NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031400100002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 11, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
'Fop Secret
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
BRIEFS AND COMMENTS
North Yemen - South Yemen: Unity Moves. . . . . 1
Western Sahara: Diplomatic Contacts .
Nepal: King Acts to Reduce Tension. . . . . . . 3
Gaza Strip: Mayor Shawwa's Views. . . . . . . . 4
USSR - Japan: Firyubin Visit. . . . . . . . . . 5
China: Interest in Rocket Engines . . . . . . . 5
Czechoslovakia: Dissident's Sentence
Extended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
SPECIAL ANALYSIS
Ecuador: Roldos and the "Force for Change". . . 7
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NORTH YEMEN - SOUTH YEMEN: Unity Moves
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The US Embassy in Sana reports that North Yemeni
leaders are trying to stall on implementing their commit-
ment to unity negotiations between the two Yemens
because of their weaker military and political position.
The Aden regime is threatening military action if faced
with prolonged delays. 25X1
North Yemeni President All Abdallah Salih, although
publicly endorsing the goal of rapid reunification of
North and South Yemen, is privately stalling to gain
time to rebuild the North's military capability. Only
one of eight joint negotiating committees established
after the cease-fire in March has met so far; its task
is to draft a constitution. Northern negotiators have
managed to delay the next session of the committee until
1 June.
arrangements, be held next week.
South Yemeni President Abd al-Fatah Ismail, whose
objective is to unify the Yemens under his regime's
leadership, has notified Salih that he will not be put
off. Ismail reportedly sent an ultimatum to Salih last
week indicating that he would resort to force if the
negotiations bogged down. Ismail is also demanding that
the follow-up summit meeting, agreed to in the cease-fire
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WESTERN SAHARA: Diplomatic Contacts
A flurry of recent diplomatic activity concerning
the Western Sahara dispute probably reflects parallel
efforts to arrange an all-party settlement conference.
The contacts include principals in the dispute--Morocco,
Algeria, Mauritania, and the rebel Polisario Front--and
other interested parties--France, Spain, Libya, Saudi
Arabia, and an organization of African Unity factfinding
mission. Greater flexibility and tough compromises will
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before any talks can make progress.
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The negotiating process has been complicated by
multiple--some uncoordinated--diplomatic efforts since
mid-April. Mauritanian Prime Minister Bousseif has
visited Tripoli, Paris, Madrid, and Rabat for official
talks and contacted Polisario spokesmen in the latter
two capitals. A high-level Algerian mission visited
Mauritania quietly in late April, and an OAU subcom-
mittee has visited the principals in the dispute. Saudi
Crown Prince Fahd may also have been involved in talks
ese an other taikS may make little headway, however;
only Mauritania has so far demonstrated genuine flexi-
bility. Procedural issues, such as Polisario participa-
tion in any all-party conference, along with the main
substantive one--Morocco's professed unwillingness to
make territorial concessions--argue against a quick solu-
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NEPAL: King Acts to Reduce Tension
Last week, disregarding the advice of hardline
advisers, Birendra began making concessions designed to
encourage demonstrators to negotiate their grievances.
He removed the Minister of Education and named a commis-
sion to study student grievances and to inquire into
police handling of earlier violent clashes. Student
demonstrations--some drawing thousands of participants--
nevertheless continued this week, although they were non-
violent because police did not intervene.
On Wednesday, the indecisive young King, perhaps
bowing to pressure from hardliners, agreed to the arrest
of those students who continued to participate in dis-
orders. Although the government softened its new ap-
proach by releasing detained students to their guardians,
such arrests could lead once again to violence between
demonstrators and police.
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GAZA STRIP: Mayor Shawwa's Views
In a series of recent interviews, Mayor Rashad
Shawwa of Gaza City has reiterated his support for the
Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole, legiti-
mate spokesman for the Palestinians. Shawwa, the most
influential politician in Gaza, criticized the coming
autonomy negotiations because they deny the possibility
of establishing an independent Palestinian state. None-
theless, he also expressed interest in meeting with
Egyptian President Sadat to discuss the autonomy talks.
Shawwa is visiting Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon and plans
to discuss the negotiations with PLO leader Yasir Arafat.
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USSR-JAPAN: Firyubin Visit
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin will arrive
in Japan on Sunday for two days of talks with Japanese
officials on a broad range of international and regional
issues. The USSR and Japan agreed last year to hold
periodic general consultations at the foreign ministry
level, but Soviet pique over the rapid development of
Sino-Japanese relations caused the USSR to delay them
until now. An appearance of improved relations with
Tokyo would bolster Moscow's overall diplomatic posture
on the eve of the summit with the US and also help the
Soviets gird for possible talks with China. There is no
evidence that either the USSR or Japan has altered its
stance on the Northern Territories issue that has lonq
prevented major progress in bilateral relations.
