere to a more "correctly neutral"
foreign policy than it has been following recently, the delivery of such
advanced weapons systems presumably will enhance further the Soviet
military presence in that country.
1. New Equipment
the delivery of 12 SA-2 missiles and 6 antitank
missiles from the USSR to Afghanistan was completed,/Subsequently
this armament was featured in Kabul's Independence Day military
parade, where it elicited general surprise from the foreign repre-
sentatives presenlj .6his public display of a;"prestige" item probably
was designed to serve a dual purpose: (1) to influence Afghan govern-
mental and military figures during the period prior to the approval of
the new consitiution and (2) to project a hardier military image to
those foreign representatives viewing the parade. These missiles
probably were purchased by the military mission led by Defense Min-
ister Khan Mohammad Khan, which traveled to Moscow in late June.
Other advanced weapons systems probably were discussed and pos-
sibly were agreed to at that time. In particular it appears likely that
Kabul will urchase a squadron(probably 10 to 16 aircraft) of MIG-21
jet fighter' as well as 4 or 5 An-12 assault transports.'-Officers trainees
The delivery of MIG-21's to Afghanistan has been rumored for the
past 2 years,
An earlier report stated that the
USSR would provide two squadrons of MIG- 21's [footnote c.ont.inued on p. 2]
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were being selected in March 1 64 to go to the USSR for training in
MIG-19 and MIG-21 aircraft. Although the MIG-19 probably figured
in Kabul's earlier plans, the dissatisfaction with the plane of other
recipients in the Free World probably is known t the Afghans, and
it is doubtful that any will be purchased. If it is ncluded in the new
agreement, the portion dealing with aircraft pos ibly could be valued
at more than $20 million at list prices.
2. Tactical Implications
Afghanistan is the fifth country of the Free World to be furnished
SAM's by the USSR. _= An analogy with other recipients permits an esti-
mate of the eventual size of Afghanistan'-s- program. To defend Kabul,
at least three SAM firing battalions and one technical support battalion
would be required. This program is valued at ab ut $10 million. Con-
struction and training requirements will push an operational readiness
date 2 or more years into the future. No estimat is possible on the
size of the inventory of Snapper or Swatter missiles. The BRDM
amphibious combat reconnaissance vehicle is the launcher used for
the missiles, and to date Kabul has not received any of these vehicles.
Purely in terms of equipment, the MIG-21 fighte s would provide an
enormous increase in performance from the obso ete MIG-15's and
MIG-17's currently comprising the Afghan air force. Likewise, a
serious air transport deficiency would be ameliorated by the acquisi-
tion of the An-1.2 assault transports. The new ac uisitions eventually
would boost the over-all Afghan air defense capability immeasurably.
When operational, they probably would discourag in some degree the
alleged intrusions of Afghan air space by Pakistani aircraft. Because
of the general ineptitude of the air force, howeve , this enhanced air
defense capability probably will not be realizedwi hin the next 2 years.
If such numbers of aircraft ever were con-
sidered, however, they have been reduced. An 11 -18 turboprop pas-
senger transport has been mentioned as a possibl purchase, but it
would not military application.
The UAR, Indonesia, India, and Iraq also have received this ad-
vanced type of weapon. Recently, Iraq canceled i s SAM program
and transferred to the UAR the equipment already delivered
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3. Other Implications
Although the present Afghan government appears to be striving
toward a more correct form of neutrality than the former Soviet-
leaning regime under Prime Minister Da'ud, the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan continues to be firmly establishe/The Afghan armed
forces have been reorganized, largely through advice of the Soviet
military aid mission, which has been working on the problem since
Marshal Sokolovskiy's visit in October 196 .- !n November 1963 the
Ministry of National Defense opened an army staff college in Kabul
organized and staffed entirely by Soviet personnel. Although there
is no evidence that the USSR is in any better position to exert leverage
on the governmental elite than it has been since the inception of mili-
tary aid in 1956, the potential for influence appears to be increasing
significantly. Addition Soviet technicians will be required to train
native personnel in Afghanistan, and more Afghan trainees probably
will be sent to the USSR for instruction, in addition to the large
number already there e
The purchase of this complex and expensive equipment, however,
will pose problems for Kabul. The assimilation of the advanced
weapons systems will require a higher level of technical competence
than has been demonstrated thus far. Furthermore, the limited
skilled manpower available in the country will be increasingly strained
by the establishment and operation of advanced weapons facilities.
Finally, although the, *financial details of the new agreement are not
yet known, any increase in indebtedness will generate additional diffi-
culties for the Afghan government in meeting its already large mili-
tary and economic debt obligations to the USSR.
Analysts
Coord:
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CHINA
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r- AFGHANISTAN
MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERED
BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
EQUIPMENT
UNITS
Medium tank
220
Self-propelled assault gun
18
Personnel carrier
62
Artillery piece
600
Jet bomber
58
Jet fighter
125
Other aircraft
92
SA-2 missile
12
Antitank missile
6
GROUP I
EXCLUDED ARC AUTOM-C D-GRA-0
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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SECRET
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i Analysts:
I/P0
``Project 41. 5176)
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St/P/.RR - Control Section
Control Sheet
Series Number CIA/RR CB 64-59
Date of Document September 1964 _
Co2y No=
Recipient
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Excluded from automatic
dongrading and
decipcsiticatloll
34 DAD RR
82 25X1 PO
24j.S~p 64
172 PO
11
173 St/P
_ 29 Sep 64
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196 - 229 Filed in St/P/C
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