CURRENT SUPPORT BRIEF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1964
• Content Type: BRIEF

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CONFIDENTIAL
220
Current Support Brief
CIA/RR CB 64-58
September 1964
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs, 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an. unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA DEBATES MARKET SOCIALISM
A large number of Czechoslovak economists have been urging pub-
licly replacement of the Soviet type of command economy in Czechoslo-
vakia by a form of market socialism. This proposal, the most radical
in the Bloc, is the focus of a general debate o-rer economic reform con-
ducted under Party auspices since last fall in the hope of finding solutions
to some of the country's severe and deep-seated economic difficulties?
The proposed economic system has much in common with the actual sys-
tem in Yugoslavia. It provides for: a devolution of authority to individual
enterprises, excluding decisions for key investments and foreign trade;,
the basing of enterprise incentives on current income instead of the ful-
fillment of plan assignments, the formation of prices reflecting supply
and demand, and the exercise of state controls mainly through financial
regulations rather than through plan directives. The liberal proposal
has been criticized by some economists who believe that Czechoslovak
economic conditions are inappropriate for market socialism. Other
economists have emphasized reforms that could be used to make a com-
mand economy work better, especially through improvements in planning
involving mathematical techniques or through management procedures
similar to those of US corporations.
The regime is proceeding slowly and cautiously in changing planning
and management. Some reforms, such as a thorough,' but on the whole
orthodox, revision of wholesale prices, have been implemented, and a
simplification of plan directives for 1965 has been announced. An in-
crease in the authority of enterprises and other changes desired by the
liberals are to be introduced in. 1965, but these changes probably will
fall far short of market socialism because of vested interests and the
concern of the present leadership with retaining close control over the
economy.
1. Economic Reform a Bloc-Wide Issue
All the countries of the Soviet Bloc are experimenting with methods
of economic planning and management, and in most of them the ideo-
logical restraints on economic reform have been loosened greatly. In.
the USSR, two years ago Liberman urged the use of profit incentives
to regulate enterprise behavior in a decentralized manner, and the sub-
ject was reopened in mid-August 1964 when Pravda published an article
by Academician V. A. Trapeznikov that proposes even more liberal
economic reforms. In addition, mathematical economists, such as
Kantorovich, have been pressing for the formation of rational prices
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by means of linear programing techniques. Hungary has introduced such
innovations as an interest charge on fixed capital. In Bulgaria the author-
ity of some enterprises (mainly local and construction enterprises) has
been increased greatly, and some basic questions of socialist economics
are being debated. In no other country of the Bloc, however, has the
discussion gone so far as in Czechoslovakia, where a large group of
economists has proposed a complete overhaul of the present economic
system. Moreover, in no other country of the Bloc is the issue of eco-
nomic reform as pressing and as politically acute as in Czechoslovakia.
2. Development of the Issue in Czechoslovakia
Basically the serious concern with economic reform and the radical
nature of some of the proposals being entertained in Czechoslovakia
stem from the near absence of economic growth during the past 2-1/2
years. As early as 1962, Czechoslovak economists were pressing for
reforms, and the need to improve techniques of planning and management
was emphasized at the Party Congress in December 1962. Party leader
Novotny, however, continued to blame some of the country's economic
difficulties on the partial decentralization of 1958-60 and called for a
tightening of central controls.
In 1963, as the economic situation deteriorated further and cultural
ferment accompanied a new wave of "destaiinization, " criticism of the
regime's policies increased greatly, and some of the critics argued --
in direct contradiction of Novotny -- that the error in 1958-60 had been
in decentralizing too little. Novotny and his followers were forced to
admit that planning had been overambitious, that serious mistakes had
been made in the allocation of investments, and that incentives did not
give enough stimulus to technical progress and improvement in the
quality of output. * Then, in the wake of a Party and government shakeup
of September 1963, which replaced some of the dogmatic officials (espe-
cially Vilem Siroky) by more pragmatic men such as Jozef Lenart and
Drahomir Kolder, the Party gave official blessing to a thoroughgoing
debate on the economic system. A group of economists, headed by
Ota Sik, a member of the Central Committee of the Party and Chief of
the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences, was charged with
an intensive study of possible reforms and asked to present its recom-
mendations to the leadership through the newly organized Economic
Commission of the Party. Sik told a Central Committee Plenum in
December 1963 that the traditional Soviet forms of socialist manage-
ment no longer worked in Czechoslovakia, because there were no more
For more detailed information on the economic difficulties, see
source l/.
