NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031400110002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 12, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Top Secret
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Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
12 May 1979
Top Secret
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4190140002
Copy
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
BRIEFS AND COMENTS
China-Vietnam-USSR: Fourth Session of
Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
USSR-Iran: Bilateral Relations. . . . . . . . . 2
Turkey: US Serviceman Killed. . . . . . . . . . 3
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ASEAN: Proposed Refugee Center. . . . . . . . . 5
Sudan: Foreign Payments Struggle. . . . . . . . 6
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Mozambique: Cholera Epidemic. . . . . . . . . . 7
Egypt: Parliamentary Elections. . . . . . . . . 8
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CHINA-VIETNAM-USSR: Fourth Session of Talks
The fourth session of talks between China and Viet-
nam is scheduled today, but neither side seems to expect
any progress. The first three formal sessions--aZZ in
Hanoi--have served only to outline the differences be-
tween the two governments. An authoritative I. AZek-
sandrov article in Pravda yesterday on the Sino-Vietnamese
negotiations strongly supports Vietnam and may reflect
the USSR's desire to reassure Vietnam before accepting
China's recent proposal for Sino-Soviet talks.
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The Chinese are arguing that Hanoi refuses to address
the "fundamental" issues, which Beijing sees as Vietnam's
ambitions in Indochina and its relations with the USSR.
China's eight-point proposal--made at the second session
of the talks--was, in effect, a call for a comp lete re-
versal in Vietnamese policy on both issues. 25X1
//The Chinese almost certainly do not expect Hanoi
to respond positively to proposals for a Vietnamese with- 25X1
drawal from Kampuchea and"a compromise political solution 25X1
there. Beijing does, however, hope to use protracted ne-
gotiations as a forum for directing international opinion
against Vietnam's occupation.
In a public note to the French Communist Party ear-
lier this week, Vietnam declared that China was using the
talks to deceive international opinion while seeking a
pretext to "make war on" Vietnam. F7 I 25X1
The Aleksandrov article says Vietnam has been "quite
right" in rejecting China's demands in the negotiations
and warns Beijing that continued intransigence will only
backfire. It criticizes China for challenging Vietnamese
sovereignty over the Paracels and the Spratleys--the first
time the Soviets at this level have ever publicly sup-
ported Vietnamese territorial claims. The article also
attacks unnamed politicians--presumably in the West and
Eastern Europe--who welcome the Sino-Vietnamese talks but
are indifferent concerning their outcome. 25X1
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In marked contrast to Soviet assessments just a few
weeks ago, the USSR now appears skeptical that the domes-
tic situation in Iran will soon become more stable and
that Soviet-Iranian relations will improve. Soviet criti-
cism of the government in Tehran is increasing, and the
:soviets appear more willing to defend the role of the
25X1 Communist Tudeh Party.
In Pravda last week, correspondent Petr Demchenko
criticized the Iranian Government, asserting that its
officials believe erroneously that the goals of the rev-
olution have been accomplished. A recent article in New
limes listed problems in Iran and concluded that the sit-
uation in Tehran was "tense and confused." Just last
month, Demchenko and other correspondents had heralded
the establishment of a republican system in Iran. Muted
criticism of the Iranian regime has now begun to appear
in broadcasts of the clandestine radio "National Voice
of Iran," and the Tudeh Party has taken an increasingly
independent stance--of which the Soviets doubtless ap-
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The Soviets are likely to continue to be cautious
in their dealings with Iran, however, to avoid antagoniz-
ing the Khomeini regime and further jeopardizing the
Tudeh Party and their own political and economic interests.
Foreign Minister Gromyko's prompt reception of the new
Iranian Ambassador to Moscow on 7 May suggests that the
Soviets still hope to smooth over strains in relations
and promote the semblance of good formal ties.
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A US serviceman was killed yesterday in Istanbul and
another was wounded in the second such incident in Turkey
in a month; the attack reflects the general increase in
anti-American activities since the declaration of martial
law last December. The attack will further complicate
Prime Minister Ecevit's effort to quell the politically-
motivated violence with a minimum of repression in the
face of military pressure to clamp down.
