NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031300210001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 25, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

gat" Director of
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intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
25 April 1979
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Briefs and Comments
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Iran: New Foreign Minister. . . . . . . . . . . 1
Lebanon: Rising Tensions. . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Rhodesia: Election Results. . . . . . . . . . . 3
Spain: Left's Control of Local Politics . . . . 4
Turkey: Martial Lab) Issue . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Uganda: New Government's Progress . . . . . . . 6
Argentina: Arrest of Labor Leaders. . . . . . . 7
Ethiopia-USSR: Aid Protocol . . . . . . . . . . 7
Algeria-Mauritania: High-Level Visit. . . . . . 8
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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS
IRAN: New Foreign Minister
Ebrahim Yazdi, appointed yesterday as Foreign minis-
ter, seems likely to provide more direction to Iran's
new "Islamic" foreign policy. Yazdi has resigned his
post as Deputy Prime Minister for Revolutionary Affairs,
but it is not clear yet whether he no longer has responsi-
bility for supervising revolutionary committees and form-
ing a new national guard. F_ I 25X1
//Yazdi enjoys the confidence of Ayatollah Khomeini
and is likely to move aggressively to reorganize the
Foreign Ministry.
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Like other leaders of the revolution, Yazdi believes
that the Islamic uprising in Iran should set an example
for the rest of the Muslim world, but he has emphasized 25X1
that he does not favor exporting revolution to other
countries. He is strongly opposed to Israel and is pro-
Palestinian and can be expected to push hard for Pales-
tinian rights.
//Yazdi spent 16 of the past 18 years in the US and
has US citizenship. He has been considered pro-American
by his US friends, but he now seems suspicious of US in-
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tentions and motivations toward Iran.//
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LEBANON: Rising Tensions
A series of recent developments has increased ten-
sions throughout Lebanon and set back prospects for an
understanding between the Syrians and major Maronite
Christian groups that would permit political reconstruc-
tion to move forward.
Relations between the Syrians and the two largest
Christian groups--the Phalange Party and the National
Liberal Party--have deteriorated since last week when
Major Haddad, the Christian militia leader in southern
Lebanon, proclaimed a "Free Lebanon" in the Christian-
controlled enclave along the Israeli. border. In a state-
ment issued on Monday, the two Christian parties justi-
fied the declaration as the "natural result" of the
Syrian and Palestinian "occupation" of Lebanon.
In northern Lebanon, the leaders of the Phalangist
and National Liberal Party militias have publicly threat-
ened to take action against the pro-Syrian Christian fac-
tion of former President Sulayman Franjiyah in retalia-
tion for attacks by Franjiyah's forces on members of the
Phalange last weekend. If the Phalangists move against
Franjiyah's militia--as is likely--Syrian troops may be
The tense situation is further complicated by con-
tinuing clashes between the Palestinians and Israelis.
The Israelis yesterday attacked Palestinian camps and
positions in southern Lebanon for the third straight day
with airstrikes and artillery. Israeli patrol boats
also exchanged fire with Palestinian shore batteries.
The escalating exchanges could culminate in a more con-
ce
rted Israeli military action in southern Lebanon.
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RHODESIA: Election Results
The transitional government's success in getting
over half of Rhodesia's eligible voters to the polls
will strengthen the government's case in seeking inter-
national recognition and a lifting of sanctions. We
have no reports of any significant electoral irregulari-
ties, and there was no appreciable increase in guerrilla
activity during the five-day election period Zast week.
Bishop Muzorewa won an impressive victory; his
party gained 51 seats--an absolute majority--in the new
parliament. Although the Bishop is being hailed as the
new prime minister, officially that office will not be
filled until late May or early June when a prime minis-
ter will be appointed by a president elected by the new
parliament. Reverend Sithole, whose party won only 12
seats, has charged "gross irregularities" in the elec-
tion and has demanded an investigation, although his
charges probably will not be substantiated by the inves-
tigation for which Sithole has called. Sithole and Chief
Ndiweni, whose Ndebele-based party won nine seats, both
should be assured cabinet posts. Chief Chirau, consid-
ered by many a stooge of the whites, did not win a seat.
Guerrilla operations during the election apparently
were limited to attacking scattered polling places, lay-
ing land mines that caused a number of civilian casual-
ties, and forcing black civilians in several rural areas
into the countryside to prevent them from voting. Fail-
ure to disrupt the election can be attributed in large
part to recent, extensive Rhodesian raids on guerrilla
camps in neighboring states and the security provided by
the estimated 85,000 security force personnel, reservists,
and black auxiliaries the government mobilized for the
election.
Rhodesian claims that 63.9 percent of the voting
population went to the polls are somewhat inflated be-
cause they are based on an estimated black electorate
of only 2.8 million. Nevertheless, even assuming the
highest estimate of 3.5 million ell ible black voters,
the turnout was over 50 percent. 25X1
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SPAIN: Left's Control of Local Politics
Collaboration between the Socialist and Communist
Parties at the local ZeveZ threatens to polarize Spanish
politics, with the left holding the reins of power in the
major cities and most provincial capitals and the Center
Democrats in charge at the national level. Concern is
growing in the government and on the right that the left's
unity could carry over into the national arena.
A formal pact between the Socialists and Communists
enabled the left to capture the municipal administrations
representing well over half of the population, including
almost all principal urban areas. In Madrid, for example,
the Socialist-Communist pact gave the mayoralty and all
other administrative positions to the left even though
the Center Democrats edged out the Socialists in total
Although a Socialist spokesman has sought to counter
criticism by pointing out that the pact involved no com-
mon program and was open to other leftist parties--and
particularly to regional groupings--the Center Democrats
are emphasizing that voters were not told in advance of
the agreement.