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reserves which could be mobilized and with which inefficiency could be
covered up. A large number of proposals and counterproposals on eco-
nomic reforms began to appear in late 1963 and continue to appear in
the Party press and technical journals.
3. The Liberal Proposal
The essence of the liberal proposal, first presented in an article
published in. the Party journal by Sik in November 1963 and developed
by many other economists, is to replace the Soviet type of command
economy in. Czechoslovakia by a form. of controlled market socialism
resembling in many respects that of Yugoslavia. Although the liberals
do not agree on all points and some aspects of the proposal are unclear,
there appears to. be.a consensus of liberal opinion on most of its basic
features.
a. Planning
Although central planning would continue, it would be attenuated
and focused on long-term development. Long-term plans would be worked
out by careful economic analysis of alternative means of achieving national
objectives. As in Yugoslavia, central economic plans would provide
guidelines for decisions at lower levels but would not have the force of
law. Enterprises would establish their own operational plans.
_ The state would retain direct control over key investments and
foreign trade but otherwise would rely on indirect controls over enter-
prises. to implement its policies. As in Yugoslavia, the indirect controls
would be achieved through financial means such as taxes, the charging
of interest on fixed and working capital, the regulation of prices and
wages, and the extension of bank credits. In contrast to Yugoslavia,
control organs other than banks would be organized mainly on. an industry
and branch basis rather than on a regional and local. basis.
* For a listing of liberal economists, see the Appendix, and for some
of their articles, see source 2/.
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C. Management
The enterprises themselves would decide what and how to pro-
duce and with whom to do business within the limits imposed by state
regulations and the direct controls in investment ana and thority in
There is no suggestion of giving workers' organizations
enterprise management comparable to that of the Yugoslav workers'
councils.
d. Incentives
Enterprises no longer would be ordered to fulfill particular
plan tasks assigned by higher authority but rather would maximize cur-
rent income. Some of the liberals are in favor of using enterprise
prise
income"
profits as a standard, but the majority of them prefer "gross
4hruby duchod) -- what remains of the receipts from sales after de-
ducting purchases from other enterprises and wages would be paid from
Yugoslavia, interest on capital,
gross income. Minimum wages would
wou d have, be observede but
wage scales for different occupations additional payments to workers and managers would depend on what
remained of gross income after all the above expenses had been paid.
e. Prices
In accordance with the reliance on incentives based on current
values and on financial controls, prices would correspond approximately
to the relative scarcities of goods and services
accounting as at present re-
flecting the prevailing conventions would not be deter-
Except for relatively few consumer goods, prices pric mined freely in the market. The
te services, ? anduconsumer staples,
of industrial materials, public utility a such as bread and sugar, and would the establish ~~ foanur
goods.
ing among buyers and sellers in t
These fixed or controlled prices,
from the levels called for bylsuPPly and
deviate markedly or for long f
demand.
The proposal is intentionally vague because of the political sen-ct state sitivity of the question on the extent and anner
cru caleque tions on the
over investments and foreign trade and g
relation of domestic to world market prices and the use of differential
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taxes, tariffs, and subsidies to protect or encourage producers. There
also are allusions to possible direct intervention by the state in other
areas "if absolutely necessary. " The proposal, moreover, is being
sold to the regime as a means of improving the real authority of the
Party and government over the economy -- by comparison with the past
system when many state directives were not observed or even had per-
verse effects on the implementation of national policies. It is very
doubtful, however, that the liberal economists really believe that state
and Party control would be unimpaired -- rather they probably expect
that thestate apparatus would be greatly curtailed and that the Party
would have to make basic changes in its methods of operation.
4. Criticisms and Alternative Proposals
Because economic reform is a proclaimed goal of the regime'sp:olicy
and because dogmatism is out of fashion, it is difficult to find any staunch
supporters of the status quo in the Czechoslovak economic press, al-
though opposition to change is certainly widespread, not only among the
state bureaucracy but also in faculties of economics, where sinecures
are being threatened. 3/ A number of economists, however, have taken
issue in the press with the liberal proposal or with aspects of it, although
they too favor (or claim to favor) reforms of the economic system.