The shooting yesterday was similar to the 12 April
attack on US servicemen. The assassins fired on a small
group of Americans and fled with the help of accomplices
in a stolen automobile. A radical Marxist organization
has claimed responsibility for the attack.
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//Earlier this week, a prominent general publicly re-
marked that martial law duty and fighting "anarchy" would
ultimately erode the morale of the armed forces and that
more effective legislation and police work are necessary
to end the violence. Kidnaping and assassinations of
Americans and other NATO personnel, together with govern-
ment reluctance to clamp down, precipitated the "coup by
memorandum" in 1971. 25X1
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ASEAN: Proposed Refugee Center
The nations most actively involved in the Indochi-
nese refugee problem will meet in Jakarta on Tuesday and
Wednesday to discuss the creation of a special process-
ing center for refugees. The meeting is unlikely to re-
solve all the issues, but broad recognition of the need
for such a center suggests that discussions will continue.
The meeting will include members of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations--the Philippines, Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore--that are the coun-
tries of first asylum and 18 other nations, including the
US, Australia, France, and Canada, that are involved in
resettlement programs. Hong Kong is excluded even though
it has a large refugee population. II 25X1
Vietnam has agreed to attend the conference as an
accommodation to its ASEAN neighbors, although it has yet
to regulate the flow of refugees as it promised. The
number of refugees, which has remained high over the past
year, has increased in recent months. 25X1
Earlier this year, Indonesia offered Galang Island,
15 miles south of Singapore, for use as a special proc-
essing center for Indochinese refugees. The offer is
subject to a number of conditions, in particular that
only refugees with a guaranteed offer of resettlement
would be admitted. Problems are also arising as to the
size and funding.of the center and the number of refugees
that would be accepted from each ASEAN nation. The
Philippines offered Tara Island for refugees who have
reached the Philippines.
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SUDAN: Foreign Payments Struggle
Sudan's agreement with the International Monetary
Fund for substantial financial support should enable it
to weather its immediate financial crunch and to import
badly needed industrial products. Since last January,
the economy has operated on a day-to-day basis as Khar-
toum sought cash to pay for critical oil and fertilizer
imports. Although the country's immediate financial
difficulties have eased, Sudan still faces a period of
economic austerity while it gets its balance of payments
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Sudan has been able to replace Iraqi oil supplies
that were cut off because of Sudan's support of President
Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Iraq has
long supplied about two-thirds of Sudan's oil. Now, how-
ever, Sudan has been able to get a commitment from Saudi
Arabia for 8.8 million barrels of crude oil--enough to
keep its refinery operating for a year. Egypt has sup-
plied about 500,000 barrels of crude oil since April and
will provide additional supplies if needed. Kuwait has
also agreed to supply petroleum products, to be financed
by a $30 million loan from the Islamic bank.
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MOZAMBIQUE: Cholera Epidemic
A cholera epidemic, which apparently started in
refugee camps run by the Zimbabwe African National Union,
has spread through Mozambique. The situation in the cap-
ital is said to be under control, and ZANU leaders have
acquired some cholera vaccine from Pakistan, presumably 25X1
for use in the camps. ZANU's activities could be signif-
icantly constrained by the disease even with the vaccine,
which is no more than about 50-percent effective.
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EGYPT: Parliamentary Elections
upon the freedom given the opposition to campaign.
credtbiZsty of the election will depend in large part
Political maneuvering is under way for the Egyptian
parliamentary election scheduled for 7 June. The outcome
is not in doubt--President Sadat's National Democratic
Party will retain the large majority it held in the pre-
vious People's Assembly. Sadat's primary goal in holding
the election, in fact, is to ensure the elimination of
outspoken critics of his policies from parliament. The
Sadat dissolved the People's Assembly on 10 April.
