NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031400120002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 14, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
14 May 1979
State Dept. review completed
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 Special Analyses
Algeria: Continuity and Change . . . . . . . . 3
United Nations: Disarmament Commission Convenes 7
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Briefs and Comments
France: Communist Party Congress . . . . . . .
USSR-Hungary: Reported Brezhnev Visit . . . . 2
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FRANCE: Communist Party Congress
The 23rd Congress of the French Communist Party,
which ended yesterday, ratified the party's break with
the Socialist Party and ruled out any programmatic
alliance for the indefinite future. The party has re-
turned to orthodox policies, renewed its traditional
reliance on workers, and abandoned the idea of partici-
pation in government. Communist Party leader Georges
Marchais, who was reelected to that post yesterday,
criticized Stalinism in a marathon speech, but concluded
that the record of Soviet-style socialism was positive.
This conclusion, one of the main resolutions voted on
at the congress, was undoubtedly gratifying to the So-
viet delegation, which had heard much harsher criticism
at the party's congress in 1976.
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//The left will therefore remain divided, probably
at least through the first round of the presidential elec-
tion in 1981, although Marchais spoke vaguely of union
(that is, unofficial cooperation) at the grass-roots 25X1
level. The Communists believe the union of the left ben-
efited the Socialists at Communist expense and confused
//The party did not permit dissenting party intel-
lectuals to attend the congress, and they failed to agree
on a plan to hold a parallel congress, in part because of 25X1
fear the party would retaliate. The party has apparently
decided not to expel any of the dissenters, who have only
limited support in the party.
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USSR-HUNGARY: Reported Brezhnev Visit
We are unable to confirm reports that Soviet Presi-
dent Brezhnev will soon visit Hungary. Last week a
Hungarian official told the US Ambassador in Budapest
that the Soviet leader will arrive "at an early date,"
assertedly before the US-Soviet summit. A trip by
Brezhnev to Hungary has long been expected, but one soon
would be surprising in light of the Soviet President's
known health problems and the need to prepare for the
scheduled summit in Vienna. Hungarian party chief Kadar
visited Moscow in early March of this year and apparently
took care of outstanding matters affecting Soviet-Hun-
25X1 garian relations.
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ALGERIA: Continuity and Change
The three-month-old government of Algerian President
ChadZi Bendjedid has generaZZy continued the domestic
and foreign policies of former President Boumediene.
There are tentative signs that Bendjedid will take a Zess
doctrinaire approach to important issues, but he seems
unlikely to initiate fundamental changes any time soon.
The government reaches key decisions by consensus in the
cabinet and perhaps the faction-ridden politburo of AZ-
geria's sole political party, the National Liberation
Front. Political disputes in the politburo constrain
Bendjedid's flexibility and inhibit policy departures.
//The new President does not have Boumediene's un-
challenged authority. endjedid
was a compromise choice of the senior military officers
who are Algeria's principal power brokers. Bendjedid
stayed out of political infighting while he was Second
Military Region Commander in Oran from 1964 through 1978;
this presumably aided his selection, but his prolonged
isolation in Oran also raises questions about the extent
of his support among politicians and military officers
from eastern Algeria.
Like his predecessor, Bendjedid has a mix of mili-
tary men and civilian technocrats in his cabinet; polit-
ically ambitious ideologues and nonsubstantive dilettantes
are largely confined to the party politburo. The new
cabinet seems stronger than its predecessors. For ex-
ample, Prime Minister Abdelghani, who retains the sensi-
tive interior portfolio, is an effective administrator
and has been granted considerable control over government
administration.
The party politburo probably sets broad policy guide-
lines. Leftists led by party coordinator Yahiaoui--a
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hardline socialist ideologue who still wields some influ-
ence--will act as a brake on any inclination by Bendjedid
and other pragmatists in the cabinet to change Algeria's
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Competition within the leadership--and with it, rule
by consensus--is likely to continue for some time. It
took a month for Bendjedid to put together his cabinet.
He left vacant the key posts of minister of defense and
armed forces chief of staff, probably because of the in-
ability of the country's power brokers to agree on nom-
25X1 inees.
A dominant figure will emerge eventually--as it did
with Boumediene, who took three years to eliminate his
major political rivals--but Bendjedid may not be the ul-
timate winner. He appears pragmatic and apparently has
few enemies, but he enjoys a Western lifestyle and lacks
the strong Arabist credentials that have been a principal
requirement for leadership in Algeria. Abdelghani, with
his key portfolios and presumed Army ties as a former
military re ion commander, is a potential rival or re-
25X1 placement.
Political infighting will most likely be played out
behind the scenes and not lead to civil disorder. Al-
geria has had its revolution, and the people have no il-
lusions about the government's willingness to use force
to maintain order. A strongman is likely to emerge by
gradually lining up the support of key military officers
rather than through an open power play.
Domestic Policy Adjustments
The new government is lifting some unpopular controls
over personal life and private business. Exit permits
are no longer required of Algerians traveling abroad.
The government apparently has released two political
leaders of the preindependence era from house arrest.
Rumors are circulating that small businessmen and apart-
25X1 ment dwellers will be able to buy the premises they have
been renting from the government and that travelers will
soon be allowed to take larger amounts of currency abroad.
