NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031300200001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 24, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of Top Secret
o tPdr Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO313002
DIA review(s)
completed.
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
24 April 1979
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Angola-Zaire: Reopening the Benguela
Railroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
France-Africa: Franco--African Conference . . . 3
Turkey: Resignations from Ecevit's
Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Afghanistan: Abortive Army Uprising . . . . . 5
Lebanon: Attacks on Phalangists . . . . . . . 7
China: Slow Growth in Industrial Output . . . 7
France-Poland-USSR: Using US Technology . . . 8
Special Analysis
Kampuchea: Economic Wasteland . . . . . . . . 9
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ANGOLA-ZAIRE: Reopening the Benguela Railroad
Zaire is reported to have sent manganese via Angola's
Benguela Railroad--the first such shipment since 1975--to
the Angolan port city of Lobito. The shipment was made
to test the security of the route against attacks in
Angola by insurgents of the National Union for the Total
25X1 Independence of Angola.
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part of the consignment that departed aire s RnaDa Re-
gion on 2 April reached its destination. Some of the
railroad cars apparently remain unaccounted for and may
have been derailed by UNITA insurgents. The Zairians are
nonetheless encouraged and plan to send more trains
carrying low-value manganese as soon as possible. High-
priced exports such as cobalt or copper will not be
risked, however, and Zaire is not now planning to use
25X1 the route for imports.
Because of the increasingly tenuous situation in
Rhodesia, restoration of the railroad could assume great
importance to Zaire's economically vital Shaba Region,
which now depends on the rail route through Rhodesia for
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Restoration of service will largely depend on in-
ternational economic assistance. The railroad lacks
spare parts, its roadbeds and rolling stock are in poor
condition, and there is a shortage of technicians. Pro-
spective donors, such as the EC, will be watchin the
security situation over the next few months.
We still believe that UNITA can damage the railroad
almost at will and that the insurgents will not allow
normal operations to resume. UNITA realizes its credi-
bility both with Angola and with the international com-
munity is largely determined by its continued ability to
keep the Benguela from operating effectively. F7 -1
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Foreign Ministers from France and several French-
speaking African countries meet in Rwanda today to pre-
pare for the summit conference next month of French
President Giscard and some 20 African Leaders. Although
the agenda is not yet established, both sessions are
likely to focus on economic and security matters. France,
which carefully orchestrates its annual sessions with
African rulers, will probably also attract leaders from
some countries that were Bel ian Portuguese, or British
colonies.
The talks are likely to focus on French aid to Afri-
can regional organizations and on Giscard's vaguely for-
mulated proposal for closer European-African-Arab co-
operation. Conservative West African leaders with close
ties to France will probably raise their concern about
the Soviet and Cuban role in Africa. Some may also ex-
press uneasiness about France's reliability in view of
its apparent decision to phase out its military involve-
ment in Chad. 25X1
The idea of a "special vocation" for France in
Africa is accepted by all French political factions, and
French Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet observed with
satisfaction recently that domestic critics of some as-
pects of France's African policy had fallen silent.
France views the coming summit as tacit recognition of
its leadership on the continent. It is anxious to ex-
pand its economic, commercial, and cultural influence
beyond the borders of its former colonies into areas
once dominated by the Belgians, Portuguese, and British.
The French appeal emphasizes cultural affinities, plays
down ideology, and tends to cater to local tastes for
showy infrastructure. In such a country as Rwanda, there-
fore, France is able to play a role out of proportion to
its material investment. 25X1
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TURKEY: Resignations From Ecevit's Party
The resignations yesterday of three deputies from
Prime Minister Ecevit's Republican People's Party further
jeopardizes his parliamentary majority. The deputies,
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only days before the parliament is scheduled to vote on
an extension--and possible expansion--of martial law.
The three deputies cited deteriorating public secu-
rity and lack of economic development in Kurdish areas,
but the martial law question probably was uppermost on
their minds. Private and public statements by independ-
ent ministers last week suggest that Ecevit has agreed
to expand martial law in return for their continued sup-
25X1 port.
Deputies from Kurdish provinces fear that the ex-
pansion of martial law to this area will further heighten
Turkish-Kurdish tensions. A harsh--and possibly indis-
criminate--attempt by the military to root out extremists
could lead to increased support among Kurds for Kurdish
nationalists or leftist provocateurs.
Ecevit has been able to offer enough compromises
and concessions to keep the deputies in line, but he may
now be hard pressed to strike a balance between those
who want and those who oppose an expansion of martial
law. The vote on martial law will be close, but it
probably will squeak through. In any case, it will not
be a vote of confidence and the opposition parties, al-
though eager to bring down the government, do not have
the votes to do so at present. The resignations could,
however, be followed by others as Ecevit attempts to
hold together a fractious cabinet and party. Thus, over
the longer run, his chances for survival are made even
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AFGHANISTAN: Abortive Army Uprising
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//A shootout between progovernment and antigovern-
ment troops at a military base near Jalalabad last Friday
signals another crack in the military's support for the
year-old Marxist regime in Afghanistan. Forces led by
rebel officers apparently were strong enough to resist
loyal armored units for several hours. They failed to
spark a general uprising in the garrison, however, prob-
ably in part because of the government's recent purges
of the military. the arrest
of officers suspected o disloyalty has seriously dis-
rupted opposition groups in Kabul and broken their ties
to similar antiregime military groups elsewhere in the
country. If unable to mount a coup, remaining dissident
officers may try assassinating party officials and their
Soviet advisers.//
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LEBANON: Attacks on Phalangists
//Tensions have escalated among Christian factions in
northern Lebanon following several attacks on Phalangists
by militiamen loyal to rival Maronite Christian leader
Sulayman Franjiyah on Sunday. The pro-Syrian Franjiyah 25X1
faction and the Phalange have clashed repeatedly since
Phalangist forces assassinated Franjiyah's son last June.
