SOVIET GRAIN HARVEST IN 1963

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01003A001800240003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 1, 1964
• Content Type: BRIEF

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CONFIDENTIAL
Current Support Brief
SOVIET GRAIN HARVEST IN 1963
CIA/RR CB 64-4
January 1964
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
CONFIDENTIAL
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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SOVIET GRAIN HARVEST IN 1963
Over the past 5 years this Office has contended that there a are
ag nd s
exaggerations in the USSR' s official statistics for grain producon
that the Soviet agricultural situation was generally worse than po ertrayed
by the Kremlin leadership and the Soviet press.
Pravda suggests that the USSR may soon publish the most accurate esti-
mate of grain production that has appeared since 1957 - a figure for
1963 which differs greatly from official
frSoviet estimates of om the independentacalOulatons
and November but which may not differ
of this Office by much more than 5 percen.
exaf ggsuch erataonls in theseCgralin
announced, it is possible that in the futur
production statistics, which this Office believes have persisted since
1958, may be substantially eliminated.
In a speech before the Supreme Soviet (published in Pravda on
Chairman of the Economic Com-
mission December 1963), 0. 1. Ivashchenko, uan-
mission of the Council of Nationalities, revealed that the average q
tity of grain obtained during the period 1959-63 was about 15 e million r
iod metric tons above the annual average of the previouso5 ein 1963 rs cal-
(1954-58). On the basis of this disclosure, p
mrage ometric
tons or the 117
culated to be either about 93 million metric
tons depending on certain assumptions regarding
Ivashchenko's statistics. However,
figure does not differ gre a t y from
figure is more likely. This lower gu
the recent estimate of this Office for 1963 of about 100 million tons;
however, the 93 million figure (as well as the less likely alternative ent of 117 million) is in sharp contra sttof 132 m llionlort1331mi11ionhrnetric
Soviet officials indicating a harve
tons.
Technical changes in statistical reporting as well as outright dis-
tortion and falsification at various levels in Soviet agriculture may pos-
sibly have delayed the leadership's appreciation of the full extent of the
1963 crisis in grain production. Falsification fPlenumin agriPacultural
Co tgol
was a major issue in the January 1961 g Commissions established in po1962 were ssible that their afindings may leadlto a substan-
malpractices, and it is posse
tial moderation in the statistical exaggerations that have persisted in
Soviet agriculture over the past 6 years.
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1 ? Recent Official Statement on Grain Production
Ivashchenko has recently stated in a speech before the Supreme
Soviet that the average quantity of grain harvested the first 5 years
(1959-63) of the Seven Year Plan was 900 million poods (about 15 mil-
lion metric tons) more than the average amount obtained annually during
1954-58 (Pravda, 17 December 1963).
Calculations based on this statement give a much lower grain harvest
for the USSR in 1963 than that indicated in earlier statements by Soviet
officials. The implied grain production in 1963 was only about 93 million
metric tons if Ivashchenko's figures include corn in the milky-waxy stage
of maturity in line with normal Soviet statistical practice. If corn in the
milky-waxy stage of maturity were excluded in his statistics, the derived
production figure for 1963 would be about 117 million metric tons. The
current estimate of this Office of the harvest of grain in 1963 -- arrived
at independently -- is about 100 million metric tons."""
Ivashchenko's disclosure is in sharp contrast to previous Soviet
statements about the 1963 grain harvest. In October, Volovchenko, the
Soviet Minister of Agriculture, indicated that the grain crop for 1963
would be about 133 million metric tons. In a speech on 6 November,
N. V. Podgorny estimated that the harvest would be about 132 million
metric tons.
During a recent discussion between the US agricultural attache in
Moscow and representatives of the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture, the
Soviet officials indicated simply that a calculated figure of 93 million
tons of grain was "too low. " The official reaction, however, apparently
was not so strong as might have been expected in view of the approxi-
mately 40-million-ton difference between this figure and the 132 million
to 133 million tons referred to above.
:[f Ivashchenko's statement is not a misprint or a garble (and these
are rare indeed in Pravda), it may be an indication that, beginning with
the 1963 crop, the USSR is taking steps to eliminate the overestimation
that this Office believes has characterized statistics on grain production
since 1957. The need to import unprecedented quantities of wheat in
For methodology, see the Appendix.
** All of these production estimates
million,
and 100 million) were computed to include corn rin tmetric tons, 117 he milky-waxy stage.
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1963-64 -- grain that the USSR probably would not have had to import if
the actual quantities of grain harvested during 1958-62 had been as great
as were claimed -- may have revealed to Soviet leaders for the first
time the degree of overestimation in their grain statistics and the prob-
lems that can be caused by such erroneous data.