CHINA: Interest in Rocket Engines
A Chinese delegation interested in space technology
recently visited the US and paid particular attention
in engines rated for manned missions. The visitors fo-
cused on problems of reliability and endurance in engine
components. Delegation leader Zhuang Fenggan said the
Chinese plan to undertake manned space missions, but he
did not say when or indicate how much effort China is
giving to such a project. The Chinese interest in en-
gines probably reflects the problems China has in devel-
oping reliable rocket engines.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Dissident's Sentence Extended
A Czechoslovak appeals court has ruled that dissi-
dent leader Jaroslav Sabata, now completing a nine-month
sentence for insulting a public official, must serve an
additional 18 months in prison because of a previous con-
viction. Sabata, a spokesman for the Charter 77 human
rights movement, was arrested last October when he at-
tempted to meet with Polish dissidents. The government
had suspended a portion of the earlier sentence, and the
court's decision to reimpose it, which was not unexpected,
indicates that the Husak regime will continue to take a
hard line against active dissidents who, like Sabata,
refuse to emigrate. Official harassment has so far
failed to deter Charter leaders from continuing their
low-key activities, which include circulation of samizdat
documents and contact with dissidents elsewhere in
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ECUADOR: Roldos and the "Force for Change"
The inauguration of populist Leader Jaime RoZdos as
Ecuador's president on .10 August will end seven years of
military rule. RoZdos, who campaigned with the slogan
"a force for change," scored a Landslide victory in the
election on 29 April. His first task will be to form a
parliamentary majority--either by achieving a working ar-
rangement with the fractious head of his party, Assad
Bucaram, or by neutralizing him. RoZdos' efforts to form
a viable government will be made easier by his own consid-
erable political skiZZ, an unequivocal popular mandate,
and by the support of a new military Leadership that is 25X1
to be named sometime this summer. Changes in government
policies are likely to be gradual and much Less pervasive
than Roldos indicated during the campaign.
Unofficial returns show that Roldos, who received
62 percent of the vote, ran up substantial majorities
not only in the coastal provinces, which are his political
base, but also in the normally conservative highlands.
All income groups supported him strongly. His opponent,
center-right candidate Sixto Duran-Ballen, received only
28 percent of the vote and carried just one province, a
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Roldos identified himself in the intial round last
summer as the antiestablishment candidate. Duran-Ballen
was never able to shake off the widespread belief that he
was backed by both the ruling military and entrenched
monied interests. His unsuccessful attempts to charac-
terize Roldos and running mate Oswaldo Hurtado as dan-
gerous radicals only served to reinforce that impression
among an electorate anxious for change. 25X1
In the legislative races, the Liberals and Conserv-
atives--two parties whose leaders had become identified
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with the oligarchy and the status quo--were the big losers.
Both failed to get 10 percent of the vote. Assembly re-
turns are still incomplete, but Roldos' Concentration of
Popular Forces seems to have won some 29 seats in the 69-
member assembly, and the Democratic Left--which is ex-
pected to support much of the President's program- - ay
have garnered 16.
//Roldos' parliamentary majority, however, is more ap-
parent than real. The election list for the Concentra-
tion of Popular Forces was dictated by party patriarch
Assad Bucaram who commands the loyalty of a large number
of the newly elected delegates. Bucaram, who was pre-
vented by the country's military leaders from running in
the first round of the presidential election last year,
intends to build his own parliamentary power base and
hopes to be named president of the assembly. His strained
relationship with other parties makes election to that
office unlikely without strong presidential support.
Roldos may have to accede to Bucaram's wishes in order
to obtain the votes necessary to confirm his cabinet ap-
pointees and gain passage of key legislation.
//Roldos might, however, try to exploit his overwhelm-
ing election victory and attempt to replace Bucaram as
party leader. Roldos is anxious to demonstrate his inde-
pendence of the party chief and plans to name a national
unity government of his own choosing. He may decide that
Bucaram's neutralization at the outset would avoid seri-
ous problems later.//
Bringing stable and effective civilian government
to a country with Ecuador's history of coups and authori-
tarian rule will not be easy. Roldos' first-round victory
last summer stunned the military and created considerable
unease in the oligarchy because of his populist ideology
and long association with Bucaram. Roldos' reassurances
to both groups culminated in a decision by a council of
generals last September to allow the election process to
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Roldos, knowing that his cabinet appointments will
be closely scrutinized, will probably name mostly well-
known moderates and technocrats to increase confidence
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in his administration. Ecuador's present strong economic
performance and lucrative investment opportunities prob-
ably will discourage any large-scale flight of capital.
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Neither Roldos nor Vice President-elect Hurtado has
any appreciable administrative experience, but both are
able political operators. They are young, bright, artic-
ulate, and personally attractive and can be expected to
make the most of their opportunities. Significant changes
in the military hierarchy in the next few months because
of retirements should provide them with a younger and more
compatible leadership to deal with in the armed forces.
Barring any national crisis, the military--which is gen-
uinely weary of governing--could grant them an extended
political honeymoon.
Despite Roldos' campaign promise to bring "social
justice" to Ecuador, traditional political and economic
attitudes probably will remain much too strong for him
to effect any major social transformation during his five-
year term. He does appear committed to rooting out cor-
ruption in the governmental bureaucracy, including those
officials who allow the illicit drug traffic to flourish.
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Roldos is a realist and a pragmatist. He will make
some effort to achieve a better income distribution through
fiscal and budgetary shifts. Although he will emphasize
tax collection, he probably will not drastically revise
the tax code. A substantial increase in public housing
in the urban slums seems certain. Land reform probably
will not go beyond the present agrarian law that calls
for redistributing fallow land. The government will also
provide a better atmosphere for foreign investment, which
Roldos sees as necessary for continued economic develop-
ment.
Ecuador's experiment with constitutional government
will be closely watched by other countries of the hem
sphere that are contemplating similar transitions.
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