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CHINA: Slow Growth in Industrial Output
China's industrial output for the first quarter of
this year was only 5.6 percent higher than during the
comparable period last year. The strikingly low first-
quarter increase stems in part from a renewed emphasis
on quality over quantity. Factories reportedly are no
longer allowed to claim as output products that fail to
meet quality standards. The country's leaders recently
conceded that the economy is out of balance, and they
have been pushing wide-ranging reforms in industrial or-
ganization and have reordered investment priorities in
industry and agriculture. Officials are saying that two
to three more years of readjustment may be required for
the economy to recover from the decade of political tur-
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moil.
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FRANCE-POLAND-USSR: Using US Technology
A French laser sold in 1974 to a Polish research
institute run by the military is being used to support
Soviet efforts in laser fusion
is the first indication, however, that the French neody-
mium-glass laser, which uses US laser glass, is part of
the Soviet laser program. The French manufacturer of the
laser filed a statement with the US indicating Poland as
the end user of the device, so there has apparently been
no violation of technology-transfer agreements. Poland
also retains control of the laser. This is the onl sale
of a French laser to Poland of which we are aware.
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KAMPUCHEA: Economic Wasteland
//Kampucheans are facing difficult economic problems
no matter who governs them. The puppet government set
up by Vietnam and Zed by Heng Samrin has abolished the
harsh labor and population control measures of the former
Pol Pot regime but has been unable to revive agriculture,
industry, and commerce. In areas remaining under the
control of PoZ Pot's forces, strict economic regulations,
forced population movement, and general deprivation still
exist. The Khmer peasant in either case suffers from a
Zack of physical security, food, shelter, clothing, and
health care. The prospect is for continued refugee flows
into Thailand and there is a danger of localized famine.//
//The most serious problem facing the Heng Samrin gov-
ernment is providing sufficient food for both civilians
and the military. When Vietnam invaded last December,
the Kampuchean rice harvest was nearly completed. Output
had already been reduced because of serious flooding, pre-
vious military action along the Vietnam-Kampuchea border,
and the evacuations of major rice growing provinces
threatened by the Vietnamese since late 1977. The re-
treating Pol Pot forces removed much rice from local ci-
vilian storage de ots to secure base areas and destroyed
what was left.//
The food supply is unlikely to improve until August,
when the crop now being planted will be harvested. Many
key rice-growing provinces in the east are solidly under
Vietnamese control and security is being improved in the
rice-rich Battambang area. Nonetheless, the August har-
vest will be well below adequate subsistence levels be-
cause of difficulties in getting planting under way.
Seed is in short supply, fertilizer and draft animals are
scarce, and many rice fields are vulnerable.
//Khmer civilians and Vietnamese soldiers go daily
into the countryside to forage for abandoned, unharvested
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rice and other foodstuffs. Individualism is the key; no
coordinated mechanism for collection, storage, and dis-
tribution of food appears to exist. The Vietnamese Army
has not completely organized a village committee system,
let alone any higher governmental offices that will be
necessary for coordinating a national-level effort to
eliminate food shortages. Vietnamese soldiers in Kampu-
chea complain of reduced and inadequate rations and the
unpalatability of the thin rice gruel they often must
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//Refugees report that in areas controlled by Pol Pot's
forces life--and death--go on under the same harsh condi-
tions that existed before the Vietnamese invasion. To
prevent people and materials from coming under the con-
trol of the Heng Samrin government, the Pol Pot forces
continue to evacuate whole communes to remote bases, re-
move as many supplies as possible, and burn what cannot
be carried. The most able peasants, including teenagers,
are conscripted into the military; the remainder are
forced to cultivate whatever food they can. Food is no
doubt given first to military and party members; what is
left distributed communally in tightly rationed amounts.
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Material shortages are eroding support for the pup-
pet government. Historic ethnic animosities are strong
and the average Khmer has no use for Communism. Khmer,
who at first voted with their feet for the security of-
fered by the Vietnamese Army, expected life to be sub-
stantially better than under Pol Pot. Shortages of food,
clothing, and shelter have persisted, however, and the
Khmer distrust Vietnamese intentions and fear a future
under Hanoi's domination as much as they fear Pol Pot.
Unless the new regime can guarantee security for the
peasants and lay the groundwork for an effective system
of agricultural production, many Khmer will suffer from
malnutrition and disease.
Vietnam's own food problems prevent Hanoi from help-
ing to alleviate Kampuchea's shortages. Vietnam's chronic
grain deficit of 1.5 to 2 million tons worsened last year
in part because of the same flooding that affected Kam-
puchea. Production is also hampered by the withdrawal of
the Vietnamese military from agricultural development
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tasks to fight in Kampucha and along the Vietnam-China
border, and the tendency of Vietnamese farmers to produce
little beyond family subsistence levels because they have
little incentive to do otherwise. Grain imports, largely
from the USSR, offset most of Vietnam's rice production
shortfall but are insufficient to permit increases in do-
mestic food rations or diversion of rice to Kampuchea.
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//If serious deprivation persists, some peasants will
try to flee to Thailand. Thousands have already crossed
into Thailand, although Bangkok has returned many of them
to Kampuchea.// F_ I 25X1
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