The national government still has a weapon at its
disposal. Parliament will soon take up the revision of
laws allocating power to the municipalities, and in the
legislature the Center Democrats--only eight seats short
of a majority--will have the dominant voice. The govern-
ment may attempt to strike a bargain by offering revi-
sions that would enhance the powers of the local govern-
ments in return for Socialist collaboration on a number
of other pressing problems such as regional autonomy,
economic planning, and labor reforms. The Socialists,
whose link to the Communists is also evident in growing
cooperation in the labor field, may want to keep open
some lines to the government.
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TURKEY: Martial Law Issue
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The Turkish Government yesterday asked parliament
to extend martial Law for another two months and add six
more provinces to the 13 currently covered. To a large'
extent, Premier Ecevit's move reflects political neces-
sity. Pressures from more conservative cabinet ministers
and the military's concern about Kurdish separatism out-
weigh the influence of leftists who supported Ecevit's
past efforts to Limit martial Law. The joint vote in
the houses of parliament tomorrow on this recommendation
will be extremely close, since the opposition is united
against the government and Ecevit's Kurdish and Leftist
supporters may abstain in protest. 25X1
In justifying the government's decision, Ecevit
alluded yesterday to the steady level of violence and to
the Kurdish separatist threat. While there have been
isolated incidents between Kurds and security forces in
the six eastern provinces that would be placed under
martial law, public violence has been more evident in
other provinces--including those already under martial
law. Many observers had expected that Izmir Province,
a leftist stronghold in western Turkey, would be placed
under martial law because of the upsurge there in violent
incidents and the assassination of a US serviceman. Ece-
vit's exclusion of Izmir is probably a concession to his
party's left wing. 25X1
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UGANDA: New Government's Progress
The new government appears somewhat unsure of itself
as it moves cautiously toward restoring Uganda to the rel-
ative prosperity and respect it enjoyed in the 1960s. The
administration is appealing to its citizens to resume nor-
mal daily activity, taking steps to expand civil rights.
and awaiting outside aid to revive the economy.
Some military activity is continuing, but the
Tanzanian Army--the only effective military force in
Uganda--is unlikely to encounter much organized resistance
from pro-Amin forces as it moves deeper into the country.
The new government does not control some 150 kilometers
of the vital road from Jinja to the Kenyan border, or
the less populous and less productive northern two-thirds
of the country. Damage from fighting and looting is
probably concentrated in the main cities.
President Lule is permitting the disparate members
of his cabinet to make their own pronouncements on issues
of special concern to them. Officials probably are being
appointed without coordination, and probably numerous po-
litical fiefdoms are being built. Neighborhood spokesmen
were chosen in open assemblies last weekend in the Kampala
area in a rudimentary election billed as a forerunner of
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Close African allies of Tanzania and British Common-
wealth countries have led a trend toward diplomatic rec-
ognition of the new government, though many African coun-
tries are reluctant to endorse a change of government made
possible by outside military force in violation of a major
principle of the organization of African Unity. Lule and
25X1 his associates are actively seeking support from Western
states and international organizations. There is no evi-
dence, however, of approaches to or by Communist countries.
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Kenya, which controls Uganda's lifelines, appears to
be overcoming its initial mistrust and has accepted a
visit from Foreign Minister Alimadi. Bilateral issues--
debt settlements and credit arrangements, treatment of
anti-Amin exiles and pro-Amin refugees, and extradition
25X1 and punishment of Amin's henchmen--are the issues likely
to dominate Uganda's relations with Kenya and most other
African countries for the next few years.
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ARGENTINA: Arrest of Labor Leaders
The government arrested 20 of Argentina's top labor
leaders on Monday after they appealed to workers to ob-
serve a national "day of protest" on Friday against
government economic policies. The planned action, the
most significant labor challenge to the military regime
since it seized power in March 1976, is also intended
to protest proposed government revisions of labor and
social welfare legislation, which the unions see as an
attempt to destroy their traditional political and eco-
nomic power. In addition, workers are disturbed over a
continuing ban on union activities and the arrest in re-
cent months of labor leaders without formal charges.
The government apparently hopes to head off serious labor
unrest through arrests and selective wage increases.
Friday's planned strike will provide a major test of that
policy.
ETHIOPIA-USSR: Aid Protocol
//Under a protocol signed in Addis Ababa on 14
April, Moscow has allocated to specific projects some of
the $90 million of unused credits extended to Ethiopia as
part of an aid agreement concluded 20 years ago. This
is the first formal allocation of Soviet economic aid to
Ethiopia since Chairman Mengistu visited Moscow last No-
vember. The new protocol provides for two grain silos
and a number of warehouses, agricultural machinery repair
shops, cold storage plants, and related facilities. Al-
though Mengistu is said to expect more than $2 billion
in new Soviet aid, there is no hard evidence that the
Soviets plan to offer large new amounts when the first
Soviet-Ethiopian economic commission meets later this
spring.//
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ALGERIA-MAURITANIA: High-Level Visit
Press reports from Mauritania indicate a high-level
Algerian delegation--including two Army officers--visited
Nouakchott briefly early this week for private talks with
Mauritanian Prime Minister Bouceif. The unusual visit--
diplomatic relations between Algeria and Mauritania have
been broken since 1976 because of the dispute over West-
ern Sahara--suggests an Algerian effort to arrange a
deal, at Morocco's expense, between the Mauritanians and
the West Saharan nationalists of the Algerian-backed
Polisario Front. Nouakchott would welcome restoration of
ties with Algiers--a prospect reportedly raised by the
Algerian delegation--but Bouceif has said publicly that
Mauritania will not conclude a West Saharan peace agree-
ment without Morocco. One press account nonetheless
speculated that a Mauritanian delegation would soon meet
Polisario representatives in an unspecified African cap-
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