Their criticisms range from the simple assertion that the liberal pro-
posal verges perilously close to bringing back "capitalism without the
capitalist" 4/ to sophisticated reservations 'about the possibility of
creating an efficient form of market socialism. 5/ It is alleged, for
example, that a system like that of Yugoslavia would not work well in
Czechoslovakia, because of the tightness of the supply of labor and the
favorable conditions for monopolistic practices in many branches of
heavy industry, especially heavy machine building.
Many economists have emphasized changes in planning and manage-
ment that. could be used to make a command economy work better, al-
though they also are advocated by some of the liberals. One group of
economists, for example, is concerned mainly with improving economic
planning through modern mathematical techniques, such as input-output
and linear programing. 6/ Another group of economists, concerned
mostly with industrial, management, takes its inspiration from large
Western corporations, arguing that the combining of enterprises into
branch-wide economic units with broad authority would facilitate tech-
nical progress and bring a businesslike approach to management with-
out much sacrifice of central controls. 7/ In regard to incentives,
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there is general agreement that the old system gi~
to gross value of production, but some economist
proposal for introducing a single indicator of ente
such as gross income or profits, and propose ins-
of a variety of plan indicators, differing among bi
the conditions of the branch and priorities of the i
together, these proposals on "scientific planning,
management, and selected incentives present a pc
line for reform to that desired by the liberal econ
native, which would salvage the essential feature:
economy, apparently is being adopted by the regir
Poland, and Hungary.
Position of the Leadership
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ies too much weight
reject the liberals'
rprise performance,
;ead the establishment
-anches in accord with
-egime. 8/ Taken
It "businesslike"
issible alternative
omists. This alter-
of the command
nes in East Germany,
As might be expected, the regime wants to h ve its cake and eat it
too -- it wants to reform planning and manageme t so as to improve
economic performance without relinquishing any important controls.
According to top Czechoslovak leaders, 9/ "the g
freed from part of the operational tasks and must
damental problems of economic policy, It "econorr.
than orders must be widely used to implement pol
reflect supply and demand. On the other hand, tY
to "strengthen the authority of the plan, which is
instrument of management, " and also "continue tc
ing role of _the Party. "
A few changes already have been introduced i
ment. For 1965, there will be a reduction of 14 1
of centrally planned and-rationed commodities an(
number of directives given to enterprises. 10/ I
announcement that no quantitative production assi
to enterprises for 1965. 11/ There are no detail.,
not clear whether the change refers to only one of
for 1965 or to all the stages. Various measures
used instead of gross output to evaluate performer
A general revision of wholesale prices was introd
following 2 years of intensive work. 13/ The new
among a much more precise assortment of produ(
and reflect costs more closely. The new prices
in the case of some close substitutes; goods in un
)vernment must be
concentrate on fun-
ic instruments" rather
icies, and prices should
e same leaders want
the most important
strengthen the lead-
n planning and manage-
)ercent in the number
of 53 percent in the
here also has been an
nments will be given
however, and it is
the stages in planning
)f net output are being
ace by an enterprise. 12/
uced in April 1964,
prices, differentiate
:ts than the old prices
also reflect demand
asually short supply;
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or certain byproducts, such as steel scrap. In general, however, the
revision follows the conventional Bloc practice of basing prices on aver-
age costs of production in each branch of industry. The regime has
promised to introduce additional reforms in the latter part of 1964 and
in 1965. 14/ Premier Lenart in May and the Party''s.:P'irs:t'^Secretary,
Novotny, during Khrushchev's recent visit to Czechoslovakia spoke
of introducing many of the specific proposals of the liberals, including
increased flexibility for prices, the use of gross income to evaluate
enterprise performance and as a basis for paying bonuses, the charging
of interest on fixed assets, and a greatly increased use of bank credit for
the allocation of investment funds. 15/ Statements by the regime, how-
ever, also have emphasized "scientific" planning (including the use of
mathematical tools), the grouping of enterprises on a branch basis,
and the application of selected incentives.