2. Comparison of Soviet and ORR Estimates
Before 1958, there was a close correlation between the estimates
of grain output calculated by this Office and official reports of the Soviet
government. However, beginning with 1958, official Soviet data on
grain production indicate harvests considerably higher than those that
could have been expected under the given combination of acreage and
weather conditions, and Soviet claims since that time have been con-
siderably higher than the calculations of this Office. A comparison of
Soviet claims and the estimates of this Office is given in the following
tabulation:
Million Metric Tons
ORR Estimate
as Percent of
iet Claim
S
ORR Estimate
Soviet Claim
Year
ov
1958
141
125
89
1959
126
100
79
ig6o
134
100
75
1961
138
115
83
1962
148
115
78
1963
133*
100
75
The overstatement of the grain harvests in the Soviet claims prob-
ably is attributable to several factors. First, an unpublished instruction
of the Central Statistical Directorate in April 1958 may have changed
radically the methodology used in determining the size of the grain har-
vest -- that is, a change in the definition of grain production. Second,
statistical malpractices by officials at various administrative levels
cumulatively may have produced substantial upward biases or over-
estimations in the figures for the total grain harvest. These statistical
malpractices were fostered by the dissolution of the machine tractor
stations in 1958 and the resulting loss of an effective statistical control
* Volovchenko's estimate referred to above.
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mechanism. Also, officials at the various administrative levels in the
USSR have been under extreme pressure to show positive results as the
Seven Year Plan progressed. In most sectors of agriculture, progress
has, `been extremely difficult because 1958, the base year of the plan, was
an excellent crop year.
The scandalous extent to which statistical falsification in agriculture
had grown was revealed at the January 1961 Plenum and in the months
just following that Plenum. Although statistical malpractices were re-
ported from virtually every region in the USSR, there were practically
no adjustments or downward revisions in the national statistics on agri-
cultural production. On the contrary, a justification for not adjusting
these statistics was published in the Soviet statistical journal Vestnik
statistiki in June 1961.
The Party-State Control Commissions, established in 1962, may
have been instrumental in determining the extent of statistical exaggera-
tion in agriculture. If so, it is possible that grain statistics will be more
accurate beginning with 1963 and that a corrected statistical series will
be issued covering 1958-62.
A Soviet statistic released just before this report went to press
tends to confirm that the USSR may admit to a very low grain harvest
in 1963, although it is not possible to judge just how lowfrom the sta-
tistic. An article in Pravda of 13 January 1964 stated that gross agri-
cultural production increased 50 percent in 1963 compared with 1952.
This is much lower than a figure given by Party Chief N. V. Podgorny
who, in a speech on 6 November commemorating the October Revolution,
stated that agricultural output had increased by 70 percent in the last
10 years. If, in fact, the final Soviet statistic is 50 percent, it implies
a drop of about 9 percent in output in 1963 compared with 1962. Whereas
no precise comparison can be made, the preliminary estimate of the
index of net agricultural production by this Office indicates a substanti-
ally smaller decline than this. This decrease was due primarily to the
very poor grain crop.
Analyst:
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APPENDIX
METHODOLOGY
Soviet statistics on grain production generally include immature corn
in the milky-waxy stage converted to a dry grain equivalent. In Soviet sta-
tistical handbooks, however, a double series of statistics on grain produc-
tion is published. One series includes the immature corn converted to dry
grain, and the other excludes the immature corn.
From Ivashchenko's statement it is possible to derive two separate
and widely divergent estimates of the total grain harvest for 1963. One
estimate would be based on the assumption that Ivashchenko's figures in-
cluded corn in the milky-waxy stage; the other would assume that he ex-
cluded it. These calculations are presented below:
Case No. 1 (Including Immatur_ e Corn)
Period
Harvest
(Million Metric Tons)
(a) 1954-58 average (official, including
113.24
immature corn)
(b) 1959-63 average (based on Ivashchenko)
127.98
90
639
(c) 1959-63 total (5 times 127.98)
.
42
546
(d) 1959-62 total (official)*
.
(e) 1963: (c) minus (d)
Case No. 2 (Excluding Immature Corn)
Period
Harvest
(Million Metric Tons)
(a) 1954-58 average (official, excluding
31
11
00.
31
immature corn)
)
11
(b) 1959-63 average (based on Ivashchenko
(c) Average annual output of immature
.
7,60
corn, 1959-62
ture
i
mma
(d) 1959-63 average (including
132.65
corn: (b) plus (c)
6
663.25
5)
(e) 1959-63 total (5 times 132.
546.42
(f) 1959-62 total (official)*
(g) 1963: (e) minus (f)
Total derived by adding official production figures (including immature
corn) for each year in this period.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
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