The first round of the election for the new parliament
will take place on 7 June and runoffs a week later. The
new body will hold its first session on 23 June. Although
exact membership figures are unclear, the People's Assem-
bly is to be expanded from 360 members to 392, including
30 seats for women and 10 presidential appointees. Two
candidates arently will be elected from each constitu-
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To create the impression of a more liberalized demo-
cratic process, the government has lifted the restriction
that political parties, to be represented in the People's
Assembly, must have at least 20 seats. Despite this move,
Prime Minister Khalil has indicated that the number of
parties will be limited. Existing bans continue against
parties that are religiously based, advocate a "totali-
tarian system," or advocate violence. An additional,
catchall restriction is that party platforms must differ
significantly from one another. A seven-member committee,
containing several cabinet members, has been formed to
review party applications, thus helping to ensure that
any new parties are acceptable to the government.
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Party Prospects
The National Democratic Party, which Sadat created
last year as the official government party, will continue
to dominate the People's Assembly. Mansur Hassan, leader
of the party, has indicated that his group intends to
field strong candidates and make a maximum effort to de-
feat Sadat's critics. National Democratic entries will
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have several advantages over their rivals; for example,
they will have free access to the government media, and
they are best able to garner government benefits for their
constituents. The party's support for Sadat's peace ef-
forts also will work in its favor among the majority of
E tian voters who back the peace treaty with Israel.
Hassan says he is urging his party to run weak candi-
dates against those from the "loyal opposition," but he
is by no means certain this will happen. Hassan predicts
that the National Democrats could win 95 percent of the
contested seats.
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//The Socialist Labor Party, the tame opposition
Sadat established last fall, is likely to run a distant
second. The leader of this party, Ibrahim Shukri, says
he has struck a deal with the National Democrats that
assures his party some 40 seats; it held 26 in the previ-
ous assembly. Shukri's estimate may be optimistic, but
the government probably will ensure that a credible num-
ber of Labor Party candidates are successful. After a
hiatus of a year, a Labor Party newspaper appeared on the
newsstands on 1 May; it reportedly is receiving newsprint
from the government at subsidized prices.// 25X1
The small rightwing Socialist Liberal Party also
claims to have reached agreement with the National Demo-
crats to increase its membership in the new parliament.
It apparently had only two seats in the former assembly,
but hopes now to obtain 25 to 30. It probably will not.
The leftist National Progressive Unionist Grouping
is likely to field several candidates, but the government-
sponsored party can be expected to campaign hard against
them. This group had two representatives in the former
parliament, both vociferous critics of the peace treaty
with Israel. Security officials raided the party's head-
quarters last month, and party officials recently were 25X1
accused of cooperating with the Iraqi Baath Party against
Egyptian policies. The party's leader, Khalid Muhi al-
Din, may be the group's only successful candidate.
Only one new party so far has applied for legal
status. The National Front, led by outspoken independent
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Mumtaz Nassar, existed in the previous parliament as an
informal coalition of leftists, rightists, and independ-
ents. Although this politically awkward amalgam may
fragment before long, it could--despite government oppo-
25X1 sition--win a few seats.
Other Groups
Although parties based on religion are prohibited,
some candidates advocating views of the outlawed Muslim
Brotherhood are likely to be elected either as independ-
ents or as members of other parties. Sadat recently pub-
licly castigated extremist religious movements, and the
government apparently is once again proscribing pro-Muslim
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Members of the moderately conservative New Wafd
Party, which dissolved itself in mid-1978 in protest of
government deliberalization measures, probably will also
take part in the election as independents or in other
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Intentions and Reactions
The dissolution of the People's Assembly and the new
election have been portrayed by the government as a fur-
ther step in the democratization of Egypt. Sadat in fact
may be hoping to create a parliament that will remain
passive despite the problems ahead over further negotia-
25X1 tions with Israel.
The Egyptian President is generally committed to a
greater degree of democratic process and seems to want a
credible opposition. He is extremely sensitive to criti-
cism, however, and continues to react strongly against
those who oppose his policies. The degree to which the
coming election is acceptable to politically informed
Egyptians, especially the intelligentsia, will hinge in
part on the latitude he allows independent or opposition
candidates during the campaign.
An interesting test case could be that of former
Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi, who resigned in the wake
of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. Fahmi
apparently hopes to run in opposition to Prime Minister
Khalil but has encountered difficulty in getting his can-
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