6. Prospects for Reforms
The prospects for economic reform in Czechoslovakia remain
highly uncertain. There is no doubt that many changes in the system
of planning and management, including some of those proposed by the
liberals, will be introduced over the next year or two. The continued
poor performance of the economy is a powerful incentive to making
such changes, and part of the Czechoslovak leadership consists of men
who are not dogmatic Communists. However, fear by the Party of a
loss of control and vested interests are powerful conservative forces
that probably predispose the regime to prefer modifications in familiar
methods to more fundamental changes that could be :risky.. Last March
the Party Presidium rejected.a proposal of the Economic Commis0ion,
presumably because it was too liberal. 16/
It seems unlikely that the present leadership will give enterprises
anywhere near the amount of authority desired by the liberals or allow
market forces to determine output except within narrow limits. Accord-
ing to Novotny, reforms will be introduced "step by step ... with much
prudence" and "without upsetting upheavals. " This cautious approach
gives the conservative forces every opportunity to prevent fundamental
changes -- as such forces did so successfully in Poland after the
promising beginning of the "new economic model" in 1956-57. Even if
there is a substantial. devolution of authority to enterprises, it remains
to be seen whether the regime will be willing to reduce the central state
apparatus correspondingly. And if the apparatus remains largely in-
tact, it will have the possibility as well as the,incentive of reimposing
controls whenever economic problems develop (as in Poland during
1959-60). As long as there appears to be a pressing economic need,
however, economic reform will remain a major issue in Czechoslovakia,
and basic changes in the system will be possible.
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Bohumil Komenda
Cestmir Kozusnik
Ota Sik
APPENDIX
LIBERAL CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMISTS
Affiliation
Economics Institute, Czechoslovak Academy
of Sciences, Prague
Hruby-
Benedikt Korda
Frantisek Valenta
Vladimir Kadera
Bohumil Krejcar
Rudolf Kocanda
Ladislav Matejka
Pavel Pelikan
Zdenek Vergner
Eduard Vopicka
Antonin Cervinka
Zdenek Kodet
Hvezdon Koctuch
Viktor Pavlenda
D~q~6
Economics Institute, Czechoslovak Academy
of Sciences, Prague
Economics Institute, Czechoslovak Academy
of Sciences, Prague
University of Economics, Prague
University of Economics, Prague
University of Economics, Prague
Research Institute of Economic Planning,** Prague
Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague
Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague
Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague
Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague
Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague
Research Institute of Economic Planning, Prague
Party University, Prague
Party University, Prague
University of Economics, Bratislava
University of Economics, Bratislava
First name unknown.
Subordinated to State Planning Commission.
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Economist Affiliation
0. Kyn - Komensky University, Faculty of Law, Bratislava
Radoslav Selucky Department of Political Economics, Czechoslovak
Institute of Technology, Prague
Julius Branik Research Institute of Ministry of Finance, Prague
Rudolf Rohlicek Worker on staff of Central Committee of KSC
and/or KSS
Eugen Loebl Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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1. CIA. CIA/RR EM 64-3, Czechoslovakia in 1963: the Year
the Economy Stood Still, Feb 64. C.
2. Sik, Ota. "Improvement of Planned System of Management, If
Rude pravo, p. 3-6, 22 Nov 63. U. (Cited in JPRS. 26256,
3 Sep 64. U. )
Vergner, Zdenek. "Problems of Planned Management of the
National. Economy, " Hospodarske noviny, 3, 17 Jan 64,
p. 6-7. U.
Komenda, Bohumil and Cestmir Kozusnik. "Simplified System
or Simplified Interpretation, " Hospodarske noviny, 13, 27 Mar
64. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 402, Translations on Czecho-
slovakia, 211, 27 Aug 64. OFF USE.)
Komenda, Bohumil and Ce stmir Kozusnik. "Some Fundamental
Problems of Improving the Management System in the National
Economy and Panel Discussion on Management, " Politka
ekonomie, no 3, 1964, p. 219-272. U. (Cited in JPRS.
GUO 383, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 206, p. 12-41 and
67-118, 11 Aug 64. OFF USE.)
Kozusnik, Cestmir. "Flexible Prices and Planned Manage-
ment of the Economy, " Planovane hospodarstvi, no 6, 1964,
p. 25-33. U. (Cited in JPRS. QUO 377, Translations
on Czechoslovakia, 204, p. 81-91, 5 Aug 64. OFD' USE.)
