NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031400020001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 2, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
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Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
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Contents
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Iran: Assassination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 25X1
Namibia: South African Troop Movements . . . . 3
Jamaica: Manley Moves Further Left .
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USSR: Improved Trade Outlook. . . . . . . . . . 7
Egypt: Criticism of Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . 8
Special Analysis
UK: The General Election. . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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The backlash against the Iranian Islamic Revolution
may have entered a new phase last night with the assassi-
nation in Tehran of Ayatollah Morteza Motahari, a member
of Ayatollah Khomeini's immediate entourage. The govern-
ment will see the killing as part of a plot and is likely
to react strongly, but we cannot predict which groups
25X1 will be its target.
A spokesman for the Forghan Group, which claimed
credit last week for killing former armed forces Chief of
Staff Qarani because of his tough attitude toward Kurdish
dissidents, said the group had also killed Motahari. He
asserted that Motahari had been the head of the Islamic
Revolutionary Council--whose membership has never been
revealed--that is responsible for Iran's "parallel gov-
25X1 ernment."
//Motahari may, however, have been the victim of
leftists, rightists, or the group of relatives of executed
former officials which reportedly has been killing members
of Khomeini's Revolutionary Guard on night patrols in ur-
25X1 ban areas.//
Motahari was the most respected modern theorist
among the Iranian Shia Muslim clergy. His influence with
Khomeini probably was based on an ability to combine his
traditional Islamic tenets with leftist concepts of a
modern secular Iranian philosopher who had strongly in-
25X1 fluenced the anti-Shah movement.
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NAMIBIA: South African Troop Movements
//An unusually high number of South African military
movements to the Namibian-Angolan border area apparently
took place Late Last month. Large convoys of armored
and transport vehicles carrying men and supplies were
seen traveling north through Windhoek
//South Africa may be augmenting its forces in Nami-
bia, or it may
only be replacing personnel who have finished their tours
of duty. If the South Africans are augmenting their
forces, they may be anticipating increased guerrilla
activity, or preparing to attack guerrilla bases of the
South-West Africa People's Organization in southern An-
gola and southwestern Zambia.//
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//We have no indication that the South African Govern-
ment is planning further cross-border strikes, but Prime
Minister Botha recently asserted that South Africa will
again respond forcibly to any significant increase in
guerrilla infiltrations from Angola or Zambia. The
South Africans no doubt hope that a discernible buildup
of their forces in frontier areas will not only deter
SWAPO infiltrations but will also strengthen South
Africa's influence on the Namibian political groups that
oppose SWAPO.// 25X1
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JAMAICA: Manley Moves Further Left
//Prime Minister Manley is continuing to move Jamaica
closer to the USSR and Cuba, despite his apparent dis-
appointment over the meager results of his five-day visit
to the USSR Last month. Manley--whose local political
stock is now at its Lowest point since he came to power--
is intent on shoring up his relations with Jamaican radi-
cals who have become increasingly critical of his Leader-
ship. While the shift in policy will probably rally the
Left, it will further alienate the moderate groups that
are needed to restore Jamaica's faltering economy.//
//Publicly, Manley has called his visit last month
a major breakthrough in Soviet-Jamaican relations, but
few Jamaicans believe him. The chief outcome was an agree-
ment for the sale of Jamaican alumina that even Manley's
wife has reportedly conceded will not yield significant
foreign exchange for Jamaica.// 25X1
//The Prime Minister, nevertheless, has continued to
bring his country closer in line with Cuba and the USSR.
A Jamaican-Cuban communique issued on 21 April backs So-
viet-Cuban positions on Puerto Rican independence, the 25X1
Camp David agreements, the US Naval Base at Guantanamo
Bay, and the recent actions of the Chinese in Asia.
Manley will probably succeed in regaining lost
ground with Jamaican leftists. Although some leading
radicals were said to be disappointed in Manley's per-
formance in the USSR, the Jamaican-Cuban communique has
undoubtedly eased their concern. Manley's ideological 25X1
shift, however, has worsened his already tense relations
with Jamaica's moderate majority and greatly decreased
chances of economic recovery under his government.
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USSR: Improved Trade Outlook
Preliminary data indicate that the USSR registered
a $3.3 billion hard currency trade deficit in 1978, up
slightly from the $3.1 billion deficit of 1977. Large
gold sales, however, enabled the USSR to achieve a sur-
plus of roughly $750 million in its current account.