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There are tentative signs of a reassessment of the
rigid economic centralization of the Boumediene era, and
there may be limited retrenchment in the industrial sec-
tor. In recent speeches, Bendjedid has proposed a shift
of emphasis to satisfy popular demands by increasing pro-
ductivity in the long-neglected agricultural sector, ex-
panding the housing program, and by decentralizing author-
ity to enable more efficient execution of government pro-
grams. The government has not disavowed socialism or
industrialization, but there is likely to be more flexi-
bility in government planning and greater emphasis on 25X1
completing existing projects and usin them more effi-
ciently before undertaking new ones. I __1
Algeria will continue to produce as much oil and
gas as possible to finance its development program and 25X1
will seek price increases that keep pace with inflation.
Although Algeria faces some debt-servicing and cash-flow
problems, its long-term economic prospects are good.
Foreign Policy
Algeria under Bendjedid probably will be less of an
international leader on Third World issues, but it will
continue to promote the cause of the guerrillas of West-
ern Sahara. Rivalry with Morocco for preeminence in 25X1
North Africa will continue to be the main feature of Al-
gerian foreign policy. This competition is the principal
motive for Algeria's involvement in Western Sahara.
//The Algerians probably are now less disposed to
compromise with Morocco than they were a year or so ago.
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Algeria's hardline Middle East policy remains con-
stant, as evidenced in Algerian condemnation of the
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The Algerians are coop-
erating with--but not leading--Arab hardliners who call
for sanctions against Egyptian President Sadat.
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//The new leaders appear to desire more balance in
relations with the superpowers. They may be more recep-
tive to US demarches on non-Arab issues and will continue
to display interest in US technology, expertise, and fi-
nancing. As they have in the past, the Algerians will
express agreement with Soviet views when there is a coin-
cidence of interests and will retain their arms supply
relationship with the USSR.//
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UNITED NATIONS: Disarmament Commission Convenes
go in elaborating the comprehensive program.
The UN Disarmament Commission convenes today for its
first substantive session since 1965. The nonaligned
states, which had pushed for resurrection of the Commis-
sion, will take the Zead in organizing its work. The
Commission is charged by the UN General Assembly with
considering the "elements" of a comprehensive program
for disarmament, but otherwise its role is uncertain.
Although a good working atmosphere has prevailed during
preliminary discussions, the four-week session will re-
veal sharp differences over how far the Commission should
man the Indian diplomat M. A. Vellodi.
making recommendations on "various" disarmament problems
and following up the decisions of the Special Session.
In two brief organizational meetings last fall, the Com-
mission adopted a provisional agenda and chose as chair-
The original Disarmament Commission was created in
1952 and fell into disuse in the early sixties. At its
Special Session on Disarmament last year, the UN General
Assembly established the present Commission as a delibera-
tive body composed of all UN members. Apart from the
comprehensive program for disarmament, it is charged with
Comprehensive Program
The smaller Committee on Disarmament in Geneva had
considered a comprehensive program for disarmament but
had made scant progress when the Special Session was
held. Vellodi intends to devote the first two weeks
the present session to the subject.
The nonaligned states want the Commission to negoti-
ate a "framework" for a comprehensive program that would
indicate priorities among disarmament measures and a
schedule for their implementation.
Western governments--probably with the
support o the USSR and its allies--will argue that the
Commission is not empowered to negotiate, only to delib-
erate and advise, and that it shoul~ only list its dis-
armament objectives and principles.
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Other Topics
//The provisional agenda includes "consideration of
various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nu-
clear arms race and nuclear disarmament." This sweeping
wording is a compromise between those Western countries
that wanted the agenda to mention conventional arms and
the nonaligned states, which preferred to focus more
narrowly on nuclear weapons. Several West European gov-
ernments want to discuss conventional arms ransfers in
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The other issues on the agenda are the reduction of
military budgets and the reallocation of resources from
military purposes to social and economic development.
The USSR has previously offered proposals for reducing
military budgets and may use this opportunity to do so
again. The connection between disarmament and develop-
ment is a favorite nonaligned theme and will likely re-
ceive much attention in plenary debates.
Relation to Other Forums
//How member states use the Disarmament Commission
will depend heavily on progress in other disarmament
forums. The achievement of consensus at the Special
Session will tend to make this first meeting of the Com-
mission less acrimonious than it otherwise would be. The
nonaligned states are generally dissatisfied, however,
with the session of the Committee on Disarmament that re-
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states in criticizing the superpowers' failure to present
a draft chemical weapons a reement at that session.//
With its broader membership and an Indian chairman,
the Commission has a more nonaligned cast than the Com-
mittee on Disarmament. Because of this, the nonaligned
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group will try to expand the Commission's functions and
to blur the distinction between deliberation and negoti-
ation.
//China will also tend to favor a large role for the
Commission. Beijing believes that the Committee on Dis-
armament, despite recent reforms, is still tainted by
superpower domination, and China therefore has not taken
its seat in Geneva. France has ended its boycott of the
Committee but has indicated that nuclear disarmament is,
at this stage. more appropriately debated in the Commis-
sion.//
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