Komenda, Bohumil. "Conditions for Working of the Market
Mechanism in Socialist Economics, " Planovane hospodarstvi,
no 7, 1964, p. 28-38. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 398,
Translations on Czechoslovakia, '210, p. 48-63, 24 Aug 64.
OFF USE.)
Kodet, Zdenek. "Gross Income or Profit,'! Hospodarske
noviny, no 23, 5 Jun 64, p. 3. U. , (Cited in JPRS. GUO 391,
Translations on Czechoslovakia, 208, 18 Aug 64, p. 1-9.
OFF USE.)
Matejka, Ladislav. "Binding Nature of the Plan and Economic
Management, " Planovane hospodarstvi, no 2, 1964, p. 31-37.
U.
Kocanda, Rudolf. "Economic Conditions of Planned Adminis-
tration, " Planovane hospodarstvi, no 2, 1964, p. 23-30. U.
(Cited in JPRS. GUO 302, Translations on Czechoslovakia,
170, 19 Mar 64. OFF USE.)
"Political Organization and Law as Applicable to the Manage-
ment of the National Economy, and Enquiry, " Pravnik, no 6
and 7, 1964. U. (Cited in RFE. Czechoslovak Press Survey,
no 1511, 25 Jul 64, p. 1-"'32. U. )
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3. State, Prague. Airgram A 410, 21 Feb 64, p. 3. OFF USE.
4. Vlcek, J. "Views Are Sorted Out, " Hospodarske novice, no
10, 6 Mar 64, p. I. U. (Cited in RFE. Czechoslovak
Press Summary, no 1438, 20 Mar 64, p. 7. U. )
FBIS. Daily Report (USSR and East Europe), 8 Jan 64,
p. gg 8. U.
Selucky, R. "Economic Views Becoming More Closely De-
fined, "` Veda a zivot, Mar 64. U. (Cited in RFE. Czecho-
slovak Press Survey, no 1442, 1 Apr 64, p. 13. U'. )
5. Sokol, Miroslav. "Application of Commodity Relationships
in Management, " Planovane hospodarstvi, no 5, 1964,
p. 31-44. U. (Cited in JPRS. GUO 358, Translations
on Czechoslovakia, 202, 16 Jul 64, p. 1-18. OFF USE.)
Tucek, Miroslav, "Planned Management of National Economy
and Finance, " Finance a over, no 4, 1964, p. 199-208. U.
(Cited in JPRS. GUO 358, Translations on Czechoslovakia,
202, 16 Jul 64, p. 33-48. OFF USE. )
6. Klas, Anton. "Economic and Administrative Management, "
Hospodarske noviny, 19, 8 May 64, p. 3. U. (Cited in
JPRS. GUO 397, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 209,
21 Aug 64, p. 1-10. OFF USE.)
Kadlec, Vladimir, "Computers in the Industrial Enterprises, "
Hospodarske noviny, 2, 10 Jan 64, p. 5. U.
7. Hospodarske noviny, 10, 6 Mar 64, p. 12. U.
Ibid., 11, 13 Mar 64, p. 10. U.
Politika ekonomie, no 3, 1964, p. 268. U.
8. Prochazka, Karel and Milos Ruzicka. "Prices Pro and Con,
Hospodarske noviny, 20, 15 May 64, p. 4. U. (Cited in JPRS.
GUO 391, Translations on Czechoslovakia 208, 18 Aug 64,
p. 23-28. OFF USE.)
Ditte rt, Josef. The Key Lies in Departmental Management,
Hospodarske noviny, 13, 27 Mar 64, p. 4, 10. U.
Vaclav. "Directive Plan and Monetary Relationship, "
Filip,
Hospodarske noviny, no 12, 20 Mar 64, p. 4. U. (Cited in
JPRS. GUO 398, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 210,
24 Aug 64, p. 31. OFF USE. )
9. Rude pravo, 6 Apr 64, p. 2. U. (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report
(USSR and East Europe), 16 Apr 64, p. gg 12. U. )
Ibid., 29 May 64, p. 2. U. (Cited in FBIS, Daily Report
(USSR and East Europe), 9 Jun 64, p. 7, 8. U.
Ibid., 30 May 64, p. 2. U. (Cited in FBIS, Daily Report
(USSR and East Europe), 8 Jun 64, p. gg 5. U. )
Ibid., 24 Jun 64, p. 3. U. (Cited in FBIS, Daily Report
(USSR and East Europe), 14 Jul 64, p. gg 28. U.)