Barring a poor harvest, the Soviets may be able to elimi-
nate their trade deficit this year and show a current
account surplus for the third consecutive year as higher
oil prices more than offset a probable decline in the
volume of oil shipments to the West.
Imports, which increased 12 percent in dollar value
last year, were led by increased grain purchases of 21
million tons costing $2.3 billion. Imports of large-
diameter pipe and other steel products grew about 15 to
20 percent in value. According to data from Western sup-
pliers, equipment imports apparently were close to 1977
levels.
The value of exports rose 14 percent, mostly on
the strength of higher prices for raw materials. Oil
exports were estimated at the 1977 volume of 1.1 million
barrels per day. With prices about the same, oil revenue
probably approximated the $5.6 billion earned in 1977
when oil accounted for nearly half of hard currency ex-
ports. Gas revenues probably rose substantially. Sales
of chemicals, particularly to West Germany, increased
markedly.
The USSR's hard currency trade may be in balance
this year. Imports are-likely to decline and export
earnings to increase--largely in the energy field. Re-
cent oil price hikes will allow the Soviets to increase
revenues even with a slight drop in volume. Despite the
prospect of reduced gold sales, increased earnings from
arms sales, tourism, and shipping--along with the im-
proved trade balance--should result in a current account
surplus and rmit the USSR reduce further its debt to
the West.
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25X1 land the Saudi severance of diplomatic rela-
tions on 23 April. Egypt now has diplomatic relations
with only three members of the Arab League--Oman, Sudan,
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EGYPT: Criticism of Saudi Arabia
President Sadat's harsh public attack on Saudi Arabia
yesterday reflects his growing irritation over recent
anti-Egyptian actions by his former ally. During his May
Day speech, Sadat described Saudi behavior as "shameful"
and accused the Saudis of encouraging or paying other
Arab states to break diplomatic relations with Egypt.
Sadat probably believes that the Saudis have gone further
than necessary in support of the anti-Egyptian sanctions
being implemented by the Arab states. Recent irritants
have included adverse Saudi press coverage on Egypt
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UK: The General Election
//The general election tomorrow is being advertised
by both Conservative and Labor Party leaders as the
first one in many years that will give Britons "a real
choice." Although some of this is campaign rhetoric,
British voters will in fact be able to choose between
two different philosophies of government. The outcome
will turn primarily on the issues, but perceptions of how
Labor Party leader James Callaghan and Conservative Party
leader Margaret Thatcher would perform as Prime Minister
may be more important than usual. The winner will have
to grapple with a rising inflation rate, recalcitrant
trade unions, the troublesome EC connection, and several
major defense decisions.//
//Support--and votes--for the parties will depend
less than in the past on loyalty to party stemming from
class or other traditional ties. Neither the Conserva-
tives nor Labor can any longer assume that most sympa-
thizers will vote automatically for them. In the two
general elections in 1974, more voters than at any time
in many years exercised the option of the protest vote.//
//The healthy lead given the Conservatives in early
public opinion polls has steadily narrowed, and some
polls in the closing days of the campaign suggest that
the results could be very close. When the dust settles,
Britain could again find itself with a minority govern-
ment.//
//The chances that either party can achieve a major-
ity will depend on the size of the vote for the small
parties, and, more importantly, on how the two major par-
ties do in almost 100 key marginal constituencies. A
uniform swing in the vote to the Conservatives of only
4 to 6 percent, compared with October 1974, would give
them a comfortable majority.//
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//A new Labor government would continue many of its
domestic and foreign policies, but Callaghan might be
freer to move more boldly on several important issues--
_provided he is able to form a majority government. His
first task would be to tackle the country's main economic
problems--risilation, unemployment, and a sluggish
economy.//
//Callaghan would try to work out agreements on an
incomes policy and wage restraints as weapons against
inflation based on the "concordat" drawn up between
union leaders and the government several months -ago.