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10. Hospodarske noviny, 7 Aug 64, p. 4. U.
11. Rude pravo, 30 May 64, p. 2. U.
12. Planovane hospodarstvi, no 7, 1963, p. 7-9. U.
13. Finance auver, no 3, 1964, p. 129-138. U. (Cited in JPRS.
GUO 313, Translations on Czechoslovakia, 27 May 64.
OFF USE.)
Ibid., no 2, 1964, p. I. U.
14. Rude pravo, 24 Jun 64, p. 3. U (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report
(USSR and East Europe), 24 Jun 64, p. '99'3. U. )
Ibid., 28 Aug 64, p. 2. U. (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report
(USSR and East Europe), 28 Aug 64, p. (gg' 2. U. )
15. Ibid.,. 30 May 64. U. (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report (USSR
and East Europe), 8 Jun 64, p. g~g(7;,8. U. )
Ibid., 28 Aug 64, p. 2. U. (Cited iii FBIS. Daily Report
(USSR and East Europe), 1 Sep 64, p. gg 7,'8. U. )
Ibid. , 30 Aug. 64, p. 3. U. (Cited in FBIS. Daily Report
(USSR and East Europe), 3 Sep 64, p. gg 15. U. )
16. Ibid., 4 Apr 64, p. 2. U.
Analysts:
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 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3
 Analyst: A/E
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01 A010240060001-3
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
St/P/RR - Control Section
Control Sheet
Series Number CIA/RR CB 64-58
Date of Document- September 1964
Copy No.
25X1A
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
dongrading and
deciasciticatlon
Returned
172 25X1A 29 Se 64
173 OCR "
174 O s 1G81 Hq.______
HR
175
18 0
181
182 184
185 -- ---__ -_
~~.
186
187 182._
190 229 Filed in St/P/C 29 Se 64
7tiX1A LS/CR for.Leon Lewins,
190
_
Bureau of International_Programs,_?__ ___ _
_ Roo 2314, Main Commerce 29 Se 64
1
-
2z -Iief -A~ 4
3 s apt t,o _ _ o cl r
_ _.
164 1
pproved'~orl~eTe`ase1~5T~-R P79T01003A002100040
01-3
Recipient
Classification
I U
III-CRIFIDENTIAL
Number of Copies 280
 Approved For Release 200A A~ RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3
"WOR1
SUBJECT- Distribution of Current Support Brief No, 64-58,
Czechoslovakia Debates Market Socialism --- Se ptember 1264 (Confidential
Copy No
1
O/DDI, Room 7E32, Hdgtrso
2-3
NIC
4 -12
OCI Internal
13
- 15
ONE
16
- 21
St/CS/RR 25X1A
zz
23
- 31
4/DD
NSA/ 25X1A
32
33
- 280
ORR Iistribution, St/A/ Document Support Section,
Room GH0915, Hdgtrs
(Distributed by OCR)
CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and;.::
declassification
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79TO1003AO02100040001-3
 CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/05/12: IA-RDP79T01003A002100040001-3
eo,4, -/Ds Distribution of Current Support Brief No. 64-58. Czechoslovakia
Co."r No.
33 .AD/RR
34 DkAD/RR
35 Ch/E
36 St/PR
37 - 41 D/A (~. each branch)
Recipient
42 - 47 D/M,S (1 each branch)
43 - 53 D/R (I each branch)
54 MRA
55 - 59 DIP (I each branch)
60 - 65 D/F (I each branch)
66 St/PS
67 - 75 D/I (1 each branch)
76 - 77 D/GG _
78 - 79 D/GC
80 D/GCIX
31 - 86 RID/A1, Unit 4, Room IB4004, Hq.
37 st/P/A 25X1A
38 St/FM
39 Analyst/Branch A/E)
90 GR/CR
91 BR/CR
92 FIB/SR/CR, Room 1G27, Hq.
93 Library/CR
94 IPI/CR
95 VMR. A-18
96 AD/OO
97 Chief, FDD
93 CD/OO
99 OCI/SA/R, Room 5G19. Hq.
100 DDI/CGS, Room. 7F35,, Hq.
101 - 10Z DDI/CGS/HR, Room 1CaI, Hq.