Callaghan is aware, however, that agreements with union
leaders may not have the backing of the rank and file
and may not prevent crippling labor actions. Although
he would move slowly, Callaghan probably would eventually
introduce legislation to curb union abuses and to enforce
an incomes policy.//
//Although the issue of Scottish devolution was in-
strumental in bringing down his government, Callaghan
probably would not suggest any new initiatives for that
region. On Northern Ireland, he probably would review
efforts to find a compromise on power sharing, but he
would need a strong majority government not dependent
on the Ulster Unionists before he could proceed with
any new initiatives.//
//On defense issues, Callaghan would have to take into
account the opposition of Labor's left wing to a continu-
ation of the country's nuclear role as the government
faces a decision--due within the next year--on a nuclear
successor weapon to the Polaris. Callaghan would look
for approval of SALT II and progress on SALT III to help
bring the left wing along.//
//Callaghan would expect to maintain his working
relationship with US officials and West European leaders,
especially West German Chancellor Schmidt, a fellow
Social Democrat. Opposition to EC membership from impor-
tant elements of the Labor Party, combined with wide-
spread popular skepticism about the value of membership,
would make Callaghan move carefully to protect the UK's
interests; he would bring Britain into the European
Monetary System only if convinced such a move would im-
prove the economy.//
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//Callaghan's other important foreign policy concern,
at least in the near term, would be how to react to the
outcome of the recent election in Rhodesia. He would
want to try to stay in step with the US administration,
but would be hard pressed to do so if Congress were to
remove economic sanctions.//
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If the Conservatives Win
//Thatcher would primarily appoint party moderates to
her cabinet and would retain her close rightwing advis-
ers. She would listen to both groups before reaching a
decision. Like Callaghan, she would quickly have to
address the country's economic problems. To curb infla-
tion, the Tories would tighten the money supply and re-
strain government subsidies. To stimulate economic growth,
they would cut income taxes and use some oil revenues for
industrial modernization.// F -1 25X1
//Thatcher would not act hastily with the trade uni-
ons. She would have to dispel the belief that a Tory
government would engage in "union-bashing." She would
attempt--through party moderates--to cooperate with union
leaders. She is convinced, however, of the need for change
in union practices and would introduce legislation to
limit or outlaw secondary picketing, ban strikes in a few
essential public services, and provide government financing
for secret balloting in strike votes and union elections.
Thatcher favors free collective bargaining, but a Con-
servative government probably would have to introduce
some type of wage controls when the new round of contract
negotiations begins in the fall.// 25X1
//On regional issues, the Tories did not favor Scot-
tish devolution and, although they have promised to exa-
mine the question of "regionalism" countrywide, there
would probably not be any concrete moves toward devolu-
tion. On Northern Ireland, Thatcher and her advisers sup-
port the link between Ulster and the rest of the UK as
long as a majority in the province favors it. Consequently,
Ulster Catholics and the government in Dublin see the
Conservatives as too strongly linked to the Protestant
cause, and progress toward a settlement could be even
more difficult than under Labor.// F_ I 25X1
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//The Conservatives are not convinced that detente
is working to the West's advantage and fear that dangerous
concessions have been and will continue to be made to
the Soviets in arms control negotiations. Thatcher
would not try to undermine SALT II, but she would want
to be consulted extensively in advance on SALT III. She
would watch carefully to ensure that none of the arms
control negotiations reduce Britain's future defense
options--including a nuclear follow-on--or damage the
West's capabilities. The Tories would try to allocate
more funds for defense but, as other British governments
have discovered, economic constraints would preclude
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//The Tories have long favored closer ties with
Europe than does Labor. Thatcher would try to strengthen
the connection, but initially she would have some diffi-
culty in establishing close relationships with the other
European leaders. She would be no less protective of
Britain's agricultural, fishing, and financial interests
than would a Labor government. A Tory government prob-
ably would be more positive than Labor on participation
in the European Monetary System, but it too would have
to be convinced that joining would serve British inter-
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//Outside Europe, Tory foreign policy would be col-
ored by an overriding concern about the spread of Soviet
power and influence. Almost every issue is seen at least
partially in this light: China, SALT, the Middle East,
southern Africa, as well as relations with the US.//
//The Tory leader probably would not immediately
change the present British policy toward Rhodesia.
Thatcher, like Callaghan, would not want to make any
moves, at least initially, that would damage the Anglo-
American cooperation. She would be under considerable
pressure from within the party, however, to recognize
the internal settlement and lift economic sanctions. A
change would be possible in November when the sanctions
come up for renewal, but it could come sooner.//
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Top Secret
Top Secret
Apprq
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