103 ri 105 OSI
106 081 25X1 A
107 - 108 Q'-.rR/I.S/IP, Room 532, Broyhill Bld . (1 - OrR/SIC)
109 NPIC/CSD/REF, Room 15518,
110 Commandant National War College, Ft. Leslie McNair. Attn; Classified
Records Section. Rm. 26, National War College Building, Wash.. D. C.
111 - 112 Assistant Secretary of Defense, Y. SA, Room 4D825, Pentagon
113 - 151 Defense Intelligence Agency, DV.-AQ-3, Room 2D233, Pentagon
152 - 155 USIA, Warren Phelps. IRR/D, Room Walker John non Building,
1734 New York Avenue, N. W. 812.
156 - 167 State, !NR Communications Center, Room 7318, State Dept. Bldg.
1.68 .. 169 Dr. Neilson Debevoise, NSC. Room 365, Executive Office Building
170 -- 171 Frank M. Charrette. Agency for International Development, Chief,
Statistics and Reports Division, Room A-204, State Annex #10
172 - Z29 St/P/C/RR, Roora 4F41, Hq.
Records Center
230- 280
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k002100040001-3
 CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/05/12 CIA-tDP79T01003A002100040001-3
F 2 October 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR'. Chief, Dissemination Control Branch,, DD/CR
FROM Chief, Publications Staff, OR.R
SUBJECT Transmittal of Material
It is requested that the attached copies of CIA/ R CB 64-581
Czeohoslova~siai 7 ebetes 2 rket Socialism September 1 1, Confident al,
e foxvarded fa cwss
State, IN1t Communications Center
Room 7818, State Dept, Bldg,
Suggested distribution for
Embassies in MaOCO1, Prague
and London
25X1A
Attachments
C< ac leis #i92 - ,194 of CB 64-58
Tt~s.: Ku .9 d
!P~.TLD
by
this memorandum has been completed,
BY : "?7d "
Date: ;b y
GROUP I
Approved For Release MnAL
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RSA 1~ daciassificatian
 R'r
A Appr ed For Release 2000/0/q !; 1~1449T01 003AO02100040001-3
16.516 CIA/RR CB 64-58
Czechoslovakia Debates Market Socialism --- September 1964
(CONFIDENTIAL)
25X1A
A/E
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Approved xcluded troM 'SUMAC
For Release 20
cWHIEKNAt D 7 J~uss~ l A
BRA
Hon r Kong,
Mexico
Guatemala
Panama
Kuala Lumpto . ,:..lava
Brazillia. Brasil.
Buenos Aires. Argentina
i gong iet
Bogota, Colombia
r
1eoii Fox e
Santiago. Chile
Taipei
E. -a
La Paz, hoti.via
Montevideo, Uruguay
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Caracasa zr''erse:uela.
Vientiane. La:xs
.Phnom Penh., C aE?nbodi.
Colombo,. Ge k, on
Near :East r% Scut! Asia
a
Yaounde, Cam>roun
Leopoldville, Congo
Addi
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Ankara, Turkey
a,
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a
Accra. Ghana
Athens, Gre- e
Abidjan.. Ivor, Coast
U0Yt1iE3r'uR
Nairobi Kenya
Mon.i.ovia i. L#be na
Kabul, Afgh at, ta.n
Tripoli, Libya
d rac hi,, :Pa c, >~ a :
#ew F e3bi: in `a
=_ti c r-s a Cyprus
1'ehrPp. (ran.
13aghda~ roc
Tel. Aviv.. Is r e,J
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Ottawa. Canada
GROUP 1
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Laos,
Mogadisc .o. SQmal
Khartoum. Sudan
Tunas? "a~1hnii sia
Pretoria, South. Airii a
A.ieierse:ieria
4 o4onnou, O=Horn'-v
Dakar, S 'ne-za.i
D02100040001-3
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2 e-1, PT.' 9LIC,l TTON S CON tl OL PRC.)C1SS1NG SF.F.K'l
43ran&i
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: t f. (it aft
the
Text .:.'heck.
-urce cheek
Sc-
F G E~~ W? le to
#l sent to AD/RR
#z sent to DDI
3 checked for release
OL/PSD notified to Disstieminatj
IA-RDP79TO1003A002100040001-3